V. K. .BANSALversusSTATE OF HARYANA AND ORS. ETC. ETC.

                     [2013] 7 S.C.R. 617


                      V. K. .BANSAL                              A
                             v.
        STATE OF HARYANA AND ORS. ETC. ETC.
                          1
          {Criminal Appeal Nos. 836-851 of 2013)
                       JULY 05, 2013
                                                                 B
      [T.S. THAKUR AND GYAN SUDHA MISRA, JJ.]

     Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881:

       s. 138 - Dishonour of Cheques - Conviction and c
  sentence - Plea for concurrent running of sentences - Held:
  Applying the principle of single transaction, the substantive
  sentences awarded to the appellant in each case relevant to
  the transactions with each company ought to run concurrently
  - However, there is no reason to extend that concession to 0
  transactions in which the borrowing company is different, no
  matter the appellant before the court is the promoter/Director
  of the said other companies also - Direction regarding
  concurrent running of sentence shall be limited to the
  substantive sentences only because the provisions of s. 427, E
  Cr.P. C. do not permit a qirection for the concurrent running
  of the substantive sentences with sentences awarded in default
· of payment of fine/ compensation - Code of Criminal
  Procedure, 1973 - s.427.

      The instant appeals arose out of the conviction and        F
 sentences imposed upon .the appellant, as a director of
 the borrowing companies, in several cases, for dishonour
 of cheques issued by the said companies. The question
 for consideration before the Court was: whether the High
 Court was right in declining the prayer made by the             G
 appellant for a direction in terms of s. 427 read with s. 482
 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 for the sentences
 awarded to him in the cases uls. 138 of the Negotiable
 Instruments Act, to run concurrently.
                               617                               H
    618       SUPREME COURT REPORTS             [2013] 7 S.C.R.


A         Allowing the appeals in part, the Court:

       HELD: 1.1. Section 427 of the Code of Criminal
  Procedure, 1973 deals with situations where an offender
  who is already undergoing a sentence of imprisonment
8 is sentenced on a subsequent conviction to
  imprisonment or imprisonment for life. It provides that
  such imprisonment or imprisonment for life shall
  commence at the expiration of the imprisonment to which
  he has been previously sentenced unless the court
  directs that the subsequent sentence shall run
C concurrently with such previous sentence. Section
  427(1) of the Code, stipulates a general rule to be followed
  except in three situations, one falling under the proviso
  to sub-s (1) to s. 427 i.e. where the person concerned is
  sentenced to imprisonment by an order u/s. 122 in default
D of furnishing security which is not the position in the case
  at hand; the second falling under sub-s (2) where a
  person already undergoing a sentence of imprisonment
  for life is sentenced on a subsequent conviction to
  imprisonment for a term or imprisonment for life; it
E provides that the subsequent sentence shall in such a
  case run concurrently with such previous sentence; and
  the third where the court directs that the sentences shall
  run concurrently. It is manifest from s. 427(1) that the
  court has the power and the discretion to issue a
F direction but in the very nature of the power so conferred
  upon the court the discretionary power shall have to be
  exercised along judicial lines and not in a mechanical,
  wooden or pedantic manner. It is difficult to lay down any
  strait jacket approach in the matter of exercise of such
G discretion by the courts. Whether or not a direction ought
  to be issued in a given case would depend upon the
  nature of the offence(s) committed, and the fact situation
  in which the question of concurrent running of the
  sentences arises. High Courts in this country have,
H therefore, invoked and exercised their discretion to issue
       V. K. BANSAL v. STATE OF HARYANA                 619


directions for concurrent running of sentence* as much         A
as they have declined such benefit to the prisoners**.
[Para 8-10] [623-F-H; 624-E-H; 625-A-E]

     *State of Punjab v. Madan Lal 2009 (3) SCR 1175 =
(2009) 5 SCC 238; Mohd. Akhtar Hussain v. Assistant            B
Collector of Customs 1988 (2) Suppl. SCR 747 = (1988) 4
SCC 183 and Mu/aim Singh v. State 1974 Crl. L.J. 1397 -
referred to.

    **Sumlo @ Sum/a Him/a Bhuriya and Ors. v. State of
Gujarat anq Ors. 2007 Crl.L.J. 612 and State of Gujarat v. C
Zaverbhai Kababhai 1996 Crl.L.J. 1296 - referred to.

     1.2. The legal position favours exercise of discretion
to the benefit of the prisoner in cases where the
prosecution is based on a single transaction, no matter
                                                               0
different complaints in relation thereto may have been
filed as is the position in cases involving dishonour of
cheques issued by the borrower towards repayment of
a loan to the creditor. [Para 15] [627-E-F; 628-E-H]

     1.3. The 15 cases at hand against the appellant fall      E
in three distinct categories. The transactions forming the
basis of the prosecution relate to three different corporate
entities who had either entered into loan transactions with
the State Financial Corpo-ration or taken some other
financial benefit like purchase of a cheque from the           F
appellant that was on presentation dishonoured.
Applying the principle of single transaction, each one of
the loan transactions/financial arrangements was a
separate and distinct transaction between the
complainant on the one hand and the borrowing                  G
company/appellant on the other. If different cheques
which are subsequently dishonoured on presentation,
are issued by the borrowing company acting through the
appellant, the same could be said to be arising out of a
single loan transaction so as to justify a direction for       H
    620      SUPREME COURT REPORTS               [2013) 7 S.C.R.

A concurrent running of the sentences awarded in relation
  to dishonour of cheques refevant to each such
  transaction. That being so, the substantive sentence
  awarded to the appellant in each case relevant to the
  transaction with each company ought to run
B concurrently. However, there is no reason to extend that
  concession to transactions in which the borrowing
  company is different no matter the appellant before the
  Court is the promoter/Director of the said other
  companies also. Similarly, there is no reason to direct
  running of the sentence concurrently in the case filed by
C the State Bank of Patiala which transaction is also
  independent of any loan or financial assistance between
  the State Financial Corporation and the borrowing
  companies. Ordered accordingly. [Para 17) [627-G-H; 628-
  E-H; 629-A-C]
D
       1.4. It is 1T1ade clear that the direction regarding
  concurrent running of sentence shall be limited to the
  substantive sentence only. The sentence which the
  appellant has been directed to undergo in default of
E payment of fine/compensation shall not be affected by
  this direction, because the provisions of s. 427 of the
  Cr.P.C. do not, permit a direction for the concurrent
  running of the substantive sentences with sentences
  awarded in default of payment of fine/compensation.
F [Para 17] [629-B-D]
                         Case Law Reference:
          2009 (3) SCR 1175        referred to        para 7
          2007 Crl.L.J. 612        referred to        para 10
G
          1996 Crl.L.J. 1296       referred to        para 11
          1974 Crl. L.J. 1397      referred to        para 12
          1988 (2) Suppl. SCR 747 referred to         para 13
H
           V. K. BANSAL v. STATE OF HARYANA                  621


     GRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal                A
 Nos. 836-851 of 2013.

      From the Judgment and Order dated 07.08.2009 of the
 High Court of Punjab and Haryana at Chandigarh in Crl.
 Revision Nos. 1536, 1537, 1538, 1539, 1540, 1541, 1542,             8
 1543 of 2009, order dated 11.08.2009 in Crl. Revision Nos.
 2081, 2082, 2083 & 2084 of 2009, order dated 15.11.2010 in
 Crl. Revisions Nos. 241, 242 & 299 of 2009 and order dated
 30.04.2009 in Crl. Misc. No. 11367 of 2009.
   '
       , D.N. Ray, Subodh Patil, Sumita Ray for the Appellant.       C

    Jitendra Kumar, Dushyant Parashar, Surya Kant, Kamal
 Mohan Gupta for the Respondents.

       The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
                                                                     D
       T.S. THAKUR, J. 1. Leave granted.

       2. The short question that falls for determination in these
  appeals by special leave is whether the High Court was right
. in declining the prayer made by the appellant for a direction in   E
  terms of Section 427 read with Section 482 of the Code of
  Criminal Procedure for the sentences awarded to the appellant
  in connection with the cases under Section 138 of the
  Negotiable Instruments Act filed againsthim to run concurrently.

      3. The material facts are not in dispute. The appellant is a F
 Director in a group of companies including Arawali Tubes Ltd.,
 Arawali Alloys Ltd., Arawali Pipes Ltd. and Sabhyata Plastics
 Pvt. Ltd. The appellant's case before us in that in connection
 with his business conducted in the name of the above
 companies, he had approached the respondent, Haryana G
 Financial Corporation for financial assistance and facilities. The
 Corporation had accepted the requests made by the
 Companies and granted financial assistance to the first three
 of the four companies mentioned above. Several cheques
 towards repayment of the amount borrowed by the appellant in H
     622      SUPREME COURT REPORTS                 [2013] 7 S.C.R.


A   the name of the above companies were issued in favour of the
   · Haryana Financial Corporation which on presentation were
    dishonoured by the banks concerned for insufficiency of funds.
     Consequently, the Corporation instituted complaints under
     Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act against the
 B appellant in his capacity as the Director of the borrowing
     companies. These complaints were tried by Judicial
     Magistrates at Hissar culminating in the conviction of the
     appellant and sentence of imprisonment which ranged between
    6 months in some cases to one year in some others besides
 c imposition of different amounts of fine levied in each complaint
     case and a default sentence in the event of non payment of
     amount awarded in each one of those cases.

         4. Aggrieved by his conviction and the sentence in the
     cases filed against him the appellant preferred appeals which
D    were· heard and dismissed by the Additional Sessions Judge,
     Hissar in terms of separate orders passed in each case. In
     some of the cases the Appellate Court reduced the sentence
     from one year to nine mon~hs.

 E         5. The appellant then approached the High Court by way
     of revision petitions. The High Court dismissed 15 out of 17
     revisions petitions in which the appellant was convicted. The
     remaining two revision petitions are still pending before the
     High Court. The High Court noticed that the appellant had not
F    questioned the correctness of the conviction before the
     appellate Court which disentitled him to do so in revision. That
     position was, it appears, not disputed even by the appellant,
     the only contention urged before the High Court being that
     instead of the sentences awarded to him running consecutively
     they ought to run concurrently. That contention was turned down
.G
     by the High Court holding that the sentence of imprisonment
     awarded to the appellant was not excessive so as to warrant
     its reduction or a direction for concurrent running of the same.
     The High Court noted:

H          "As regards sentence, keeping in view the amount of
       V. K. BANSAL v. STATE OF HARYANA                    623
                   [T.S. THAKUR, J.]
    cheques, sentence of simple imprisonment for six months        A
    in each case cannot be said to be excessive so as
    warrant reduction or direction for concurrent running of the
    sentences in all the 8 cases. Even sentence in default of
    payment of fine, which is huge amount, also cannot be said
    to be excessive".                                              B

     6. The revision petitions filed by the appellant along with
the criminal miscellaneous applications moved under Section
482 of the Cr.P.C. were accordingly dismissed. The present
appeals assail the correctness of the orders passed by the High    C
Court which are no doubt separate but in similar terms.

     7. Learned counsel appearing for the appellant strenuously
argued that the High Court has committed an error in declining
the prayer made by the appellant for_ an appropriate direction
to the effect that the sentences awarded to the appellant in the   D
cases in which he was found guilty ought to run concurrently and
not consecutively. It was urged that the trial Court and so also
the appellate and the revisional Courts were competent to
direct that the sentences awarded to the appellant should run
concurrently. The power vested in them to issue such a direction   E
has not been properly exercised, contended the learned
counsel. Reliance in support was placed upon the deci$ion of
this Court in State of Punjab v. Madan Lal (2009) 5 SCC 238.

     8. Section 427 of the Code of Criminal Procedure deals
with situations where an offender who is already undergoing a
                                                                   F
sentence of imprisonment is sentenced on a subsequent
conviction to imprisonment or imprisonment for life. It provides
that such imprisonment or imprisonment for life shall commence
at the expiration of the imprisonment to which he has been
previously sentenced unless the Court directs that the             G
subsequent sentence shall run concurrently with such previous
sentence. Section 427 may at this stage be extracted:

     "427. Sentence on offender already sentenced for
     another offence - (1) when an person already undergoing       H
    624      SUPREME COURT REPORTS                  [2013) 7 S.C.R.


A         sentence of imprisonmentis sentenced on a subsequent
          conviction to imprisonment or imprisonment for life, such
          imprisonment or imprisonment for life shall commence at
          the expiration of the imprisonment to which he has been
          previously sentenced unless the Court directs that the
B         subsequent sentence shall run concurrently with such
          previous sentence.

                Provided that where a person who has been
          sentenced to imprisonment by an order under Section 122
          in default of furnishing security is, whilst undergoing such
c         sentence, sentenced to imprisonment for an offence
          committed prior to the making of such order, the latter
          sentence shall commence immediately.

          (2) When a person already undergoing a sentence of
D         imprisonment for· life is sentenced on a subsequent
          conviction to imprisonment for a term or imprisonment for
          life, the subsequent sentence shall run concurrently with
          such previous sentence."

E      9. That upon a subsequent conviction the imprisonment or
  imprisonment for life shall commence at the expiration of the
  imprisonment which has been previously awarded is manifest
  from a plain reading of the above. The only contingency in which
  this position will not hold good is where the Court directs
F otherwise: Proviso to sub-section (1) to Section 427 is not for
  the present relevant as the same deals with cases where the
  person concerned is sentenced to imprisonment by an order
  under Section 122 in default of furnishing security which is not
  the position in the case at hand. Similarly sub-section (2) to
  Section 427 deals with situations where a person already
G undergoing a sentence of imprisonment for life is sentenced
  on a subsequent conviction to imprisonment for a term or
  imprisonment for life. Sub-section (2) provides that the
  subsequent sentence shall in such a case run concurrently with
  such previous sentence.
H
        V. K. BANSAL v. STATE OF HARYANA                   625
                    [T.S. THAKUR, J.]
      10. We are in the case at hand concerned more with the A
nature of power available to the Court under Section 427(1) of
the Code, which in our opinion stipulates a general rule to be
followed except in three situations, one falling under the proviso
to sub-section (1) to Section 427, the second falling under sub-
section (2) thereof and the third where the Court directs that B
the sentences shall run concurrently. It is manifest from Section
427(1) that the Court has the power and the discretion to issue
a direction but in the very nature of the power so conferred upon
the Court the discretionary power shall have to be exercised
along judicial lines and not in a mechanical, wooden or pedantic   c
manner. It is difficult to lay down any strait jacket approach in
the matter of exercise of such discretion by the Courts. There
is no cut and dried formula for the Court to follow in the matter
of issue or refusal ·of a direction within the contemplation of
 Section 427(1). Whether or not a direction ought to be issued
                                                                   0
 in a given case would depend upon the nature of the offence
 or offences committed, and the fact situation in which the
 question of concurrent running of the sentences arises. High
Courts in this country have, therefore, invoked and exercised
 their discretion to issue directions for concurrent running of E
 sentence as much as they have declined such benefit to the
 prisoners. For instance a direction for concurrent running of the
 sentence has been declined by the Gujarat High Court in
 Sumlo @ Sum/a Him/a Bhuriya and Ors. v. $fate of Gujarat
 and Ors. 2007 Crl.L.J. 612 that related to o.ommission of
 offences at three different places resulting in three different F
 prosecutions before three different Courts. The High Court
 observed:

     "The rule of 'single transaction' even if stretched to any
     extent will not bring the cases aforesaid under the umbrella G
     of 'single transaction' rule and therefore, this application
     fails. The application is rejected."

    11. Similarly a direction for concurrent running of sentence
has been declined by the same High Court in State of Gujarat
                                                                   H
    626       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                         [2013] 7 S.C.R.


A   v. Zaverbhai Kababhai 1996 Crl.L.J. 1296 which related to an
    offence of rape committed at different places resulting in
    conviction in each one of those offences in different
    prosecutions. The High Court observed:

          " .... It is true that it is left to the discretion of the Court while
B
          ordering the sentence to run either consecutively or
          concurrently. However, such discretion has to be exercised
          judicially, having regard to the facts and circumstances of
          the case. As observed by the Supreme Court, the rule with
          regard to sentencing concurrently will have no application,
c         if the transaction relating to offence is not the same and
          the facts constituting the two offences are quite different.
          The respondent-accused is found to be guilty for the
          offence punishable under Section 376 of the Indian Penal
          Code in two different and distinct occurrences on two
D         different dates, and the transactions relating to the
          commission of the offences have no nexus with each
          other ...

         12. There are also cases where the High Courts have
E   depending upon whether facts forming the basis of prosecution
    arise out of a single transaction or transactions that are akin to
    each other directed that the sentences awarded should run
    concurrently. As for instance the High Court of Allahabad has
    in Mu/aim Singh v. State 1974 Crl. L.J. 1397 directed the
F   sentence to run concurrently since the nature of the offence and
    the transactions thereto were akin to each other. Suffice it to
    say that the discretion vested in the Court for a direction in terms
    of Section 427 can and ought to be exercised having regard
    to the nature of the offence committed and the facts situation,
G   in which the question arises.

        13. We may at this stage refer to the decision of this Court
    in Mohd. Akhtar Hussain v. Assistant Collector of Customs
    (1988) 4 SCC 183 in which this Court recognised the basic rule
    of convictions arising out of a single transaction justifying
H
        V. K. BANSAL v. STATE OF HARYANA                      627
                  [T.S. THAKUR, J.]
concurrent running of the sentences. The following passage is         A
in this regard apposite:

    "The basic rule of thumb over the years has been the so
    called single transaction rule for concurrent sentences. If
    a given transaction constitutes two offences under two            B
    enactments generally, -it is wrong to have consecutive
    sentences. It is proper and legitimate to have concurrent
    sentences. But this rule has no application if the transaction
    relating to offences is not the same or the facts constituting
    the two offences are quite different."
                                                                      c
     14. In. Madan Lat's case (supra) this Court relied upon the
decision in Akhtar Hussain's case (supra) and affirmed the
direction of the High Court for the sentences to run concurrently.
That too was a case under Section 138 of the Negotiable
Instruments Act. The State was aggrieved of the direction that        D
the sentences shall run concurrently and had appealed to this
Court against the same. This Court, however, declined
interference with the order passed by the High Court and
upheld the direction issued by the High Court .
                                                                      E
      15. In conclusion, we may say that the legal position favours
exercise of discretion to the benefit of the prisoner in cases
where the prosecution is based on a single transaction no
matter different complaints in relation thereto may have been
filed as is the position in cases involving dishonour of cheques
issued by the borrower towards repayment of a loan to the             F
creditor.

     16. Applying the above test to the 15 cases at hand we
find that the cases against the appellant fall in three distinct
categories. The transactions forming the basis of the G
prosecution relate to three different corporate entities who had
either entered into loan transactions with the State Financial
Corporation or taken some other financial benefit like purchase
of a cheque from the appellant that was on presentation
dishonoured. The 15 cases that have culminated in the H
    628        SUPREME COURT REPORTS                [2013) 7 S.C.R.


A   conviction of the appellant and the award of sentences of
    imprisonment and fine imposed upon him may be categorised
    as under:

          1)     Cases in which complainant-Haryana State
B                Financial Corporation advanced a loan/banking
                 facility to M/s Arawali Tubes Ltd. acting through the
                 appellant as its Director viz. No.269-11/97; No.549-
                 11/97; No.393-11/97; No.371-11/97; No.372-11/97;
                 No.373-11/97; No.877-11/96; No.880-11/96; No.878-11/
                 96; No.876-11/96; No.879-11/96; No.485-11/96
c
          2)     Cases in which complainant-Haryana State
                 Financial Corporation advanced a loan/banking
                 facility to the appellant to Mis Arawali Alloys Ltd.
                 acting through the appellant as its Director viz.
D                No.156-11/1997 and No.396-1111998

          3)     Criminal complaint No. 331-11/97 in which -
                 complainant- State Bank of Patiala purchased/
                 discounted the cheque offered by Sabhyata
E                Plastics acting through the appellant as its Director.

       17. Applying the principle of single transaction referred to
  above to the above fact situations we are of the view that each
  one of the loan transactions/financial l;lrrangements was a
  separate and distinct transaction between the complainant on
F the one hand and the borrowing company/appellant on the
  other. If different cheques which are subsequently dishonoured
  on presentation, are issued by the borrowing company acting
  through the appellant, the same could be said to be arising out
  of a single loan transaction so as to justify a direction for
G concurrent running of the sentences awarded in relation to
  dishonour of cheques relevant to each such transaction. That
  being so, the substantive sentence awarded to the appellant
  in each case relevant to the transactions with each company
  referred to above ought to run concurrently. We, however, see
H no reason to extend that concession to transactions in which
       V. K. BANSAL v. STATE OF HARYANA                       629
                 [T.S. THAKUR, J.]
the borrowing company is different no matter the appellant A
before us is the promoter/Director of the said other companies
also. Similarly we see no reason to direct running of the
sentence concurrently in the case filed by the State Bank of
Patiala against Mis Sabhyata Plastics and Mis Rahul Plastics
which transaction is also independent of any loan or financial B
assistance between the State Financial Corporation and the
borrowing companies. We make it clear that the direction
regarding concurrent running of sentence shall be limited to the
substantive sentence only. The sentence which the appellant
 has been directed to undergo in default of payment of fine/ c
 compensation shall not be affected by this direction. We do so
 because the provisions of Section 427 of the Cr.P.C. do not,
 in our opinion, permit a direction for the concurrent running of
the substantive sentences with sentences awarded in default
 of payment of fine/compensation.                                 0
    18. In the result, these appeals succeed but only in part
and to the following extent:
            ',,      .
      1)    SubslaQtive sentences awarded to the appellant by
            the Courts of Judicial Magistrate, First Class,           E
            Hissar and Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate,
            Hissar, in· Criminal complaint cases No.269-11/97;
            No.549-11/97; No.393-11/97; No.371-11/97; !",Jo.372-11/
            97; No.373-11/97; No.877 "11/96; No.880-11/96;
            No.878-11/96; No.876-11/96; No.879-11/96; No.485-11/      F .
            96 relevant to the loan transaction between Haryana
            Financial Corporation and Arawali Tubes shall run
            concurrently.

      2)     Substantive sentences awarded to the appellant
            by the Court of Judicial Magistrate, First Class,         G.
            Hissar in Criminal complaint cases No.156-1111997
            and No.396-11/1998 between Haiyana Financial
            Corporation and Arawali Alloys relevant to the
            transactions shall also run concurrently;
                                                                      H
    630         SUPREME COURT REPORTS                (2013] 7 S.C.R.


A          3)    Substantive sentences inter se by the Court of
                 Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Hissar in the above
                 two categories and that awarded in complaint case
                 No.331-11/97 shall run consecutively in terms of
                 Section 427 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.
B
           4)    No costs.

    R.P.                                    Appeals partly allowed.