Holding

The lease was for residential use only; a 'personal office' does not constitute a commercial or composite purpose, and eviction under Section 14(1)(c) of the Delhi Rent Control Act is valid.

Summary

The landlord sought eviction of the tenant under Section 14(1)(c) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958, alleging that the premises were let for a composite residential and office purpose, which would disqualify the tenancy from protection. The lease deed contained a clause stating the premises were to be used for "Residential/Personal office only and Not for commercial purposes." The tenant argued that the inclusion of a personal office made the tenancy composite and thus outside the Act's purview. The Delhi High Court reversed the Rent Controller's eviction order, holding that the word "office" meant a non‑residential purpose and that a composite purpose barred eviction. The Supreme Court, however, interpreted "personal office" as essentially residential, emphasizing the parties' intent to restrict use to residence and a private office, and restored the eviction order. The Court also granted the tenant a limited period to vacate, considering the difficulty of finding alternative accommodation.

Issues considered

The true meaning of the term 'personal office' in clause 12 of the lease deed.
Whether a tenancy for residential use with a personal office constitutes a composite purpose that removes the premises from the definition of residential accommodation under the Delhi Rent Control Act.
Whether eviction under Section 14(1)(c) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 is permissible in the present facts.

Legislation cited

Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958s. 14(1)(c)
Indian Evidence Act, 1872s. 90, s. 91, s. 92, s. 93, s. 94
Transfer of Property Act

Subjects

lease interpretationresidential tenancyevictionDelhi Rent Control Actpersonal officecontract constructioncomposite purpose

Judgment

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51
·v.S.TALWAR A.
.. .
v.
PREM CHANDRA SHARMA
March I, 1984
·s; MuRTAZA FAzAL Au, A. VARADARAIAN AND B.
RANGANATII M1s:KA, JJ. · ,
. •
_ Com true tion .0/ d~cument1, :Principie o/-'!'rut m·eaning of claUst 12 of th•
ieas~ deed dated 5.l .19687 Mealli•g of ''offic1"-Wh1th1r -'"p1rso11al OjjiceH .in
clause 12 would. mean that tht premi•eJ were ,,, out for composite purpostJ axi
not for residentia/'purPoseJ and th1rtfor• eVictio11 under 1ectio• .14(1} (•)of the
Delhi Rent Control Act~annot_l1e I -
c
,
Prem Chai:td Sharma was· admitted into- tenancy. of the suit prenlises
under a lease
. .
deed dated
.
5th- January,
. -
1968, clause 12, th~reof .
. provided: ·
''That the lessee shall use _the premises !Or the ptirpose of Re!identia\
··.n·.
.•
Personal '!ffice ·only a•d llOl for convrurcial Purp•ses!'. /. ·
•
'
. The landlord; appellant, applied to the Jtent Controller on Mar;:h 4, 1972,
(or· evicti_on of the Respondent under section 14(1) (c) of the Delhi Rent Control
Aci. 1958. Th~ re~p_o~dent tenant obtained ICaVe to contest and pleaded i111er
alia that the premises. were Jet out_ both for re1idential as also for office and the
· composite purpose of the.tenancY took the pre.mises out of the Purview of rcsi·
~Cntial accommodation. VTbe Coritroller did not accept tbC defence· and pasied · E.
- ' &n_orderforeviction. Inr~ision, however,_ the High Court.rejected.the Jand·
·.O lord's submissioD.: holding that the use ofthe_wOrd "personal" before ·~officeu
~ wa5intendcd to convey the idea that the-·tenancy. was not for the- purpose ot
~ accominodating a place of business· and reversed the decision of eviction. HenCe _
the appeal_ Dy. th~ lan~lord, after obtairitng special leave o! the C9ui-t.

' .
Allowing the ·appeal,
. the .Co'urt:
· -HE-LD: (ti The.word ~'offi~e"' is used in different senses and- in e3.~h·
case that mea_ning must· be assigned to it wh!Ch conform.s with the language
U,Jed. Therefore, in the instant case, the High Court was not right in. picking
..
one of· the meanings giyen .in· the chaffiber's dictionary aOd proc~ding to 'the
conclusion tha.t Hoffice'" is certainly ~'not residence'' and a Jetting purpose. which . ,
G ..
includes office must be undCrstood to include a_ purpose· other than residence ,
only. [54·A, 55A·B] · ..

. Macmillan v; Guest (1942) A.C. 561 ; Smt. Kaota Kathuria. v. Manak
· (:hand_Surana, (1970) 2s.c.c. 232, r~ferred to. · •.
• ..
52 SUPREME COURT REPORTS l!984) 3 S.C.R
·- 2:1. Law is fairly se.ttled that in construing a document the ordinary rule
is to give effect to the normal and natural meaning of the words employed in the
document itself. [55 D-El • '

. Krishna Bihari/al v. Guiab Chand and Others, [1971] Supp, S.C.R. 27;
D.D.A. v. D.C. Kaushish, (1974) I S.C.R. 535; MonypenilJ v. Monyp.nny, [186ll
9 H.j:..C. 114; In re: Meredith, e;,;-parte Chick, [1879] JI Cb. D. 731, referred
to. · · · . . •
'
2:2. In_thC instant case if;is clear thlit the parties.to the doc.ument were
B anxious enough and took prop·er care in order to keep the user of the premises
confined to resdential purpose; that is why it was expressly''.stipulated in· the lease
•
to prohibit commercial user. Even while permitting an office to be located, equal
care was taken to put the)word_ •personal' before -'Office' to convey the idea that the
tenant would not be ent!Ued tO transact official business connected with his avoca·
tion. Although .ordinarily an office would me'an the place where official business
c
J. is transacted, a personal office in contradistii1ction to an- office simpliciter ora- •
commercial office would be a place where an outsider would not normally be ·
admitted; commercial transactions would .not take place; there w"ould be no
fixity of the location and the tenant would be entitled to use· any portion of the
premises as his personal· office and the like. Such a place is referred to as -
personal office would essentially be residential and obviously while entering into
• the present -lease deed~ the parties were nof trYing to cteate a lease of premises
for any other purposes. In para 2 of the document, there was no descriptioµ of
D
an)' existin~· offic~room and av~ilable for such u_se to the tenant, nor was space
cal-marked' for any personal offiCe Out of this accommodation. It was in the
discretion of the lessee to use any part as a personal office. Every lessee, or for,-
the' matter of that every petson maintaiiiing an acceptable standard of living
does set ipart a porti6n of the aCcommodation available to hiin ·which can
J. ansWer tlie description of a personal office. .Even the clause relating to payment"
E of· iax by the fossor do not support the stand of the lessee. As contemplated·
under tlie Tran.t'er of Property Act a document of ·1ease normally provides· the .
rights and obiigations of both the lessor and the lessee. In. stipulating the rent"
payable for the use and occupation of the premises the lessor bad undertaken the
liability of payment of.taxes.as-described therein as long as the premises were
used for residence only. This clause necessarily me3.ns .that what had been
stipulated was only residential user. In fact, the lessor bad· been paying the
taxes and the lessee had not been called upon to share the burden. ·ibis clause
is an added prOvision to clinch the point in dispute against the tenant. There-
fore the High Court,·went Wrong in reversing the decision of the Rent Contro11er
by merely, relying upon clause 12 of the· lease deed. [SSC, 56F-G, 57A-B; D·E, ·
GR. ss' A·Bl
· 3. _ Though t}le .fact that the tenant has b~en in occupation. for more than.
14 years after the litigatiori began will djsentitlC him to any further- time· to.
G vacate, taking judicial notice of the fact that these days an alternative premises
would be very difficult to find, the Court considered it appropriate to grant time
to· tbi>,.Respondent: to yacatethe premises upto 31st December, 1984 subject to
furnishing usual undertakin~ within fo~r weeks or to face evictio!1 after f0\11'
wi;ek~,
v.S, :TALWAR v. P~EM <:liANDRA .(Rang11nath Misra, i.)
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : GivH Appeal No. 2999 Qf 1980.

Froni the judgment and order dated the 22nd April, '1980 of A
the High Court of Delhi at New Delhi in C.R. Petition No. ;336 of A
1979.

., · G:L. Sanghi, Mr. A.K. Ve,rma and S. Kashwafor the appellant'.
D.D. Tfiakur, P.H. Parekh, P.K. Menon and R.K. Sharma. fQr B
the respondent. "

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

• RANGANATH MISRf, J.-The Jandlor<l whose application for evic·
·tion of the tenant, respondent before us, 'was rejected by the High
Court by reversiiig the order of the. eviction passed by the Additional
Rent Controll~t has come before this Court on obtaining special leave
and the short ppint arising for consideration is as fo the true meaning
of a clause in the rent deed .

. .The respondent was ·admitted into tenancy of the premises 'in D
question under a lease deed dated 5th January, 1968. Clause '12
thereof provided :
•
"That the Jessee' shall use the premises for the pw:'pose ·of
Residential/ Personal office only and Not for commercial
purposes". · (underlinings are our own)
•
the landlord, appellant before us, applied to the Controller on March
14, 1972, fol' eviction ofihe respondent under Section 14 (I) '(e) of
the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 ('the Act' for short). The ten~t
obtained leave to contest and pleaded, inter alia, that the premises
were let out both for residential as also office ond the composite ·pur- p
pose of the tenancy took the premises out of the purview of reslden•
iial accommodation. the ·controller did not accept the <lefence '!rid
passed an order for eviction. Thereupon, the tenant carried a revi-
sion 10 the Delhi High Court. and reiterated his defence that lhe
tenancy was not for residential purpose. 'Fhe High Court found · that
·there was no infirmity in the finding about the bona fide requirement G
but adverting to the conclusion on the letting purpose held :

!'It is well known that premises tnay be let out .for residence
only, for use as an office·, for use as a shop alld for other com-
A
StJl'llllMB COURT REPORTS [1984j 3 S.C.R.
mercial purpose. Once any of the latter purposes is combined
with the purpose of use as residence, the premises let out for a
A . composite purpose and for residence only.

The meaning of the word 'office', not defined in the Act, in the
Chamber's dictio)lary is a place where business is carried on, Office
is certainly not residence and a lettint purpose which includes office }-

must be understood· to include a purpose other than residence,9nly".
B · And ultimately concluded by saying :

"CJapse (e) of Section 14(1) is availabl;: as. a ground to seek
eviction of tenants only, among other requirements, if the pre-
mise<i were let ·out for residence only and once the letting •
purpose is shown to be composite, an eviction petition under
c
•
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Section 14(1) (e), without more, must fail." •
•
The High Court rejected the landlord's submission that the use of the
word 'personal,.before 'office' was intended to convey the idea ·1hat
the tenancy was not for the purpose of accommodating a place of
D business._
• •
Counsel for the appellanttook us to the terms of clause 12 of
the lease agreement and emphasised on the feature that ~ommercial
purposes were clearly kept out and the lease was for residence and
authorised the location of a personal office. He also relied upon the
• i: description of the prembes as re_sidential in· the ap'plication made by
.
the tenant to the controller for fixation of fair rent in respect of the
.
very premises.

., The word 'office' is used in different senses and in each case that
. meaning must be assigned to it which conforms with. the language
F used. In Volume 67, Corpus Jµris Secundum at page 96, the follow-
ing statement appears : "The ten;n 'office' is one which is employed to
convey various meanings, and no one definition thereof can be relied
on for all purposes and occasions". This Court has approved. the
obser~ation Of Lord Wright in Macmillan v. Guest,1 where it was
G statecl :

"The word 'office' is of indefinite content. Its various meanings

(1) [1942] A.C. 561.
'r.l.l:..WAR v. PRBM CHANDRA (Ranganath Misra;.}.) 55
,
cover four columns of the New English Disctionary ......... "
See Smt. Kanta'Kathuria v. Ma~ak Chand Surana(l).-. In this view of the A
position the High Court was not right in picking one of the meanings
given to the word in the Chamber's dictiona,y and proceeding to the
conclusion that 'office'· is certainly not residence and a letting purpose
which includes office must be understood to in.elude a purpose other
than residence only.
B
Section 2(i) of the Act defines- 'premi$es' to mean "any building
or part of a building which. is, or is intended to be, le.t separately for
use as a residence or for commercial use or for any other purpose ..... .
... ... " Respondent's counsel has argued that tenancy under the Act
.can be for three · purpose ;,(l) residential, (2) commercial and (3)
for.any other purposes depending upon the use for which the premises
are let out. Conceding that thi:, definition is capable of such an
argumei;it being built up; a reference to the pleadings in this case
shows that the permission in the rent deed of Iocating a personal office •
had been stated to be a commercial purpose. Great eare seems to
have been taken by the-landlord while inducting the tenant under the
_rent deed to put a total prohibition to commercial user' of the pre-· D
mises. That is why in clause 12 it has been specifically stated .that it
is"'not for commercial purposes". In the back-drop of such a. provi-
sion in the lease agreement, the true meaning of the words 'personal
office' has to be found out. Law is fairly settle~ that in construing a
document the ordinary rule is to give effect to the normal and natural
meaning of the words employed in the d.ocument itself. See Krishna
Bihari/a/ v. Gulabchand and Ors. (') This Court in D.D.A. v. D.C.
Kaushish(') observed :
"There {at pages 28-29) 'Construction of Deeds and Statutes' by
Odger's (Stb ed. 1967) the First General Rule of "Interpretation p
formulated is : 'the meaning of the document or of a particular
part of it is therefore to be so11ght for in the document itself'.
That is, undoubtedly, the primary rule of construction to which
Sections 90 to 94 of the Indian Etjdence Act give statutory re cog.
nition and effect......... Of course, 'the doeument' means 'the
·document' read as a whole and not piecemeal.

(I) . [1970] 2 s.c.c. 232.
(2) [1971] Supp. S.C.R. 27,
(3) [1974) I S.C.R. 535.
;

[1984i 3 s.c.R.
The rule stated above follo"ws logically from the Literal
Rule gf Construction which, U{lless its application produces
A· absurd results must 0e resorted to first. Tbis is clear from the
following passages cited in Odgers' short book under the First
, Rule of Interpretation set out above :

Lord Wensleydale in M onypenny v. M onypenny1 said :

B "the question is not what the parties to a deed may have •.
intended to do by entering into that deed, but what is the
meaning of the words used. in that deed; a most important
. distinction in all cases of construction and the disregards of
which often leads to erroneous conclusions",

·c. Brett, L.J. ill Re Meredith, ex-parte Chick2 observed :

"I am c\isposed to follow the rule of construction which
• was laid down by Lord Denman and Baron Parke.~.... They
said that in.construing instruments you must have regard not to·
the presumed intention· of the parties, but to the meaning of the
D words which they haw used." •
Sinee we agree with this exposition of the law reference to the oral
evidence or even to the tenant's documents would be wholly out of
place. The. terms of the document if the.y make any good meaning
must be given effect to.
E
All the provisions of the lease deed have to be read and in fact.
with the assistance of counsel we h:ive read the same. more than once "
during the hearing. The ·parties to the document. were anxious
enough and took proper care in order to keep the user of the premises
confined to residential purpose; that is why it was expressly stipulated
F in the lease to prohibit commercial user. Even while permitting an office
to be located, equal care was taken to put the word 'personal' before
'office' to convey the idea that the tenant would not be entitled to
transact official business connected with his avocation. Although ordi-
narily an office would mean the pla1:e where official business. is transacted ·
a personal office in contradistinction to an office simpliciter or a com·
mercial office .would be a plallC where an outsider would not normally

(1) (1861] 9 H.LC. 114.
(2) [1879] ll Ch. D. 731.
~ ..
\/.$. f~LWR v. PRllM CHANDltA (Ranganath M;isra, i.) 57
be admitted;' commercial transactions would not take place; there .
wo~ltl be no fixity of the location and the tenant would be entitled to•
.
use any . portion of the premises
. as his personal office. and the like. ·
Such a place if referred to as personal office would essentially be res.i-
A

dential and obviously while entering into .the .present lease deed, the
parties wer.e not trying to create, a lease of premises for any other
· purposes .as now contended by Mr. Thakur for the respondent. · The
. High ·Court, therefore, went wr&ng .in reversing .the decision of the.
B .•
Rent Controller by merely relying upon clause 12 of the lease deed. ·

It is relevant to note the description of the premises as given in
the lease deed itself. Paragraph 2 of the document described the
premises thus :
c .;
"The lessor hereby leases to the lessee tlie following• described
-r· premises of the entire house built on plot No. 125. Greater
Kailash-1, New Delhi comprising of th_ree bed rooms with two
bath rooms, drawing-cum-dining room, one kitchen one front
...and central veranda, front and back lawn, garage, servant qu~r-
· 'i~r, above garage, a servant w<oc. and terrace." D •
··.;~, '

-·.· .
There w.as no,Aescription of any existing office room and available for
such use 'to the. tenant. nor was space earmarked for any personal office
of
out this accom_modation. As indicated above it was in the discre~·
tion''i>f the lessee to use any part as a personal office. Every lessee,'
E I
or for the matter of that every person maintaining· an acceptable
. standard of living does set apart a portion of the accommodation .
available to him which can answer the description of a personal office.
•
Mr. Thakur placed reliance• on another clause of the lease deed
, which reads as follow1 :

"That the lessor .shall pay all the taxes of any kind whatsoever
including house tax, ground rent as are of. may hereinafter be
assessed on the demised premises by the municipality or any
other authority whatsoever provided the premises are used for
residence only."

We do not think the terms of this clause . support the stand of the
lessee. As Contemplated under the Transfer or Property Act a docn•
meat of lease normally provid'es the rights and obligations of both the

•
58 [198.:IJ 3S.C.R•.
lessor and the lesses. In stipulating the rent payable for the use and
oq:upation of the premises t_he lessor had undertaken the liability of
A . , payment of taxes as described therein as long as the premises were. used
for residence oply. This clause necessarily means that what had been ·
stipulated was only residential user. It is appropriate to take note. of
the admission of Mr. Thakur. that . the lessor had been paying the
taxes and the lessee has not been called upon to share the burden.
This clause is an added provision to clinclt the poiqt in dispute against
B the tenant.

We are, therefore, of the view that the High Court cka{IY erred
in law in reversing the decision of the Controller allowing the
eviction. The appeal is allowed and tl)e order of the High Court is .
c ·.·~
set aside and the order of the Additional Rent Controller is restored.
Parties are directed to bear their respective cost throughout.

This is a litigatii>n which began in 1970. The tenant has been
in occupition and continuing for about 14 years now after the ap~li
cation for eviction had been filed. Ordinarily we would not have
allowed any time to the tenant keeping this aspect in view: But Mr.
D
·· Thakur bas urged upon us to lake judiciai notice Qf the fact that these
· days an alternative premises would be very difficult to find. We allow
time to the tenant until 30th December, 1984 to vacate the prelnises
subject to furnishing usual.u.ndertaking within four weeks from towiy.
In the absence of the undertaking the tenant becomes liable to eviction
E . after four weeks. •

S.R. . Appeal allowed

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