VAKIL PRASAD SINGHversusSTATE OF BIHAR

                                  (2009] 1 S.C.R. 517


                              VAKIL PRASAD SINGH                            A
                                         v.
                                 STATE OF BIHAR
                         (Criminal Appeal No. 138 of 2009)
                                 JANUARY 23, 2009
                                                                            B
                         [D.K. JAIN AND R.M. LODHA, JJ.]

                 CONSTITUTION OF IND/A, 1950:

                   Article 21 - Right to speedy trial - HELD: Is an c
             inalienable rig(lt applicable not only to actual proceedings in
             court but also includes within its sweep the preceding police
             investigations as well - In the instant case, prosecution has
             failed to show any exceptional circumstance for condoning a
 ' ~'        callous and inordinate delay of more than 20 years in D
             investigation and the trial - In the circumstances, continuance
             of criminal proceedings against appellant is unwarranted -
             Proceedings quashed - Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973
             - s.482 - Penal Code, 1860 - ss. 161, 109, 120-B -
             Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 - s. 5(2).
                                                                             E
                  The appellant was an Assistant Engineer in the Bihar
             State Electricity Board. A complaint was lodged against
             him by a contractor for allegedly demanding Rs.1,000/- as
             illegal gratification. A trap was laid and the appellant was
             caught red handed. A charge-sheet was filed on 28.2.1982 F
             against the appellant for commission of offences
             punishable u/ss 161, 109, 120-B IPC and s.5(2) of the
             Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947. The Magistrate took
             cognizance on 9.12.1982. The appellant filed a petition u/
.,           s 482 CrPC before the High Court contending that the G
     ...     Inspector of Police who had conducted the investigation
             had no jurisdiction to do so. The High Court by its order
             dated 7.12.1990 quashed the order of Magistrate taking
           - cognizance, with a direction to get the investigation
                                             517                             H
     518        SUPREME COURT REPORTS              [2009] 1 S.C.R.
                                                                      ..
A completed by the appropriate officer, within three
  months, but to no avail. In the year 1998 the appellant
  filed another petition uls 482 CrPC for quashing of the
  proceedings pending against him in Special Case No. 29
  of 1987 before the Special Judge. During the pendency
B of the petition, the investigation was completed and a
  fresh charge-sheet was filed on 1.5.2007. On 9.7.2007, the
  High Court dismissed the appellant's petition.

      In the instant appeal, it was contended for the
  appellant that though a period of about 28 years since the
C registration of the case against him had elapsed, the trial
  did not commence and the appellant was deprived of his
  constitutional right of speedy investigation and trial
  flowing from Article 21 of the Constitution.

D.         Allowing the appeal, the Court

         HELD: 1.1. Time and again this Court has
    emphasized the need for speedy investigations and trial
    as both are mandated by the letter and spirit of the
. E provisions of the Cr.P.C. (in particular, Sections 197, 173,
    309, 437 (6) and 468 etc.) and the constitutional protection
    enshrined in Article 21 of the Constitution. It is well settled
    that the right to speedy trial in all criminal prosecutions
    is an inalienable right under Article 21. This right is
    applicable not only to the actual proceedings in court but
  F also includes within its sweep the preceding police
    investigations as well. [Para 12 and 15] [524-E-F; 528-B]

      P. Ramachandra Rao v. State of Karnataka (2002) 4
  SCC 578; Abdul Rehman Antulay & Ors. v. R.S. Nayak & Anr.
G (1992) 1 SCC 225; Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India & Anr.
  (1978) 1 SCC 248; Hussainara Khatoon & Ors. v. Home
  Secretary, State of Bihar (1980) 1 SCC 81; State of Haryana
  & Ors. v. Bhajan Lal & Ors. 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335; Janata
  Dal v. H.S. Chowdhary & Ors. (1992) 4 SCC 305 and
H Kurukshetra University & Anr. v. State of Haryana & Anr.
                  VAKIL PRASAD SINGH v. STATE OF BIHAR                 519


--   -'"    (1977) 4 sec 451, relied on.

                "Common Cause" A Registered Society v. Union of India
                                                                             A


            (UOI) & Ors. (1996) 4 SCC 33; "Common Cause", A
            Registered Society v. Union of India & Ors. (1996) 6 SCC 775;
            Raj Deo Sharma v. State of Bihar 1998) 7 SCC 507 and Raj
                                                                             B
            Deo Sharma II v. State of Bihar (1999) 7 SCC 604, referred
            to.
     +           1.2. In the instant case, the prosecution has failed to
            show any exceptional circumstance which could possibly
            be taken into consideration for condoning a callous and c
            inordinate delay of more than two decades in
            investigations and the trial. The said delay cannot, in any
            way, be said to be arising from any default on the part of
            the appellant. It is also pertinent to note that even till date,
     ~
            it is not clear whether sanction for prosecuting the D
            appellant is required and if so, whether it has been
            granted or not. Thus, on facts of the case, the stated
            delay clearly violates the constitutional guarantee of
            speedy investigation and trial under Article 21 of the
            Constitution. Under the circumstances, further E
            continuance o( criminal proce~dings pending against the
            appellant in the court of Special Judge, Muzaffarpur is
            unwarranted and, despite the fact that allegations against
      ),    him are quite serious, the proceedings pending against
            the appellant in Special Case No. 29 of 1987 are quashed. F
            [Para 16 and 17] (529-D-G]
                              Case Law Reference:
                (1977) 4 sec 451         relied on            para 9
                (1992) 4 sec 305         relied on            para 9         G
f
     ....       1992 Supp (1) SCC 335 relied on               para 9
                (1978) 1 sec 248         relied on            para 12
                (1980) 1 sec 81          relied on            para 12        H
    520        SUPREME COURT REPORTS              [2009) 1 S.C.R.


A         (1992) 1 sec 225        relied on             para 13       ~
                                                                              -
          (1996) 4 sec 33
                                                                              <
                                  referred to           para 14
          (1996) 6 sec 115        referred to           para.14
          1998) 1 sec 507         referred to           para 14
B
          (1999) 1 sec 604        referred to           para 14
        CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal
    No. 138 of 2009.
c       From the Judgment and Order dated 9. 7.2007 of the High
    Court of Judicature at Patna in Crl. Misc. No. 17513 of 1998.

        Akhilesh Kumar Pandey and Shalni Chandra for the
    Appellant.
D                                                                         >
          Manish Kumar and Gopal Singh for the Respondent.

          The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

          D.K. JAIN, J.1. Leave granted.
E
       2. Challenge in this appeal is to the order dated 9th July,
  2007 passed by the High Court of Judicature at Patna in
  Criminal Miscellaneous No.17513 of 1998. By the impugned
  order, the High Court has dismissed the petition preferred by      ,.
  the appellant under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal
F Procedure, 1973 (for short 'the Cr.P.C.'), seeking quashing of              t


  proceedings pending against him in Special Case No. 29 of
  1987 before the Special Judge, Muzaffarpur for allegedly
  committing offences under Sections 161 (before its omission
  by Act 30/2001), 109 and 1208 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860
G (for short 'the l.P.C.') and Section 5(2) of the Prevention of
  Corruption Act, 1947 (for short 'the Act').                        I"
                                                                              ~




      3. The case has a chequered history and, therefore, in
  order to appreciate the rival stands of the parties, it would be
H ne9essary to notice the background facts in a little greater
               VAKIL PRASAD SINGH v. STATE OF BIHAR             521
                           [D.K. JAIN, J.]
     detail.                                                          A

           The genesis of the case dates back to 8th April, 1981 when
     a search operation was conducted by the office of the
     Superintendent of Police, Crime Investigation Department,
     (Vigilance), Muzaffarpur, on the basis of a complaint lodged by 8
     a civil contractor against the appellant, an Assistant Engineer
     in the Bihar State Electricity Board (Civil) Muzaffarpur, for
     allegedly demanding a sum of Rs.1000/- as illegal gratification
     for release of payment for the civil work executed by him. In the
     trap laid to catch the culprit, the chemically treated currency C
     notes are stated to have been recovered from appellant's·
     pocket. As a follow up action, after investigation by an Inspector
     of Police, a chargesheet for the afore-mentioned offences was
     filed against the appellant on 28th February, 1982. The
     Magistrate took cognizance on 9th December, 1982. Nothing
     substantial happened till 6th July, 1987 except for dismissal of D
     an application, dated 30th June, 1983 filed by the prosecution
     for reinvestigation of the case, when the case was transferred
     from Muzaffarpur to Patna.

          4. On 7th December, 1990, the appellant filed a petition E
     under Section 482 Cr.P.C. before the Patna High Court against
     the order passed by the Special Judge, Muzaffarpur taking
     cognizance of the said offences, on the ground that the
)<   Inspector of Police, who had conducted the investigations, on
     the basis whereof the chargesheet was filed, had no jurisdiction F
     to do so. Accepting the plea of the appellant, the High Court,
     vide order dated 7th December, 1990 quashed the order of
     Magistrate taking cognizance, with a direction to the
     prosecution to complete the investigation within a period of
     three months from receipt of the order, by an offi~r of the rank G
     of a Deputy Superintendent of Police or any other officer duly
     authorised in this behalf. No further progress was made in the
     case and the matter rested there till the year 1998, when the
     appellant filed yet another petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C.,
     giving rise to the present appeal, seeking quashing of the entire H
    522        SUPREME COURT REPORTS                  [2009] 1 S.C.R.


A criminal proceedings pending against him mainly on the ground
  that re-investigation in the matter had not been initiated even
  after a lapse of seven and a half years of the order passed by
  the High Court on 7th December, 1990 and in the process the
  appellant had suffered undu~ harassment for over eighteen
B years. On 20th November, 1998, the petitionwas admitted to
  final hearing.
        5. Ultimately, when the matter was called out for final
  hearing after almost nine years, on 11th May, 2007, counsel for
  the vigilance department sought time to seek instructions in
C regard to the stage of investigations. In furtherance thereof, an
  affidavit was filed on behalf of the prosecution, inter a/ia, stating
  that the Superintendent of Police, Muzaffarpur vide his letter
  dated 22nd February, 2007 had directed the Deputy
  Superintendent of Police to complete the investigations. In
D pursuance of the said direction, the Deputy Superintendent
  started investigations on 28th February, 2007 and ultimately
  filed a fresh chargesheet on 1st May, 2007.
        6. As noted earlier, the High Court has dismissed the
E petition. Acknowledging that there has been substantial delay
  in conclusion of proceedings against the appellant and some
  prejudice may have been caused to the appellant in his
  professional career on account of continuance of criminal case
  against him as he was deprived of the promotion in the
F meantime, the learned Judge finally concluded that this reason
  by itself was not sufficient to quash the entire criminal
  proceedings against him, particularly keeping in view the
  seriousness of the allegations. The learned Judge, however,
  directed the trial court to conduct the trial in the matter on a day
  to day basis and complete the same within a period of four
G months. The Court also directed that if the sanction of the State
  Government had not yet been obtained, the question of grant
  of sanction shall be considered by the State Government within
  a period of six weeks from the date of the order. Being
  aggrieved by the said decision, the appellant has preferred the
H present appeal.
                  VAKIL PRASAD SINGH v. STATE OF BIHAR                   523
                              [D.K:. JAIN, J.]
....             7. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant        A
            vehemently submitted that though a period of about twenty eight
            years, since the registration of the case against the appellant,
            has elapsed, the trial according to law is yet to commence and
            thus, the appellant has been deprived of his constitutional right
            to speedy investigation and trial flowing from Article 21 of the    B
           ·Constitution. It was pleaded that having regard to the prevailing
            circumstances and the fact that it is still not clear whether the
 -~
            requisite sanction to prosecute the appellant has been granted
            or not, this is eminently a fit case where the chargesheet
            against the appellant ought to be quashed.                          c
                 8. Per contra, learned counsel for the State contended that
           in view of the seriousness of the offences alleged against the
           appellant, the High Court was fully justified in dismissing the
           petition by applying the correct principles to be kept in view
-,..(      while exercising its inherent powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C.       D
           The learned counsel also submitted that the delay in trial was
           also, to some extent, attributable to the appellant because it
           was he who had belatedly questioned the jurisdiction of the
           investigating officer. Learned counsel also urged that the
           prosecution could not be held responsible for delay in trial on      E
           account of transfer of the case from Muzaffarpur to Patna and
           again from Patna to Muzaffarpur.
   _:,,-     9. Before adverting to the core issue, viz. wbether under
        the given circumstances the appellant was entitled to approach
       _the High Court for getting the entire criminal proceedings
                                                                           F
        against him quashed, it would be appropriate to· notice the
        circumstances and the parameters enunciated and reiterated
        by this Court in a series of decisions under which the High Court
        can exercise its inherent powers under Sections 482 Cr.P.C.
        to prevent abuse of process of any Court or otherwise to secure G
 "ii--  the ends of justice. The power possessed by the High Court
        under the said provision is undoubtedly very wide but it has to
        be exercised in appropriate cases, ex debito justitiae to do
        real and substantial justice for the administration of which alone
                                                                           H
     524         SUPREME COURT REPORTS              [2009) 1 S.C.R.


A the courts exist. The inherent powers do not confer an arbitrary
  jurisdiction on the High Court to act according to whim or
  caprice. It is trite to state that the said powers have to be
  exercised sparingly and with circumspection only where the court
  is convinced, on the basis of material on record, that allowing
B the proceedings to continue would be an abuse of the process
  of the court or that the ends of justice require that the
  proceedings ought to be quashed; [See: Kurukshetra
  University & Anr. v. State of Haryana & Anr. 1• Janata Dal v.
  H.S. Chowdhary & Ors. 2 , and State of Haryana & Ors. v.
C Bhajan Lal & Ors. 3)
       10. In Bhajan Lal's case (supra), while formulating as many
  as seven categories of cases by way of illustration, wherein the
  extra-ordinary power under the afore-stated provisions could be
  exercised by the High Court to prevent abuse of process of the
D court, it was clarified that it was not possible to lay down precise   >
  and inflexible guidelines or any rigid formula or to give an
  exhaustive list of the circumstances in which such power could
  be exercised. This view has been reiterated in a catena of
  subsequent decisions.
E         11. We are of the opinion that having regard to the factual
    scenario, noted above, an<! for the reasons stated hereafter, it
    is a fit case where the High Court should have exercised its
    powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C.
F       12. Time and again this Court has emphasized the need
  for speedy investigations and trial as both are mandated by the
  letter and spirit of the provisions of the Cr.P.C. (In particular,
  Sections 197, 173, 309, 437 (6) and 468 etc.) and the
  constitutional protection enshrined in Article 21 of the
G Constitution. Inspired by the broad sweep and content of Article
  21 as interpreted by a seven-Judge Bench of this Court in

    1.   (1977)4SCC451.
    2.   (1992) 4 sec 305.
H 3.     1992 Supp (1) sec 335.
                VAKIL PRASAD SINGH v. STATE OF BIHAR                       525
                            [D.K. JAIN, J.)
       Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India & Anr. 4 , in Hussainara                   A
       Khatoon & Ors. v. Home Secretaf}1, State of Bihar6, this Court
       had observed that Article 21 confers· a fundamental right on
       every person not to be deprived of his life or liberty except
       according to procedure established by law; that such
       procedure is. not some semblance of a procedure but the                    B
       procedure should be 'reasonable, fair and just'; and therefrom
       flows, without doubt, the right to speedy trial. It was also
       observed that no procedure which does not ensure a
       reasonably quick trial can be regarded as 'reasonable, fair or
       just' and it would fall foul of Article 21. The Court clarified that       c
       speedy trial means reasonably expeditious trial which is an
       integral and essential part of the fundamental right to life and
       liberty enshrined in Article 21.
             13. The exposition of Article 21 in Hussainara Khatoon's
        case (supra) was exhaustively considered afresh by the                    D
"""'    Constitution Bench in Abdul Rehman Antulay & Ors. v. R.S.
        Nayak &Anr. 6· Referring to a number of decisions of this Court
        and the American precedents on the Sixth Amendment of their
        Constitution, making the right to a speedy and public trial a
       ·.constitutional guarantee, the Court formulated as many as                E
        eleven propositions with a note of caution that these were not
        exhaustive and were meant only to serve as guidelines. For the
        sake of brevity, we do not propose to reproduce all the said
        propositions and it would suffice to note the gist thereof. These
  ""    are: 0) fair, just and reasonable procedure implicit in Article 21
        of the Constitution creates a right in the accused to be tried
                                                                                  F
        speedily; (ii) right to speedy trial flowing from Article 21
        encompasses all the stages, namely the stage of investigation,
        inquiry, trial, appeal, revision and retrial; (iii) in every case where
        the speedy trial is alleged to have been infringed, the first             G
        question to be put and answered is - who is responsible for
 ~      the delay?; (iv) while determining whether undue delay has
       4. (1978) 1 sec 81.
       5.   (1980) 1 sec 81.
       6.   (1992) 1 sec 225.                                                     H
    526        SUPREME COURT REPORTS                 [2009] 1 S.C.R.


A occurred (resulting in violation of right to speedy trial) one must
   have regard to all the attendant circumstances, including nature
   of offence, number of accused and witnesses, the work-load
   of the court concerned, prevailing local conditions and so on-
   what is called, the systemic delays; (v) each and every delay
B does not necessarily prejudice the accused. Some delays may
   indeed work to his advantage. However, inordinately long delay
   may be taken as presumptive proof of prejudice. In this context,
   the fact of incarceration of accused will also be a relevant fact.
   The prosecution should not be allowed to become a
c persecution. But when does the prosecution become
   persecution, again depends upon the facts of a given case; (vi)
   ultimately, the court has to balance and weigh several relevant
   factors-'balancing test' or 'balancing process'-and determine in
  each case whether the right to speedy trial has been denied;
   (vii) Ordinarily speaking, where the court comes to a conclusion
0
  that right to speedy trial of an accused has been infringed the
  charges or the conviction, as the case may be, shall be
  quashed. But this is not the only course open and having regard
  to the nature of offence and other circumstances when the court
E feels that quashing of proceedings cannot be in the interest of
  justice, it is open to the court to make appropriate orders,
  including fixing the period for completion of trial; (viii) it is
  neither advisable nor feasible to prescribe any outer time-limit
  for conclusion of all criminal proceedings. In every case of
  complaint of denial of right to speedy trial, it is primarily for the
F prosecution to justify and explain the delay. At the same time,
  it is the duty of the court to weigh all the circumstances of a
  given case before pronouncing upon the complaint; (ix} an
  objection based on denial of right to speedy trial and for relief
  on that account, should first be addressed to the High Court.
G Even if the High Court entertains such a plea, ordinarily it should
  not stay the proceedings, except in a case of grave and
  exceptional nature. Such proceedings in the High Court must,
  however, be disposed of on a priority basis.
         14. Notwithstanding elaborate enunciation of Article 21 of
H the Constitution in Abdul Rehman Antu/ay (supra}, and
            VAKIL PRASAD SINGH v. STATE OF BIHAR                 527
                        [D.K. JAIN, J.]
    rejection of the fervent plea of proponents of right to speedy     A
    trial for laying down time-limits as bar beyond which a criminal
    trial shall not proceed, pronouncements of this Court in
    "Common Cause" A Registered Society v. Union of India
    (UOI) & Ors. 7 • "Common Cause", A Registered Society v.
    Union of India & Ors. 8, Raj Deo Sharma v. State of Bihar9 and      B
    Raj Deo Sharma II v. State of Bihar10 gave rise to some
    confusion on the question whether an outer time limit for
    conclusion of criminal proceedings could be prescribed
    whereafter the trial court would be obliged to terminate the
    proceedings and necessarily acquit or discharge the accused. c
    The confusion on the issue was set at rest by a seven-Judge
     Bench of this court in P. Ramachandra Rao v. State of
    Kamataka 11 • Speaking for the majority, R.C. Lahoti, J. (as his
     Lordship then was) while affirming that the dictum in A.R.
    Antulay's case (supra) as correct and the one which still holds
~
                                                                         D
     the field and the propositions emerging from Article 21 of the
    Constitution ~nd expounding the right to speedy trial laid down
    as guidelines in the said case adequately take care of right to
     speedy trial, it was held that guidelines laid down in the A.R.
    Antulay's case (supra) are not exhaustive but only illustrative.
    They are not intended to operate as hard and fast rules or to E
    be applied as a strait-jacket formula. Their applicability would
    depend on the fact-situation of each case as it is difficult to
    foresee all situations and no generalization can be made. It has
    also been held that it is neither advisable, nor feasible, nor
    judicially permissible to draw or prescribe an outer limit for F
    conclusion of all crimin~I proceedings. Nonetheless, the
    criminal courts should exercise their available powers such as
    those under Sections 309, 311 and 258 of Cr.P.C. to effectuate
    the right to speedy trial. In appropriate cases, jurisdiction of the
    High Court under Section 482 Cr.P.C. and Articles 226 and 227 G
    7.   (1996) 4 sec 33.
    8.   (1996) a sec 775.
    10. (1999) 7 sec 604.
    11. (2002) 4 sec 578.
                                                                        H
    528        SUPREME COURT REPORTS                   [2009] 1 S.C.R.


A of the Constitution can be invoked seeking appropriate relief
                                                                             ,..
  or suitable directions. The outer limits or power of limitation
  expounded in the aforenoted judgments were held to be not in
  consonance with the legislative intent.
         15. It is, therefore, well settled that the right to speedy trial
B in all criminal persecutions is an inalienable right under Article
   21 of the Constitution. This right is applicable not only to the
  actual proceedings in court but also includes within its sweep
  the preceding police investigations as well. The right to speedy
  trial extends equally to all criminal prosecutions and is not
c confined to any particular category of cases. In every case,
  where the right to speedy trial is alleged to have been infringed,
  the court has to perform the balancing act upon taking into
  consideration all the attendant circumstances, enumerated
  above, and determine in each case whether the right to speedy
D trial has been denied in a given case. Where the court comes               ...
                                                                             ;
  to the conclusion that the right to speedy trial of an accused
  has been infringed, the charges or the conviction, as the case
  may be, may be quashed unless the court feels that having
  regard to the nature of offence and other relevant
E circumstances, quashing of proceedings may not be in the
  interest of justice. In such a situation, it is open to the court to
  make an appropriate order as it may deem just and equitable
  including fixation of time frame for conclusion of trial.
                                  ..
        16. Tested on the touchstone of the broad principles
F enumerated above, we are convinced that in the present case
  appellant's constitutional right recognised under Article 21 of
  the Constitution stands violated. It is manifest from the facts
  narrated above that in the first instance investigations were
  conducted by an officer, who had no jurisdiction to do so and
G the appellant cannot be accused of delaying the trial merely
  because he successfully exercised his right to challenge an
  illegal investigation. Be that as it may, admittedly the High Court
  vide its order dated 7th September, 1990 had directed the
  prosecution to complete the investigation within a period of
H three months from the date of the said order but nothing
                 VAKIL PRASAD SINGH v. STATE OF BIHAR                 529
                             [D.K. JAIN, J.]

            happened till 27th February, 2007 when, after receipt of notice A
            in the second petition preferred by the appellant complaining
            about delay in investigation, the Superintendent of Police,
            Muzaffarpur directed the Deputy Superintendent of Police to
            complete the investigation. It was only thereafter that a fresh
            chargesheet is stated to have been filed on 1st May, 2007. It B
            is also pertinent to note that even till date, learned counsel for
            the State is not sure whether a sanction for prosecuting the
    -;..
            appellant is required and if so, whether it has been granted or
            not. We have no hesitation in holding that at least for the period
           from 7th December, 1990 till 28th February, 2007 there is no c
           explanation whatsoever for the delay in investigation. Even the
            direction issued by the High Court seems to have had no effect
           on the prosecution and they slept over the matter for almost
           seventeen years. Nothing could be pointed out by the State, far
           from being established to show that the delay in inv~stigation
            or trial was in any way attributable to the appellant. The D
            prosecution has failed to show any exceptional circumstance
           which could possibly be taken into consideration for condoning
           a callous and inordinate delay of more than two decades in
           investigations and the trial. The said delay cannot, in any way,
           be said to be arising from any default on the part of tne E
           appellant. Thus, on facts in hand, in our opinion, the stated delay
           clearly violates the constitutional guarantee of a speedy
           investigation and trial under Article 21 of the Constitution. We
           feel that under these circumstances, further continuance of
           criminal proceedings, pending against the appellant in the court F
           of Special Judge, Muzaffarpur, is unwarranted and despite the
           fact that allegations against him are quite serious, they deserve
           to be quashed.
               17. Consequently, the appeal is allowed and the
           proceedings pending against the appellant in Special Case        G
    ~      No. 29of1987 are hereby quashed.
~
           RP.                                          Appeal allowed.