UTPAL DAS & ANR.versusSTATE OF WEST BENGAL
- Citation
- 2010 INSC 294
- Decided
- 7 May 2010
- Disposal
- Dismissed
- Bench
- B SUDERSHAN REDDY
Holding
The conviction under Sections 376 and 34 IPC stands as the victim’s testimony is credible, corroborated, and supported by medical evidence, and the FIR and Section 164 statement cannot be used as substantive evidence.
Summary
The victim, a married woman with two children, was intercepted while traveling by rickshaw, taken to a house under construction and forcibly raped by the two appellants, Utpal Das and Haradhan Sutradar. She was later rescued, identified the accused, and lodged an FIR. The trial court acquitted the appellants, but the Calcutta High Court convicted them under Sections 376 and 34 of the IPC. On appeal, the Supreme Court examined whether the FIR and the statement recorded under Section 164 Cr.P.C. could be used as substantive evidence, whether the absence of injuries on the victim’s private parts negated rape, and whether there were material contradictions in the victim’s testimony. The Court held that the FIR and Section 164 statement are only admissible for corroboration or contradiction, not as substantive proof, and that the victim’s testimony was credible, corroborated by the rickshaw‑puller’s evidence and medical findings of semen, while the lack of injuries does not defeat a rape charge. Consequently, the conviction was upheld.
Issues considered
- The evidentiary value of the FIR and the statement recorded under Section 164 Cr.P.C.
- Whether the absence of injuries on the victim’s private parts negates the occurrence of rape
- Whether there are material contradictions in the victim’s testimony that warrant disbelief
- Whether the prosecution proved the elements of rape under Section 376 IPC beyond reasonable doubt
- Whether the alleged consensual nature of the intercourse can be inferred
Legislation cited
- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973s. 164
- Indian Penal Code, 1860s. 34, s. 366, s. 368, s. 376
Subjects
Judgment
[2010] 6 S.C.R. 495
UTPAL DAS & ANR. A
v.
STATE OF WEST BENGAL
(Criminal Appeal No. 800 of 2007)
··-..
MAY 07, 2010 .-
B
[B. SUDERSHAN REDDY AND AFTAB ALAM, JJ.]
Penal Code, 1860: ss.376134- Conviction under- Held:
Evidence of eye-witness supporting prosecution case ;.;.·There
was no material contradiction in the evidence of prosecutrix c
and eye-witness in order to disbelieve them - Prosecutrix was
a grown up lady with 2 children and in such circumstance
absence of injuries on her private parts wo1.1/d not in any
manner support the case of defence - Plea of consensual sex,
· raised for the first time' before Supreme. Court, thus not D
. sustainable - Crime against women - Rape.
·Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973: s.164' - FIR and
s.164 statement .- Evidentiary value .ofr when attention of
witness not drawn to the contents thereof.
E
Prosecution case was that on the fateful night at
about 8 p.m., the prosecutrix-victim (PW-14) was travelling
in a rickshaw. The appellants-accused and other
accused persons surrounded the rickshaw and told PW-
. 6, the rickshawpuller to divert the destination. Thereafter F
they forcibly took-PW-14 inside a house under
.construction and committed rape on her one after
another. They also threatened to kill her if she raised
voice. Thereafter, victim was taken to a nearby tea stall
and locked in it. After some time PW-1, PW-2 and others G
came there and rescued her. Trial court acquitted au the
accused on the ground that prosecution had failed to
prove its case beyond reasonable doubt. The High Court
upon re-appreciation of the. evidence and the totality of
495_ H
496 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010] 6 S.C.R.
A circumstances held that the trial court had extended
benefit of doubt to the appellants under misconception
of facts and wrong appreciation of evidence and held the
appellants guilty of the offence punishable under Section
376/34 IPC. However, the High Court confirmed the
B acquittal of the other accused. The order of acquittal of
those accused attained its finality since there was no
appeal preferred by the State.
In appeal to this Court, it was contended for the
appellants that the prosecutrix made improvements in
C her statement about certain facts which were not
mentioned in the FIR; that there was no acceptable
evidence of the appellants committing any rape as the
Medical Officer who examined the victim did not find any
injuries on her person as were likely to be found had she
D been subjected to forced sexual intercourse; that the
medical evidence and the reports of the chemical
examination would at the most suggest that the victim
was a party to a sexual intercourse in recent time; and
in alternate it was contended that there was no evidence
E to suggest that the intercourse was without her consent
or against her will or that she had been forcibly violated
by any person.
Dismissing the appeal, the Court
F HELD: 1. The FIR does not constitute substantive
evidence. It can, however, only be used as a previous
statement for the purposes of either corroborating its
maker or for contradicting him and in such a case the
previous statement cannot be used unless the attention
G of witness was first drawn to those parts by which it was
proposed to contradict the witness. In this case, the
attention of the witness (PW-14) was not drawn to those
parts of the FIR which according to appellants were not
in conformity with her evidence. Likewise statement
H recorded under Section 164 Cr.P.C. could never be used
UTPAL DAS & ANR. v. STATE OF WEST ~ENGAL 497
as substantive evidence of truth of the facts but may be A
used for contradictions and corroboration of a witness
who made it The statement made under Section 164
Cr.P.C. can be used to cross examine the maker of it and
the result may be to show that the·eviden·ce of the witness
was false. It can be used to impeach the credibility of the B '
prosecution witness. In the present case it was for the I
defence to invite the victim's attention as to what she
stated in the FIR and the statement made under Section
164 Cr.P.C. for the purposes of bringing out the
contradictions, if any, in her evidence. In the absence of c
the same the court cannot read Section 164 statement
and compare the same with her evidence. [Para 13] [503-
o~H]
2.1. There was no reason to disbelieve the evidence
of Prosecutrix who meticulously narrated the sequence D
of events as to what transpired on that fateful day from
8.00 p.m. onwards till about her lodging the FIR on the
next day. There was nothing on record· to disbelieve her
evidence. The only suggestion made to her was that she
was tutored by the police at the thana and she had set E
up a false story to implicate the appellants in the case.
No reasons were suggested for such false implication.
There was nothing to disbelieve the version given by PW-
1 which supported the prosecution's case. The evidence
of PW-6 who was the rickshaw puller was also very F
crucial. There was no reason whatsoever to disbelieve his
statement as he was totally an uninterested witness.
[Paras 14-16] [504-A-B, E; 505-A-B]
2.2. The evidence of PW-14. and PW-6 showed that
G
there were no material contradictions so as to disbelieve
their evidence. The version given by PW-14 received
complete corroboration from the evidence of PW-6. The
High Court rightly expressed its indignation as to the
manner in which the trial court completely misread the
vital medical evidence. PW-8 examined the victim a day H
ii
y
498 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010] 6 S.C.R.
A after incident. On examination, he opined that the victim
was habituated to sexual intercourse and therefore he
could not express his firm opinion in his report about the
commission of rape at the time of medical examination.
But in the evidence, he clearly stated after considering
B the report of FSL regarding stains on victim's clothing,
that there was sufficient proof of recent sexual
intercourse. This cannot in any manner support the case
of the defence. [Paras 17, 18) [505-B-G]
2.3. The mere fact that no injuries were found on
C private parts of her body cannot be the ground to hold
that she was not subjected to any sexual assault. Victim
was a married grown up lady with two children and in
such circumstances the absence of injuries on her
private parts was not of much significance. The
D proposition canvassed for the first time across the bar
regarding the consensual sexual intercourse was
absolutely untenable and unsustainable. There was- not
even a suggestion made to the victim that she had
consented to sexual intercourse. The sequence of events
E clearly apparent from the evidence of PW-1, PW-6 and
PW-14, leading to the sexual assault completely ruled out
the possibility of consensual sex. The High Court rightly
observed that the victim made no mistake in identifying
the two appellants, and that, based on the evidence of
F PW-1, PW-6 and the victim (PW-14) herself, it is
satisfactorily proved that the two appellants were actually
the pers.ons who committed rape on the victim. [Paras 19
and 20] [505-G-H; 506-A, C-E]
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal
G No. 800 of 2007.
From the Judgment & Order dated 26.02.2007 of the High
Court at Calcutta in G.A. No. 25 of 1989.
Chanchal Kumar Ganguli, Debesr. Panda for the
H Appellants.
UTPAL DAS & ANR. v. STATE OF WEST BENGAL 499
Tara Chandra Sharma, Neelam Sharma for the A
Respondent.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
8. SUDERSHAN REDDY, J. 1. This appeal by special
leave is directed against the judgment of the Calcutta High B
Court setting aside the acquittal of the appellants herein under
Section 376 IPC and sentencing them to suffer rigo\OUS
imprisonment for five years and to pay a fine of Rs. 2,000/~ in
default of payment of fine to further undergo two months
rigorous imprisonment. C
2. The prosecution story, briefly statea, is that on 28.4.1984
at about 8.00 p.m. one Sitarani Jha (PW-14) got down from a
train at Burdwan Railway Station alone and hired a rickshaw
to go to the Badamtola bus stand as she had to take a bus for 0
Satgachia. On reaching at Badamtola bus stand she learnt that
the last bus for Satgachia had already left. She then told the
rickshaw puller, Bipul Samaddar (PW-6) to take her to a girl of
her village who lived at nearby place, Kaina Gate. It is alleged
that when the victim was about to leave Badamtala bus stand E
she was intercepted by four or five persons who forcibly took
her to a house under construction and thereafter two of them
forcibly committed rape on her one after another against her
will. One of them had a knife in his hands. The victim further
alleged that after commission of rape she was taken to a
nearby tea stall and locked there in a small room by the F
appellants. After sometime one Parimal Babu (PW-2), Probal
Babu (PW-1) and Bipul Samaddar (PW-6) and some other
people rescued her from that shop, to whom she narrated' the
whole incident. Thereafter the victim took shelter for night in the
house of one Joydeb Prajapati (PW-4) a distant relative of her. G
It is further alleged that on the following morning i.e. 29.4.1984
local people brought Utpal Das (appellant no. 1 herein),
Haradhan @ Bhalta Sutradar (appellant no.2 herein) and one
Banshidhar Dawn before the victim and she identified Utpal
H
500 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010) 6 S.C.R.
A and Haradhan @ Bhalta Sutradhar as the persons who
committed rape on her and at that time Haradhan @ Bhalta
managed to flee away. This, in fact, is the story given out by
the prosecutrix - Sitarani Jha while she lodged the FIR (Ex. 9)
with Burdwan (Sadar) Police Station at 10.45 a.m. on
B 29.4.1984.
3. Based on the report (Ex.9) the Police Station Burdwan
registered a case under Sections 366, 368 and 376 read with
Section 34 of the IPC against the appellants.
C 4. During the course of investigation, site was inspected,
the seizure list was prepared, the prosecutrix and the appellants
were got medically examined and the medical examination
reports of the prosecutrix (Ex.P-2) as well as Ex. P-3 and Ex.
P-4 of the appellant nos. 1 and 2 respectively were obtained.
D
5. After completion of the investigation, the police filed
charge sheet against the appellants under Sections 366, 368
and 376 read with Section 34 of the IPC. The prosecution
altogether examined 17 witnesses (PW-1 to PW-17) and 09
E documents were got marked (Ex. P-1 to P-09). The statements
under Section 313 Cr.P.C. of the appellants were recorded in
which they pleaded their false implication.
6. The learned Additional Sessions Judge upon
consideration of the evidence and material available on record
F held that prosecution has failed to prove its case beyond
reasonable doubt and accordingly acquitted all the accused of
the charges framed against them.
7. Aggrieved by the order of acquittal, the State of West
G Bengal preferred an appeal before the High Court. The High
Court upon reappreciation of the evidence and the totality of
circumstances held that the trial court has extended benefit of
doubt to the appellants under misconception of facts and wrong
appreciation of evidence and accordingly came to the
H
UTPAL DAS & ANR. v. STATE OF WEST BENGAL 501
{B. SUDERSHAN REDDY, J.]
conclusion that the appellants are guilty of the offence A
punishable under Section 376/34 of the IPC. However, the High
Court confirmed the acquittal of the other accused. The order
of acquittal of those accused has attained its finality since there
is no appeal preferred by the State. Hence, the appellants are
before us in this appeal challenging their conviction and award B
of sentence by the High Court under Section 376/34 of the IPC.
8. We have heard the learned counsel appearing for the
appellants as well as for the State and perused the material
available on record.
c
9. Shri Chanchal Kumar Ganguli, learned counsel
appearing on behalf of the appellants submitted that the High
Court failed to appreciate that there was no acceptable
evidence of the appellants committing any rape as the Medical
Officer who examined the victim did not find any injuries on her D
. person as are likely to be found had she been subjected to
forced sexual intercourse. The medical evidence and the
·. reports. of the chemical examination may at the most suggest
a
. tbat the victim was party to a sexual intercourse in recent time.
But there is no evidence to suggest that the intercourse was E
without her consent or against her will or that she had been
forcibly violated by any person. The counsel thus submitted that
essential ingredients of the offence of rape under Section 376
IPC are not present in the case. It was also submitted that the
evidence of prosecutrix suffers from material contradictions. Her F
version was not supported by any of the prosecution witnesses.
She is not a truthful witness and it may be unsafe to rely upon
her evidence and convict the appellants for the offence
punishable under Section 376 IPC. An attempt was also made
by the learned counsel for the appellants to read the statement G
of the victim recorded under Section 164 Cr.P.C and to .
compare the same with her evidence. It was also submitted that
PW-2, PW-3, PW-4 and PW-5, were declared hostile by the
prosecution and the prosecution is left with no evidence other
than the statements of Rikshaw Puller (PW-6) and the victim H
who contradict each other.
502 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010] 6 S.C.R.
A 10. Learned counsel for the State submitted that evidence
of the victim (PW-14) itself is sufficient to convict the appellants
and at any rate, her version is completely supported by the
evidence of PW-6, whose evidence cannot be rejected for
whatsoever reasons. It was further submitted that there is
B nothing in the medical evidence which supports the case of the
appellants as contended by the .appellants.
11. In order to consider as to whether the prosecution
established the case against the appellants beyond reasonable
C doubt, we are required to critically scrutinize the evidence of
the prosecutrix and Probal Babu· (PW-1), Bipul Samaddar (PW-
6) and also the evidence of Dr. A. Chakravorty (PW-8) as the
entire case turns upon their evidence.
12. In exhibit P-9 (report) the prosecutrix (PW-14) alleged
D that on 28.4.1984, at about 8.00 p.m when she was going in a
rickshaw towards Kaina Gate all of a sudden the appellants and
other accused surrounded the rickshaw and told the rickshaw
puller to divert the destination and they forcibly took her to a
nearby house under construction and tried to rape her. She
E made an attempt to save herself and requested them to free
her. The appellants did not heed to her request but forcibly
committed rape on her one after another. She was prevented
from raising her voice as they threatened her to kill. One of them
was holding a knife. Thereafter, the accused took her to a
F nearby tea stall and locked her inside it. That after about 15/
20 minutes one Asok Babu, Parimal Babu (PW-2) and Probal
Babu (PW-1) and many others came there and rescued her
from that shop after unlocking the door. She narrated the entire
episode before them. Thereafter all of them took her away to
G the house of Joydeb Projapati where she took shelter in the
night. Next day morning PW-1, PW-2 and others who rescued
her came along with the accused where she identified the
appellants as the one who committed rape on her. She also
stated that she experienced pain in her private parts and all
H over her body.
. UTPAL DAS & ANR. v. STATE OF WEST BENGAL 503
[B. SUDERSHAN REDDY, J.]
13. The Prosecutrix more or less reiterated the same facts A
in her evidence. In the cross examination she stated that one
of the miscreants "ji,;mped" on the rickshaw and threatened her
at the point of knife that she would be killed if she raises any
hue and cry. She identified appellant No.2 in the court as the
one who threatened her with the knife. Relying on this part of 8
the statement in the cross examination, learned counsel
suomitted that this part of the story of appellant no.2 'jumping
on the rickshaw and threatening her at the point of knife etc.
was not stated by her in the first information report given to the
. police. This one circumstance_acc;ording to the learned counsel C
for the appellants belies the evidence of the Prosecutrix as she
went on making improvements. We find no merit in this
-submission for the simple reason that the contents of the first
information report were never put to the victim. It is ·needless
to restate· that the First Information Report does not constitute
. substantive evidence. It can, however, only be used as a D
previous statement for the purposes of either corroborating its
maker or for contradicting him and in such a case the previous
statement cannot be used unless the attention of witness- has
first been drawn to those parts by which it is proposed to
contradict the witness. In this case the aftention of the witness E
(PW-14) has not been drawn to those parts of the FIR which
. according to appellants are not in conformity with her evidence.
Likewise statement recorded under Section 164 Cr.P.C. can
never be. used as substantive evidence of truth of the facts but
may be used for contradictions and corroboration of a witness F
who made it. The statement made under Section 164 Cr.P.C.
can be used to cross examine the maker of it and the result
may be to show that the evidence of the witness is false. It can
be used to impeach the credibility of the prosecution witness.
In the present case it was for the defence to invite the vict!m's G
attention as to what she stated in the first information report and
statement made under Section 164 Cr.P.C. for the purposes
of bringing out the contradictions, if any, in her evide_nce. In the
absence of the same the court cannot read 164 statement and
compare the same with her evidence. H
504 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010) 6 S.C.R.
A 14. We do not find any reason whatsoever to disbelieve
the evidence of Prosecutrix who meticulously narrated the
sequence of events as to what transpired on that fateful day from
8.00 p.m. onwards till about her lodging the first information
report on the next day. There is nothing on record to disbelieve
8 her evidence. The only suggestion made to her is that she was
tutored by the police at the thana and she had set up a false
story to implicate the appellants in the case. What are the
reasons suggested for such false implication? None.
15. Probal Chakarborty (PW-1), in his evidence narrated
C as to what PW-6, told him on that fateful night about the incident.
The rickshaw puller told him that he was carrying a woman
passenger in his rickshaw to proceed towards Kaina Gate and
on the way 4-5 young men at the point of knife directed him to
divert his rickshaw and that one of them sat by the side of the
D girl in the rickshaw. Upon reaching near a house under
construction he was asked by those men to leave the girl with
them. This incident PW-6, narrated to PW-1, within a short time
after the incident. That all of them searched for the girl and·
ultimately found the girl in a nearby tea stall where she was
E locked inside. There is nothing to disbelieve the version given
by PW-1 which supports the prosecution's case.
16. Bipul Samaddar (PW-6) is none other than the rickshaw
puller whose evidence is very crucial. He in his evidence clearly
stated that on the fateful day at about 8.00 p.m. one woman
F hired his rickshaw to Badamtola bus stand. He took his
rickshaw to Badamtola bus stand but on finding that she missed
her bus took her towards Kaina Gate on her instructions. It is
at that time 4-5 young men appeared there and "forcibly got
her down from the rickshaw and took her away. Out of fear he
G rushed towards para" (Mohalla) and reported the matter to PW-
1 and others. Thereafter he along with PW-1 and others went
on searching for the woman and ultimately found her in a tea
stall of one Punjabee from where she was rescued. Thereafter
he along with others took her to one of her relative's house. It
H
UTPAL DAS & ANR. v. STATE OF WEST BENGAL 505
[B. SUDERSHAN REDDY, J.]
is also in his evidence that two of the miscreants (appellants) A
forcibly took that woman away on that night and he identified
them in the court. There is practically nothing suggested to this
witness in the cross examination. We do not find any reason
· whatsoever to disbelieve the statement of PW-6 who is totally
· · an uninterested witness. B
17. On consideration of the evidence of PW-14 and PW-
6, we are of the opinion that there are no· material
contradictions in their evidence so as to disbelieve their
evidence. The version given by PW-14, (victim) receives C
complete corroboration from the evidence of PW~6. It is not
_even suggested to PW-6, that such an incident has not taken
place on that fateful day. We see no reason whatsoever to
disbelieve his evidence.
18. One more aspect that requires our consideration is as D
to whether the medical evidence does not support the _
prosecution's case? The High Court. rightly expressed its
indignation as to the manner in which the trial q9urt completely .. .. ·.
,
, misread the vital medical evidence. Dr. A. Chakroborty, (PW-
·.. 8)_ ex~mined the victim on 29.4.1984. On examination he E
opinecfthat the vidim is habit~ated to sexual intercourse and
'··therefore could not express his firm opinion in his report about
the commission of rape at the time of medical examination. But
in the evidence he clearly stated after considering the report
of FSL regarding stains on victim's clothing, that there is F
sufficient proof of recent sexual intercourse. The vaginal swab
and smear were sent to Chemical Examiner. Based on the FSL
report and the report of Serologist (Ex. 7) he found that the
semen was present in the vaginal swab of the victim. We fail
to appreciate as to how and in what manner the medical G
evidence supports the case of the defence.
19. The learned counsel for the appellants however,
submitted that the medical examination report of the victim
shows that no injuries were found on her private parts or on any ·
H
506 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [201 O] 6 S.C.R.
A part of her body. We are required to note that victim Sita Rani
Jha is a married grown up lady and blessed with two children
and in such circumstances the absence of injuries on her
private parts is not of much significance. The mere fact that no
injuries were found on private parts of her body cannot be the
B ground to hold that she was not subjected to any sexual assault.
The entire prosecution story cannot be disbelieved based on
that singular assertion of the learned counsel. In this regard
another submission was made by the learned counsel for the
appellants that the sexual intercourse, if any, was With the
c consent of the victim. According to him it was consensual
sexual intercourse. This proposition canvassed for the first time
across the bar is absolutely untenable and unsustainable. There
is not even a suggestion made to the victim that she has
consented to sexual intercourse. The sequence of events
clearly apparent from the evidence of PW-1, PW-6 and PW-
0
14, leading to the sexual assault completely rules out the
possibility of consensual sex. We have no hesitation to reject
the submission.
20. The High Court rightly observed that the victim made
E no mistake in identifying the two appellants, and that, based
on the evidence of PW-1, PW-6 and the victim (PW-14) herself,
it is satisfactorily proved that the two appellants were actually
the persons who committed rape on the victim on that faf P.ful
day on 28.4.1984.
F
21. For all the aforesaid reasons, we find no merit in this
appeal and the same is accordingly dismissed.
D.G. Appeal dismissed.
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