V. MEKALAversusM. MALATHI & ANR.

                        [2014) 5 S.C.R. 774

A                            V. MEKALA
                                  v.
                         M. MALATHI & ANR.
                  (Civil Appeal No. 4880 of 2014)
                           APRIL 25, 2014
B
     [GYAN SUDHA MISRA AND V. GOPALA GOWDA, JJ.]

        Motor Vehicles Act, 1988:

c       s. 166 - Motor accident - Just and reasonable
  compensation - 16 years old bright student became
  permanently disabled - Compensation under the head 'loss
  of earning', 'pain and suffering', ' loss of amenities', 'loss of
  enjoyment of marriage' etc. - Held: High Court on the. basis
0 of medical evidence has rightly arrived at the conclusion that
  appellant has suffered 70% of permanent disablement -
  However, the assumption of courts below as regards monthly
  notional income of 6, 0001- is on the lower side - Appellant is
  a brilliant student as she has secured first rank in 10th
E Standard, she would have had a better future in terms of
  educational career and employment prospects, which are lost
  as a result of her being permanently disabled - Therefore,
  for computation of just and reasonable compensation, under
  the head 'loss of income', her monthly income is to be taken
  as Rs. 10, 0001- and 50% of it to be added towards future
F prospects of income - Compensation towards pain and
  suffering enhanced to Rs.2,00,0001- - Compensation under
  head loss of amenity and attendant charges enhanced to
  Rs. 2, 00, 0001- - Compensation under head of 'loss of
  enjoyment of life and marriage prospects' enhanced to
G Rs. 3, 00, 0001- - Rs. 50, 0001- for purchase of crutches and
  Rs.25,0001- towards cost of litigation also awarded-Appellant,
  thus, entitled to a total compensation of Rs. 30, 93, 0001- with
  9% interest from date of application till payment.

H                                774
              V. MEKALA v. M. MALATHI                      775

     s. 166 - Motor accident claim - Period taken in disposal     A
- Inflation - Effect of - Held: Having regard to undisputed
fact that there has been inflation of money since the accident,
the same has to be taken into account by Tribunal and
appellate court while awarding compensation to claimant-
 .
appellant as per the principle laid down by Supreme Court.        B

    The appellant, a 16 years old student of class 11
holding first rank in her school, met with an accident and
sustained serious injuries making her permanently
disabled. The Tribunal granted her compensation of Rs.            C
6,46,000 and the High Court enhanced it to
Rs. 18,22,000/-. The claimant filed the instant appeal
contending that the High Court erred in taking her
notional income as Rs. 6,000 per month. It was her case
that she was a brilliant student and could have got
professional degree and atleast could have earned a sum           D
of Rs. 18,0001- per month.

    The question for consideration before the court was:
whether the claimant-appellant was entitled to
enhancement of compensation under the heads, namely,              E
loss of earning, pain and suffering, loss of amenities, loss
of enjoyment of marriage prospects and the cost of
crutches?

     Allowing the appeal the court
                                                                  F
     HELD: ·1.1. Upon examination of the claimant-
appellant, the Doctor-PW2 has opined that she is not able
to squat, her disability is ascertained at 70%. PW 2, has
stated in his evidence that the appellant has sustained
fracture in both bones in both the legs, the knee folding         G
is restricted, and the legs could not be stretched fully and
the knee bones are mal-united and the appellant cannot
walk without crutches. The doctor has also stated that
the appellant is suffering from severe pain while walking
and further the thickness of the appellant's both legs has        H
   776      SUPREME COURT REPORTS              [2014] 5 S.C.R.

A been reduced. The evidence of PW2 has been accepted
  by the Tribunal and concurred by the High Court. The
  High Court on the basis of medical evidence on record
  has rightly arrived at the conclusion that the appellant
  has suffered 70% of permanent disablement. [para 5, 12
B and 14] [781-E; 785-G-H; 786-A-B; 787-A-B]

         Raj Kumar v. Ajay Kumar and Anr. 2010 (13) SCR 179 =
   (2011) 1 sec 343 - relied on.

      1.2. However, the assumption of the courts below as
C regards monthly notional income of 6,000/- is on the
  lower side. The appellant is a brilliant student as she has
  secured first rank in the 10th Standard, she would have
  had a better future in terms of educational career to
  acquire basic or master degrees in the professional
D courses and she could have got a suitable public or
  private employment, but on account of permanent
  disablement she suffered due to injuries sustained by her
  in the accident, that opportunity is lost to her and,
  therefore, she is entitled to compensation as per law laid
E down by this Court. [para 14-15] [787-8-C, 788-A-C]
        R.D. Hattangadi v. Pest Control (India) Pvt. Ltd. & Ors.
   1995 (1) SCR 75   =
                     (1995) 1 SCC 551; Govind Yadav v; New
   India Insurance Company Limited (2011) 10 SCC 683; and
   Raj Kumar v. Ajay Kumar and Anr. 2010 (13) SCR 179 =
F (2011) 1 sec 343 - relied on.
       1.3. Further, having regard to the undisputed fact that
  there has been inflation of money since the occurrence
  of the accident, the same has to be taken into account
G by the Tribunal and appellate court while awarding
  compensation to the claimant-appellant as per the
  principle laid down by this Court. [para 16] [788-C-D]
       Govind Yadav v. New India Insurance Company Limited
   (2011) 10 SCC 683; and Reshma Kumari v. Madan Mohan
H 2009 (11) SCR 305 = (2009) 13 sec 422 - relied on.
              V. MEKALA v. M. MALATHI                     777

     1.4. As regards the plea of respondent No.2 that the        A
appellant can still finish her education and find
employment and, therefore, there is no necessity to
enhance the amount of compensation under the head of
'loss of income' and 'future prospects', it is pertinent to
note that the claimant/ appellant has been undergoing            B
substantial pain and suffering due to the accident which
has rendered both her legs dysfunctional. This has
reduced the scope of her future prospects including her
marriage substantially. Moreover, a tortfeasor is not
entitled to dictate the terms of the claimants-appellants        c
career. [para 17) [789-B-D]

   K. Narsimha Murthy v. The Manager, Oriental Insurance .
Company Ltd and Anr. ILR 2004 KARNATAKA 2471 - relied
on.
                                                                 D
     1.5. In the light of the principles laid down in the case
of Reshma Kumari, it would be just and proper for this
Court, keeping in mind past results of the appellant, to
take 10,000/- as her monthly notional income for
computation of just and reasonable compensation under            E
the head of loss of income. Further, the High-Court has
failed to take into consideration the future prospects of
income based on the principles laid down by this Court.
Therefore, the appellant is justified in seeking for re-
enhancement under this head as well and this Court               F
holds that the claimant-appellant is entitled to 50%
increase under this head as per the principle laid down
by this Court in the case of Santosh Devi. Therefore,
taking both the aspects into account, the total amount of
compensation under this head is calculated as                    G
Rs.22,68,000/-. [para 19) [791-C-E; 792-G]
     Santosh Devi v. National Insurance Company Ltd. &
                         =
Ors. 2012 (3) SCR 1178 (2012) 6 sec 421 - relied on.

      1.6. The compensation under the head pain and              H
   778     SUPREME COURT REPORTS              [2014] 5 S.C.R.


A suffering and mental agony was awarded by the High
  Court after recording concurrent finding with the award
  passed by the Tribunal. However, the courts below have
  not recorded the nature of the permanent disablement
  sustained by the appellant, while awarding 1,00,000/-
B under this head which is too meager an amount and is
  contrary to the judgments of this Court. Therefore, under
  this head the amount awarded should be enhanced to
  2,00,000/- as the Doctor-PW2 has opined that at the time
  of walking with support of crutches, the claimant-
C appellant will be suffering pain permanently. [para 20]
  [792-G-H; 793-A,F]                                .

      1.7. The loss of amenity and attendant. charges
  awarded by the courts below at 1,00,000/- is also too
  meager an amount as the appellant has permanently lost
D her amenity of both the legs. For the purpose of walking,
  squatting, running and also studying throughout her life
  and, particularly, at the advanced age, she will be
  requiring an attendant throughout. Therefore, the
  compensation under this head is required to be enhanced
E from 1,00,000/- to 2,00,000/- based upon the principle laid
  down by this court in Govind Yadav case. [para 21] [793-
  G-H; 794-A·B]

      1.8. The amount of compensation awarded under the
F head of 'Loss of enjoyment of life and marriage
  prospects' at 2,00,000/- is totally inadequate since the
  appellant's marriage prospect has substantially reduced
  and on account of permanent disablement she will be
  deprived of enjoyment of life. Therefore, it would be just
G and proper to enhance the compensation from 2,00,000/
  - to 3,00,000/-. In so far as, purchase of crutches
  periodically, it would be just and proper to award a sum
  of 50,000/-. [para 22] [794-D-F]

      1.9. Further, the accident had taken place on
H 11.4.2005 and the claimant- appellant, since then has
               V. MEKALA v. M. MALATHI                     779

been fighting for justice. Therefore, she is rightfully _A
entitled to the 'cost of litigation', which is assessed at
25000/-. [para 23) [794-F-H]
    Bairam Prasad v. Kuna/ Saha & Ors. (2014) 1 SCC 384
- relied on.
                                                                   B
       1.10. Thus, the claimant-appellant is entitled to a total
amount of 30,93,000/- as compensation with an interest
@ 9% per annum from the date of filing of the application
till the date of payment. Insurance Company shall deposit
the amount as directed.[para 24 and 25) [795-A-C]                  c
     Municipal Corporation of Delhi, Delhi v. Uphaar Tragedy
                                                  =
Victims Association & Ors. 2011 (16) SCR 1 (2011) 14
sec 481 - relied on.
                      Case Law Reference:
                                                                   D
  2012 (3) SCR 1178               relied on           para 3
  1995 (1) SCR 75                 relied on           para 5
   (2011) 10 sec 683              relied on           para 6
                                                                   E
  2010 (13) SCR 179                relied on          para 13
  2009 (11) SCR 305                relied on          para 16
  ILR 2004 KARNATAKA 2471 relied on                   para 17
  (2014) 1 sec 384                 relied on          para 23      F

  2011 (16) SCR 1                  relied on          para 24
    CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No.
4880 of 2014.
                                                                   G
    From the Judgment & Order dated 31.08.2012 of the High
Court of Madras in CMA No. 2131 of 2008.

     T. Harish Kumar for the·Appellant.

     Manjeet Chawla for the Respondent.                            H
    780      SUPREME COURT REPORTS                 [2014] 5 S.C.R.


A         The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

          V. GOPALA GOWDA, J. 1. Leave granted.

       2. This appeal is preferred by the injured-claimant as she
  was aggrieved by the impugned judgment and award dated
B 31.8.2012 passed by the High Court of Judicature at Madras
  in C.M.A. No. 2131 of 2008 even though it has enhanced the
  compensation from Rs. 6,46,000/- to Rs. 18,22,000/- with
  interest at the rate of 7.5% per annum from the date of filing
  the claim petition under various heads urging various facts and
C grounds in justification of her claim.

         3. The claimant-appellant is aggrieved by the determination
  .of monthly notional income of the deceased by the High Court
   by taking a meager sum of Rs. 6,000/- instead of Rs. 18,000/
0  - per month as she is a student studying in the 11th Standard
   holding first rank in her school. She had an excellent career
   ahe!ad of her but for the accident in which she has sustained
   grievous injuries and has become a permanently disabled. Both
   the Motor Accident Claim Tribunal, Poonamallee (for short "the
E Tribunal") as well as the High Court of Judicature at Madras
   failed to take into consideration all the relevant legal aspects
   of the matter namely, having arrived at the conclusion that on
   account of permanent total disablement suffered by the
   claimant-appellant on account of injuries sustained in the
   accident her future loss of income should have been assessed
F taking into consideration, her age at the time of accident which
   was 16 and that she is a brilliant student and could have
   acquired professional degree and procured a well paid job
   either in public or private sector thereby at least she would have
   earned a sum of Rs. 18,000/- per month. Also, the future
G prospects of revision of wages, dearness allowance,
   increments and promotional benefits could have been earned/
   by her. However, because of the accident caused by rash and
   negligent act of the driver of the offending vehicle of the owner-
   respondent she has been deprived of her potential income to
H eke out a comfortable livelihood as she has b~comel
                 V. MEKALA v. M. MALATHI                      781
                   [V. GOPALA GOWDA, J.]
permanently disabled, this legal and factual aspect has not           A
been taken into consideration both by the Tribunal and the High
Court. Therefore, she placed reliance upon the law laid down
by this Court in the case of Santosh Devi v. National Insurance
Company Ltd. & Ors., 1 having regard to her age, 50% of the
future prospects should have been added by both the Tribunal          B
and Appellate Court to the notional monthly income that could
be fixed for determination of the loss of earning as she had lost
her earning capacity as she has become permanently disabled.
Therefore, the compensation under this head of loss of earnings
is required to be enhanced considerably.                              c
     4. The second ground sought to be pressed into operation
by the learned counsel on behalf of the claimant-appellant is
that the concurrent finding of fact recorded by the High Court
on the basis of evidence of Doctor-PW2, who has examined
the appellant, who has made observations regarding the nature         D
of her injuries which will be recorded in the later part of this
judgment.

       5. Upon examination of the claimant-appellant, the Doctor-
  PW2 opined that she is not able to squat, her disability is         E
  ascertained at 70%, therefore, she is not able to sit with cross
· legged comfortably on the floor and the right range of movement
  (Gionimeter) - fixed flexim deformity of 850 - ligam~nt
  instability present on account of grievous injuries sustained by
  her in the unfortunate accident. Therefore, PW2 has assessed        F
  the permanent disability of the claimant-appellant at 70% and
  to this effect he has issued Ex. P12-the Disability Certificate
  and the same was marked as an exhibit in justification of the
  claim for awarding just and reasonable compensation under the
  loss of earning, pain and suffering, loss of amenities and mental   G
  agony. The above said substantial piece of evidence in the form
  of disability certificate on record has not been taken into
  consideration in the proper perspective by the High Court
  though it has concurred with the finding of fact recorded by the
 1.   c2012) 6 sec 421.                                               H
    782       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                 [2014] 5 S.C.R.


A Tribunal in re-appreciating the evidence on record. The legal
  aspect of the matter regarding the quantum of compensation
  is required to be dismissed and awarded to compensate for
  human pain and suffering and deprivation of happiness and
  enjoyment of personal life of the claimant. The compensation
B that would be awarded can not be equated with the human
  sufferings or personal deprivation as observed by this Court in
  the case of R.D. Hattangadi v. Pest Control (India) Pvt. Ltd.
  & Ors. 2 •

       6. Both the Tribunal and Appellate Court were required to
C consider the fall in the value of money which requires continuing
  reassessment of these awards and periodic reassessments of
  damages at certain key points in the pattern where the disability
  is readily identifiable and are not subject to large variations in
  individual cases as held in the case of R.D. Hattangadi.(supra).
D Therefore, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the
  claimant-appellant submits that pain and suffering, loss of
  amenities having lost both the limbs which are the relevant
  important material facts which have been completely ignored
  by both the Tribunal and the High Court while determining the
E just and reasonable compensation under the aforesaid heads
  while awarding compensation in favour of the claimant.
  Therefore, learned counsel for the appellant requested this
  Court for an award of just & reasonable compensation under
  the aforesaid heads by applying the legal principles laid down
F by this Court in the cases referred to supra. In support of his
  contention, the learned counsel has correctly relied upon the
  principle laid down in the case of R.D. Hattangadi (supra)
  which was reiterated in the case of Govind Yadav v. New India
  Insurance Company Limited3, it would be appropriate to
G extract certain relevant paragraphs of R.D. Hattangadi case,
  which read as under:

          "10. In cannot be disputed that because of the accident the
   2.   (1995) 1 sec 551.
H 3. c2011) 10 sec 683.
              V. MEKALA v. M. MALATHI                       783
               [V. GOPALA GOWDA, J.]
    appellant who was an active practising lawyer has become        A
    paraplegic on account of the injuries sustained by him. It
    is really difficult in this background to assess the exact
    amount of compensation for the pain and agony suffered
    by the appellant and for having become a life long
    handicapped. No amount of compensation can restore the          s
    physical frame of the appellant. That is why it has been
    said by courts that whenever any amount is determined as
    the compens?tion payable for any injury suffered during an
    accident, the object is to compensate such injury "so far
    as money can compensate" because it is impossible to            c
    equate the money with the human sufferings or personal
    deprivations. Money cannot renew a broken and shattered
    physical frame.

    11. In the case Ward v. James [1965) 1 All E.R. 563 it was
    said:                                                           D

    Although you cannot give a man so gravely injured much
    for his "lost years", you can, however, compensate him for
    his loss during his shortened span, that is, during his
    expected "years of survival". You can compensate him for        E
    his loss of earnings during that time, and for the cost of
    treatment, nursing and attendance. But how can you
    compensate him for being rendered a helpless invalid? He
    may owing to brain injury, be rendered unconscious for the
    rest of his days, or, owing to back injury, be unable to rise   F
    from his bed. He has lost everything that makes life worth-
    while. Money is no good to him. Yet judges and juries have
    to do the best they can and give him what they think is fair.
    No wonder they find it well nigh insoluble. They are being
    asked to calculate the incalculable. The figure is bound to     G
    be for the most part a conventional sum. The judges have
    worked out a pattern, and they keep it in line with the
    change in the value of money."

      7. The learned counsel for the appellant further submitted
that the claimant-appellant has been deprived of the enjoyment      H
    784     SUPREME COURT REPORTS                 [2014] 5 S.C.R.

A of life as well as the marital prospects. Further, the concurrent
  finding recorded by the High Court in the impugned judgment
  shows that the appellant on account of the knee injuries and
   permanent disablement and mal-united knee bones, she is
  unable to walk without crutches and she is suffering from
s severe pain while walking and further the thickness of both the
  legs are also reduced due to the injuries sustained by her in
  accident and multiple surgeries were conducted on her. This
  relevant aspect should have been taken into consideration both
  by the Tribunal and the High Court. Further, she has to use
c crutches throughout her life for mobility which she is required
  to periodically purchase, the cost of which has not been
  awarded either by the Tribunal or by the High Court. Therefore,
  the' learned counsel for the appellant has requested this Court
  to ~ward suitable compensation keeping in view the above
  mentioned facts.
0
        8. On the other hand, Ms. Manjeet Chawla, the learned
  counsel on behalf of the respondent No. 2-lnsurance Company
  sought to justify the impugned judgment and award contending
  that the High Court after re-appreciation of the pleadings and
E evidence on record has exorbitantly enhanced the
  compensation under the various heads mentioned in the
  impugned judgment such as pain and suffering, permanent
  disablement, medical expenses, transport expenses, extra
  nourishment, loss of future career and loss of marriage
F prospects. Therefore, this is not a fit case for this Court to
  enhance the compensation as prayed in this case by the
  ~claimant-appellant.

        9. Further, the learned counsel for the respondent No. 2
G submits that the claimant-appellant can continue her studies by
  attending to the college and get either the public employment
  or alternative private employment on completion of her studies.
  In such circumstances, seeking for enhancement of
  compensation either under the head of loss of earning or future
  prospects as claimed by the claimant-appellant, is not
H
              V. MEKALA v. M. MALATHI                         785
               [V. GOPALA GOWDA, J.]
justifiable in law. Therefore, the learned counsel for the            A
respondent No.2 has prayed for dismissal of the Civil Appeal.

    10. With reference to the above rival factual and legal
conterttions, this Court is required to examine:-

      (1)    Whether the claimant-appellant is entitled to            B
            enhancement of compensation under the following
            heads namely, loss of earning, pain and suffering,
            loss of amenities, loss of enjoyment of marriage
            prospects and the cost of crutches?
                                                                      c
      (2)   What award?

     11. The first question is required to be answered in favour
of the claimant-appellant for the following reasons :-

     Having regard to the nature of following injuries sustained      D
by the appellant in the accident which is an undisputed fact :-

    "Right lower limb: Hypertrophic scar extending from distal
    thigh to distal 2/3rd of right leg circumferentially. Decreased
    sensation over the M/3rd of Right leg.                            E

    Left leg: Hypertrophic scar over middle 3rd to distal 3rd
    of left leg and with patchy areas decreased sensation over
    the scar.

    Muscle wasting of both the legs present.                          F

    Right Ankle: Equinous deformity of Right ankle of 1st
    present. Fixed Flexim deformity of II Joints of toes about
    1Oth present."

     12. The Doctor-PW 2, has stated in his evidence that the         G
appellant has sustained fracture in both bones in both the legs,
the knee folding is restricted between 25 degree to 85 degree
and the legs could not be stretched fully and the knee bones
are mal-united and the :appellant cannot walk without crutches.
The doctor also stated that the appellant is suffering from           H
    786           SUPREME COURT REPORTS                 [2014] 5 S.C.R.


A   severe pain while walking and fu.rther the thickness of the
    appellant's both legs were reduced.

       13. The aforesaid evidence of the Doctor-PW2 is
  accepted by the Tribunal and concurred by the High Coart, the
B High Court came to the right conclusion that the appellant has
  sustained permanent disablement, the same is in conformity
  with the principle laid down by this Court in the case of Raj
  Kumar v. Ajay Kumar and Anr. 4 at para 12, which reads thus:

          "12. Therefore, the Tribunal has to first decide whether
C         there is any permanent disability and, if so, the extent of
          such permanent disability. This means that the Tribunal
          should consider and decide with reference to· the evidence:

           (i)     whether the disablement is permanent or
0                  temporary;

           (ii)    if the disablement is permanent, whether it is ·
                   permanent total disablement or permanent partial ·
                   disablement;

E          (iii)   if the disablement percentage is expressed with
                   reference to any specific limb, then the effect of
                   such disablement of the limb on the functioning of
                   the entire body, that is, the permanent disability !
                   suffered by the person.                            :
F
          If the Tribunal concludes that there is no permanent
          disability then there is no question of proceeding further
          and determining the loss of future earning capacity. But if
          the Tribunal concludes that there is permanent disability
          then it will proceed to ascertain its extent. After the Tribunal
G         ascertains the actual extent of permanent disability of the
          claimant based on the medical evidence, it has to
          ~etermine whether such permanent disability has affected
          or will affect his earning capacity."

H 4.   c2011) 1 sec 343.
              V. MEKALA v. M. MALATHI                        787
               [V. GOPALA GOWDA, J.]
     14. The High Court on the basis of medical evidence on         A
record with reference to the fractures sustained by the appellant
to both the legs, rightly arrived at the conclusion that she has
suffered 70% of permanent disablement and therefore she was
awarded the compensation under the head of loss of earning
in the impugned judgment taking into account monthly notional       B
income of Rs. 6,000/- in the absence of any document on record
as she was a student. This assumption of the courts below is
on the lower side in view of the observations made by this Court
in R.D. Hattangadi (supra). The said principle is reiterated in
Govind Yadav (supra). The relevant para from R.D. Hattangadi        c
is extracted below :

    "14. In Halsbury's Laws of England, 4th Edition, Vol. 12
    regarding non-pecuniary loss at page 446 it has been said:

    Non-pecuniary loss; the pattern. Damages awarded for            D
    pain and suffering and loss of amenity constitute a
    conventional sum which is taken to be the sum which
    society deems fair, fairness being interpreted by the courts
    in the light of previous decisions. Thus there has been
    evolved a set of conventional principles providing a            E
    provisional guide to the comparative severity o_f different
    injuries, and indicating a bracket of damages into which
    a particular injury will currently fall. The particular
    circumstances of the plaintiff, including his age and any
    unusual deprivation he may suffer, is reflected in the actual   F
    amount of the award.

    The fall in the value of money leads to a continuing
    reassessment of these awards and to periodic
    reassessments of damages at certain key points in the
    pattern where the disability is readily identifiable and not    G
    subject to large variations in individual cases."

                                  (Emphasis laid by the Court)

     15. In view of the aforesaid judgments of this Court and
                                                                    H
    788       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                   [2014] 5 S.C.R.

A the fact that the appellant is a brilliant student as she has
  secured first rank in the 10th Standard, she would have had a
  better future in terms of educational career to acquire basic or
  master degrees in the professional courses and she could have
  got a suitable either public or private employment but on
B account of permanent disablement she suffered due to injuries
  sustained by her in the accident, that opportunity is lost to her
  and therefore, she is entitled to compensation as per law laid
  down by this Court in the cases of Raj Kumar, R.D. Hattangadi
  and Govind Yadav (supra).
c      16. Further, having regard to the undisputed fact that there
  has been inflation of money in the country since the occurrence
  of the accident, the same has to be taken into account by the
  Tribunal and Appellate Court while awarding compensation to
  the claimant-appellant as per the principle laid down by this court
D in the case of Govind Yadav which has reiterated the position
  of Reshma Kumari v. Madan Mohan 5 case, the relevant
  paragraph of which reads as under:

          "46. In the Indian context several other factors should be
E         taken into consideration including education of the
          dependants and the nature of job. In the wake of changed
          societal conditions and global scenario, future prospects
          may have to be taken into consideration not only having
          regard to the status of the employee, his educational
F         qualification; his past performance but also other relevant
          factors, namely, the higher salaries and perks which are
          being offered by the private companies these days. In fact
          while determining the multiplicand this Court in Oriental
          Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Jashuben held that even dearness
          allowance and perks with regard thereto from which the
G
          family would have derived monthly benefit, must be taken
          info consideration."
          17. The fact that the appellant was a brilliant student at the

H   s.   (2009) 13 sec 422.
                V. MEKALA v. M. MALATHI                         789
                 [V. GOPALA GOWDA, J.]
  time of the accident should also be taken into consideration A
  while awarding compensation to her. Therefore, taking 6,000/
  - as monthly notional income by the Tribunal for the purpose of
  awarding compensation under this head is too meager an
  amount. The learned counsel appearing for the respondent
  No.2 contended that the appellant can still finish her education B
  and find employment and therefore, there is no necessity to
  enhance the amount of compensation under the head of 'loss
  of income' and 'future prospects'. It is pertinent to reiterate here
  that the claimant/ appellant has undergone and undergoing
' substantial pain and suffering due to the accident which has c
  rendered both her legs dysfunctional. This has reduced the
  scope of her future prospects including her marriage
  substantially. Moreover, a tortfeasor is not entitled to dictate the
  terms of the claimants-appellants career as has been held by
  the Karnataka High Court in the case of K. Narsimha Murthy 0
  v. The Manager, Oriental Insurance Company Ltd and Anf
  ILR 2004 KARNATAKA 2471, the relevant paragraph of which
  reads as under:

      "41 ..... Further, it needs to be emphasized that it is not
      the right of the tortfeasor or a person who has taken over        E
      the liability of the tortfeasor in terms of and under the Act
      to dictate that the injured person should do some other
      work, manual or otherwise, it does not matter, may be with
      pain and discomfort, in order to minimize his or its liability.
      Such insistence is untenable in law and if such is the case,      F
      it would violate basic human rights of the injured person.
      In this case, the appellant is reduced to such a state that
      he is unable to do any work, m~nual or otherwise, without
      subjecting himself to pain and suffering, agony and
      discomfort. In an accident, if a man is disabled for a work       G
      which he was doing before the accident, that he has no
      talents, skill, experience or training for anything else and
      he is unable to find any work, manual or clerical, such a
      man for all practical purposes has lost all earning capacity
      he possessed before and he is required to be                      H
    790       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                    [2014] 5 S.C.R.

A         compensated on the basis of total loss. In reaching this
          conclusion we may derive support from the judgments in
          Daniels v. Sir Robert Mc Alpine and Sons Limited and
          Blair v. FJC Lilley (Marine) Limited. Secondly, the physical
          incapacity to earn income sustained by the appellant is not
B         temporary, but permanent and complete as per Exhibit P.
          43. Thirdly, it cannot be said that since the appellant has
        . sustained only 54% permanent physical disability in
          respect of the whole body as per P.W. 3, the Court should
          take into account functional disability also at 54% only
c        while assessing the loss of earning capacity. Such
          hypothesis does not stand to reason nor can it be accepted
         as valid in terms of law. An injured person is compensated
          for the loss which he incurs as a result of physical injury
          and not for physical injury itself. In other words,
          compensation is given only for what is lost due to accident
          in terms of an equivalent in money insofar as the nature of
          money admits for the loss sustained. In an accident, if a
          person loses a limb or eye or sustains an injury, the Court
         while computing damages for the loss of organs or
          physical injury, does not value a limb or eye in isolation,
E         but only values totality of the harm which the loss has
          entailed the loss of amenities of life and infliction of pain
         and suffering: the loss of the good things of life, joys of life
          and the positive infliction of pain and distress."

F        18. Further, it has been· held in the case of Resh ma
    Kumari (supra) that certain relevant factors should be taken into
    consideration while awarding compensation under the head of
    future prospect of income. The relevant paragraph read as
    under:
G
          "27. The question as to the methodology required to be
          applied for determination of compensation as regards
          prospective loss of future earnings, however, as far as
          possible should be based on certain principles. A person
          may have a bright future prospect; he might have become
H
               V. MEKALA v. M. MALATHI                        791
                [V. GOPALA GOWDA, J.]
     eligible to promotion immediately; there might have been         A
     chances of an immediate pay revision, whereas in another
     the nature of employment was such that he might not have
     continued in service; his chance of promotion, having
     regard to the nature of employment may be distant or
     remote. It is, therefore, difficult for any court to lay down    B
     rigid tests which should be applied in all situations. There
     are divergent views. In some cases it has been suggested
     that some sort of hypotheses or guess work may be
     inevitable. That may be so."

     19. Therefore, in the light of the principles laid down in the   C
aforesaid case, it would be just and proper for this Court, and
keeping in mind her past results we take Rs. 10,000/- as her
monthly notional income for computation of just and reasonable
compensation under the head of loss of income. Further, the
High Court has failed to take into consideration the future           D
prospects of income based on the principles laid down by this
Court in catena of cases referred to supra. Therefore, the
appellant is justified in seeking for re-enhancement under this
head as well and we hold that the claimant-appellant is entitled
to 50% increase under this head as per the principle laid down        E
by this Court in the case of Santosh Devi (supra). The relevant
paragraph reads as under:

    "13. In Sar/a Verma's case (supra), another. two Judge
    Bench considered various factors relevant for determining
    the compensation payable in cases involving motor
                                                                      F
    accidents, noticed apparent divergence in the views
    expressed by this Court in different cases, referred to large
    number of precedents including the judgments in U.P.
    SRTC v. Trilok Chandra (1996) 4 SCC 362, Nance v.
    British Columbia Electric Railway Company Ltd. 1951               G
    AC 601, Davies v. Powell Duffryn Associated Collieries
    Ltd: 1942 AC 601 and made an attempt to limit the
    exercise of discretion by the Tribunals and the High Courts
    in the matter of award of compensation by laying down
    straightjacket formula under different headings, some of          H
    792       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                   [2014] 5 S.C.R.

A         which are enumerated below:

          (i) Addition to income for future prospects

          In Susamma Thomas this Court increased the income by
          nearly 100%, in Sarla Dixit the income was increased only
B         by 50% and in Abati Bezbaruah the income was increased
          by a mere 7%. In view of the imponderables and
          uncertainties, we are in favour of adopting as a rule of
          thumb, an addition of 50% of actual salary to the actual
          salary income of the deceased towards future prospects,
c         where the deceased had a permanent job and was below
          40 years. (Where the annual income is in the taxable
          range, the words "actual salary" should be read as "actual
          salary less tax"). The addition should be only 30% if the
          age of the deceased was 40 to 50 years. There should
D         be no addition, where the age of the deceased is more
          than 50 years.

          Though the evidence may indicate a different percentage
          of increase, it is necessary to standardise the addition to
          avoid different yardsticks being applied or different
E
          methods of calculation being adopted. Where the
          deceased was self-employed or was on a fixed salary
          (without provision for annual increments, etc.), the courts
          will usually take only the actual income at the time of death.
          A departure therefrom should be made only in rare and
F         exceptional cases involving special circumstances.

      Therefore, taking both the aspects into account, the total
  amount of compensation under this head is calculated as
  Rs.22,68,000/- [(Rs.10,000/-x 70/100 + 10,000 x 70/100 x 501
G 100) x 12 x 18]

      20. The compensation under the head pain & suffering and
  mental agony was awarded by the High Court after recording
  concurrent finding with the award passed by the Tribunal. I
H However, the courts below have not recorded the nature of the:
               V. MEKALA v. M. MALATHI                        793
                [V. GOPALA GOWDA, J.]
permanent disablement sustained by the appellant, while               A
awarding Rs. 1,00,000/- under this head which is too meager
an amount and is contrary to the judgment of R.D. Hattangadi
and Govind Yadav cases (supra). The relevant paragraphs of
Govind Yadav case read as under:
                                                                     B
    "25. The compensation awarded by the Tribunal for pain,
    suffering and trauma caused due to the amputation of leg
    was meager. It is not in dispute that the appellant had
    remained in the hospital for a period of over three months.
    It is not possible for the tribunals and the courts to make a
    precise assessment of the pain and trauma suffered by a C
    person whose limb is amputated as a result of accident.
    Even if the victim of accident gets artificial limb, he will
    suffer from different kinds of handicaps and social stigma
    throughout his life. Therefore, in all such cases, the tribunals
    and the courts should make a broad guess for the purpose. D
    of fixing the amount of compensation.
    26. Admittedly, at the time of accident, the appellant was
    a young man of 24 years. For the remaining life, he will
    suffer the trauma of not being able to do his normal work.        E
    Therefore, we feel that ends of justice will be met by
    awarding him a sum of Rs 1,50,000 in lieu of pain, suffering
    and trauma caused due to the amputation of leg."
     Therefore, under this head the amount awarded should be
enhanced to Rs.2,00,000/- as the Doctor-PW2 has opined that           F
at the time of walking with support of crutches, the claimant-
appellant will be suffering pain permanently. Therefore, under
this head it has to be enhanced from Rs.1,00,000/- to
Rs.2,00,000/-.
     21. The loss of amenity and attendant charges awarded            G
by the courts below at Rs.1,00,000/- is also too meager an
amount as the appellant has permanently lost her amenity of
both the legs. For the purpose of walking, squatting, running and
also studying throughout her life and particularly, at the advanced
age, she will be requiring the attendant for giving assistance        H
    7'94       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                    [2014] 5 S.C.R.


A to attend the nature's call and also at the time of sitting or
  moving around. Therefore, the compensation at this head is
  required to be enhanced from Rs.1,00,000/- to Rs.2,00,000/-
  based upon the principle laid down by this court in Govind
  Yadav case (supra), the relevant paragraph of which reads as
B under:
           "27. The compensation awarded by the Tribunal for the
           loss of amenities was also meagre. It can only be a matter
           of imagination as to how the appellant will have to live for
           the rest of his life with one artificial leg. The appellant can
c          be expected to live for at least 50 years. During this period
           he will not be able to live like a normal human being and
           will not be able to enjoy life. The prospects of his marriage
           have considerably reduced. Therefore, it would be just and
           reasonable to award him a sum of Rs 1,50,000 for the loss
D          of amenities and enjoyment of life."

       22. The amount of compensation awarded under the head
  of 'Loss of enjoyment of life and marriage prospects' at Rs.
  2,00,000/- is totally inadequate since her marriage prospect
E has substantially reduced and on account of permanent
  disablement she will be deprived of enjoyment of life. Therefore,
  it would be just and proper to enhance the compensation from
  Rs.2,00,000/- to Rs.3,00,000/-. In so far as, purchase of
  crutches periodically, it would be just and proper to award a
F sum of Rs.50,000/-.

        23. Further, the accident had taken place on 11.4.2005
  and the claimant- appellant, since then has been fighting for
  justice, first, in the Motor Accident Claim Tribunal, then the High
  Court and finally before us. Therefore, we consider that she is
G rightfully entitled to the cost of litigation as per the principle laid
  down by this Court in the case of Bairam Prasad v. Kuna/ Saha
  & Ors6 . Therefore, we award a sum of Rs.25000/- under the'
  head of 'cost of litigation'.

H   6.   (2014) 1 sec 384.
                   V. MEKALA v. M. MALATHI                     795
                   [V. GOPALA GOWDA, J.]
      24. Thus, the claimant-appellant in this appeal is entitled      p.
 to a total amount of 30,93,000/- as compensation with an
 interest @ 9% per annum based on the principle laid down by
 this Court in Municipal Corporation of Delhi, Delhi v. Uphaar
 Tragedy Victims Association & Ors. 7 from the date of filing of
 the application till the date of payment.                             ~

      25. The Insurance Company is directed to deposit 50%
 of the awarded amount with proportionate interest within four
 weeks from the date of receipt of a copy of this order, after
 deducting the amount if already paid, in any of the Nationalized
 Bank of the choice of the appellant, for a period of 3 years.         C
 During the said period, if she wants to withdraw a portion or
 entire deposited amount for her personal or any other expenses,
 including development of her asset, then she is at liberty to file
 application before the Tribunal for release of the deposited
 amount, which may be considered by it and pass appropriate            D
 order in this regard.

       The rest of 50% amount awarded with proportionate
  interest shall be paid to the appellant/claimant by way of a
  demand draft within four weeks from the date of receipt of the       E
· copy of this judgment. The Insurance Company is further
  directed to submit compliance report before this court within
  five weeks thereafter.

      26. The appeal is allowed accordingly. No costs.
                                                                       F
 Rajendra Prasad                                     Appeal allowed.




 7.   (2011) 14 sec 481.