URVIBEN CHIRAGHBAI SHETHversusVIJAYBHAI SHAMBHUBHAI JORANPUTRA .& ORS.

                       [2011] 5 S.C.R. 897


                URVIBEN CHIRAGHBAI SHETH                             A
                                 v.
     VIJAYBHAI SHAMBHUBHAI JORANPUTRA .& ORS.
             (Civil Appeal No. 3618 of 2011) ....

                         APRIL 26, 2011
                                                                     B
    [G.S: SINGHVI AND ASOK.KUMAR GANGULY, JJ.]
                                                     .      .

          Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 - s. 166 - Compensation -
    Claim 'for enhancemerit - First respondent los( control of the
  . car while driving and dashed the same against a milestone, c
    resulting in serious injuries to occupants of the car -
    Appellant, aged 30 years and earning around Rs. 15001- pm
    suffered disability and rendered bedridden as' a result of the
· accident - Claim petitiori"by appellant seeking Rs.c 15 lakhs
    as compensation - Tribunal computed compensation as Rs. D
    6, 07, 0001- with interest at the rate of 9%, with the consent of
    the parties -·Appeal filed by appellant claiming enhancement
    lor compensation - Affidavit filed by advocate who appeared
 ·· before the Tribunal contending that no such settlement was
·· ever entered into by the consent of parties - Dismissal of the E
     appeal by the High Court discarding the affidavit:.:.. 'on appeal
     held: High Court took a narrow view of the entire controversy
    - Tribunal held the amount granted by it is just proper and
     reasonable and also held that the same is bas.ed on the
     consent of the parties - High Court being the last court of fact F
     and law did not examine whether the Tribunal's finding that
     the compensation granted is proper, just and reasonable in
     the facts of the case - Tribunal could not accept the
     represl;Jntation lowering down .the claim on the mere oral
     statement of counsel - It should have insisted on production G
     of some material for the same - Also, no leave was obtained
     by the parties from the Tribunal to enter the said settlement .
     - In the absence thereof, the High Court erred in discarding
   .the affidavit filed by the advocate only on the ground that this

                                897                                  H
    898     SUPREME COURT REPORTS                [2011] 5 $.C.R.

A was filed belatedly before the High Court and is an
  afterlhought - Stand taken in the affidavit of the advocate
  appears probable since there is nothing on record to show
  that the appellant ever (iled any petition or affidavit for
  settlement before the MACT - Principle of sanctity of recitals
a in Courl proceedings is available to a Court of Record and
  cannot be stretched to the proceedings of a Tribunal - High
  Court in the process erred by equating the record of
  proceedings in a Tribunal with proceedings in a courl of record
  - However, on basis of the materials on record, the matter
c should not be remanded back, since the accident took place
  in 1990 and the appellant has suffered 100% medical
  disability which is permanent in nature with no sign of
  recovery - She has two children and her husband expired
  prior to the incident - Compensation should be assessed so
  that the interest accruing therefrom would be sufficient for the
0
  maintenance of the family of the victim and the concept of
  compensation is wider than mere damages - Thus,
  compensation of Rs. 15 lacs with interest at the rate of 8% on
  the enhanced compensation from the date of filing the claim
E petition before MACT till date of realization.

       Compensation - Assesment of - Held: Compensation
  should be assessed so that the interest accruing therefrom
  would be sufficient for the maintenance of the family of the
  victim - Concept of compensation is wider than mere
F damages.

       The first respondent, while driving the car owned by
  the second respondent, lost control of the car and
  dashed the car with full force against a milestone,
G resulting in serious injuries to the occupants, appellant
  and others. The appellant suffered disability and was
  rendered bedridden. She filed a claim petition before the
  Tribunal, claiming rupees fifteen lakhs as compensation.
  At the time of the accident the appellant was 30 years old

H
URVIBEN CHIRAGHBAI SHETH v. VIJAYBHAI SHAMBHUBHAI     899
                  JORANPuTRA

and she claimed that she was earning Rs.1,50.0/- to A
Rs.1,600/w per month, The first respondent-driver, the
second respondent~owner of the car and third
respondent-insurance company with which the car was
insured, were held jointly and severally liable to pay
compensation to the appellant. The Tribunal awarded B
compensation of Rs.6,07,000/- with interest at the rate of
9%. While computing the compensation, the MACT held
that the compensation had been computed with the
consent of the parties. The appellant filed an appeal
before the High Court for enhancement of compensation C
and the same was dismissed. Therefore, the appellant
filed the instant appeal.
    Allowing the appeal, the Court
     HELD: 1.1 As regards the submission that there was D
no consent before MACT and the same was wrongly
recorded by the Tribunal, no application appears to have
been made before the Tribunal to rectify the error, if there
was one. Instead, the parties filed an appeal before the         .'
High Court being aggrieved by the compensation E
awarded by the Tribunal. In the impugned judgment, the
High Court took a narrow view of the entire controversy.
In its rather cryptic judgment, the High Court refused to
take into consideration the affidavit filed by the advocate
who appeared for the appellant before the MACT. The F
said affidavit is on record. A perusal of the said affidavit
which was filed before the High Court shows that the
advocate who appeared on behalf of the appellant before
the MACT averred that the Tribunal recorded that both the
parties agreed qua the amount that was to be paid to the
claimant. Neither any pursis in writing was passed to the G
Tribunal to such effect nor while arguing any such
consent was given. The said fact appears to have been
recorded erroneously. The High Court ignored the said
stand taken before it on the ground that such an affidavit
                                                             H
   900      SUPREME COURT REPORTS                [2011] 5 S.C.R.


A being placed before the High Court was an afterth_ought
  and no ground had been taken in the memorandum 9f
  appeal to that effect. [Paras 9, 10 and 11] [905-G-H; 906-
  A-D].

         1.2 From a ,perusal of the judgment of the Tribunal, it
8 does not appear that it was based solely on the cons'ent
    of the.parti'es. MACT curiously held that i'n the facts of the
  . case,· the al'!lount granted by it is just proper and
  · reasonable an~ also held that the same is based .on the
    cohsent of the parties. The High Court, as the last court
C o(fact and law should have examined whether the
    Tribunal's finding that the compensation granted is
     proper, just and reasonable in the facts of the case. The
     High Court admittedly failed to do so. [Paras 14, 16] [906-
    G-H; 907 -B-C]
D
          1.3 While acting as a Claims Tribunal, its proceedings
    are summary in nature but in exercising its summary
    jurisdiction the Tribunal must follow principles of justice,
    equity and good conscience and must be aware that its
E summary enquiry i!i in cc:>nnection with a legislation
     which is. meant for social welfare. Therefore, when a
     r~present(ltion is made before the Tribunal that a claim
     of Rs.15 lacs by way. of consent is reduced to Rs.6 lacs
     and odd, the Tribunal must insist on production of some
F material either, an affidavit of the claimant or the
     statement of the claimant before the MACT in support of
     such lowering down of claim. The MACT cannot accept
     the said representation on the mere oral statement of
     counsel since such settlement is purely a question of .fact.
   · No leave was obtained from the Tribunal to enter into a
G C0111P1'.'0mise between the parties in respect of the
.. settlement. In the absence of all these materials, when an
     affidavit was filed by the advocate who appeared before
     the Tribunal, contending that no such settlement was
     ever entered into by the consent of parties, the High
H
 URVIBEN CHIRAGHBAI SHETH v. VIJAYBHAI SHAMBHUBHAI 901
                   JORANPUTRA

Court fell info an error by discarding the same only on A
the ground that this was filed belatedly before the High
Court and is an afterthought. It may be true that in the
grounds of appeal before the High Court, this should
have been mentioned, but on a mere defect of pleading
of the parties, justice cannot be denied if in the facts of B
the case, the stand taken on the affidavit of the advocate
appears probable. The stand taken in the affidavit of the
advocate appears probable specially when there is
nothing on record to show that the appellant ever filed
any petition or affidavit for settlement or compromise c
before the MACT. [Paras 17, 18, 19 and 20] [907-D-H; 908-
A-C]
    Daman Singh and Ors. etc. v. State of Punjab and Ors.
AIR 1985 SC 973 - distinguished.
                                                             D
     1.4 The High Court relied on the principle of sanctity
of a record entered by a Court and held that what is
recited in the Court record is sacrosanct. The High Court,
in the process, fell into an error by equating the record
of proceedings in a Tribunal with proceedings in a court E
of record. Under the hierarchy of Courts, a High Court
(under Article 215) and the Supreme Court (under Article
129) are recognized as Courts of Record. A Motor
Accidents Claims Tribunal constituted under the Motor
Vehicles Act, 1988 is a Civil Court of limited jurisdiction, F
and is certainly not a Court of Record. The infallibility of
its formal record is one of the earliest marks of a Court
of Record, but it has developed other characteristics too.
Therefore, the principle of sanctity of recitals in Court
proceedings is available to a Court of Record. This G
principle cannot be stretched to the proceedings of a
tribunal. The High Court failed to appreciate this. [Paras
23 and 26] [908-G-H; 909-A, O]

    State of Maharashtra v. Ramdas Srinivas Nayak and Anr.
AIR 1982 SC 1249 - referred to.                              H ·
     902    SUPREME COURT REPORTS               [2011] 5 S.C.R.


A       Reg v. Aaron Mellor (1858) 7 Cox's Criminal Law
     Cases 454 - referred to.

         A History of English Law by W S. Holdsworth, Vol 5, p.
     158 - referred to.
8        1.5 Having regard to the materials on record, the
     matter should not be remanded, keeping in mind the
     period which has elapsed in between since the accident
     took place in 1990, and the fact that the appellant had
     been bedridden since then. [Para 27] [909-E]
c
          1.6 Admitted evidence about the appellant's medical
     disabilities is that she has 100% disability which is
     permanent in nature with no sign of recovery. The
     appellant's case that she was running a beauty parlour
o    prior to the accident could not be proved, specially her
     income from the said parlour was not proved. The
     existence of the beauty parlour is however, not in dispute.·
     Assuming the appellant is not running the parlour, the
     fact remains that she has two children and her husband
E    died prior to the incident. Therefore, the dependence of
     the children and the running of the family is to be
     shouldered by her even though she is infirm and
     bedridden. She also needs someone to help her in her
     daily life. She has to have recurring medical expenses.
     Just because she is a homemaker is no reason why the
F    courts should be miserly in fixing compensation for her.
     [Paras 28, 29, 30 and 31) [909-F-H; 910-A-C]

          Arun Kumar Agrarwal and Anr. v. National Insurance Co.
     Ltd. and Ors. 2010 (9) sec 218 - referred to.
G
          1.7 Compensation may be so assessed that the
     interest accruing therefrom would be sufficient for the
     maintenance of the family of the victim and the concept
     of compensation is wider than mere damages. Thus, the
     compensation of Rs.15 lacs (Rupees Fifteen Lacs) with
.H
 URVIBEN CHIRAGHBAI SHETH v. VIJAYBHAI SHAMBHUBHAI             903
                   JORANPUTRA ·          '

interest at the rate of 8% on the enhanced compensation               A
from the date of filing the claim petition before MACT till
date of realization is granted. [Paras 32 and 33]
[910-D,E]
                         Case Law Reference:
                                                                      B
     AIR 1985 SC 973                Referred to          Para 12
     l
         AIR 1982 SC 1249           Referred to          Para 25
    " .
         2010 (9) sec 218           Referred to          Para 31
                                                                      c
    CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No.
3618 of 2011.  '    "          ·

    From the Judgment & Order dated 06.07.2005 of.the High
Court of Gujarat· at Ahmedabad in First Appeal No'.·· 4994 bf
2001.         ·                                             .         D

         Bharat Rao for the Appellant.

     Manjeet Chawla, P. K. Seth, Vijay Verma for the
 Respondents.
                                                                      E
         The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

         GANGULY, J. 1. Delay condoned.
         2. Leave granted.
                                                                      F
        3. On 18.5.1990, the appellant and others were going in
  a Fiat car (No. GGG 792), owned by the second respondent,
· from Surat to Ubhrat. The said car was driven by the first
  respondent, who lost control of the car and dashed the car with
  full force against a milestone, after which the car turned turtle   G
  thrice. As a result, the occupants of the car sustained serious
  injuries.

    4. The appellant filed a claim petition before the Motor
Accident Claims Tribunal (MACT) claiming compensation of              H
    904      SUPREME COURT REPORTS                [2011) 5 S.C.R.


A   Rs.15,00,000/-. At the time of the accident, she. was aged 30
    years and she claimed to be earning Rs.1,500/- to Rs.1,600/-
    per month from running a business in the name of Contessa
    Beauty Parlour at Ahmedabad.

B      5. Before the MACT it was established that the first
  respondent was absolutely liable for the accident in view of his
  careless, rash and negligent driving. Thus, the first respondent
  (driver), second respondent (owner of the car) and the third
  respondent (insurance company with which the car was insured)
C were held jointly and severally liable to pay compensation to
  the appellant. In the accident, the spinal cord of the appellant
  was damaged, as a result of which she was unable to walk and
  was bedridden. In computing the compensation payable to the
  appellant, the MACT, by order dated 23.3.2001, reached a
  finding that the compensation had been computed with the
D consent of the parties.

       6. MACT awarded Rs.50,000/- towards pain and suffering,
  Rs.3,50,000/- towards treatment charges, Rs.10,000/- towards
  attendant charges and Rs.5,000/- towards nutritious food. The
E appellant had contended that she was running a beauty parlour,
  but no reliable evidence was produced to substantiate the
  same. Thus, appellant being a housewife, monthly income was
  assessed at Rs.1000/- and applying a multiplier of 16, the future
  loss of income was assessed at Rs.1,92,000/- (Rs.1000 X 12
F X 16). Thus, the appellant was held entitled to total
  compensation of Rs.6,07,000/- with interest at the rate of 9%.

       7. Aggrieved by the compensation awarded by the MACT,
  the appellant appealed to the High Court for enhancement of
  compensation. The High Court, vide order dated 6.7.2005,
G dismissed the appeal on the following ground:

          "Through these appeals judgment of the MACT Valsad at
          Navsari dated 23.3.2001 is assailed on the ground that
          proper compensation has not been awarded, therefore, it
H         be enhanced. However, after hearing the counsel for both
 URVIBEN CHIRAGHBAI SHETH v. VIJAYBHAI SHAMBHUBHAI 905
       JORANPUTRA [ASOK KUMAR GANGULY, J.]

    the sides, it is found that the compensation has been A
    settled as per the consent of the counsel for the parties.
    This fact is recorded in para 10 of the award. That being
    so, interference is not called for. Shri Parikh, learned
    counsel for the appellants want to place on record affidavit
    of Shri K.Z. Rifai, Advocate dated August 5, 2002 to point      s
    out that neither any pursis in writing was passed to the
    Claims Tribunal nor while arguing, such consent was given,
    fact appears to have been recorded erroneously.
    Placement of affidavit at this stage is after thought,
    therefore, declined. In such case no such agreement was c
    there with regard to the amount of compensation as
    mentioned in the judgment. averment to that effect ought
    to have found place in the memorandum of appeal dated
    2oth June, 2001. Judgment record is conclusive. Neither
    lawyer nor litigant can claim to contradict it, except before
                                                                  0
    the judge himself but nowhere f'lse. Court is bound to
    accept the statement of the judge recorded in the judgment
    as what transpired in the court and cannot allow statement
    of the Judge to be contradicted by statement by affidavit
    and other evidence (See: Daman Singh and others etc. E
     v. State of Punjab and others (AIR 1985 SC 973).
    Accordingly, claim for enhancement cannot be considered
     in light of the agreement by counsel for parties before the
    Claims Tribunal.•

     8. This appeal is directed against the aforesaid judgment      F
of the High Court.

     9. The appellant contends that there was no consent before
the MACT, and the same was wrongly recorded by the Tribunal.
However, we notice that no application appears to have been         G
made before the Tribunal to rectify the error, if there was one.
Instead, the parties filed.an appeal before the High Court being
aggrieved by the compensation awarded by the Tribunal.

     10. This court finds that in the impugned judgment, the High
                                                                    H
    906       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                   [2011] 5 S.C.R.


A  Court has taken a rather narrow view of the entire controversy.
   In its rather cryptic judgment, the High Court refused to take into
   consideration the affidavit filed by Sri K.Z. Rifai, the learned
   advocate who appeared for the appellant before the MACT.
 ' The said affidavit is on record. A perusal of the said affidavit
B which was filed before the High Court shows that the advocate
   who appeared on behalf of the appellant before the MACT
   averred:

          "2) ...... The learned Tribunal in paragraph 1O of the
          judgment has recorded that both the parties agree qua the
c         amount that was to be paid to the claimant. I say that neither
          any pursis in writing was passed to the Tribunal to such
          effect nor while arguing was any such consent given. The
          said fact appears to have been recorded erroneously."

D        11. The High Court ignored the said stand taken before it
    on the ground that such an affidavit being placed before the
    High Court was an afterthought and no ground had been taken
    in the memorandum of appeal dated 21.6.2001 to that effect.

E        12. The other ground which weighed with the High Court
    is that statement recorded in the judgment of the Court cannot
    be contradicted by any affidavit or any other evidence and in
    coming to said conclusion the High Court relied on the judgment
    of this Court in Daman Singh and others etc. v. State of
    Punjab and others, reported in AIR 1985 SC 973.
F
        13. This Court fails to appreciate the aforesaid stand of
    the High Court for various reasons which are discussed
    hereunder.

G         14. From a perusal of the judgment of the Tribunal, it does
    not appear that it was based solely on the consent of the parties.
    Apart from consent, if any, of the parties, the MACT also held
    that the amount of compensation awarded by it "appears to be
    proper, just and reasonable taking into consideration the
H   aforesaid evidence."
 URVIBEN CHIRAGHBAI SHETH v. VIJAYBHAI SHAMBHUBHAI 907
       JORANPUTRA [ASOK KUMAR GANGULY, J.]
    15. In fact, the exact finding of the MACT is set out below:    A

    "...... With consent of both the parties, it has been decided
    to make payment of the under mentioned amount which
    appears to be proper, just and reasonable taking into
    consideration the aforesaid evidence."
                                                                    8
      16. Therefore, it appears to be a mixed bag. MACT
curiously held that in the facts of the case, the amount granted
by it is just proper and reasonable and also held that the same
is based on the consent of the parties. The High Court, as the
last court of fact and law should have examined whether the C
Tribunal's finding that the compensation granted is proper, just
and reasonable in the facts of the case. The High Court·has
admittedly failed to do so.

     17. Coming to the question of so-called consent of the        0
parties, the approach of the High (,ourt also cannot be
appreciated. It is true that while acting as a Claims Tribunal,
its proceedings are summary in nature but in exercising its
summary jurisdiction the Tribunal must follow principles of
justice, equity and good conscience and must be aware that E
its summary enquiry is in connection with a legislation which is
meant for social welfare. Therefore, when a representation is
 made before the Tribunal that a claim of Rs.15 lacs by way of
 consent is reduced to Rs.6 lacs and odd, the Tribunal must insist
 on production of some material either, an affidavit of the
 claimant or the statement of the claimant before the MACT in F
 support of such lowering down of claim. The MACT cannot
accept the said representation on the mere oral statement of
counsel since such settlement is purely a question of fact. In
fact no leave was obtained from the Tribunal to enter into a
compromise between the parties in respect of the settlement. G

     18. In the absence of all these materials, when an affidavit
was filed by the learned advocate who appeared before the
Tribunal, contending that no such settlement was ever entered
into by the consent of parties, the High Court fell into an error   H
    908      SUPREME COURT REPORTS                . [2011] 5 S.C.R.     I

A   by discarding the same only on the ground that this was filed
    belatedly before the High Court and is an afterthought

         19. It may be true that in the grounds of appeal before the
    High Court, this should have been mentioned, but on a mere
8   defect of pleading of the parties, justice cannot be denied if in
    the facts of the case, the stand taken on the affidavit of the
    advocate appears probable.

          20. To our mind, the stand taken in the affidavit of the
    advocate referred to above appears probable specially when
C   there is nothing on record to show that the appellant ever filed
    any petition or affidavit for settlement or compromise before the
    MACT.

         21. The reliance placed by the High Court on the judgment
o   of this court in the case of Daman Singh (supra) is rather
    misconceived. In the said case, what this court held was when
    several points were raised in a writ petition before the High
    Court, and argument is confined to some grounds or points, as
    other grounds are considered by the counsel unworthy of
E   canvassing, thereafter the counsel cannot make a grievance
    that other grounds were not considered by the court (see para
    13).

         22. The situation in this case is not similar to the one
    pointed out in Daman Singh (supra).
F
        23. Here the High Court relied on the principle of sanctity
  of a record entered by a Court and held that what is recited in
  the Court record is sacrosanct. The High Court, in the process,
  fell into an error by equating the record of proceedings in a
G Tribunal with proceedings in a court of record. Under our
  hierarchy of Courts, a High Court (under Article 215) and the
  Supreme Court (under Article 129) are recognizedas Courts
  of Record. A Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal constituted under
  the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 is a Civil Court of limited
H jurisdiction, and is certainly not a Court of Record. The
 URVIBEN CHIRAGHBAI SHETH v. VIJAYBHAI SHAMBHUBHAI             909
       JORANPUTRA [ASOK KUMAR GANGULY, J.]
infallibility of its formal record is one of the earliest marks of a   A
Court of Record, but it has developed other characteristics too
(See A History of English Law by W.S. Holdsworth, Vol 5, p.
158).

     24. In Reg v. Aaron Mellor, reported in (1858) 7 Cox's            B
Criminal Law Cases 454, it was held "We must consider the
statement of the learned judge as absolute verity and we ought
to take his statement precisely as a record and act on it in the
same manner as on a record of Court which of itself implies
an absolute verity."
                                                                       c
    25. This has been followed by this Court in State of
Maharashtra v. Ramdas Srinivas Nayak & Anr., reported in
AIR 1982 SC 1249.

    26. Therefore, the principle of sanctity of recitals in Court      o
proceedings is available to a Court of Record. This principle
cannot be stretched to the proceedings of a tribunal.
Unfortunately the High Court failed to appreciate this.

     27. Now the question which arises is whether the matter
should be remanded by this Court? Having. regard to the                E
materials on record, this Court is of the opinion that the matter
should not be remanded, keeping in mind the period which has
elapsed in between since the accident took place in 1990, and
the fact that the appellant had been bedridden since then.
                                                                       F
     28. Admitted evidence about her medical disabilities is
that she has 100% disability which is permanent in nature with
no sign of recovery.                                   .,

    29. It is of course true that the appellant's case that she
was running a beauty parlour prior to the accident coul.d not be       G
proved, specially her income from the said patlour has not been
proved. The existence of the beauty parlour is however not in
dispute.

     30. Assuming the appellant is not running the parlour, the        H
    910       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                 [2011] 5 S.C.R.


A fact remains that she has two children and her husband died
  prior to the incident. Therefore, the dependence of the children
  and the running of the family is to be shouldered by her even
  though she is infirm and bedridden. She also needs someone
  to help her in her daily life. She has to have recurring medical
B expenses.

       31. Just because she is a homemaker is no reason why
  the courts should be miserly in fixing compensation for her. A
  Bench of this Court in Arun Kumar Agrarwal & Anr. v. National
  Insurance Co. Ltd. & Ors., reported in 2010 (9) SCC 218, had
C occasion to consider this question and held that the work of
  homemakers and housewives should be properly assessed
  and in making assessment of compensation payable to them,
  they should not suffer from a gender bias.

D         32. It is an accepted principle that compensation may be
    so assessed that the interest accruing therefrom will be
    sufficient for the maintenance of the family of the victim and the
    concept of compensation is wider than mere damages.

E         33. Considering all this, we grant compensation of Rs.15
    lacs (Rupees Fifteen Lacs) with interest at the rate of 8% on
    the enhanced compensation from the date of filing the claim
    petition before MACT till date of realization.

         34. Compensation on the aforesaid basis must be paid
F   to the concerned MACT by the respondents within six weeks
    by a demand draft. Thereupon the MACT shall forthwith deposi1
    the same in the bank account of the appellant.

           35. The appeal is thus allowed.
G          36. No order as to costs.

    N.J.                                            Appeal allowed.