Holding

The Special Tribunal/Special Court under the Andhra Pradesh Land Grabbing (Prohibition) Act, 1982 has jurisdiction to decide questions of adverse possession, and the Konda Lakshmana Bapuji decision is the correct law, overruling N. Srinivasa Rao.

Summary

The Supreme Court was asked to resolve a conflict between two earlier decisions on whether the Special Tribunal or Special Court created under the Andhra Pradesh Land Grabbing (Prohibition) Act, 1982 could decide questions of adverse possession. The Court examined the provisions of the Act, its non‑obstante clause, and the powers conferred on the special courts, noting that they are deemed civil courts with full civil and criminal jurisdiction. It held that the special forum can entertain and determine adverse possession claims, and that the earlier decision in Konda Lakshmana Bapuji (2002) correctly interpreted the Act, thereby overruling N. Srinivasa Rao (2006). Consequently, the reference was answered in favour of the appellant’s view that the tribunal has jurisdiction over adverse possession matters.

Issues considered

Whether the Special Tribunal/Special Court constituted under the Andhra Pradesh Land Grabbing (Prohibition) Act, 1982 has jurisdiction to entertain a claim of adverse possession.
Which of the two conflicting Supreme Court decisions – Konda Lakshmana Bapuji (2002) or N. Srinivasa Rao (2006) – correctly interprets the Act’s jurisdiction.

Legislation cited

Andhra Pradesh Land Grabbing (Prohibition) Act, 1982s. 10, s. 15, s. 2(d), s. 2(e), s. 3, s. 4, s. 7, s. 7A, s. 8, s. 9
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908s. 260, s. 9
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973s. 262, s. 263, s. 264, s. 265
Indian Evidence Act, 1872
Limitation Act, 1963s. 27, s. Schedule – Article 65

Subjects

Adverse possessionSpecial TribunalSpecial CourtAndhra Pradesh Land Grabbing (Prohibition) ActJurisdictionLand grabbingCivil procedureLimitation ActSupreme CourtConflict of judgments

Judgment

[2009) 3 S.C.R. 1040

-{c_ • '
A V. LAXMINARASAMMA
v.
A. YADAIAH (DEAD) & ORS.
(Civil Appeal No.1849 of 2002)
MARCH 3, 2009
B
(S.B. SINHA, ASOK KUMAR GANGULY AND R.M.
LODHA, JJ.] +

Andhra Pradesh Land Grabbing (Prohibition) Act, 1982:
c
Special Tribunal and/or Special Court constituted under
the Act - Determination of question of adverse possession -
Wh~ther would come within the purview of its jurisdiction - Two
conflicting decisions of Division Benches of Supreme Court
D - On being referred to it a three Judge Bench Held: The
Trib1unal/Special Court constituted under the Act has the
requisite jurisdiction to go into the question of adverse
possession.

In view of conflict of decisions of two Division
E Benches of the Supreme Court in Konda Lakshmana
Bapuji (2002) 3 SCC 258 and N. Srinivasa Rao (2006) 4 SCC
214, the determination of a question of adverse
possession whether would come within the purview of
the jurisdiction of Special Tribunal and/or Special Court
F constituted under the Andhra Pradesh Land Grabbing
(Prohibition) Act, 1982, was referred to the three Judge
Bench.

Answering the reference, the Court
G
HELD: 1.1. The Tribunal/Special Court constituted
under the Andhra Pradesh Land Grabbing (Prohibition)
Act, 1982 has the requisite jurisdiction to go into the
question of adverse possession. [Para 19] [1058-G-H]
H 1040
V. LAXMINARASAMMA v. A. YADAIAH (DEAD) & ORS. 1041

r-.. . 1.2. Kanda Lakshmana Bapuji lays down the correct A
law and N. Srinivasa Rao does not. [Para 22) [1059-F]

Kanda Lakshmana Bapuji v. Government of Andhra
Pradesh & Ors. (2002) 3 SCC 258 and Mahalaxmi Motors
Ltd. v. Manda/ Revenue Officer and Ors. (2007) 11 SCC 714, 8
affirmed.

N. Srinivasa Rao v. Special Court under the A.P. Land
""+ Grabbing (Prohibition) Act & Ors. (2006) 4 SCC 214,
overruled.
c
2.1. Jurisdiction is exercised by the Tribunal and/or
Special Court upon arriving at a satisfaction in regard to
existence of jurisdictional fact. Even in terms of Article 65
of the Schedule appended to the Limitation Act, 1963 in
.. the event, the plaintiff proves his title, the burden of proof D
t would be on the defendant to show that he has acquired
title by adverse possession. [Para 15] [1055-C-D]

2.2. The defendant in all circumstances, would be
entitled to prove that he is lawfully entitled to possess the
E
land. No law says that if a new forum is created by a
special statute in terms whereof the jurisdiction of the
a civil court becomes barred, the Tribunal constituted
.. 4 thereunder must be a substitute for a civil court, not only
with regard to all its powers but also with all its
F
' deficiencies. If the Special Act satisfies substantive due
~
process, the same would satisfy the legal requirements.
[Para 16) [1055-E-F)

Collector of Bombay v. Municipal Corporation of the City
of Bombay AIR 19E1 SC 469; Mahabir Vegetable Oils Pvt. G
Ltd. and Anr. v. State of Haryana and Ors., (2006) 3 SCC 620
~
and Annakili v. A. Vedanayagam and Ors. (2007) 14 SCC
308, relied c.n.

H
1042 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 3 S.C.R.

-f -.
A A.P. Housing Board v. Mohd. Sadatullah & Ors. (2007)
6 sec 566, referred to.
3.Acquisition of an indefeasible title by. prescription
is a creation of statute. Section 27 of the Limitation Act
B provides for extinction of a title of the owner of the land
and vesting thereof in a person who has acquired the
same by adverse possession. The plea of adverse ~

f?ossession, however, must expressly be raised and +
~stablished. [Para 17] [1055-F-H]

c Government of Andhra Pradesh v. Thummala Krishna
Rao and Anr. (1982) 2 SCC 134, held inapplicable.

State of A.P. v. Pramee/a Modi (2006) 13 SCC 147,
referred to. ...__
D 1
4. It is one thing to say that a summary proceeding
cannot be resorted to when a noticee resists a bona fide
dispute involving complicated questions of title and his
right to remain in possession of the land but it is another
thing to say that although a Special Court and/or a
E I
Tribunal which has all the powers of a civil court would
not be entitled to enter into such a contention. [Para 21] "'
\
[1059-E-F]
..
Case Law Reference:
F ,,

(2002) 3 sec 258 affirmed Para 1
(2006) 4 sec 214 overruled Para 1
(2001) 6 sec 566 referred to Para 8
G AIR 1951 SC 469 relied on Para 14
(2006) 3 sec 620 relied on Para 14
•
(2007) 14 sec 3oa relied on Para 15

H
V. LAXMINARASAMMA v. A. YADAIAH (DEAD) & ORS. 1043

(2006) 13 sec 141 referred to Para 18 A
(2007) 11 sec 714 affirmed Para 18

(1982) 2 sec 134 held inapplicable Para 20

CIVIL APP ELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No.1849 B
of 2002.

From the Judgment and Order dated 18.11.2000 of the
High Court of Andhra Pradesh at Hyderabad in W.P. No.
15844 of 1992. C

WITH

C.A. No. 1850 of 2002.
D
M.N. Rao, Y. Raja Gopala Rao, Y. Ramesh, Y. Vismai, M.N.
Rao, Annam D.N. Rao, A Ramesh and Anshuman Ashok for
the Appellant.

Anoop G. Chaudhary Manoj Saxena, Rajnish Kr. Singh,
Rahul Shukla, T.V. George, Nikhil Nayyar, TVS Raghavendra E
Sreyas and Amboj Agarwal for the Respondent.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

S.B. SINHA, J. 1. Determination of a question of adverse F
possession whether would come within the purview of the
jurisdiction of Special Tribunal and/or Special Court constituted
under the Andhra Pradesh Land Grabbing (Prohibition) Act,
1982 (hereinafter called and referred to for the sake of brevity
as 'the Act') has been referred to this Bench, noticing purported G
conflict in the decisions of two Division Benches of this Court
in Konda Lakshmana Bapuji v. Government of Andhra
Pradesh & Ors. [(2002) 3 SCC 258] and N. Srinivasa Rao v.
1044 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009) 3 S.C.R.

A Special Court under the A.P. Land Grabbing (Prohibition) Act
& Ors. [(2006) 4 sec 214).

2. Before, however, adverting to the said question, we may
notice some salient features of the said Act.
B The Government of Andhra Pradesh noticed organized
attempts on the part of certain lawless persons operating ).

individually and in groups, to grab either by force or by deceit
or otherwise, lands (whether belonging to the Government, a
local authority, a religious or charitable institution or endowment,
c including a wakf, or any other private persons) as also the fact
that the land grabbers are forming bogus co-operative housing
societies or setting up fictitious claims and indulging in large
scale and unprecedented and fraudulent sales of lands through
unscrupulous real estate dealers or otherwise in favour of
"
D certain sections of the people resulting in large accumulation i

of unaccounted wealth and as thereby public order was also
adversely affected now and then by such unlawful activities of
land grabbers in the State in respect of urban and urbanisable
land. The said Act was enacted with a view to prohibiting the
E activities of land grabbing in the State of Andhra Pradesh and
to provide for matters connected therewith.

The Act is a special Act. It is a self contained code. >

'Land grabber' is defined in section 2(d) of the Act to mean
F a person or a group of persons who commits land grabbing
and includes any person who gives financial aid to any person
for taking illegal possession of lands or for construction of
unauthorized structures thereon, or who collects or attempts to
collect from any occupiers of such lands, rent, compensation
G and other charges by criminal intimidation; or who abets the
doing of any of the above mentioned acts; and also includes
the successors in interest.

'Land grabbing' has been defined in Section 2(e) to mean:
H
V. LAXMINARASAMMA v. A. YADAIAH (DEAD) & ORS. 1045
[S.B. SINHA, J.]
-~ A
"every activity of grabbing of any land (whether belonging
to the Government, a local authority, a religious or
charitable institution or endowment, including a wakf, or
any other private person) by a person or group of persons,
without any lawful entitlement and with a view to illegally
taking possession of such lands or enter into or create B
illegal tenancies or lease and licence agreements or any
;. other illegal agreements in respect of such lands, or to
construct unauthorized structures thereon for sale or hire,
or give such land to any person on rental or lease and
licence basis for construction, or use and occupation of c
unauthorized structures; and the term 'to grab land' shall
be construed accordingly."

Section 3 declares 'land grabbing' in any form to be
.... ,. unlawful and any activity connected therewith to be an offence
I
1' punishable under the Act. Section 4 imposes prohibition on land D
grabbing, violation whereof results in penal action (s) as
specified therein. Section 7 provides for constitution of Special
Courts. The Chairman of the Special Court is a sitting or retired
Judge of the High Court and out of other four members thereof
two ought to be sitting or retired District Judges (Judicial E
members) and the other two who hold or have held a post not
below the rank of a District Collector. The process for
{
.... appointment of the Chairman and Members of the Judicial
Members of the Special Court has been laid down therein.
F
The Special Court has been empowered to make
regulations relating to the procedure to be followed for the
conduct of cases as also the manner of taking decisions. Sub-
section (50) of Section 7 of the Act reads as under:

"5(D)(i) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of G
Civil Procedure, 1908, the Special Court may follow its
own procedure which shall not be inconsistent with the
--'t
principles of natural justice and fair play and subject to the
other provisions of this Act and of any rules made
thereunder while deciding the Civil liability. '
H
1046 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 3 S.C.R.
,.

A (ii) Notwithstanding anything contained in Section 260 or
. _

Section 262 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973,
every offence punishable under this Act shall be tried in a
summary way and the provisions of Sections 263 to 265
(both inclusive) of the said Code shall, as far as may be
B apply to such trial.
(iii) When a person is convicted of an offence of land
grabbing attended by criminal force or show of force or by
criminal intimidation, and it appears to the Special Court
that, by such force or show of force or intimidation the land
c of any person has been grabbed, the Special Court may
if it thinks fit, order that possession of the same be
restored to that person after evicting by force, if necessary,
any other person who may be in possession of the
property." ~
"
D
Section 7A provides for the powers of the Special Tribunal,
sub-section (1) whereof reads as under :
"B7-A. "Special Tribunals and its powers etc:-(1) Every
Special Tribunal shall have power to try all cases not taken
E cognizance of by the Special court relating to any alleged
act of land grabbing or with respect to the ownership and
title to, or lawful possession of the land grabbed whether
before or after the commencement of the Andhra Pradesh ,.,
Land Grabbing (Prohibition)(Amendment) Act, 1987 and
brought before it and pass such orders (including orders
by way of interim directions) as it deems fit.
Provided that if, in the opinion of the Special Tribunal, any
case brought before it is prima facie frivolous or vexatious,
it shall reject the same without any further enquiry;
G
Provided further that if in the opinion of the Special Tribunal
any case brought before it is a fit case to be tried by the
Special court it may for reasons to be recorded by it ;
transfer the case to the Special Court for its decision in
H
V. LAXMINARASAMMA v. A. YADAIAH {DEAD) & ORS. 1047
,. [S.B. SINHA, J.]
~·
" the matter." A
The first proviso appended thereto empowers the Special
Court to reject a case brought before it without any further
enquiry, if prima facie it appears to be frivolous or vexatious.
Special tribunal may also for reasons to be recorded by it
B
transfer a case to the special court for its decision in the matter.
, A special tribunal ordinarily is required to follow the procedures
~
prescribed in the Code of Civil Procedure.
An appeal is maintainable from a judgment or order to the
_,
special court. Sub-section (4) of Section ?A makes a finding c
of the Special Tribunal with regard to any alleged act of land
~
grabbing to be conclusive of the said fact as also the persons
who committed the act of land grabbing conclusive .
.......
~
Section 8 provides for the procedure and power of the
~ D
Special Courts, the relevant parts whereof read as under:
"8. Procedure and Powers of the Special Court:-(1) The
Special Court may, either suo motu, or on application made
by any person, officer or authority, take cognizance of and
try every case arising out of any alleged act of land E
grabbing, or with respect to the ownership and title to, or
lawful possession of, the land grabbed, whether before or
'(
after the commencement of this Act, and pass such orders
~

(including orders by way of interim directions) as it deems
fit.
F
xxx xxx xxx
(28) Notwithstanding anything in the Code of Criminal
Procedure, 1973, it shall be lawful for the Special Court
to try all offences punishable under this Act. (Central Act
G
~ 2 of 1974).
(6) Every finding of the Special Court with regard to any
alleged act of land grabbing shall be conclusive proof of
the fact of land grabbing and of the persons who committed
such land grabbing, and every judgment of the Special H
1048 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009) 3 S.C.R.
•
"t ..
A Court with regard to the determination of title and
ownership to, or lawful possession of, any land grabbed
shall be binding on all persons having interest in such land.
Provided that the Special Court shall by notification specify
the fact of taking cognizance of the case under this Act.
B Such notification shall state that any objection which may
be received by the Special Court from any person •
including the custodian of evacuee property within the +
period specified therein will be considered by it.

c Provided further that where the custodian of evacuee
property objects to the Special court taking cognizance of
the case, the Special Court shall not proceed further with
the case in regard to such property;
>-
Provided also that the Special Court shall cause a notice A

D of taking cognizance of the case under the Act, served on '
any person known or believed to be interested in the land,
after a summary enquiry to satisfy itself about the persons
likely to be interested in the land.

E (7) It shall be lawful for the Special Court to pass such
order as it may deem fit to advance the cause of justice. It
may award compensation in terms of money for wrongful
possession of the land grabbed which shall not be less ,...
than an amount equivalent to the market value of the land
grabbed as on the date of the order and profits accrued
F from the land, payable by the land grabber to the owner of
the grabbed land and may direct re-delivery of the grabbed
land to its rightful owner. The amount of compensation and
profits, so awarded and costs of re-delivery, if any, shall
be recovered as an arrear of land revenue in case the
G Government is the owner, or as a decree of a Civil Court, \.
in any other case to be executed by the Special Court.
Provided that the Special Court shall, before passing an
order under this sub-section, give to the land grabber an
H opportunity of making his representation or of adducing
V. LAXMINARASAMMA v. A. YADAIAH (DEAD) & ORS. 1049
[S.B. SINHA, J.]
~,.
evidence, if any, in this regard and consider such A
representation and evidence.
(8) Any case, pending before any court or other authority
immediately before the constitution of a Special Court, as
would have been within the jurisdiction of such Special
8
Court, shall stand transferred to the Special court as if the
cause of action on which such suit or proceeding is based
A
~ had arisen after the constitution of the special court."
Section 9, inter alia, provides that the provisions of the
Code of Civil Procedure and the Code of Criminal Procedure c
shall apply to the proceedings before the Special Court insofar
as they are not inconsistent with the provisions of the Act and
for the purposes thereof the Special Court shall be deemed to
be a 'Civil Court' or as the case may be a 'Court of Sessions'
A
and shall have all the powers of a Civil Court or the Court of D
~
Sessions.
Section 10 provides for the burden of proof. Section 15
of the Act contains a non-obstante clause stating that the
provisions thereof shall have effect notwithstanding anything
inconsistent therewith contained in any other law for the time E
being in force or custom, usage or agreement or decree or
order of a court of any other tribunal or authority.
'\
... 3. ·Rule making power is vested in the State in Section 16
of the Act. Section 17A provides for review of the judgment and F
order passed by the special court under Section 8. Section 178
provides for guidelines for interpretation of the Act as contained
in Schedule appended thereto.
The Government of Andhra Pradesh made rules in
exercise of its power conferred by sub-section (1) of Section G
,,, ~ 16 of the Act known as the Andhra Pradesh Land Grabbing
(Prohibition) Rules, 1988 (for short "the Rules"). Rule 5 lays
down the procedure for suo motu action. Rule 6 provides for
verification of application. Rule 7 mandates that the Special
Court before taking cognizance of the case is to give notice in H
1050 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 3 S.C.R.

A form 2A by publishing it in the Andhra Pradesh Gazette. Sub- -+ - ,.,...-
section (2) thereof makes a similar provision in relation to the
Special Tribunal. Rules furthermore provide for notice to the
person interested as also notice to the land grabbers. It
provides for filing of a counter affidavit. Rule 10 provides for
8 the application of the Code of Civil Procedure in the matters
as provided for therein. Rule 15 lays down the procedure for
taking possession. ..
4. The Special Court has also framed regulations in
•
exercise of its power conferred upon it under sub-section (SA)
c of Section of the Act, inter alia, providing for :
1. Place of sitting of the Special Courts (Regulation
4)
2. Sitting hours of the Special Court (Regulation 5) A
D
3. Working hours of the office of the Special Court •
(Regulation 6)
4. Scrutiny of the application (Regulation 8)
5. Weekly and daily cause list (Regulation (11)
6. Documents to accompany summons to the
respondent (Regulation 12)
....
Chapter Ill of the Regulations provide for the powers and
F functions of the officers of the Court. The Regulations
furthermore provide for the matters relating to proceedings
before the Special Court, inspection of documents by strangers,
inspection of the records, production of records in the custody
of a court, production of records in the custody of public officer
G other than a court, etc.
5. The Act indisputably confers a wide jurisdiction upon the ~
...
Special Court and the Special Tribunal. The Tribunal or the
Special Courts are high powered ones. For all intent and
purport, the Tribunal and Special Courts are substitutes for the
H
V. LAXMINARASAMMA v. A. YADAIAH (DEAD) & ORS. 1051
[S.B. SINHA, J.]

;--f civil court and the appellate authority. A
Statements of objects and reasons for enacting the said
Act clearly establish that the said Act was enacted to achieve
a special purpose; the 'object' being to prohibit land grabbing
resulting in breakage of public law and order.
8
The Act brings within it umbrage not only 'grabbing of
. ~
lands' of Government or local authorities but also statutory
authorities and private persons. It aims at those persons who
form a distinct class. The Special Courts have both civil and
criminal jurisdiction. The provisions of Code of Civil Procedure c
and Code of Criminal are ordinarily applicable subject, of
course, to the provisions to the contrary. It also safeguards the
interest of the notices from vexatious or frivolous litigations.
Before taking cognizance of a case, a report of the revenue
'A authorities are required to be obtained. In the event a suo motu D
~ action is to be taken, the proceeds are required to be heard.
A legal fiction is created that it would be civil court and/or
court of sessions and would otherwise have the same power
as civil court or the court of sessions as provided for in the
Code of Civil procedure and Code of Criminal Procedure, the E
Act provides for transfer of cases to the Tribunals in relation to
the matters pending before any court. of law relating to land
~ grabbing. The Act also contains a non-obstante clause.
>
6. The Special Courts and Tribunals, indisputably are F
entitled to determine any question or issue including the
question of title or possession in the proceedings initiated
before it. Special Courts am:t the Tribunal not only have
trappings of a court but also of a civil court and, thus, are
entitled to determine complicated questions of title.
G
7. Would the question of adverse possession be beyond
,.. 1 the purview of its jurisdiction is the question. There appears to
be an apparent conflict in the decision in Kanda Lakshmana
Bapuji (supra) and N. Srinivasa Rao (supra). Whereas in the
former, the defence of adverse possession had specifically H

-
1052 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 3 S.C.R.

A been gone into holding that the appellant therein had acquired
indefeasible title by adverse possession, opining:
'"-"'
"17. It is pertinent to note that mere allegation of an act of
land grabbing is sufficient to invoke the jurisdiction of the
Special Court. In both Section 7(1) and Section 8(1) of the
B Act the phrase "any alleged act of land grabbing" is
employed and not "act of land grabbing". It appears to us
that it is designedly done by the legislature to obviate the ~
difficulty of duplication of trial once in the courts under the
Act and over again in the ordinary civil court. The purpose
c of the Act is to identify cases involving allegation of land
grabbing for speedy enquiry and trial. The courts under the
Act are nonetheless civil courts which follow the Code of
Civil Procedure and are competent to grant the same
reliefs which can be obtained from ordinary civil courts." A•
D
It was furthermore observed: •
"A combined reading of these provisions leads to the
conclusion that the jurisdiction of the civil court under
Section 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure and under the
Civil Courts Act is ousted and the Act which is special law
will prevail and as such the Special Court will have
jurisdiction in respect of the matters dealt with thereunder.
(See: Sanwarmal Kejriwal v. Vishwa Coop. Housing •
...
Society Ltd.)"
p:
In N. Srinivas Rao (supra), another Division Bench,
however, unfortunately, without noticing Kanda Lakshamana
Bapuji (supra), despite holding that there was no actual
-
dispossession, opined :
G "... In our view, in a proceeding before the Special
Court the only issue which fell for decision is whether there ~
has been an act of land grabbing as alleged and who is
the guilty party. The Special Court has no jurisdiction to
decide questions relating to acquisition of title by adverse
H possession in a proceeding under the Act as the same

•
V. LAXMINARASAMMA v. A. YADAIAH (DEAD) & ORS. 1053
[S.B. SINHA, J.]
.... ,..,. _,
would fall within the domain of the civil courts. The learned A
Special Judge apparently travelled beyond the jurisdiction
vested in him under the 1982 Act in deciding that even if
the provisions of Section 47 of the Act were a bar to
transfer without the sanction of the Tahsildar, the occupants
of the land had perfected their title thereto by way of B
adverse possession."
;.
~ 8. We may, however, notice that another Bench of this
Court in A.P. Housing Board v. Mohd. Sadatul/ah & Ors.
[(2007) 6 sec 566] despite noticing both the decisions did not
enter into the larger question and in the peculiar facts and c
attending circumstances thought it appropriate that the finding
as to adverse possession be set aside by granting liberty to
all or any of the respondents to take appropriate proceedings
'J.,
by approaching a competent civil court, if they claim title on the
~ D
basis of adverse possession.
9. Mr. M.N. Rao, learned senior counsel appearing on
behalf of the appellant, would submit that the Tribunal being not
a Court and as the protections afforded to a defendant in a civil
suit have been taken away by reason of the provisions of the E
said Act, they require strict construction. Jurisdiction of the Civil
Court having been expressly ousted and in any event, the
'(
>
Tribunal and/or special court being not an alternative efficacious
complicated question in regard to adverse possession, it was
urged, must be held to be beyond the purview of the Tribunal.
F
10. Mr. Anoop G. Chaudhary, learned senior counsel
appearing on behalf of the respondent, on the other hand, would
contend that the said Act being a special law having been
enacted to deal with special circumstances and providing for
a high powered tribunal, it must be held to have the jurisdiction G
... -f to deal with a question of adverse possession. Acquisition of
an indefeasible title by adverse possession, the learned
counsel would submit, also being a question of title, there is
absolutely no reason as to why special court and/or tribunal can
be said to be having no jurisdiction in relation thereto. H
1054 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 3 S.C.R.

A 11. The validity of the Act is not in question. We have, ~. -
therefore, no other option but to proceed on the basis that the
same is constitutional. In view of the question referred to before
us, we are also not called upon to decide the larger question
as to whether by reason of the provisions of the Act, the
B jurisdiction of the Civil Court has been ousted.
12. We have noticed the provisions of the Act. The Act
jDrovides for inbuilt safeguards for the defendants. The Special ~

Court or the Tribunal derives jurisdiction of a case only in the
event it is satisfied with regard to the existence of the
c jurisdictional facts viz. activities of land grabbing. Notices are
issued by the Tribunal only on arriving at a prima facie
satisfaction. Hearing of the noticee is mandatory in the event
a suo motu action under the Act is to be taken. A report of the
revenue officer who is man on the spot is required to be ,.._ '
D obtained. ~

13. Rules and Regulations framed under the Act provide
for a detailed procedure. The Tribunal or the Special Court, thus,
cannot act in an arbitrary or capricious fashion. The provisions
of the Act provide for adequate remedy in case an application
E
is found to be vexatious or frivolous although it exercises a very
wide jurisdiction both under Civil as also Criminal law. The
Tribunal is a high powered one. It can execute its own decrees. '
The provisions of the Act, as noticed herein before, contain non- "
obstante clause in terms whereof the provisions thereof prevail
F over not only Code of Civil Procedure but also AP. Civil Court's
~-

Act.
14. 'Civil Court' is defined under the AP. Civil Courts Act.
Tribunals and/or Special Courts by reason of a legal fiction
G created are both Civil Court as also the Court of Sessions.
Legal fiction created under the Act is of wide amplitude. [See ••
Collector of Bombay v. Municipal Corporation of the City of
Bombay [AIR 1951 SC 469]; and Mahabir Vegetable Oils Pvt.
Ltd. and Anr. v. State of Haryana and Ors., (2006) 3 SCC 620].
H 15. The Tribunal and/or Special Court are ordinarily
V. LAXMINARASAMMA v. A. YADAIAH (DEAD) & ORS. 1055
[S.B. SINHA, J.]
_.-1 required to follow the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure A
and Code of Criminal Procedure. Being a 'court', the provisions
of the Indian Evidence Act would also be applicable. It is true
that burden of proof is on the noticee being an alleged land
grabber, but the same by itself would not mean that it is an
interim Tribunal vis-a-vis the civil court. Enactment of such a B
provision, moreover, was within the competence of the
,.. Legislature. Only because burden of proof is on the noticee,
-I
the same would not mean that he has been deprived of his right
to defend himself in the proceedings. Burden of proof is in the
realm of procedural law. By reason of such a provision, c
substantive right of the parties on an immovable property is not
taken away. Jurisdiction is exercised by the Tribunal and/or
Special Court upon arriving at a satisfaction in regard to
existence of jurisdictional fact. Even in terms of Article 65 of
, .._
the Schedule appended to the Limitation Act, 1963 in the event,
~ D
the plaintiff proves his title, the burden of proof would be on the
defendant to show that he has acquired title by adverse
possession. {See Annakili v. A. Vedanayagam and Ors.
[(2001) 14 sec 308].
16. The defendant in all circumstances, therefore, would E
be entitled to prove that he is lawfully entitled to possess the
land. No law says that if a new forum is created by a special
..
,. statute in terms whereof the jurisdiction of the civil court
becomes barred, the Tribunal constituted thereunder must be
a substitute for a civil court, not only with regard to all its powers F
but also with all its deficiencies. If the Special Act satisfies
substantive due process, in our opinion, the same would satisfy
the legal requirements.
17. Acquisition of an indefeasible title by prescription is a
creation of statute. Se·:ton 27 of the Limitation Act provides G
.. 1 for extinction of a title of the owner of the land and vesting
thereof in a person who has acquired the same by adverse
possession. The plea of adverse possession, however, must
expressly be raised and established.
H
1056 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009) 3 S.C.R.

A 18. The question referred to before us has been gone into +---
by a Bench of this Court in Mahalaxmi Motors Ltd. v. Manda/
Revenue Officer and Ors~ [(2007) 11 SCC 714), wherein this
Court took into consideration the earlier decisions of this Court
including Konda Lakshmana Bapuji (supra) and N. Srinivasa
B Rao (supra) and Mohd. Sadatullah (supra) as also State of AP.
v. Pramee/a Modi [(2006) 13 SCC 147).
In Mahalaxmi Motors (supra), it was held:
"36. We are bound by the decision of the larger Bench in
c this case (sic for coordinate bench). The Special Court
exercises a jurisdiction of the civil court, provisions of the
Code of Civil Procedure being applicable. If it is a civil
court, all questions relating to title and possession can be
gone into. The proceeding can be initiated in terms of
D Section 4 of the said Act against a person who continues
to be in occupation, otherwise than as a lawful tenant, of
a grabbed land belonging to the Government, local
authority, religious or charitable institution or endowment
including a wakf, or any private person. If and when a
proceeding is initiated under the said Act, the proceedee
E
not only can raise jurisdictional questions but can also raise
questions relating to his title and possession. It is,
therefore, difficult to comprehend as to how the Special
Court would be debarred from determining the questions
raised by the parties thereto."
F
It was opined :
"40. The Tribunal being possessed of extensive
jurisdiction, subject of course to fulfilment of the conditions
precedent, for initiation of the proceeding, was entitled to
G go into all issues. We have furthermore to bear in mind
that the definition of "land grabber" is not only restricted to
the party to the proceeding, but also includes his
predecessor-in-interest. Once the land is held to be a
government land, the logical corollary thereto would be that
H
V. LAXMINARASAMMA v. A. YADAIAH (DEAD) & ORS. 1057
[S.B. SINHA, J.]

subject to the law of limitation and prescription, the State A
would not lose the said right to the opposite party.
41. It may be true that absence of lawful entitlement by itself
may not be sufficient to pass a judgment and decree in
favour of the State and against the land grabber, but also
B
it must be shown that he had taken illegal possession
thereof.
42. The Bench in Kanda Lakshmana Bapuji has applied
both the broader and narrow meanings of the said
expression. It would not, however, mean that all the tests c
laid down therein are required to be satisfied in their letter
and spirit. What is necessary to be proved is the
substance of the allegation. The proof of intention on the
part of a person being his state of mind, the ingredients
of the provisions must be considered keeping in view ·the D
materials on records as also circumstances attending
thereto. What would be germane for lawful entitlement to
remain in possession would be that if the proceedee
proves that he had bona fide claim over the land, in which
event, it would be for him to establish the same. E
43. In Konda Lakshmana Bapuji this Court has
categorically held that the requisite intention can be
inferred by necessary implication from the averments
made in the petition, the written statement and the
\
,.
depositions of witnesses, like any other fact. The question F
which must, therefore, have to be posed and answered
having regard to the claim of the land grabber would be
that, if on the face of his claim it would appear that he not
only had no title, but claimed his possession only on the
basis thereof, tre same must be held to be illegal. The G
question in regard to lawful entitlement of the proceedee,
therefore, for invoking the charging section plays an
important and significant role.
44. We would like to add that the person's purported belief
H
\
1058 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 3 S.C.R.

A that he is legally entitled to hold the land and his
possession is not otherwise illegal must also be judged
not only from the point of time when he entered into the
possession or when he had acquired the purported title but
also from the point of view as to whether by reason of
B determination of such a question by a competent court of
law, he has been found to have no title and consequently
continuance of his possession becomes illegal. If the
proceedee against whom a proceeding has been initiated
under the provisions of the said Act is entitled to raise the
c question of adverse possession, which being based on
knowledge of a lawful title and declaration of the hostile
title on the part of the person in possession, there does
not appear to be any reason as to why knowledge of defect
in his title and consequently his possession becoming
unlawful to his own knowledge would not come within the
D
purview of the term "land grabbing" as contained in Section
2(e) of the Act. The provisions of the Act must be construed
so as to enable the tribunal to give effect thereto. It cannot
be construed in a pedantic manner which if taken to its
logical corollary would make the provisions wholly
E unworkable. Only because a person has entered into
possession of a land on the basis of a purported registered
sale deed, the same by itself, in our considered opinion,
would not be sufficient to come to the conclusion that he
had not entered over the land unauthorisedly, unfairly, or
F greedily.
45. For determination of such an issue, the Special Court
will be entitled to take into consideration not only the rival
claims of the parties, but also the earlier round of litigation,
G if any, and subsequent conduct of the proceedee himself."
19. We agree with the legal principles laid down in the said
decision and are of the considered view that the Tribunal/
Special Court constituted under the Act has the requisite
jurisdiction to go into the question of adverse possession.
H
V. LAXMINARASAMMA v. A. 'f'ADAIAH (DEAD) & ORS. 1059
[S.B. SINHA, J.]

20. We are not oblivious of a decision of this Court in A
Government of Andhra Pradesh v. Thumma/a Krishna Rao
and Anr. [(1982) 2 sec 134] wherein it was held that a question
of title could not properly be decided in a summary enquiry
contemplated by Sections 6 and 7 of the A.P. Land
Encroachment Act, 1905. In that case, the principal question, B
which arose for consideration, was as to whether the property
in question was in possession of the family of one Habibuddin
for a long time and, thus, the same had not vested in the
Government by reason of a land acquisition proceeding initiated
for acquisition of the land for Osmania University. In that case, c
Osmania University filed a suit for possession which was
dismissed on the premise that Habibuddin had perfected his
title by adverse possession. Thereafter Osmania University
requested the Government of Andhra Pradesh to take steps for
summary eviction of the persons who are not in authorized
0
occupation of the said plots. The observations made therein
must be held to have been made in the aforementioned factual
matrix.

21. It is one thing to say that a summary proceeding cannot
be resorted to when a noticee resists a bona fide dispute E
involving complicated questions of title and his right to remain
in possession of the land but it is another thing to say that
although a Special Court and/or a Tribunal which has all the
powers of a civil court would not be entitled to enter into such
a contention. Krishna Rao (supra), therefore, in our opinion has F
no application to the facts of the present case.

22. We, therefore, are of the opinion that Konda
Lakshmana Bapuji (supra) lays down the correct law and N.
Srinivasa Rao (supra) does not. The reference is answered
accordingly. The merit of the matter may now be determined G
by an appropriate Bench.

G.N. Reference answered.