Holding

A notice to quit under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act is not necessary for eviction when the landlord establishes a case under the applicable Rent Control Act.

Summary

The landlady sought eviction of her tenant under the Tamil Nadu Building (Lease and Rent Control) Act on the ground of personal necessity. The Rent Controller dismissed the application; the appellate court held that personal necessity existed but required a notice to quit under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act, which was not complied with. The Madras High Court reversed, holding that such a notice was unnecessary. The Supreme Court examined the interplay between the Transfer of Property Act and State Rent Control Acts and held that a notice to quit under Section 106 is not a prerequisite for obtaining an eviction order when the landlord establishes a case under the relevant Rent Act. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed and the High Court’s view affirmed.

Issues considered

Whether a notice to quit under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act is required to obtain an eviction order under State Rent Control Acts.

Legislation cited

Andhra Pradesh Building (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 1960s. 10(1), s. 10(7), s. 12, s. 13
Bihar Rent Acts. 11
Bombay Rents, Hotels and Lodging House Rents Control Act, 1947s. 12, s. 13, s. 5
Madhya Pradesh Accommodation Act, 1961s. 12
Madhya Pradesh Accommodation Control Act, 1955s. 4
Tamil Nadu Building (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960s. 10(1), s. 10(3)(ii), s. 10(7), s. 11, s. 14, s. 15, s. 16, s. 2, s. 3, s. 8
Transfer of Property Acts. 106, s. 108, s. 111

Subjects

evictionrent controlnotice to quitTransfer of Property Actlease determinationpersonal necessitystatutory tenantcontractual tenant

Judgment

334

A V. DHANAPAL CHETTIAR
v.
YESODAI AMMAL
August 23, 1979
B [Y. V. CHANDRACHUD, C.J., R. S. SARK'ARIA, N. L. UNTWALIA,
P. N. SHINGHAL, P. S. .KAILASAM, 0. ClIINNAPPA REDDY -.... -
AND E. S. VENKATARAMAIAH, JJ.]

Rent Control Acts-Provide conditions for eviction of tenants-Notice under
s. 106 1'ransfer of Property Act if necessary after decree for eviction 'passed
c -by Court.

A lease between a lessor and a lessee comes into existence by way of con-
tract when the parties to the contract agree on the rent, duration of tenancy and
other relevant terms. Section 111 of the transfer of Property Act provides
various methods by which a lease of immovable property can be determined.
Under clause (h) of s. 111 a lease determines on the expiry of a notice to
D determine the lease given by the landlord to the tenant. Once the lease is
deter-mined by notice -the lessor can enforce his ·right of recovery of possession
of the property. But if the lease does not stand determined under any of the
clauses (a) to (g) of s. 111 notice under s. 106, Transfer of Property Act to
determine the lease is necessary. But this section does not imp0se an obliga-
tion on the landlord to spell out the grounds on which the landlord wishes to
evict the tenant.
E
During the postwar years all the State Legislatures pas!ed Building :md Rent
Control Acts to give protection to tenants against unreasonable eviction by the
landlords as well as to prevent the landlords from exploiting the tenants by
way of exorbitl\llt rents. As in the case of all social legislation which is de-
signed for the protection of the needy, the Rent Control Acts have brought
considerable inroad on the landlord's freedom of contract. Many Acts have
F brought about considerable changes in the righ~ and liabilities of the lessor
1
and the lessee and the tilt of the law is largely in fnour of the lessee. The
landlord is bound to let out his premises on rent to a person even against his
wishes when the concerned authority allots a parti~ular premises to a person.
_When once the premises are so allotted, the landlord is bound to give the pre-
mises to that person l!llld at the rent fixed by the authority concerned.

G In the matter of determination of the tenancy .the State Rent Acts do not
permit a landlord to snap his relationship with the tenant merely by serving
on him a notice to quit as is the position under the Transfer of Property Act.
The 'landlord can recover possession of the property only on one or more of
the grounds enacted in the relevant section of the Rent Acts. Even after the
termination of the contractual tenancy the landlord, under the definitions of land-
. lord and tenant contained in the Rent Acts, remains a landlord and a tenant
H remains a tenant because of the eXpress provision made in the enactments that
a tenant means "a person continuing in possession after the termination of
the tenancy in his favour." It is also provided that no .landlord can treat a
building to have been vacant by merely terminating the contractual tenancy
V. D. CHBTTIAR V. YBSODAI 335

as the tenant still lawfully continues in possession of the premises. Yet another A
important feature of the Rent Acts is that either by way of a non-obstante
clause or by necessary implication these enactinents have done away with the
law contained in s. 108 of the T. P. Act dealing with rights and liabilities of the
.lessor and the lessee.

The difference between the position obtaining under· the Transfer of Property
Act and the Rent Acts in the matter of determination of a lease is that under B
the former Act to recover possession of the property determination of the lease
is necessary because during the continuance of the lease the landlord cannot
recover possession of the premises while under the Rent Acts the landlord be.
comes entitled to recover possession only on the fulfilment of the conditions
laid down in the relevant sections. He cannot recover possession merely by
determining the tenancY. Nor can he be stopped from doing so on the ground
that he has not terminated the contractual tenancy. c
In the instant case the appellant filed an application against the tenant under
s. 10(3)(ii) of the Tamil Nadu Building (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1970
calling upon him to quit 'On the ground of personal necessity. The Rent Con~
troller rejected her application. The Appellate Court, while 'holding that the
respondent required the premises bona fide tor her personal necessity, dismissed
the application on the ground that a notice to quit was necessary and that the D
notice given by her was not in accordance with law. In revision the High Court
held that notice to <;J.Uit under s. 106, T.P. Act was not necessary.

Dismissing the appeal,

I-IELD : ( 1 ) · The High Court was right in its view that no notice to quit.
was necessary under s. 106 of the T.P. Act to enable the landlord to get an E
order of eviction against the tenant. On the question of requirement of notice
under s. 106, T.P. Act there is no scope for taking different views on the basis
of difference in phraseology of the various Rent Acts. The difference in the
language does not bring about any distinction. [353F; 342C-D]

2. In the case of a landlord wishing to evict .his tenant under the Rent Acts
• determination of the lease in accordance with the Transfer of Property 1\ct is F
unnecessary. It is a mere surplusage because the landlord cannof get eviction
of the tenant even after such determination. The tenant continues to be a
h.(,..
,\ tenant even thereaftef. That being so, making out a case under the Rent Act
for eviction of the tenant by itself is sufficient and it is not Obligatory io found
the proceeding on the basis of determination of the lease by issue of notice in
accordance with s. 106, T.P. Act. [353D-E]
G
3. Although the Rent Acts restrict the. rights which the landlord possesses
either for charging excessive rents or for evicting tenants, if within the an1bit
of tho~e restricted rights the landlord ma'.kes out his case, it is a rncre empty
· formahty, a mere surplusage, to ask him to determine the contractual tenancy
before the institution of a suit for eviction. Such a notice under the T.P. Act is
necessary because mere determination of the lease entitles a landlord to recover
possession. But und~r the Rent Control Acts it becomes a-n unnecessary techni- H
cality to insist that the landlord must also determine the contractual tenancv.
It is of no practical use to insist again upon a notice under s. 106, after placi~g
336 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1980] l S.C.R.

A so many restrictions under the Rent Acts on the landlord'• ri&ht to evict tho
tenant. [344H-345A-B] '
4. But where a landlord, by way Of abundant caution:, to butteress his case,
gives a notice to the tenant that be intends to file a suit for eviction, it is not
open to the tenant to say that such a notice is compulsory or obligatory or that
it must fulfil all the technical requirements of s. 106 of the Transfer of Property T
B Act. Once the liability to be evicted is incurred by the tenant; he cannot tum
round and say that the contractual lease has not been determined. The action
of the landlord in instituting the suit for evictjon on the grounds mentioned in
any State Rent Acts will amount to an expression of his intention that he does
not want the tenant to continue as his lessee and the jural relationship of lessor
and l~ec would come to an encl on the passing of an order or a decree Jor
eviction. [340B-D]
c
5. The restricted area under the various State Rent Acts has done away to
a lar&e extent, with the requirement of the law of contract and the Transfer of
Property Act. This being so there is no reason to impose an unnecessary and
unjustifiable formality of terminating the contractual lease. [345C]

6. Secondly, if protection from eviction is -clai_mable by the tenant eTen after
D determination of the contractual tenancy under the Rent Acts there is no reason
why the law of contract engrafted in the Transfer of Property Act should again
be imported for seeking eviction of the tenant. [346B]

7. If the termination of the contractual tenancy by notice dpes not entitle
the landlord to recover possession of the premises and he becomes entitled to
recover posses.sion only if he makes out a case under the special provisions of the
E State Rent Acts then termination of the contractual relationship by notice is
not necessary. Termination comes into effect when a case is successfully made
out for eviction of the tenant under the State Rent Acts. [347A-B]
Bhaiya Punjalal Bhagwanddin v. Dave Bhagwatpraaad Prabhuprasad
[1963] 3 SCR 312, Mangilal v. Suganchand Rathi [1964] 5 SCR, 239,
Manujmdra Dutt v. Purendu Presad Roy Chowdhury & ors. [1967] 1 S.C.R.
475, lsha Valimohamad & Anr. v. Haji Gulam Mohamad & Hajj Dada Trust
F [1975] 1 SCR, 720, P. J. Gupta & Co. v. K. Venkatesan Merchant & ors. [1975J
2 SCR. 401, Dattanpant Gopalyarao Devakate v. Vithabrao Maruthirao Jana-
gavai [1975] Suppl. SCR. 67, Ratan Lal v. Vardesh Chander & ors. [1976] 2
SCR. 906 and Sardarilal Vishwanath and Ors. v. Pritam Singh [1978] 1 SCR.
I! I not approved.

8. 'Vhere, on the other band, over and above the protection under the rele-
G vant Act a clause in the lease deed gives 'an extra protection of getting notice
to quit and vacate the premises, such a clause not being unlawful, the extra
protection given to the .,.tenant against eviction must be adhered to. But for this
reason it is not correct to say that s. 106 of the T.P. Act gives an extra protec-
tion to the tenant against eviction. The purpose of this provision is merely to
terminate the contract which the over-riding Rent Acts do not permit to be
terminated. [348 A-BJ
H
Mis. Raval and Co. v. K. G. Ramachandran and others. [1974] 2 SCR 629,
Raj Kris/ma and another v. S. K. Shaw and Brothers [1951] SCR 145 and
v. D. CHETTJAR v. v. YESODAI (Untwalia, J.) 337

.Puwada Venkateswara Rao v. Chidamana Venkata Ramana [1976] 3 SCR. 551 A
Y approved.
Shri Hem Chand v. Shrimati Sham Devi I.L.R. 1955 Punjab, 36 approved.

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Civil Appeal No. 1303 of
1977.
B
Appeal l;>y Special . Leave from the Judgment and Order dated
10-12-1976 of the Madras High Court in C.R.P. No. 836/76.
K. Jayaram and K. Ramkumar for the Appellant .
• M. N. Padmanabhan, T. A. Ramachandran, M. N. Tandon and
l;frs. Ramachandran for the Respondent. C

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

UNTWALIA J. This appeal by special leave at the instance of
the ten'allt of certain premises in the town of Vellore was heard by a
larger Bench of this Court consisting of seven Judges to resolve the
D
cleavage of opinion between the various High Courts in India as also
between several decisions of this Court, on the question as to whether
in order to get a decree or order for eviction against a tenant under
any State Rent Control Act it is necessary to give a notice under Sec-
tion 106 of the Transfer of Property Act. We proceed to do so in
this Judgment. E
The respondent filed an application agains! the appellant under
section, 10(3) (a) (iii) of the Tamil Nadu Building (Lease and Rent
Control) Act, 1960, hereinafter referred to as 'the Tamil Nadu Rent
Act, on the ground of personal necessity. The Rent Controller held
that the requirement of the respondent was not genuine and he accor- F
dingly dismissed her petition. On appeal by the landlady the Appel-
late Court held in her favour on the point of her requiring the premises
bona fide for her personal necessity but maintained the dismissal of her
~pplication on the ground that a "notice to quit was necessary and the
·one given by her was not in accordance with law. The landlady took
up the matter in revision to the Madras High Court. A learned G
single Judge of that Court following his earlier decision in K. Sukuma-
ran Nair etc. v. S. Neelakantan Nair by constituted attorney P. Raman
Nair etc. etc.(') held that notice to quit under section 106 of the
Transfer of Property Act was not necessary for seeking an eviction of
·a tenant under The Tamil Nadu Rent Act. Hence ibis appeal by the
tenant. H

(!) (1976) 2 Madras Law Journal 84.
•

338 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1980] 1 S.C:.R.

A We do not think it necessary to decide in this appeal whether the
notice to quit given fo the appellant was a valid notice in accordance ·
with section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act. The controversy
before us centered round th~ question whether such a notice was at
all necessary to be given.
B We shall presently refer to the various decisions of the High r
Courts and this Court taking contrary views. But before we do so
we may make some general observations. It is weUcknown that after
the second world war to give protection to a tenant against unneces-
sary, undue or unreasonable eviction and in the matter of being ex-
ploited for payment of exorbitant rent all States in India at one time
' c or the other passed Building and Rent Control Acts. Amendments
in t)lem were brought about from time to time. The language and
the scheme of the Acts varied and differed from State to State. Even
though there was no basic or fundamental difference in regard to the
'(
law of eviction of a tenant in any of the State Statutes, different cons-
,tructions were put in regard to them and principles were culled out
D
in varying manners to arrive at the conclusions in some cases that a
notice to quit in accordance with section 106 of the Transfer of Pro-
perty Act was necessary and in some i~ was held that it was not neces-
sary. The grawmen of the underlying principles seems to have been-
over-looked in many cases.
E
Under the Transfer of Property Act the subject of "Leases of
I=ovable Property" is dealt with in Chapter V. Section 105 defines
the lease, the lessor, the lessee and the, rent. Purely as a matter of
contract, a lease comes into existence under the Transfer of Property
Act. But in all social legislations meant for the protection of the
F needy, not necessarily the so-called weaker section of the society as is
commonly and popularly called, there is appreciable inroad on the·
freedom of contract and a person beccmes a tenant of a landlord even
against his wishes on the allotment of a particular premises to him by
the authority concerned, Under section 107 of the Transfer of Pro-
perty Act a lease of i=ovable property from year to year, or for
G any term exceeding one year, or reserving a yearly rent, can be made
only by a registered instrument. None of the State Rent Acts has abro-
gated or affected this provision. Section 108 deals with the rights
and liabilities of lessors and lessees. Many State Rent Acts have
brought about considerable changes in the rights and liabilities of a
,.
lessor and a lessee, largely in favour of the fatter, although not whole
H ly. The topic of Transfer of Property other than agricultural land is·
covered by Entry 6 of List III in the Seventh Schedule fo the Constr-
tution. The subject being in the Concurrent List, many State Rent
v. D. CHETTIAR v. YESODAI (Untwalia, J.) 339

Acts have by necessary implication and many of them by starting cer- ,A
tain provisions with non-obstante clause have done away with the law
engrafted in section 108 of the Transf7r of Property Act except in
regatd to any matter which is not provided for in the State Act either
expressly or by necessary implication.

Section 111 deals with the question of determination of a lease, and B
in various clauses (a) to (h) methods of determination of a lease of
immovable property are provided. Clause (g) deals with the forfei-
ture of lease under certain circumstances and at the end are added
the words "and in imy of these cases the lessor or his transferee gives
notice in writing to the lessee of his intention to determine the lease."
The. notice spoken of in clause (g) is a different kind of notice and c
even without the State Rent Acts different views have been expressed
as to whether such a notice in all cases is necessary or not. We only
observe here that when the State Rent Acts provide under what cir-
' cumstances and on what grounds a tenant can be evicted, it does pro-
vide that a tenant forfeits his right to continne in occupation of the D
property and makes himself liable to be evicted on fulfilment of those
conditions. Only in those State Act~ where a specific provision bas
been made for the giving of any notice requiring the tenant either to
pay the arrears of rent within the specified period or to do any other
thing, snch a• the Bombay Rent Act or the West Bengal Rent Act,
n.o notice in accordance with clause (g) is necessary .. A ]ease of E
immovable property determines under clause (h) : -

"On the expiration of a notice to determine the lease, or
to quit, or of intention to quit, the property lea•ed, duly
given by one party to the other."
F ,
It is this clause which brings into operation the requirement of
section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act. Without adverting to
the effect and the details of waiver of forfeiture, waiv.er of notice to
quit, relief against forfeiture for non-payment of rent etc. 3S provided
for in sections 112 to 114A of the Transfer of Property Act, suffice
it to say that under the said Act no ground of eviction of a tenant has G
to be made out once a contractual tenancy is put to an end by service
of a valid notice under section 106 of the Tran~fer of Property Act.
Until and unless the lease is determined, the lessee is entitled to con-
tinue in possession. Once it is determined it becomes open to the
lessor to enforce his right of recovery o! possession of the property
against him. In .such a situation it was plain and clear that if the H
lease of the immovable property did not stand determined under any
of the clauses (a) to (g) of section 111, a notice to determine it un-
340 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1980] l S.C.R. ·

A der section 106 was necessary. But when under the various .State
Rent Acts, either in one language or the other, it has been provided that
a tenant can be evicted on the grounds mentioned in certain sections of
the said Acts, then how does the question of determination of a
tenancy by notice arise? If the State Rent Act requires the giving
of a particular type of notice in order to get a particular kind of relief,
:B »uch a notice will have to be given. Or, it may be, that a landlord
will be well advised by way of abundant precaution a.nd in order to
lend additional support to his case, to give a notice to his tenant inti-
mating that he intended to file a suit against him for his eviction on the
ground mentioned in the notice. But that is not to say that such a
notice is compulsory or obligatory or that it must fulfil all the techni-
c cal requirements of section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act. Once
the liability to be evicted is incurred by the tenant, he cannot turn
round and say that the contractual lease has not been determined. The
action of the landlord in instituting a suit for eviction on the ground
mentioned in any State Rent Act will be tantamonnt to an expression
of his intention that he does not want the tenant to continue as his
·D lessee and the jural relationship of lessor and lessee will come to an
end on the passing of an order or a decree for eviction. Until then,
under the extended definition of the word 'tenant' under the various
State Rent Acts, the tenant continues to be a tenant even though the
contractual tenancy has been determined by giving a valid notice
E under section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act. In many cases
· the distinction between a contractual tenant and a statutory tenant
was alluded to for the purpose of elucidating some particular aspects
which cropped up in a particular case. That led to the criticism of
that expression in some of the decisions. Without detaining our-
selves on this aspect of the matter by any elaborate discussion, in our
F opinion, it will suffice to say that the various State Rent Control Acts
make a serious encroachment in the field of freedom of contract. It
does not permit the landord to snap his relationship with the tenant
merely by his act of serving a notice to quit on him. Inspite of the
notice, the law says that he continues to be a tenant and he does so
enjoying all the right~ of a lessee arid is at the same time deemed to
G be under all the liabilities such as payment of rent etc. in accordance
with the law.
In Sukumaran Nair's case (supra) the learned !udge has pointed
out the difference of opinion expressed in the various decisions of the ,
Madras High Court from time to time in regard to notice to quit un-
H der section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act. In Parthasarthy and
another v. Krishnamoorthy and another(') a learned single Judge of
(1) A.l.R. 1949 Madras 387.
I

V. D. CHETTIAR v. YESODAI (Untwalia, J.) 341

that Court held that a notice to quit was uecessary. A contrary view A
was expressed by a Division Bench of the High Court in R. Krishna·
murthy v. S. Parthasarthy and another.(') Difference of opinion in
Madras High Court continued in many other cases and then came
the Full Bench decision in the case of M./s Raval and Co. v. K. G.
Ramachandran and others. (2) This decision was' approved in the B
r majority decision of ·this Court in Raval & Co. v. K. G. Ramachand-·
ran & Ors. ( 3 ) Raval's case was not directly a case in relation to
section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act but some observations

• made therein did tend to show that notice would not be necessary .
In spite of the Full ·Bench decision of the Madras High Court in
Raval's case a Division Bench of that Court in B. Kalyanasundaram c
v. A. R. Nataraian( 4 ) stuck to the view that notice was necessary.
The Punjab High Court in Shri Hem Chand v. Shrimati Sham Devi(")
had expressed the view that notice was not necessary. The Full
Bench of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in Bhaiya Ram Haroo
Lal v. Mahavir Parshad Murari Lal Mahajan(') took a contrary view.
After the majority view of the Full Bench of the Patna High Court D'
in Niranjan Pal and another v. Chaitanyalal Ghosh and another(T) it
has been consistently held in the Patna High Court that a notice is
necesS'ilry. A Special Bench of the Cakntta High Court in Surya
Properties Private Ltd. and other v. Bimalendu Nath Sarkar and
others(') has taken the view that over and above the notice required
to be given under the State Act a notice under section 106 of the E
Transfer of Property Act is also necessary. To the same effect is the
view expressed in Chhotelal Banshidhar v. Abdullabhai Abdul
Gaffor;(') Shambhooram & another v. Mangal Singh & another("')
Siddappa Adivappa v. Venkatesh Raghavendra Hubba/Ii;(") Batoo
Mal v. Rameshwar Nath and others(u) and Parshotam Lal v. Kalayan
F
Singh and another("). As against this, and specially after some
• decisions of this Court, the preponderance of recent view in the !Jigh

(I) A.I.R. 1949 Madra., 780
(2) A.I.R. 1967 Madras 57.
(3) [1974] 2 S.C.R. 629.
(4) (1969) 2 M.L. J. 585. G
(5) I.L.R. 1955 Punjab 36.
(6) A.I.R. 1969 Punjab & Haryana l IO.
(7) A.LR. 1964 Patna 401.
(8) A.LR. 1964, Calcutta I.
(9) A.LR. 1952 Madhya Bharat 121.
(10) A.l.R. 1959 Rajasthan 59.
(11) A.I.R. 1965 Mysore 65. H
(12) A.l.R. 1971 Delhi 98.
(13) A.l.R. 1971 J. & K. 20.
342 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1980] l S.C.R.

A · Courts of Andhra Pradesh, Madras, Kerala, Kamataka and Punjab
and Haryana is that no notice under section 106 of the Transfer of
Property Act is necessary. These cases are Ulligappa etc. v. S. Mohan
Rao, minor by guardian Changamma, etc.('); K. Sukumaran Nair and ·
others v. S. Neelakantan Nair and others('); Lalitha v. Avissumma(');
Govindaswamy R. v. Pannalal C. S.(•) and Vinod Kumar v. Harbans
B Singh Azad(•). Such a cleavage of opinion cropped up in the various
High Courts because of some observations of this Court in -;.ome
decisions which will be presently alluded to. It was so on an erro-
neous assiimption, if we may say so with great respect, that the diffe-
rence in the phraseology of the different State Rent Acts justifies this
c difference of views. In our considered judgment on the question of a
requirement of a notice under section 106 of the transfer of Property
Act there is no scope for taking different views on the basis of tire
difference in the phraseology of the various Rent Acts. In this regard
the difference in the language does not bring about any distinction.
In all the States the law should be uniform viz. that either a notice
D is necessary or it is not. It was high time, therefore, that this larger
Bench was constituted to lay down a uniform law for the governance
of the whole country and not permit the unjustified different trend of
decisions to continue.

Before we embark upon a review of some of the decisions of this f-'
E Court we think it necessary and advisable to briefly refer to the pro-
visions od' some of the State Rent Acts in support of the observations
made by us above that on the question of notice no different result is
possible on the language of any State Act. Section 10 of The Tamil
Nadu Rent Act says : - "A tenant shall not be evicted whether in
execution af a decree or otherwise except in accordance with the pro-
F
visions of this section or sections 14 to 16." In other words if a
case. is made out for his eviction in accordance with the provisions
aforesaid, he can be evicted. Even after the terinination of the con-
tractual tenancy under the definition of the landlord in clause ( 6)
and of the tenant under clause (8) of section 2 the landlord re-
G mains a fandlord and the tenant remains a tenantl as clause ( 8) ex-
pressly says that tenant means "a person continuing in possession
after tire termination of the tenancy in his favour.'' Section 3 indicated
that no landlord can treat the building to have become vacant by

(!) (1971) 2 Andhra Weekly Report 298.
(2) A.l.R. 1976 Madras 329.
H
(3) A.I.R. 1978 Kerala 167.
(4) (1978) (1) fearnatalca Law Journal 506.
(5) A.I.R. 1977 Punjab & Haryana 262.
V. D. CHETTIAR v. YESODAI (Untwalia, !.) 343

merely terminating the contractnal tenancy as the tenant still lawfully A
continues in possession of the premises. The tenancy actnally termi-
nates on the passing of the order or decree for eviction and the build-
ing falls vacant by his actual eviction. The giving of the notice, there-
fore, is a mere surplusage and unlike the law under the Transfer of
Property Act it does not entitle the landlord to evict the tenant.
B
Adverting to the provisions of the Bombay Rents, Hotels and Lod-
ging House Rents Control Act, 1947 it would be found from the de-
finition section 5 that any person remaining in the building after the
· determination of the lease is a tenant within the meaning of clause
(Ii). Section 12 of the Bombay Act says that the landlord shall
not be entitled to the recovery of possession of any premises so long c
as the conditions mentioned in sub-section (1) are fulfilled nor any
suit for recovery of possession shall be instituted by a landlord against
a tenant on the happening of the events mentioned in sub-section (2 l
until the expiration of one month next after the notice is served on
the tenant in the manner provided in section 106 of the Transfer of
Property Act, as required by the said sub-section. Section 13 provi- D
des that a landlord may recover possession on certain grounds. Is
it not plain then that on the happening of the events or on the fulfil-
ment of the conditions mentioned in sections 12 and 13 etc. the land-
lord becomes entitled to recover possession from the tenant, other-
wise not. It will bear repetition to say that under the Transfer of
E
Property Act in order to entitle the landlord to recover possession
determination of the lease is necessary as during its continuance he
could not recover possession, while under the State Rent Act the
• blndlord becomes entitled to recover possession only on the fulfil-
ment of fhe rigour of law provided therein. Otherwise not. He can-
not recover possession merely by determination of tenancy. Nor can F
r he be stopped from doing so on the ground that he has not terminat-
ed the. contractual tenancy. Under the State Rent Control Acts the
concept of the contractual tenancy has lost much of its significance
and force. Identical is the position under the Bihar Act. The defi-
nition section permits the tenant to continue as a tenant even after
the determination of the contractual tenancy. Section 11 gives him G
protection against eviction by starting with a non-obstante clause and
providing further that he shall not be liable to eviction from any build-
ing except in execution of a .decree passed by the Court for one or
more grounds mentioned in section 11. Does it not stand to reason to
say that a decree can be passed if one or more of the grounds exist
and such a decree can be passed against an existing tenant within the H
meani_ng of the State Rent Act? Similar is the position under the
Kerala Lease and Rent Control Act, 1965 and the East Punjab Urban
344 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1980] 1 ~.C.R.

A Rent Restriction Act, 1949. We shall refer to the provisions of the
Madhya Pradesh and Andhra Pradesh State Rent Acts when we come
to review the decisions of this Court in relation to those Acts.
A Constitution Bench of this Court in Rai Brij Raj Krishna and
another v. S. K. Shaw and Brothers (') in a different context dealing
with section 11 of the Bihar Rent Act observed at page 150 : - {.

"Section 11 is a self-contained section, and it is wholly 'f
unnecessary to go outside the Act for determining whether a
tenant is liable to be evicted or not, atnd under what condi-
tions he can be evicted. It clearly provides that a tenant is
not liable to be evicted except on certain conditions, and one
c of the conditions laid down for the eviction of a month to
month tenant is non-payment of rent ................. .
The Act thus sets up a complete machinery for the investi-
gation of those matters upon which the jurisdiction of the
Controller to order evic.tion of a tenant depends, and it
I) expressly makes bis order final and subject only to the deci-
sion of th\) Commissioner."
It was on that 'account held that the decision of the Controlling
authority was final and it was not open to the Civil Court to take a
different view of the matter on the question of non-payment of rent.
It was ·not a case where a question of notice arose for determination.
E
The first decision of this Conrt which is necessary to be noticed
on the point of notice is the case of Bhaiya Punja/al Bhagwanddin v.
Dave Bhagwatprasad Prabhuprasad( 2 ). The case related to Bombay
Rent Act. Raghubar Dayal J. speaking on behalf of the Division
Bench of this Court expressed the view at page 318 thus:-
F "We are therefore of opinion that where a tenant is in
possession under a lease from the landlord, he is not to be
evicted for a cause which would give rise to a suit for re-
covery of possession under s. 12 if his tenancy has not been
determined already. It follows that whenever a tenant acts
in a way which would remove the bar on the landlord's right
G to evict him it is necessary for the landlord to serve him
with a notice determining his tenancy and also serve him with
a notice under sub-s.(2) of s.12 of the Act."
It is true that the Rent Act is intended to restrict the rights whiclt
the landlord possessed either for charging excessive rents or for evicting
H tenants. But if within the ambit of those restricted rights he makes out
(1) [1951] S.C.R. 145.
(2) [1963] 3 S.C.R. 312:
v. D. CHETTIAR v. YESODA! (Untwalia, !.) 345

his case it is a mere empty formality to ask him to determine the A
contl'actual tenancy before institution of a suit for eviction. As we
have pointed out above, this was necessary under the Transfer of Pro-
perty Act as mere termination of the lease entitled the landlord to re-
cover possession. But under the Rent Control Acts it becomes an
.nnnecessary technicality to insist that the landlord must determine the
contractual tenancy. It is of no pmctical use after so many restrictions
on his right to evict the tenant have been put. The restricted area
• under the various State Rent Acts has done away to a large extent with
requirement of the law of contract and the Transfer of Property Act.
If this be so why unnecessarily, illogically and unjustifiably a formality
of terminating the contractual lease . should be insisted upon? In
Bhaiya Punjala/'s case, if we may say so with very great respect, the
principle of law laid down by this Court in Rai Brij Raj Krishna's case
(supra) and by the Punjab High Court in Hem Chand's case was
'' wrongly distinguished. After quoting the passage from the former if
was said at {Y.lge 322 : -
"In the present case, s.12 of the Act is differently worded I>
and cannot therefore be said to be a complete Code in itself.
There is nothing in fr which overrides the provisions of the
Transfer of Property Act.''
The difference in the wordings of section 11 of the Bihar Act and
section 12 of the Bombay Act does not justify the conclusion that the
provisions of the Transfer of Property Act have not been overridden
,by section 12 of the Bombay Act reading it with section 13 etc. This
was the ground given for distinguishing Hem Chand's case also by
erroneously pointing out the distinction between section 1'3 (1) of the
Delhi and Ajmer Merwara Rent Control Act, 1952 and the Bombay
Act. In 'our considered judgment Bhaiya Punja/al's case was not
F'
correctly decided.
In another decision of this Court in VoraAbbasbhai Ali Mohamed
v. Haji Gulamnabi Haji Safibhai,(') in relation to the Bombay Rent
Act again there are some lines at page 162 wherein it has been observ-
ed' thus:-
"The clause applies to a tenant who continues to remain G
in occupation after the contractual tenancy is determined: it
does not gr:mt a right to evict a contractual tenant without
determination of the contractual tenancy."
But the above observ&tion is followed by the words : -
"Protection from eviction is claimable by the tenant even
after determination of the contractual tenancy so long as he
(1) [1964] 5 S.C.R. 157.
.346 SUPREM!l COURT REPORTS (1980] I s.C.R.

A pays or is ready -and willing to pay the amount of the standard
rent and permitted increases and observes and performs the
other conditions of the tenancy consistent with the provisions
of the Act."
In" our view if "protection from eviction is claimable by the tenant (
even after, determination of the contractual tenancy" then why import "f
B
the contractual Jaw engrafted in the Transfer of Property Act for seek-
ing evictiort of the tenant? .
The decision of this Court in the case of Mangilal v. Suganchand
Rathi,(') being a decision of a Constitution Bench consisting of five
learned and eminent Judges of this Court requires careful consideration.
Therein it was held at page 244 with reference to section 4 of the
Madhya Pradesh Accommodation Control Act, 1955 thus:-
"The Accommodation Act does not in any way abrogate
Ch. V of the Transfer of Property Act which deals with leases
of immovable property. The requirement of s. 106 of the
Transfer of Property Act is that a lease from month to month
can be terminated only after giving fifteen days' notice expir-
ing with the end of u month of the t~nancy either by the
landlord to the tenant or by the tenant to the landlord. Such
a notice is essential for bringing to an end the relationship
of landlord and tenant. Unless the relationship is validly
E terminated the landlord does not get the right to obtain
possession of the premises by evicting the tenant. Section
106 ofthe Transfer of Property Act does not provide for the
satisfaction of any Additional requirements. But then, s. 4
of the Accommodation Act steps in and provides that unless
one of the several grounds set out therein is established or
.F exists, the landlord cannot evict the tenant."
Section 4 of the Madhya Pradesh Rent Act, 1955 provided that no
suit could be filed in any Civil Court against a tenunt for his eviction
for any accommodation except on one or more grounds set out in that
section. The corresponding provision in Madhya Pradesh Accommo-
dation Act of 1961 is contained in Section 12 which starts with a non-
obstante clause also but the definition of the tenant as in other St~e
Acts includes "any person continuing in possession after the termina-
tion of his tenancy". How then is it correct to say that a notice is r
essential. for bringing to an end the relationship between the landlord
;..
and the tenant? The notice does not bring to an end such a re!'ation-
H ship because of the protection given to the tenant under the Rent Act.
If that be so then it is not necessary for the landlord to terminate the
(I) J1964] 5 S.C.R. 239;
v. D. CHETTIAR v. YESODAI (Untwalia, J.) 347

.contractnal relationship to obtain possession of the premises for evicting A
the tenant. If the termination of the contractual tenancy by notice
does not, because of the Rent Act provisions, entitle the landlord to
recover possession and he becomes entitled, only if he makes out a case
under the special provision of the State Rent Act, then, in our opinion,
termination of the contractual relationship by a notice is not necessary.
B
The termination comes into effect when a case is successfully made out
for eviction of the tenant under the State Rent Act. We say with
utmost respect that on the point of requirement of a notice under sec-
tion 106 of the Transfer of Property Act Mangilal's case was not
correctly decided.

In Manujendra Dutt v. Purendu Prasad Roy Chowdhury & Ors.,(') c
the question of notice came to be considered with reference to the Cal-
cutta Thika Tenancy Act, 1949 and in that connection it was said at
page 480 : -
"The Thika Tenancy Act like similar Rent Acts passed in
differen~ States is intended to prevent indiscriminate eviction D
of tenants and is intended to be a protective statute to safe-
guard security of possession of tenants and therefore should
be construed in the light of its being a social legislation. What
· section 3 therefore does is to provide that even where a land-
,, lord has terminated the contractual tenancy by a proper
notice such landlord can succeed in evicting his tenanf provid- E
ed that he falls under one or more of the clauses of that
section." .

For the reasons already stated we do not agree, and we say so with
respect, with the above enunciation of law. This apart there is scope
for distinguishing Manujendra's case because clause 7 of the lease deed F
therein ran as follows : -

........... "Provided always and it is hereby agreed and declared
that if it be required that the lessee should vacate the said
premises at the end of the said term of IO years the lessee will
be served with a 6 months notice ending with the expiry of G
· the said term and it is further agreed that if the lessee is per-
mitted to hold over the land after the expiry of the said term
of 10 years the lessee will be allowed a six months notice to
quit and vacate the said pr_emises."

Over ~nd above the protection under the Thilca Tenancy Act clause
H
7 of the lease deed gave an extra protection of getting six months
(I) !1967] I S.C.R. 475.

1.
.
348 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1930] 1 s.c.R.

A notice to quit and vacate the premises. In that event one can say that
such a clause being not unlawful and giving an extra protection to
the tenant against eviction must also be adhered to. But it is not
correct to say that sectio11 106 of the Transfer of Property Act merely
providing for termination of a lease either by the lessor or the lessee
B by giving the requisite notice is an extra protection against eviction.
The purpo6e of this provision is merely to terminate the contract which
the overriding Rent Acts do not permit to be terminated.

In Raval's case (supra) the question for consideration was whe-
..
ther section 4 of the Tamil Nadu Rent Act providing for an applica-
C lion for fixation of fair rent was available both to the tenant and the
landlord. The majority speaking through Alagiriswami J. took the
view that it was so. A contrary view was expressed by Bhagwati J.
speaking for the minority. While discussing this question the relevant
passage from the decision of this Court in Rai Brij Raj Krishna's
case was quoted at page 634 and reference was made to the decision
D of the ~jab High Court in Hem Chand's case. Thereafter the ob-
servation of this Court in Bhaiya Punja/al' s case to the effect that
"Rent Acts are not ordinarily intended to interfere with contractual
leases and are Acts for the protection of tenants and are consequently
resfrictive and not enabling, conferring no new rights of oaction ·but
restricting the existing rights either under the contract or under the
E general law," were held not to apply to all Rent Acts irrespective of
the scheme of those Acts and their provisions. This observation
given with reference to the dictum of this Court in Bhaiya Punjalal's
case concerned with the question of notice under section 106. It
enabled certain High Courts to make a firm departure and take the
view with reference to the scheme of their respective State Acts to say
F
that a notice was not necessary. This happened in Madras, Andhra
Pradesh, Kerala, Karnataka and Punjab & Haryana. Alagiriswami J.
at page 635 after having made that observation with reference to
Bhaiya Punja/al's case has said-"Be that as it may, we are now
concerned with the question of fixation of a fair rent" In our opin-
G ion the majority decision with regard fo section 4 was undoubtedly
·-
·~

correct and the minority stretched the law, if we may say so with
respect, too far to hold that section 4 was not available to fue land-
lord. It should be remembered, as we have said above, that the field
of freedom of contract was encroached upon to a very large extent by
the State Rent Acts. The encroachment was not entirely and wholly
H one sided. Some encroachment v.'llS envisaged in the interest of the
landlord also and equity and justice demanded a fair play on the part
of the legislature not to completely ignore the helpless situation of

,
'
v. D. CHETTIAR v. YESODAI (Untwalia, I.) 349

many landlords who arc also compared! to some big tenants sometimes A
weaker section of the society. As for example a widow or a minor
lets out a family house in a helpless situation to tide over the financial
. difficulty and later wants a fair rent to be determined. Again sup-
pose for instance in a city there is an apprehension of cxtemaJi aggres-
sion, severe intema.I disturbances or spread of epidemics. A man in
possession of his house may go to another town letting out his premi-
ses to a tenant financrally strongi and of strong nerves at a rate com-
•
paratively much lower than the prevailing market rates. Later on, on
tl!e nomia.Iization of the situation as against the agteed rnte of rent
he approaches the Building Controller for fixing a fair rent in accor-
dance with a particular State Rent Act. Why should she or he bt1
debarred from doing so. The statute gives him the protection and
c
enables the Controller to intervene to fix a fair rent as against the term
of contract between the parties.. In a large number of cases it is the
tenant who gets this protection. But in some as in the case of Raval
the landlord needs and gets the protection. But this is not a direct
authority on the point of not'icc.
In lsha Valimohmmad & Anr. v. Haji Gu/am Mohamad & Haji
•
Dada Trust,(') Mathew J. speaking for a Division Bench of this Court
had to consider the question with reference to the Saurashtra Rent
Control Act, 19 51. In that connection it was observed at page 726
that the High Court was right in the assumption that a notice undec
E
the Transfer of Property Act. was necessary to terminate the tenal!lcy
on tjJe ground that the appellants had sublet the premises. Says the
learned Judge further that the landlord could not have issued a notice
under any of the provisions of the Transfer of Property Act to deter-
mine the tenancy on the ground of sub-letting by the tenant. It is
nee! correct to assume' that a notice under section 106 of the Transfer F
of Property Act as required by clause (h) of section 111 needs a
ground to be made out for the termination of the tenancy. Such a
view could be taken only under clause (g). Beg J. as he then was
~..
in P. I. Gupta & Co. v. K. Venkatesan Merchant & Ors.( 2 ) speaking
for himself and Krishna Iyer J. following Ravars case observed at
page 403 : - G
"In other words, the special· procedure provided by the
Act displaces the requirements of the procedure for eviction
under the Transfer of Property Act and by an ordinary civil
suit. Therefore, we need not concern ourselves with the
. provisions of Transfer of Property Act. . . . . A tenancy is H
(I) [1975j I S.C.R. 720.
(2) [1975] 2 S.C.R. -401.
4-S31SCln9
350 5UPREME COURT REPORTS Ll980] l S.C.R.

A ~ntially b36ed on and governed by an agreement or con-
tract even when a statute intervenes to limit the area with-
in which an agreement or contract operates, or, subjects
contractual rights to statutory rights and obligations."
In Dattopant Gopalyarao Devakate v. Vithabrao Maruthirao •
Janagavai(') one of us (Untwalia J.) speaking on behalf of himself
B
and Krishna Iyer J. said at page 71 : -
"We do not think that the alternative argument put for-
ward by Mr. Chitaley that no notice was necessary in this
case is correct. The appellant was a contractual tenant who
would have become a statutory tenant within the meaning
c of clause (r) of section 2 of the Act if he would have conti-
nued in possession after the termination of the tenancy in
his favour. Otherwise not. Without termination of the
contractual. tenancy by a yalid notice or other mode set oull
in Section 111 T.P. Act it was not open to the landlord to
treat the appellant as a statutory tenant and seek his evic-
D tion without service gf a notice to quit."
On a careful consideration and approach of the matter in the ins-
tallt case we think that we cannot approve of the view expressed in
the passage extracted above. In Ratan Lal v. Vardesh Chander &
OrS( 2 ) Krishna Iyer J. delivered the Judgment on behalf of a Bench
E of this Court consisting of himself, Chandrachud J., as he then was
and Gupta J. The case related to a building in Delhi. The Court
was concerned with clause ( g) of section 111 of the Transfer of Pro-
perty Act. Tracing the history of the legislation it was pointed out
by the Court at page 918 that the requirement as to written notice pro-
vided in section 111 (g) cannot be said to be based on any general
F rule of equity and therefore forfeiture of lease brought about in terms
of section 111 (g) of the Transfer of Property Act not by notice but
on the application of justice, equity and good conscience was held to
•
be good determination of the lease. Quoting from Manujendra' s case
it was said at page 911 :___,.
"We are inclined to hold that the landlord in the present
G qse cannot secure an order for eviction without first estab-
lishing that he has validly determined the lease under the
T.P. Act.''
Why this dual requirement? Even if the lease is determined by
a forfeiture under the Transfer of Property Act the tenant continues to
H be a tenant, that is to say, there is no forfeiture in the eye of law.
(1) [19751 Suppl. S.C.R. 67.
(2) [1976) Z S.C.R. 906
. \

v. D. CHETTIAR v. YESODAI (Untwalia, J.) 351

I
,.,,, The tenant becomes ·liable to be evicted and forfeiture comes into A,
.,_,,..·
4 play only if he bas incurred the liability to be evicted under the State
Rent Act, not otherwise. In many State statutes different provisiollll
• have been made as to the grounds on which a tenant can be evicted
and in relation to his incurring the liability to be so evicted. Some
• provisions overlap those of the Transfer of Property Act. Some are
' new which are mostly in favour of the tenants but some are in favonr
of the landlord .ilso. That being so the dictum of this Court in Raj
B
).

., Brij's case comes into play and one has to look to the provisions Qf
law contained in the four comers of any State Rent Act to find out
whether a tenant can be evicted or not. The theory of double po-
tection or additional protection, it seems to us, has been stretched too
far and without a proper and due consideration of all its remifica- c
tions.
Beg J., as he then was, speaking for the Court in the case of
Puwada Venkateswara Rao v. Chidamana Venkata Ramana(') had to
deal witl1 the question as to whether a notice to quit was necessary
for seeking an order for eviction under the Andhra Pradesh Build- D
ing (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 1960. The Andhra
Pradesh High Court had relied upon the decision of that Court in
Ul/igamma & Ors. v. S. Mohan Rao & Ors(') for taking the view
that a notice under section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act was
not necessary. Gopal Rao Ekbote J., delivering the judgment on be-
half of a Bench of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Ul/igappa's E

• case reviewed several decisions of the High Courts and this Court and
considered the special provisions of the Apdhra Pradesh Rent Act.
The view expressed by him that no notice was necessary under section
106 of the Transfer of Property Act was approved by this Court. We
find no justification for saying that because of some special provisions
F
• contained in the Andhra Act a different view was possible to be taken .
This iS exactly the reason why we have thought it fit to review all the
decisions and lay down a uniform law for all the. States. Section 10
( 1) of the Andhra Pradesh Act provided that "A tenant shall not be
evicted whether in execution of a decree or otherwise except in accor-
dance with the provisions of this section or sections 12 and 13 ." A
special provision in the Andhra Act was contained in section 10(7) G
which says : -
"Where an application under sub-section (2) or sub-
section (3) for evicting a tenant has been rejected by the
Controller, the tenancy shall, subject to the provisions of
this Act, be deemed to continue on the same terms and H,
(I) [1976] 3 S.C.R. 551.
(2) (1969] l A.P. Law Journal, 351~(1971) 2 .Andhra Weekly Reportor 29

:k
352 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1980] 1 s.c.R.

/I. conditions as before and shall not be terminable by the land-
lord except on one or more of the .grounds mentioned in
•uh-section (2) or sub-section (3)."
This special provision is provided by way of abunda.nt precaution
only. Even without this a tenant continuing in possession filter the
B termination of the contractual tenancy and until an eviction order is
passed against him continues on the same terms and conditions as
before and he cannot be evicted unless a ground is made out for bis
eviction according to the State Rent Act. The said provision by it-
self did not justify a departure from the view expressed by this Court
in Mangilal's case. Beg J., followed the decision of this Court in
c Ravars case and of the Punjab High Court in Hem Chand's case.
For the reasons stated by us, we approve of his view not on the
ground that the Andhra Pradesh State Act is a different one but be-
cause in respect of any State Act that is the correct view to take.
Lastly our attention was. drawn to the decision of this Court in
D Firm Sardari/al Vishwanath and Ors v. Pritam Singh('). The lease
in that case had come to an end by effiux of time. A tenant continu-
ed in possession and became a so-called statutory tenant. 'The argu-
ment put forward before this Court that a fresh notice under section
106 of the Transfer of Property Act was necessary was rejected on
the ground : -
E "Having examined the matter orr authority and precedent
it must be frankly confessed that no other conclusion· is pos-
sible on the first principle. Lease of urban immoveable pro-
perty represents· a contract between the lessor and the lessee.
If the contract is to be put to an end it has to be terminated
., by a notice to quit as envisaged under s. 106 of the Trans-
fer of Property Act. Brit it is eqoolly clear as provided by
s. 111 of the Transfer of Property Act that the lease of
immoveable property determines by various modes therein
prescribed. Now, if the lease of immoveable property de-
tennines in any· one of the modes prescribed under s.111
the contract of lease comes th an end, and the landlord can
G
exercise his right of re-entry. This right of re-entry is· fur-
tl1er restricted a.nd fettered by the provisions of the Rent
Restriction Act. Nonetheless the contract of lease had
expired and the tenant lessee cotinnes in possession un.der
,
the protective wing of the Rent Restriction Act until the
B Jessee loses protect'ion. But there is no question of termi-
nating the contract because the contract comes to an end
---
(1) (1979] 1 S.C.R. 111
V. D. CHETTIAR v. YESODAI (Untwalta, J.) 35 3

once the lease detennines in any one of the modes pres- A
cribed under s.111. There is, therefore, no question of
giving a notice to quit fo such a lessee who continued in
' possession 'after the determination of the lease, i.e. after the
• contract came to an -~nd under the protection of the Rent
Restriction Act. If the contract once came to an end there
was no question of terminating the contract over again by B
a fresh notice."
)I If we were to agree \;'i_th the view that determination of lease in
accordance with the Transfer ·of Property Act is a condition pre<--e- I
dent to the starting of a proceeding under the State Rent Act for evic-
tion of the tenant; we could have said so with respect that the view c
expressed in the above passage is quite correct because there was
no question of determination of the lease again once it was determined
by elllux of time. But on the first assumption we have taken a diffe-
rent view of the matter and have come to the conclusion that d6ter-
mination of a lease in accordance with the Transfer of Property Act
is unnecessary and a mere surplusage because the landlord cannot get D
eviction of the tenant even after such determination. The tenant con-
tinues to be so ev_cn thereafter. That being so, making out a case
under the Rent Act for eviction of the tenant by itself is sufficient and
it is not obligatory .to found the proceeding on the basis of the deter-
mination of the lease by issue of notice in accordance with section
106 of the Transfer of Property Act. E

For the reasons stated above we hold that the High Court was
right in its view that no notice to quit was necessary under section
l 06 of the Transfer of Property Act in order to enable the landlady-
respondent to get an order of eviction against the tenant-appellant.
But we were told by learned counsel for the appellant that he had F
some more points to urge before the High Court to challenge the Order
of eviction. We do not find from the judgment of the High Court that
the appellant was prevented from supporting the orders of the courts
below m his favour by urging any other point. No point of subs-
tan~e could be indimted before us which was worth consideration
after a clear and definite finding by the Appellate Court that the res- G
pondent required the premises bona fide for a personal necessity.
We do not think it advisable to delay the proceeding any further and
send back the case to the High Court on this account. We accor-
dingly dismiss the appeal but in the circumstances direct the parties
to bear their own costs throughout.

P.B.R. Appeal dismissed.
•