Holding

An unexplained, inordinate, unreasonable delay in disposing of mercy petitions, not caused by the convict, constitutes a supervening circumstance that violates Article 21 and mandates commutation of the death sentence to life imprisonment.

Summary

Three death‑row convicts (V. Sriharan @ Murugan, T. Suthendraraja @ Santhan and A.G. Perarivalan @ Arivu) filed mercy petitions under Articles 72/161 of the Constitution. The Governor of Tamil Nadu rejected the petitions in 2000 and the President finally rejected them in August 2011 after an inordinate delay of more than eleven years. The petitioners filed writ petitions under Article 32 seeking commutation of their death sentences to life imprisonment, arguing that the delay violated their right to life and personal liberty under Article 21. The Supreme Court, relying on the recent decision in Shatrughan Chauhan & Anr. v. Union of India, held that an unexplained, unreasonable delay not caused by the convict is a supervening circumstance that makes execution arbitrary and violative of Article 21, and that the convicts need not prove specific mental suffering. Consequently, the Court commuted the death sentences to life imprisonment and directed that mercy petitions be disposed of expeditiously.

Issues considered

The effect of an inordinate, unreasonable delay in disposal of mercy petitions on the validity of a death sentence under Article 21.
Whether the petitioner must demonstrate actual mental suffering caused by the delay to obtain commutation.
Whether a writ under Article 32 can be entertained as a review of the executive's decision under Articles 72/161 on the ground of fundamental rights violation.
Whether the delay was attributable to the executive and not to the petitioners.

Legislation cited

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973s. Sec 432, s. Sec 433-A
Constitution of Indias. Art 161, s. Art 21, s. Art 32, s. Art 72

Subjects

death penaltymercy petitiondelaycommutationArticle 21Article 72Article 161Supreme Courtconstitutional lawdue processmental anguish

Judgment

[2014} 1 S.C.R. 1093

V. SRIHARAN @ MURUGAN A
v.
UNION OF INDIA & ORS.
(Transferred Case (Criminal) No. 1 of 2012)
FEBRUARY 18, 2014
B
[P. SATHASIVAM, CJI, RANJAN GOGOi AND
SHIVA KIRTI SINGH, JJ.]

Constitution of India, 1950:
c
Art. 21 rlw Art. 721161- Delay in execution of death
sentence - Delay of 11 years in decision of mercy petition
under Art. 72 - Held: Exorbitant delay in disposal of mercy
petition renders the process of execution of death sentence
arbitrary, whimsical and capricious and, therefore, 0
inexecutable -- Furthermore, such imprisonment, occasioned
by inordinate delay in disposal of mercy petitions, is beyond
the sentence accorded by the court and to that extent is extra-
legal and excessive -- The unreasonable delay caused
qualifies as the supervening circumstance, which warrants for E
commutation of sentence of death into life imprisonment -
Death sentence of three petitioners commuted into
imprisonment for life - Life imprisonment means end of one's
life, subject o remission - Sentence/Sentencing.

Art. 21 - Commutation of death sentence due to delay in F
its execution- Held: Prolonged delay in execution of death
sentence, by itself, gives rise to mental suffering and agony
which renders the subsequent execution of death sentence
inhuman and barbaric - There is no obligation on the convict
to demonstrate specific ill effects of suffering and agony on F
his mind and body as a prerequisite for commutation of
sentence of death.

Arts. 721161 - Delay in disposal of mercy petition - Held:
1093 H
1094 Si.JPREME COURT REPORTS [2014] 1 S.C.R.

A Clemency procedure under Art. 721161 provides a ray of hope
to the condemned prisoner and his family members for
commutation of death sentence into life imprisonment and,
therefore. the executive should step up and exercise
clemency power within a reasonable time - Another criteria
B may be added to the existing yardsticks so as to require
consideration of the delay that may have occurred in disposal
of a mercy petition.

Art.32 and Art. 721161 - Writ petition for commutation of
death sentence due to delay in decision of many petition -
C Scope of - Held: relief sought for under these kind of petitions
is not per se review of the order passed under Art. 721161 on
merits but on the ground of violation of fundamental rights
guaranteed under the Constitution to all the citizens including
the death row convicts.
D
The petitioners filed writ petitions before the High
Court seeking a writ of declaration that the execution of
sentence of death pursuant to the letter No. F.No.14/1/
1999-Judicial Cell dated 12.08.2011 issued by the Union
E of India, was unconstitutional, and prayed for
commutation of the sentence of death to imprisonment
for life. The writ petitions raised vital issues pertaining to
violation of fundamental rights of death row convicts
ensuing from inordinate delay caused at the hands of
F executive in deciding the mercy petitions filed under Art.
72/161 of the Constitution of India, 1950. The writ petitions
were transferred to and heard by the Supreme Court of
India.

Allowing the petitions, the Court
G
HELD: 1.1 In Shatrughan Chauhan"' this Court has
held that unexplained delay in execution of sentence of
death on the accused notwithstanding the existence of
supervening circumstances, is in violation of Art. 21 of
H the Constitution. One of the supervening circumstances
V. SRIHARAN@ MURUGAN v. UNION OF INDIA 1095

sanctioned by this Court for commutation of death
\
A
sentence into life imprisonment is the undue, inordinate
and,unr~asonable delay in execution of death sentence
as).t attribut_es to torture. The two principles stipulated in
the judgment for commutation of death sentence into life
imprisonment on the ground of delay as the supervening B
circumstance are: firstly, that the delay occurred must be
inordinate and secondly, that the delay must not b~
caused at the instance of the accused. [para 2-3] [1099-
E-G; 1100-E-F]

*Shatrughan Chauhan &,Anr. vs. Union of India & Ors. C
(2014) 1 SCR 609 - relied on. • ·
.
.1.2 In the instant case, the mercy petitions V.)ere
rejected by the Governor of Tamil Nadu on 25.04.2000.
Consequently, the mercy petitions were forwarded to the D
President of India on 26.04.2000 for consideration under
Art.' 72 of the Constitution. The President, on 12.08.2011,
rejected these mercy petitions after a delay of more than
11 years~ It is, therefore, indisputable that the delay
ensued in the given petitions is inordinate and E
unreasonable and the same was not caused at the
instance of the petitioners. Accordingly, the unreasonable
delay caused qualifies as the supervening circumstance,
which warrants for commutation of sentence of death into
life impris.onment as stipulated in Shatrughan Chauhan. F
[para 5-6 and 15] [1101-C-D; 1103-H; 1104-A-B]

. Triveniben vs. State of Gujarat (1988) 4 SCC 574, Sher
Singh and Ors. vs. State of Punjab (1983) 2 SCC 344 and·
T. V. Vatheeswaran vs. State of Tamil Nadu 1983 (2) SCR 348
= (1983) 2 SCC 68 - referred to. G

1.3 Exorbitant delay in· disposal of mercy petition
renders the process of execution of death sentence
arbitrary, whimsical and capricious and, therefore,
in.executable. Furthermore, such imprisonment, H
1096 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2014] 1 S.C.R.

A occasioned by inordinate delay in disposal of mercy
petitions, is beyond the sentence accorded by the court
and to that extent is extra-legal and excessive. Therefore,
the apex constitutional authorities must exercise the
power under Art. 72/161 within the bounds of
B constitutional discipline and should dispose of the mercy
petitions filed before them in an expeditious manner.
[para 16] [1104-C-E]

1.4 Delay violates the requirement of a fair, just and
reasonable procedure. Regardless and independent of
C the suffering it causes, delay makes the process of
execution of death sentence unfair, unreasonable,
arbitrary and capricious and thereby, violates procedural
due process guaranteed under Art. 21 of the Constitution
and the dehumanizing effect is presumed in such cases.
D It is in this context, this Court, in past, has recognized that
incarceration, in addition to the reasonable time
necessary for adjudication of mercy petitions and
preparation for execution, flouts the due process
guaranteed to the convict under Art. 21 which inheres in
E every prisoner till his last breath. [para 18) [1105-A-B]

2.1 This Court has consistently held that prolonged
delay in execution of death sentence, by itself, gives rise
to mental suffering and agony which renders the
F subsequent execution of death sentence inhuman and
barbaric. [para 19) [1105-C]

2.2 There is no requirement in Indian law as well as
in international judgments for a death-row convict to
prove actual harm occasioned by the delay. There is no
G obligation on the convict to demonstrate specific ill
effects of suffering and agony on his mind and body as
'a prerequisite for commutation of sentence of death. In
the instant case, in the writ petitions all the petitioners
highlighted that the delay caused unendurable torture to
H
V. SRI HARAN @ MURUGAN v. UNION OF INDIA 1097

them and they repeatedly requested the authorities to A
forthwith decide their mercy petitions. [para 20-21] [1106-
H; 1107-C-D]

3.1 The relief sought for under these kind of petitions
is not per se review of the order passed under Art. 72/161 8
of the Constitution on merits but on the ground of
violation of fundamental rights guaranteed under the
Constitution to all the citizens including the death row
convicts. [para 27] [1110-E-F]

3.2 The clemency procedure under Art. 72/161 c
provides a ray of hope to the condemned prisoner and
his family members for commutation of death sentence
into life imprisonment and, therefore, the executive should
step up and exercise its time-honored tradition of
clemency power guaranteed in the Constitution one-way D
or the other within a reasonable time. [Para 28] [1110-F-G]

, 3.3 The mercy petitions filed under Art. 72/161 can be
disposed of at a much faster pace, if the due procedure
prescribed by law is followed in verbatim. The fact that E
no, time limit is prescribed to the President/Governor for
disposal of the mercy petition should compel the
government to work in a rttore systematized manner to
repose the confidence of the people in the institution of
democracy. This Court implores upon the government to
render its advice to the President within a reasonable time · F
so that the President is in a position to arrive at a decision
at the earliest.· [para 29] [1111-A-C]

3.4 It has been stated that the Union Government,
considering the nature of the power under Art. 72/161, G
has set out certain criteria in the form of circular for
deciding the mercy petitions. This Court, therefore,
recommends that in view of the recent jurisprudential
development with regard to delay in execution, another
criteria may be added to the existing yardsticks so as to H
1098 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2014] 1 S.C.R.

A require consideration of the delay that may have occurred
in disposal of a mercy petition. [para 30] [1111-D-E]

3.5 The death sentence of the three petitioners is
commuted into imprisonment for life. Life imprisonment
means end of one's life, subject to any remission granted
8
by the appropriate Government u/s 432 of the Code of
Criminal Procedure, 1973 which, in turn, is subject to the
procedural checks mentioned in the said provision and
further substantive check in s. 433-A of the Code. (para
C 31) (1111-F-G]
Case Law Reference:
(2014) 1 SCR 609 relied on para 2
(1988) 4 sec 57 4 referred to para 15
D
(1983) 2 sec 344 referred to para 15
1983 (2) SCR 348 referred to para 15
CRIMINAL ORIGINAL JURISDICTION : Transferred Case
E (Criminal) No. 1 of 2012.

Under Article 139 of the Constitution of India.

WITH

F T.C. (Crl.) No. 2 of 2012.

T.C. (Crl.) No. 3·of 2012.

Goolam E. Vahanvati, AG, Sidharth Luthra, ASG, Ram
Jethmalani, Yug Mohit Chaudhary, Lata Krishnamurti, P.R.
G Mala, Karan Kalia, Pranav Diesh, Sureshan P., N.
Chandrasekaran, Sidhartha Sharma, Jayanth Muthuraj, S.
Prabhu Ramasubrmanian, Paarivendhan, Sethu Mahandran,
Amina Pal, Sureshan P., S. Gowthaman, Siddhartha Dave,
Ranjana Narayan, N. Pasha, Supriya Juneja, B.K. Prasad,
H
/
'
. /
..· V. SRIHARAN@ MURUGAN v. UNION OF INDlt- 10~g
Shreekant N. Terdal, Subramonium Prasad, M. Yogesh Kanna, A

I A. Santha Kumaran, Vanita C. Giri for the appearing parties.
..
The Judgment of th.e Court was delivered by

· p_: SATHASIVAM, CJI. ·1. The above transferred cases

I which· were borne out of the writ petitions filed by V. Sriharan
@ Murugan, T. Suthendraraja @ Santhan and A.G. Perarivalan
@Arivu in the Madras High Court and which got transferred to
B

lIthis Court under Article 139A of the Constitution of India raise
vital issues pertaining to violation of fundamental rights of death
row convicts ensuing from inordinate delay caused at the hands
of executive in deciding the mercy petitions filed under Article
c
l 721161 of the Constitution. In all the writ petitions, the petitioners
l
.
• prayed for a writ of declaration declaring that the execution of "
the sentence of death, pursuar:it to the letter No. F.No.14/1/1999-
Judicial.Cell dated 12.08.2011 issued by the Union of India, is D
unconstitutional· and thus sought for commutation of the
sentence of death to imprisonment for life.
I• 2. Akin to this issue was decided by us in a recent
I judgment viz., Shatrughan Chauhan & Anr. vs. Union of India
E
& Ors. [Writ Petition (Criminal) No. 55 of 2013 etc.] decided
I on 21.01.2014 wherein this Court held that execution of
sentence of death on the accused notwithstanding the existence

I of supervening circumstances, is in violation of Article 21 of the ·
Constitution. One of the supervening circumstances sanctioned
by this_ Court for commutation of death sentence into life F
· imprisonmen1 is the undue, inordinate and unreasonable delay

I in execution of death sentence as it attributes to torture.
However, this Court, cogently clarified in its verdict that the
nature of delay i.e. whether it is undue or unreasonable must
be appreciated based on facts of individual cases and no G
exhaustive guidelines can be framed in this regard.The relevant
' ' ' . 'l ~ _, ' '' - '
portion of 'Shatrughan Chauhan (supra), is as under:-•.

\l
"42) Accordingly, if there is undue, unexplained and
inordinate delay in execution due to pendency" of mercy H

lI
1100 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2014] 1 S.C.R.

A petitions or the executive as well as the constitutional
authorities have failed to take note of/consider the relevant
aspects, this Court is well within its powers under Article
32 to hear the grievance of the convict and commute the
death sentence into life imprisonment on this ground alone
B however, only after satisfying that the delay was not caused
at the instance of the accused himself... "
*** *** ***

"54) ... Therefore, in the light of the aforesaid elaborate
C discussion, we are of the cogent view that undue,
inordinate and unreasonable delay in execution of death
sentence does certainly attribute to torture which indeed
is in violation of Article 21 and thereby entails as the
ground for commutation of sentence. However, the nature
D of delay i.e. whether it is undue or unreasonable must be
appreciated based on the facts of individual cases and no
exhaustive guidelines can be framed in this regard."

3. Accordingly, the case at hand has to be decided under
E the guidance of this judgment. The two principles stipulated in
the judgment for commutation of death sentence into life
imprisonment on the ground of delay as the supervening
circumstance are firstly, that the delay occurred must be
inordinate and secondly, that the delay must not be caused at
the instance of the accused. Let us assess the facts of the given
F case in the light of established principles in Shatrughan
Chauhan (supra).

Factual Background:

G 4. In these petitions, we are concerned only with the
rejection of the mercy petitions of the petitioners by the
President of India under Article 72 of the Constitution after the
confirmation of death sentence by this Court, thus there is no
need to traverse the factual details leading up to the imposition
H of death sentence.
V. SRIHARAN@ MURUGAN v. UNION OF INDIA 1101
[P. SATHASIVAM, CJI.]
5. Initially, the mercy petitions were filed before the A
Governor of Tamil Nadu on 17.10.1999 and the Governor, on
27.10.1999, rejected the same. Subsequently, the said rejection
was challenged before the Madras High Court in W.P. Nos.
17655-17658 of 1999 on the ground that the mercy petitions
were decided without consulting the Council of Ministers, which B
is unsustainable in law. Accordingly, by order dated
25.11.1999, the Madras High Court set aside the order of
rejection of mercy petitions by the Governor and directed to
reconsider the mercy petitions afresh. Thereafter, on
25.04.2000, the Governor again rejected the mercy petitions. c
6. Consequently, the mercy petitions were forwarded to the
President on 26.04.2000 for consideration under Article 72 of
the Constitution. The President, on .:12.08.2011, rejected these
mercy petitions after a delay of more than 11 years. The
rejection of the aforesaid petitions was communicated to the D
petitioners on 25.08.2011. Subsequently, the said rejection was
also challenged in W.P. Nos. 20287-20289 of 2011 before the.
Madras High Court on 29.08.2011. Later, by order dated
01.05.2012, in Transfer Petition (Criminal) Nos. 383-385 of
2011 and 462-464 of 2011, this Court transferred all the three E
,, writ petitions to this Court in the interest of justice. Pursuant to
the aforesaid order, the Madras High Court transmitted the
original records to this Court, which have been registered as
Transferred Case (Criminal) Nos. 1-3 of 2012. All the
petitioners are currently lodged in the Central Prison, Vellore: F
Tamil Nadu and they are in incarceration since 1991, i.e., for
more than two decades.

7. Heard Mr. Ram Jethmalani, learned senior counsel, Mr.
Yug Mohit Chaudhary, learned counsel for the petitioners and G
Mr. Goolam E. Vahanvati, learned Attorney General and Mr.
Sidharth Luthra, learned Additional Solicitor General for the
Union of India.

H
1102 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2014] 1 S.C.R.

A Contentions:

8 The only contention, as projected by Mr. Ram
Jethmalari, learned senior counsel and Mr. Yug Mohit
Cha1_;dhary, learned counsel for the petitioners is that in view
of inordinate delay of more than 11 years in disposal of mercy
8
petitions, the sentence of death imposed upon the petitioners
herein is liable to be commuted to life imprisonment as it is
violative of Article 21 of the Constitution in addition to various
International Conventions. Universal Declarations, to which India
C is a signatory. In support of their contention, they heavily relied
on Shatrughan Chauhan (supra).

9. On the other hand, Mr. Goolam E. Vahanvati, learned
Attorney General, assisted by Mr. Sidharth Luthra, learned
Additional Solicitor General, submitted that the delay caused
D was not at the instance of the head of the executive and is not
unreasonable. They further submitted that even if there was
inordinate delay in disposal of mercy petitions in the light of the
principles enunciated in Shatrughan Chauhan (supra) and
also from the information furnished by the petitioners in their
E affidavits filed before the High Court praying for commutation,
the petitioners have not made out a case for passing similar
order of commutation as ordered in Shatrughan Chauhan
(supra).

Points for Consideration:
F
10. Firstly, as mentioned earlier, the question whether
inordinate delay in disposing of mercy petitions is a supervening
circumstance for commutation of sentence of death into life
imprisonment is well settled in view of the recent verdict in
G Shatrughan Chauhan (supra). As a result, the task before this
Court is confined only to finding out whether the nature of delay
caused is reasonable or inordinate in the light of the
circumstances of the given case and to verify whether the delay
was caused at the instance of accused.
H
V. SRIHARAN@ MURUGAN v. UNION OF INDIA 1103
[P. SATHASIVAM, CJI.]
11. The second point for consideration before this Court A
is whether in Shatrughan Chauhan (supra), this Court, laid
down for actually proving the dehumanizing effect on the
accused or mere unreasonable and inordinate delay on face
of it is sufficient for commutation of death sentence to life.
B
Discussion:

12. After having carefully analyzed all the materials and rival
contentions, now let us venture to distinctively discuss on the
aforesaid issues. At the outset, let us examine whether the
delay of 11 years in disposing of mercy petitions is C
unreasonable and inordinate in the light of the facts of the given
case.

13. Following the rejection of mercy petitions of the
petitioners herein by the Governor on 25.04.2000, these 0
petitions were forwarded to the Ministry of Home Affairs,
Government of India on 04.05.2000. After an unreasonable
delay of 5 years and 1 month, on 21.06.2005, the Ministry of
Home Affairs submitted the petitioners' mercy petitions to the
President for consideration. Thereafter, on 23.02.2011, the
E
Ministry of Home Affairs recalled the petitioners' mercy petitions
from the office of the President. Here also, there was a delay
of 5 years and 8 months. Ultimately, the President, on
12.08.2011, rejected these mercy petitions after a delay of
more than 11 years.

14. Across the bar, learned Attorney General, while
explaining the delay ensued i.e., 5 years and 1 month submitted
that shortly after the receipt of the mercy petitions in 2000, a
note was prepared but thereafter the file was lying in the drawer
of some officer of the Ministry of Home Affairs, and, hence, G
could not be processed. As regards delay of 5 years and 8
months, learned Attorney General fairly admitted that this delay
couldn't be explained in any way.

15. It is, therefore, indisputable that the delay ensued in
H
1104 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2014] 1 S.C.R.

A the given petitions is inordinate and unreasonable and the same
was not caused at the instance of the petitioners. Accordingly,
the unreasonable delay caused qualifies as the supervening
circumstance. which warrants for commutation of sentence of
death into life imprisonment as stipulated in Shatrughan
B Chauhan (supra), inter alia, the judicial decisions in Triveniben
vs. State of Gujarat (1988) 4 SCC 574, Sher Singh and Ors.
vs. State of Punjab (1983) 2 SCC 344 and T. V. Vatheeswaran
vs. State of Tamil Nadu (1983) 2 SCC 68.

16. Exorbitant delay in disposal of mercy petition renders
C the process of execution of death sentence arbitrary. whimsical
and capricious and, therefore, inexecutable. Furthermore, such
imprisonment, occasioned by inordinate delay in disposal of
mercy petitions, is beyond the sentence accorded by the court
and to that extent is extra-legal and excessive. Therefore, the
D apex constitutional authorities must exercise the power under
Article 72/161 within the bounds of constitutional discipline and
should dispose of the mercy petitions filed before them in an
expeditious manner.

E 17. As regards the second contention, it was argued by
learned Attorney General that the test laid down by this Court
in cases involving delayed mercy petitions requires the
petitioners to actively demonstrate the sufferings occasioned
by the delay, and that in the present case, the petitioners have
F been having a good time in prison and they have not suffered
at all. Hence, it is argued that the petitioners are not entitled to
relief.

18. Before we advert to respond the aforesaid contention,
it is relevant to comprehend the primary ground on the basis
G of which the relief was granted in cases of delayed disposal of
the mercy petition and that is, such delay violates the
requirement of a fair, Just and reasonable procedure.
Regardless and independent of the suffering it causes, delay
makes the process of execution of death sentence unfair.
1-1 unreasonable, arbitrary and capricious and thereby, violates
V. SRIHARAN@ MURUGAN v. UNION OF INDIA 1105
[P. SATHASIVAM, CJI.]
procedural due process guaranteed under Article 21 of the A
Constitution and the dehumanizing effect is presumed in such
cases. It is in this context, this Court, in past, has recognized
that incarceration, in addition to the reasonable time necessary
for adjudication of mercy petitions and preparation for
execution, flouts the due process guaranteed to the convict B
under Article 21 which inheres in every prisoner till his last
breath.

19. This Court has consistently held that prolonged delay
in execution of death sentence, by itself, gives rise to mental C
suffering and agony which renders the subsequent execution
of death sentence inhuman and barbaric. In Shatrughan
Chauhan (supra), this Court held as under:

"33) This is not the first time when the question of such a
nature is raised before this Court. In Ediga Anamma vs. D
State of A.P., 1974(4) SCC 443 Krishna Iyer, J. spoke of
the "brooding horror of haunting the prisoner in the
condemned cell for years". Chinnappa Reddy, J. in
Vatheeswaran (supra) said that prolonged delay in
execution of a sentence of death had a dehumanizing E
effect and this had the constitutional implication of depriving
a person of his life in an unjust, unfair and unreasonable
way so as to offend the fundamental right under Article 21
of the Constitution. Chinnappa Reddy, J. quoted the Privy
Council's observation in a case of such an inordinate delay F
in execution, viz., "The anguish of alternating hope and
despair the agony of uncertainty and the consequences of
such suffering on the mental, emotional and physical
integrity and health of the individual has to be seen." ... "
*** *** *** G

"39) Keeping a convict in suspense while consideration
of his mercy petition by the President for many years is
certainly an agony for him/her. It creates adverse physical
conditions and psychological stresses on the convict under H
1106 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2014] 1 S.C.R.

A sentence of death. Indisputably, this Court, while
considering the rejection of the clemency petition by the
President, under Article 32 read with Article 21 of the
Constitution. cannot excuse the agonizing delay caused to
the convict only on the basis of the gravity of the crime."
B *** *** ***

"43) The procedure prescribed by law, which deprives a
person of his life and liberty must be just, fair and
reasonable and such procedure mandates humane
C conditions of detention preventive or punitive. In this line,
although the petitioners were sentenced to death based
on the procedure established by law, the inexplicable delay
on account of executive is unexcusable. Since it is well
established that Article 21 of the Constitution does not end
D with the pronouncement of sentence but extends to the
stage of execution of that sentence, as already asserted,
prolonged delay in execution of sentence of death has a
dehumanizing effect on the accused. Delay caused by
circumstances beyond the prisoners' control mandates
E commutation of death sentence. In fact, in Vatheeswaran
(supra), particularly, in para 10, it was elaborated where
amongst other authorities, the minority view of Lords
Scarman and Brightman in the 1972 Privy Council case
of Noel Noel Riley vs. Attorney General, (1982) Crl. Law
F Review 679 by quoting "sentence of death is one thing,
sentence of death followed by lengthy imprisonment prior
to execution is another"."

20. Thus, the argument that the petitioners are under a
legal obligation to produce evidence of their sufferings and
G harm caused to them on account of prolonged delay is unknown
to law and will be misinterpretation of Shatrughan Chauhan
(supra). Such a prerequisite would render the fundamental rights
guaranteed under Part Ill of the Constitution beyond the reach
of death-row convicts and will make them nugatory and
H inaccessible for all intent and purposes. Besides, there is no
V. SRI HARAN @ MURUGAN v. UNION OF INDIA 1107
[P. SATHASIVAM, CJI.]
requirement in Indian law as well as in international judgments A
for a death-row convict to prove actual harm occasioned by the
delay. There is no obligation on the convict to demonstrate
specific ill effects of suffering and agony on his mind and body
as a prerequisite for commutation of sentence of death.
B
21. In any case, the petitioners have extensively pleaded
the nature of their sufferings both in the petitions as well as in
the reminder letters which each of them repeatedly have sent
to the President which remained unheeded. As regards the
argument of learned Attorney General, viz., the petitioners were
enjoying themselves in prison, a perusal of specific averments C
in their writ petitions filed before the High Court shows a
different picture. All the petitioners highlighted that the delay
caused unendurable torture to them and they repeatedly
requested the authorities to forthwith decide their mercy
petitions. D

22. In Transferred Case (Crl.) No. 1 of 2012 (V. Sriharan
@ Murugan), in Writ Petition No. 20287 of 2011 filed before
the High Court, in para 5, the petitioner has expressed his
grievance in the following manner: E

"I state that the extraordinary and unjustified delay in
deciding my mercy petition is entirely caused by the office
of the Hon'ble President of India. For each day after the
sentence of death was confirmed by the Hon'ble Supreme
Court, and while my mercy petition was pending before the F
Hon'ble President of India, my family and I have undergone
a living hell not knowing whether I would live or die, and
whether I would live to see another day or draw another
breath, or whether that day and that breath would be my
last. I state that I have been swinging between life and G
death for these past many years confined in a single cell.
I.state that I have suffered enough and that it would not be
in the interests of justice to. compound this suffering by
executing me. I submit that the interests of justice would
be served by converting the sentence of death to one of H
1108 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2014] 1 S.C.R.

A life imprisonment. I state that cases where the delay has
been less than half of what it is in the present case have
been held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court and this Hon'ble
Court to be unconscionable and excessive and in breach
of Article 21, warranting substitution of death sentence by
B a sentence of life."

In paragraph 22, the petitioner has stated as under:

"I state that I have been in custody since 4.6.1991, i.e. for
more than 20 years. I have been under sentence of death
c since the judgment of the trial court on 28.1.1998, i.e. for
more than 13 years and 7 months. I further state that after
the rejection of my review petition by the Supreme Court
on 8.10.1999, i.e. for a period of about 11 years and 10
months, I have lived under the shadow of the hangman's
D noose. During this period, I have been kept in a single cell,
with the threat of imminent death hanging over my head.
My mercy petition was filed more than 11 years and 4
months ago (about 4100 days). During this long period, I
have suffered excruciating mental agony and torture of a
E kind that is difficult to imagine or conceptualize. I have been
swinging between life and death, believing every waking
minute to be my last, not knowing whether I will be spared
or not, and when the hangman's noose will close around
my neck. Every person passing my prison cell is imagined
F
to be the harbinger of news regarding the outcome of the
mercy petition, or the date of my execution. Such torment
is a punishment far worse than death."

23. In the year 2005, the petitioner-Sriharan @ Murugan
sent a representation to the President of India reminding the
G pendency of his mercy petition. In that letter, apart from
highlighting his pathetic position, he asserted that "it has been
5 years since I had sent my petition requesting Justice. I
live like a moving dead body with the rope tangling in
front of my eyes always in solitary confinement. I request
H iustice but not mercy."
V. SRI HARAN @ MURUGAN v. UNION OF INDIA 1109
[P. SATHASIVAM, CJI.]
24. In another letter dated 17.06.2006, addressed to the A
President, he asserted to the sufferings of his family members
in the following words:

"For about 8 years, I have been serving sentence as death
sentence convict. So, the sufferings of my parents,
8
brothers, wife and daughter can not be described in words.
I ask God daily why they should suffer due to me. No body
knows how many times the convicts who are sentenced
to death like me die and how many times they dream about
their being hanged and no body knows about this truth. No C
one who loves consciousness, humanity and truth do not
fear death. But with the aim of making sacrificial goat, after
being sentenced to death, and justice is not done for years
together and being harassed and under the
circumstances, there is every change for a man to
disintegrate. When one's life is unreasonably wasted, no D
human being can lead life without fear or suffering. This
confusion and fear is very bad misery. I have been suffering
this for many years. I request you to grant reduction of
punishment and render justice at the earliest."
E
In the subsequent letter dated 10.03.2007, addressed to the
President of India, the petitioner has stated:

"Sir, 16 years have passed since I and my wife were
imprisoned. The female child born to us in jail is suffering
F
without security and education as a nomad. During this
long time, the suffering undergone and undergoing now by
our family members can not be said in words. Thinking of
punishing me have punished my entire family. So, my life
in jail has become a living death."
G
In the same way, he also made several subsequent letters to
the President highlighting his pathetic position, torture, sufferings
of his family, etc.

25. In Transferred Case (Crl.) No. 2 of 2012 (T. Suthendraja
H
1110 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2014] 1 S.C.R.

A @ Santhan) in Writ Petition No. 20288 of 2011 filed before the
High Court and Transferred Case (Crl) No. 3 of 2012 (A.G.
Perarivalan @ Arivu) in Writ Petition No. 20289 of 2011 filed
before the High Court, both the petitioners/death convicts have
expressed their grievance in similar terms like the co-convict
B Murugan. These petitioners also sent similar letters to the
President highlighting their agony in the prison and prayed for
earlier disposal of their mercy petitions. They also highlighted
sufferings on account of solitary confinement, mental agony, etc.

26. Having perused all the averments specifically averred
C in the writ petitions as well as the copies of the communication
addressed to the Ministry of Home Affairs and to the President
of India and also in view of other information/materials available
in the affidavit filed before the High Court in the year 2011, we
are unable to accept the views expressed by learned Attorney
D General on this point.

Conclusion:

27. At the outset, we once again clarify that the relief sought
E for under these kind of petitions is not per se review of the order
passed under Article 72/161 of the Constitution on merits but
on the ground of violation of fundamental rights guaranteed
under the Constitution to all the citizens including the death row
convicts.

F 28. The clemency procedure under Article 72/161 provides
a r.ay of hope to the condemned prisoners and his family
members for commutation of death sentence into life
imprisonment and, therefore, the executive should step up and
exercise its time-honored tradition of clemency power
G guaranteed in the Constitution one-way or the other within a
reasonable time. Profuse deliberation on the nature of power
under Article 72/161 has already been said in Shatrughan
Chauhan (supra) and we embrace the same in the given case
as well.
H
V. SRIHARAN@ MURUGAN v. UNION OF INDIA 1111
[P. SATHASIVAM, CJI.]

29. We are confident that the mercy petitions filed under A
Article 72/161 can be disposed of at a much faster pace than
what is adopted now, if the due procedure prE)scribed by law
is followed in verbatim. The fact that no time limit is prescribed
to the President/Governor for disposal of the mercy petition
should compel the government to work in a more systematized B
manner to repose the confidence of the people in the institution
of democracy. Besides, it is definitely not a pleasure for this
Court to interfere in the constitutional power vested under Article
72/161 of the Constitution and, therefore, we implore upon the
government to render its advice to the President within a c
reasonable time so that the President is in a position to arrive
at a decision at the earliest.

30. Before we conclude, we would also like to stress on
one more aspect. We have learnt that the Union Government,
considering the nature of the power under Article 72/161, set D
out certain criteria in the form of circular for deciding the mercy
petitions. We hereby recommend that in view of the recent
jurisprudential development with regard to delay in execution,
another criteria may be added to the existing yardsticks so as
to require consideration of the delay that may have occurred E
in disposal of a mercy petition.

31. In the light of the above discussion and observations,
in the cases of V. Sriharan @ Murugan, T. Suthendraraja @
Santhan and A.G. Perarivalan @ Arivu, we commute their death F
sentence into imprisonment for life. Life imprisonment means
end of one's life, suoject to any remission granted by the
appropriate Government under Section 432 of the Code of
Criminal Procedure, 1973 which, in turn, is subject to the
procedural checks mentioned in the said provision and further G
substantive check in Section 433-A of the Code. All the writ
petitions are allowed on the above terms and the transferred
cases are, accordingly, disposed of.

R.P. Writ Petitions allowed &
Transferred Cases disposed of. H