Holding

A multiplier of 10, no deduction of unrelated social‑security or insurance receipts, interest at 9% per annum, and the conversion rate of Rs.30 per dollar constitute the correct award.

Summary

The case involved the death of Dr. Suresh K. Mahajan, an American citizen, in a road accident in India. His dependants claimed compensation under Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, initially using a multiplier of 7 and a conversion rate of Rs.30 per US dollar, which the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal awarded as Rs.1.19 crore. The High Court successively increased the award by applying higher multipliers (10 and then 13) and a higher conversion rate, resulting in a claim of Rs.16.12 crore. The Supreme Court examined whether (i) a multiplier different from that in the Second Schedule could be justified, (ii) deductions for social‑security benefits and life‑insurance proceeds were permissible, (iii) the rate of interest could be altered, and (iv) the conversion rate could be changed. It held that a multiplier of 10 was reasonable given the high income of the deceased and the ages of the dependants, that no deduction could be made from amounts unrelated to the accidental death, that interest should be reduced to 9% in view of prevailing rates, and that the conversion rate must remain Rs.30 as originally prayed. The Court restored the Single Judge’s award with these modifications and dismissed the appeal challenging the negligence finding.

Issues considered

The appropriate multiplier to be applied under the Second Schedule of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 in a case of high income and foreign currency earnings.
Whether amounts received under social‑security schemes or life‑insurance policies can be deducted from the compensation for accidental death.
Whether the rate of interest awarded on compensation can be altered on appeal.
Whether the conversion rate of US dollars to rupees can be changed from the rate used in the original prayer.

Legislation cited

Motor Vehicles Act, 1988s. 163A, s. 165, s. 166, s. 168, s. 171

Subjects

Motor Vehicles ActCompensation multiplierSecond ScheduleSocial security deductionInterest rateCurrency conversionForeign citizenStructured formulaDeviation from schedule

Judgment

A UNITED INDIA INSURANCE CO. LTD. ETC. ETC.
v.
. PATRICA JEAN MAHAJAN AND ORS. ETC. ETC.

JULY 8, 2002

B [D.P. MOHAPATRA AND BRIJESH KUMAR, JJ.]

Motor Vehicles Act, 1988:

Second Schedule and Section /63A-Motor accident-Death-
C Compensation-Multiplier-Deviation from-Permissibility of-Held,
ordinarily provisions contained in Second Schedule may be taken as a guide-
But in. case where gap of income is wide, deviation from the multiplier is
permissible-For the purposes offair compensation a lesser multiplier can be
applied to a heavy amount of f!IUltiplicand.
D Compensation-Deduction on accoun~ of receipts under the Insurance
Policy and other receipts under social security system-Whether perrnissible-
H~ld, such deduction for balancing losses and gains by reason of death, to
arrive at amount of compensation is a general rule-But the amount received
on account of social security must have nexus or relation with the accidental
E injury or death.

Interest-A.ward ofat the rate of I 2'Y<r-Held, in view of declining interest
rate, interest reduced to 9%.

Death offoreign citizen-Claim of compensation after applying a certain
F conversion rate-In appeal plea to calculate amount of award at higher
conversion rate-Held, higher conversion rate not permissible-The claimants
cannot ask for more than what was claimed in the claim petition.

Practice and Procedure-Issue not raised in Courts below-Interference
by Supreme Court-Non-raising of the issue inferred from the observation of
G the Court below-Held, generally such observation cannot be denied-But in
case of vague observation, it is open to Supreme Court to ascertain the correct
position on the basis of totality of the observations in the judgment.

Words and Phrases :

H 1176
UNITED INDIA INSURANCE CO. LTD. 1•. PATRICA JEAN MAHAJAN } J 77

"Receipts from l·vhatever source "-~Meaning of· in the context of Motor A
Vehicles Act, 1988.

An American citizen while he was on visit to India met with an
accident and succumbed to his injuries. His parents, his wife and his three
children were his dependants.
B
The dependants filed petitfon claiming compensation on account of
his death. In the petition, details of income etc. had been given in Dollars
but prayer for passing the decree was for a sum indicated in rupees, which
was arrived at by applying Rs. 30 as conversion rate of Dollar.

Motor Accident Claims Tribunal found that death of the deceased C
was on account of rash and negligent driving and ascertained the amount
of compensation by applying multiplier of7, and by deducting the amount
received by the claimants on account of social security system, Applying
the exchange rate of rupees 30, it awarded compensation of Rs. 1.19 crores
with interest at the rate of 12%. D
On appeal Single Judge of High Court enhanced the amount of
compensation to Rs. 10.38 crores by using multiplier of JO and disallowed
the deductions on account of social security system. Rate of exchange was
applied at Rs, 47 i.e. the current rate as then prevailing. The rate of interest
was maintained as 12°/o. E
In appeal, before Division Bench of High Court, the Court further
enhanced the compensation by applying multiplier of 13 according to
Second Schedule referable to Section 163-A of the Motor Vehicles Act,
1988 holding that the Schedule was safe guide to arrive at the amount of
just compensation. It disallowed the deduction on account of social security F
system. Interest rate was maintained as 12% while the exchange rate was
applied at Rs. 30. Thus total amount of compensation came to about Rs.
16.12 crores.

In appeal to this Court it was contended by insurance company that
while assessing the amount of compensation the benefits, which have G
accrued to the claimants by reason of death, must also be taken into
account. The claimants contended that the question relating to rate of
interest was not under challenge before High Court hence the same could
· not be raised in this Court; that the factual position as recorded by Division
Bench of High Court that the rate of interest was not in dispute before H
,I

J.....

1178 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2002] 3 S.C.R.

A the Court, should not be allowed to be disputed; and that it is only the
current exchange rate of dollar which should be allowed since the value
of the Rupee has fallen in exchange of Dollar after the application of claim
was made and award was given.

Disposing of the appeals, the Court
B
HELD: 1.1. Considering all the facts and factors, application of
multiplier of 7 is definitely on the lower side. Some deviation in the figure
of mulitplier would not inean that there may be a wide difference between
the multiplier applied and the scheduled multiplier, which in this case is
C 13. The difference between 7 and 13 is too wide. Looking in the high
amount of mulitplicand and the ages of the dependants and the fact that
the parents are living in India, application of mulitplier of 10 would be
reasonable and would provide a fair compensation i.e. a purchase factor
of 10 y~ars. Accordingly multiplier of 10 should be restored instead of
multiplier of 13. 11192-D-FI
D
1.2. Ordinarily while awarding compensation, the provisions
contained in the Second Schedule may be taken as a guide including the
mulitplier, but there may arise some cases, as one in hand, which may fall
in the category having special feature or facts calling for deviation from
E the multiplier usually applicable. The Court cannot be totally oblivion to
the realities. T~e second Schedule while prescribing the multiplier, had
maximum income of Rs. 40,000 p.a. in mind, but it is considered to be a
safe guide for applying prescribed multiplier in cases of higher income
also but in cases where the gap in income is so wide as in the present case
income is 2,26,297 $, in such a situation, it cannot be said that some
F deviation in the multiplier, would be impermissible. Therefore, a deviation
from applying the multiplier as provided in the second Schedule may have
to be made in this case. Apart from other factors the amount of
multiplicand also become a factor to be taken into account which in this
case comes to 226297 $ that is to say an amount of around Rs. 68 lacs per
G annum by converting it at the rate of Rs. 30. By Indian standards it is
certainly a high amount. Therefore, for the purposes of fair compensation,
a lesser multiplier can be applied to a. heavy amount of multiplicand. A
deviation would be reasonably permissible in figure of multiplier. Applying
a multiplier other than the scheduled multiplier does not mean that any
method other than mulitplier method has been applied.
H 11193-E; 1192-H; 1193-A, B; 1191-GI
UNITED INDIA INSURANCE CO. LTD. ''· PATRICA JEAN MAHAJAN 1179

1.3. In the instant case the amounts granted as compensation by A
Single Judge and Division Bench of High Court, are huge. Looking to the
Indian economy, fiscal and financial situation, the amount is certainly a
fabulous amount though in the background of American conditions it may
not be so. Therefore, there is_ so much of disparity in the economic
conditions and affluence of the two places viz. the place to which the victim B
belongs and the place where the compensation is to be paid, a golden
balance must be struck somewhere, to arrive at a reasonable and fair
mesne. Looking by the Indian standarcis they may not be much too
overcompensated and similarly not very much under compensated as well,
in the background of the country where most of the dependent
beneficiaries reside. 11192-B-DI C
General Manager, Kera/a State Road Transport Corporation,
Trivandrwn v. Susamma Thomas (Mrs) and Ors., 1199412SCC176; U.P.
State Road Transport Corporation and Ors. v. Trilok Chand and Ors., 119961
4 SCC 362; Lala Wadhwa and Ors. v. State of Bihar and Ors., 12001 I 8 SCC
197 and Jyoti Kaul and Ors. v. State of Madhya Pradesh, JT 120001 7 SCC D
367, referred to.

Devis v. Tailor (1997) AC 207; Devis v. Paul Dujfryn Associated
Limited, (1942) 1 All Er. 657 (HL) and Mal/eel/ v. Mc Monagle. (1970) AC
166, referred to.
E
2.1. High Court has rightly disallowed any deduction on account of
receipts under the Insurance Policy and other receipts under social security
system which the claimant would have also otherwise_ entitled to receive
irrespective of accidental death. Principle of balancing between losses and
gains, by reason of death, to arrive at amount of compensation is a general p
rule, but what is more important is that such receipts by the claimants
must have some co-relation with the accidental death by reason of which
alone the claimants have received the amounts. Amount on account of
social security as may have been received must have nexus or relation with
the accidental injury or death, so as to be deductible from the amount of
compensation. There must be some co-relation between the amount G
received and the accidental death or it may be in the same sphere, absence
the amount received shall not be deducted from the amount of
compensation. The amount received on account of insurance policy of the
__, deceased cannot be deduced from the amount of compensation though no
doubt the receipt of the insurance amount is accelerated due to pre-mature H
1180 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2002] 3 S.C.R.

A death of the insured. No co-relation of allowance paid to the children, and
the wife under the social security system, with the accidental death has
been shown much less established. Apart from the fact that contribution
comes from different sources for constituting the fund out of which,
payment on account of social security system is made one of the constituent
B of fund is tax which is deducted from income for the puruose.
11199-1'1; 1200-A-EI

2.2. If the proposition "receipts from whatever source" is interpreted .
so widely that it may cover all the receipts, which may come into the hands )
of the claimants, in view of the mere death of the victim, it would only
C defeat the purpose of the Act providing for just compensation on account
of accidental death. Such gains may be on account of saving or other
investment etc. made by the deceased would not go to the benefit of wrong
doer and the claimant should not be left worse of, if he had never taken
an Insurance Policy or had not made investments for future returns.
(1200-E-FI
D
Helen C. Rebello (Mrs.) v. Maharashtra State Road Transport
Corporation, 1199'91 1 SCC 90, relied on.

Gobald Motor Service limited v. R.MK. Veluswami and Ors., 119621
1 SCR 929: Mis. Shekhupura Transport Co. Ltd. v. Northern India Transport
E Company, 11971) 1 SCC 785; General Manager, Kera/a State Road Transport
Corporation Trivandrum v. Susamma Thomas (Mrs.) and Ors., 11994) 2
sec 176, referred to.
Davis v. Powell Duffiyn.Associated Collieries Ltd., (1942) AC 601 and
Hodgson v. Trapp and Anr., (1988) 3 All ER. 870 and 230 S.O. 2(d)(l)
F (1968) Flaapp Lexis 5073 Marc A 0 'NEAL', referred to.

American law Report 84 AlR 2d; Report of Royal Commission on civil
liability and compensation for personal injury under the Chairmanship of lord
Pearson, Volume-I; Mac Grager on damages 16 Edition; Encyclopedia
G America page 186 (!), referred to.
3.1. In view of declining rate of interest, it is reduced to 9%1 in place
of 12% as awarded by the High Court. 11203-DI

Kaushnuma Begum (Smt.)and Ors v. New India Assurance Company
H Ltd., 120011 2 sec 9, relied on.
UNITED JNDIA INSURANCE CO. LTD. 1•. PATRICA JEAN MAHAJAN 1181

R.D. Haltangadi v. Pest Control (India) Pvt. ltd. and Ors .. 119951 I A
sec 551, distinguished.
Rabert v. Insurance Company Ltd.. (19991 8 SCC 226, referred to.

Jefford and Anr. v. Gee, (2001) ACC 540; (1970) All ER 1202, referred to.

3.2. Though it is correct that concession made by a party and an B
observation made to that effect in the judgment, cannot be allowed to be
denied. Only the Court which recorded the statement itself was competent
to rectify the error if the Court recording the statement was approached
to consider the matter without delay. But in certain cases where a stray
remark or observation made by the Court which is not very clear and is C
vague, and a different picture emerges from other part of judgment it may
be open for this Court to ascertain the correct position on the basis of
totality of the observations made in the judgment itself. It is nowhere
indicated that the Insurance Company had made any statement conceding
the rate of interest nor it is indicated how the concession was made. Then
the observation that the "rate of interest was not in dispute before the D
Court" may only lead to an inference that the rate of interest was not ·
disputed before the Court in the arguments advanced on behalf of the
party concerned .. But factually.it is found that, the Insurance Company
had cited the decisions to indicate that the lower rate of interest was
awarded in certain decisions, which had been relied upon by him. This is E
enough to indicate that the lower rate of interest was awarded in certain
decisions, which had been relied upon by him. This is enough to indicate
that the rate of interest was actually disputed. More than one case, a
reference of which has been made in the judgment of the Division Bench
itself, has been relied upon by the Insurance Company for reducing the
rate of interest. 11201-D·HI F
State of Maharashtra v. Ramdas Shrinivas Nayak and Anr., 119821 2
SCC 463 and Apar (P) Ltd. and Anr. v. Union of India and Ors., 11992( Supp.
I SCC, referred to.

4. Calculation of the amount of award at the conversion rate of Rs. G
47 cannot be permitted. Ther~ is no occasion to convert the amount of
decree in Rupees into Dollars applying Rs. 30 as rate of conversion and
then re-convert it in Rupees at the rate of Rs. 47. The claimants cannot
ask for more than what was prayed for in the claim petition. In the present
case prayer for passing a decree was for a sum indicated in Rupees which
figure was arrived at by the claimants applying Rs. 30 as the conversion H
1182 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2002] 3 S.C.R.

A rate. Therefore, in the present case there is no such dispute as to what
rate .of conversion was.to be applied. 11204-B-EI ..-

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal Nos. 3655-58 of
2002.

B From the Judgment and Order dated 17.10.2001 of the Delhi High
Court in L.P.A. Nos. 225/200 I, 179/200 I and 236/200 I.

Soli J. Sorabji, Attorney General, T.R. Rajagopalan, Ranjit Kr P.P. Rao
and P.P. Malhotra, M.K. Dua, S.M. Suri, Manish Singhvi, Varun Goswami,
Ashok K. Mahajan, Kishore Rawat, P.N. Puri, Ashwani Kumar and Arvind
C Kumar Gupta for the appearing parties.

the Judgtnent of the Court was delivered by

BRIJESH KUMAR, J. Leave granted.

The above noted four appeals arise out of the proceedings before the
D Motor Accident Claims Tribunal Tis Hazari, Delhi in Suit No. 325 of 1995.
Since in all the appeals the judgment and order passed by the Division Bench
of Delhi High Court has been challenged and the matters relate to the same
accident, all these appeals have been heard together and they are being disposed
of by this order.
E The brief facts are that Dr. Suresh K. Mahajan aged 47-48 years a
medical graduate went to America and established himself in the medical
\ • I profession and became an American National. He established his own hospital
in Miu'.igan, U.S.A. He was on visit to India and on February 3, 1995 while
·1
proceeding to Jaipur from Delhi in a Maruti Car No. DL-4CB- I 926 belonging
F to one of the two brothers travelling with him, a truck No. HR-29D- l 125 hit
the rear part of the Maruti Car. Dr. Mahajan was sitting on the back seat was
injured and succumbed to his injuries. The Dependants of Dr. Suresh K.
Mahajan filed a petition under Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act for
compensation on account of death of Dr. Mahajan. According to the claimants
'· Dr. Mahajan had specialized in the field of Nephrology and had set up his
G good practice and a hospital in Michigan U.S.A. According to the claimants,
income of the d~ceased was progressively increasing every year out of his
practice and the hospital and in the year 1994 his income was to the tune of
9 lacs US dollars. At the time of his death Dr. Suresh K. Mahajan left behind
his wife Patrica Jean Mahajan, two daughters, a son and his parents residing
H in Delhi. According to the claimants, he was providing good education to his
UNITED INDIA INSURANCE CO. LTD. 1•_ PATRICA JEAN MAHAJAN [BRIJESH KUMAR, J.J } } 83

children and had also been sending a sum of Rs. 8,000 to his parents in A
Delhi. A compensation for a sum of Rs. 54 crores was claimed.

-
The Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, after appreciation of the evidence
and the material on the record and on detailed discussion therefore, recorded
the finding that Dr. Mahajan received injuries and died because of the rash
and negligent driving of the Troller No. HR 29-D-1125. So far the amount B
of compensation is concerned, the Tribunal came to the conclusion that the
Carry home income of the deceased was 3,09204 US Dollars. Out of which,
2/3rd amount was set apart on account of self expenses of the deceased and
I/3rd amount was held to be the amount of dependency which came to
1,03068 US Dollars. A multiplier of 7 was applied to arrive at the figure of C
compensation, the amount came to 7,21,476 US Dollars, out of which
deduction on account of benefits of social security system/UC was deducted
which included an amount of 2,50,000 US Dollars received by the claimants
on .account of personal life insurance of Dr. Mahajan. The other amounts
paid to Mrs. Mahajan and two of her children on account of social security
coming to a sum of 51,300 US Dollars were also deducted. The Tribunal D
deducted a total amount of. 3,22,900 dollars. Applying the exchange rate of
Rs. 30 a sum of Rs. 1.19 crores was awarded with interest at the rate of 12%
from the date of filing of the petition up to the date of payment, the total
amount thus come to about Rs. 1.62 crores.

The claimants approached the High Court in appeal. The learned Single E
Judge found that carry home income of the deceased was 3,39,445 US Dollars
and out of the said amount, I/3rd of it instead of 2/3rd was liable to be
deducted on account of self expenditure of the deceased, the amount of
dependency thus, was fixed at 226297 US dollars. The learned Single Judge
applied the multiplier of 10 and disallowed any deductions on account of F
social security syste1n. The same rate of interest \Vas maintained as awarded
but the rate of exchange at Rs. 47/- was applied being the current rate as then
prevailing. The total amount of compensation thus arrived at, came to
Rs. 10.38 crores. The FAO No. 273 of 1998 preferred by the claimants was
thus allowed in the manner indicated above. And the appeal preferred by the
United India Insurance company Ltd. FAO No. 366 of 1998 was dismiS>ed G
with an observation that there was no scope to disturb the finding of the
Tribunal on the question of negligence ofoffending !roller/driver. The parties
preferred three Letters Patent Appeals before the Division Bench, which have '
been decided by the judgment and order dated 17.10.200 I. The LPA No. 179
of 200 I, preferred by Patrica Mahajan, and LPA No. 225 of 200 I and 236 H
'
•
I 184 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2002] 3 S.C.R.

A of 2001 had been filed by the United Insurance Company Ltd. challenging
the amount of compensation as awarded by the learned Single Judge and also \.

the order upholding the finding of rash and negligent driving on the part of
driver of the troller. By means of impugned judgment, the Division Bench
maintained the order passed by the learned Single Judge but for application ._
of multiplier and the exchange rate. In so far it related to exchange rate of
B Dollar, the Division Bench observed that it was a closed chapter since the
amount awarded by the Tribunal at the exchange rate of Rs. 30 was withdrawn
by the claimants and the exchange rate of Rs. 4 7 as awarded by the Single
Judge was disallowed. The Division Bench applied the mutiplier of 13
according to second schedule to the Act referable to Section 163A of the Act. .
c It was found that there was no reason not to follow the schedule which has
been held by the Supreme Court to be safe guide to arrive at the amount of .,
just compensation. In the result, the total amount i.e. principal with interest
came to about Rs. 16.12 crores.

The above noted appeals have been filed against the judgment of the ~
D Division Bench, the United Insurance Company Ltd. raising a grievance
against application of multiplier of 13 and disirllowance of deduction on
account of social security system. They also feel aggrieved by award of
interest at the rate of 12% per annum. In one of the appeals preferred by the
United India Insurance Company the finding of rash and negligent driving on
E the part of driver of the troller has also been sought to be challenged. In the
appeal preferred by the claimants, conversion rate of Dollar in terms of
Rupet:s has been asked @ Rs. 4 7 as was awarded by the learned Single
Judge.

We may first take up the question of application of appropriate multiplier
F in the facts and circumstances of this case. The multiplier of 13, has been
applied by the Division Bench of the High Court strictly following the Second
Schedule to the Act referable to Section 163A of the Act. The Petition was
filed by the claimant for award of compensation under Section 166 of the
Motor.Vehicles Act. Before adverting to the case law on the point cited by
the learned counsel for both the sides, it may be beneficial to peruse the two
G
provisions indicated above. Section 163A as inserted by Act 54 of 1994
w.e.f. 14.11.1994 reads as under:-
~
.:A "163A. Special Provisions as to payment of compensation on
structured formula basis.-(1) Notwithstanding anything contained r-

H in this Act or in any other law for the time being in force or instrument
UNITED !NOIA INSURANCE CO. LTD. 1·. PATRICA JEAN MAHAJAN {BRJJESH KUMAR, J.] J J 85
having the force of law. the owner of the motor vehicle of the A
authorised insurer shall be liable to pay in the case of death or
pennanent disable1nent due to accident arising out of the use of motor
vehicle, compensation, an indicated in the Second Schedule, to the
legal heirs or the victim, as the case may be.

Explanation.-For the purposes of this sub-section, "permanent B
disability" shall have the sa1ne 111eaning and extent as in the
Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923 (8 of the 1923).

(2) In any claim for compensation under sub-section (I), the claimant
shall not be required to plead or establish that the death or pennanent
disablement in respect of which the claim has been made was due to C
any wrongful act or neglect or default of the owner of the vehicle/ or
vehicles concerned or of any other _person.

(3) The Central Governn1ent may, keeping in view the cost of living
by notification in the Official Gazette, from time to time amend the
Second Schedule." D
The noticeable features of this provision are that it provides for
compensation in the case of death or permanent disablement due to
accident arising out of use of Motor Vehicle. The amount of
compensation would be as indicated in the Second Schedule. The
claimant is not required to plead or establish that the death or E
permanent disablement was due to any wrongful act or negligence or
default of the owner of the vehicle or any other person. Award of
compensation according to Schedule under this provision is also known
as structured formula.

Section 166 reads as under:- F
"Application for compensation-( I) An application for
compensation arising out of an accident of the nature specified in
sub-section (I) of section 165 may be made-

(a) by the person who has sustained the injury; or G
(b) by the owner of the property; or
(c) where death has resulted from the accident, by all or any of the
legal representatives of the deceased; or
(d) by any agent duly authorised by the person injured or all or any H
,--.I

1186 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2002] 3 S.C.R.

A of the legal representatives of the deceased, as the case may be;

Provided tha, where all the legal representatives of the deceased
have not joined in any such application for compensation, the
application shall be made on behalf of or for the benefit of all the

B
legal representatives of the deceased and the legal representatives
who have not so joined shall be impleaded as respondents to the
application.

(2) Every application under sub-section (I) shall be made, at the
.
option of the claimant, either to the Claims Tribunal having jurisdiction
over the area in which the accident occurred or to the Claims Tribunal
c within the local limits of whose jurisdiction the claimant resides or
carries on business or within the local limits of whose jurisdiction the
defendant resides, and shall be in such form and contain such
particulars as may be prescribed;

Provided that where no claim for compensation under section 140
D is made in such application, the application shall contain a separate
statement to that effect immediately before the signature of the
applicant.

(4) The claims Tribunal shall treat any report of accidents forwarded
to it under sub-section (6) of section 158 as an .application for
E compensation under this Act.

It would also be necessary to peruse sub-Section I of Section .165
which reads as under:-

165. Claims Tri~unals.-{ I) A State Government may, by notification
F in the Official Gazette, constitute one or more Motor Accidents Claims
Tribunals (hereafter in this Chapter referred to as Claims Tribunal)
for such area as may be specified in the notification for the purpose
of adjudicating upon claims for compensation in respect of accidents
involving the death of or bodily injury to, persons arising out of the
use of motor vehicles, or damages to any property of a third party so
G arising, or both.

Exp/anation.-For the removal of doubts, it is hereby declared that
the expression "claims for compensation in respect of accidents
involving the death of or bodily injury to persons arising out of the
H use of motor vehicles" includes claims for compensation under Section
UNITED INDIA INSURANCE CO. LTD. 1·. PATRICA JEAN MAHAJAN [llRIJESH KUMAR. J.] 1187

140 and section 163A." A
From the provisions quoted above, it is clear that a claim under Section
166 covers cases of all kinds of bodily injuries or damage to the property of
third p_arty or both. Under the explanation to sub-Section I of Section 165 it
has been inC:icated that the provision includes the claims for compensation
under Section 140 and Section 163A but it is nowhere provided that the B
a1nount of compensation is to be assessed or calculated according to the
second Schedule. On the other hand, Section 168 provides the key leading to
determination of amount of compensation under Section 166 of the Act. The
relevant part of Section 168 reads as under:-

.. 168. Award of the Claims Tribunal.-On receipt of an application C
for compensation made under section 166, the Claims Tribunal shall,
after giving notice of the application to the insurer and after giving
the parties (including the insurer) an opportunity if being heard, hold
an inquiry into the claims or as the case may be, each of the claims
and, subject to the provisions of section 162 may make an award an D
award determining the amount of compensation which appears to it
to be just and specifying the person or persons to whom compensation
shall be paid and in making the award the Claims Tribunal shall
specify the amount which shall be paid by the insurer of owner or
driver of the vehicle involved in the accident or by all or any of them,
as the case may be; E
Provided that where such application makes a claims of
compensation under section 140 in respect of the death or permanent
disablement of any person, such claim and any other claim (whether
made in such application or otherwise) for compensation in respect
of such death or permanent disablement shall be disposed of in F
accordance with the provisions of Chapter X.

(2) The Claims Tribunal shall arrange shall arrange to deliver
copies of the award to the parties concerned expeditiously and in any
case within a period of fifteen days from the date of the award.
G
(3) When an award is made under this section. The person who
is required to pay any a1nount in terms of such award shall, within
thirty days of the date of announcing the award by the Claims Tribunal,
deposit the entire amount awarded in such manner as the Claims
Tribunal may direct."
H
1188 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2002] 3 S.C.R.

A It thus makes it clear that it is fo; the Tribunal to arrive at an ,,.
amount of compensation which it may consider to be just in the facts
and circumstances of the case. This Court however has been of the
view that structured formula as provided under the Second Schedule
would be a safe guide to calculate the amount of just compensation.
Deviation though permissible may only be resorted to for some special
B reasons to do so. So far structured formula is concerned, it provides
for a maximum multiplier of 18. The application of the multiplier
depends upon the age of the deceased, age of his dependants, number
of his dependents, the amount of dependency etc. Again we find that
the structured formula relates to victim whose income is up to a sum
c of Rs. 40,000 per annum. It may be darified that in the present case,
it is not in dispute that the multiplier method, which is accepted and
prevalent method, would be applicable and has been applied. The
question of setting apart I/3rd oft.he income on account of expenditure
on the self by the deceased is also not in dispute, i.e. to say that the
amount of multiplicand shall be the 2/3rd of annual income of the
D deceased. The annual income of the deceased, as found by the learned
Singie Judge and the Division Bench namely $3,39445 is also not in
dispute, nor the amount of dependency2,26297 US Dollars. The only
dispute is about application of 13 as multiplier as applied by a Division
Bench of the High Court following the Second Schedule to the Act.
E We may refer to the decision reported in [1994] 2 SCC 176 _General
Manager, Kera/a State Road Transport Corporation, Trivandrum v. Susamma
Thomas (Mrs.) and Ors.

In this case while considering the law on the subject, it was observed
p in para 13 of the report as follows:-

"The choice of the multiplier is determined by the age of the deceased
(or that of the claimants whichever is higher) and by the calculation
as to what capital sum, if invested at a rate of interest appropriate to
a stable economy, would yield the multiplicand by way of annual
G interest. In ascertaining this, regard should also be had to the fact that
ultimately the capital sum should also be consumed up over the period
for which the dependency is expected to last."

It was reiterated in para 16 that the multiplier method is logically sound
and legally well established as compared to other methods indicated in the
H other decisions in which different methods of computation was applied. It
UNITED INDIA INSURANCE CO. LTD. 1'. l'ATRlCA JEAN MAHAJAN [BRIJESH KUMAR, J.] ] J89

was observed that those cases cannot be said to have laid any principle of A
co111putation of compensation .. The Cou11 then further observes as follows:~

"The proper method of computation is the multiplier method. Any
departure except in exceptional and extraordinary, cases, would
introduce inconsistency of principle, lack of uniformity and an element
of unpredictability for the assessment of compensation. Some B
judgments of the High Courts have justified a departure from the
multiplier method on the ground that Section 110-B of the Motor
Vehicles Act, 1939 in so far as it envisages the compensation to be
just, the statutory determination of a just compensation would
unshackle the exercise fro1n any rigid formula. It 1nust be borne in C
mind that the multiplier method is the accepted method of ensuring
a just compensation which, will make for uniformity and certainty of
the awards. We disapprove these decisions of the High Courts, which
have taken a contrary view. We indicate that the multiplier method
is the appropriate method, a departure from which can only be justified
in rare and extraordinary circumstances and very exceptional cases." D
In another decision reported in [ 1996] 4 SCC page 362 UP State Road
Transport Corporation and Ors. v. T1·i/ok Chand and Ors., the view taken in
the case of Susamma Thomas (supra) has been reiterated. It has been held
that in the case of Susamma Thomas maximum multiplier which could be
applied was found to be 16 which according to this case can now be up to E
18, in view of the Second Schedule. This part of the judgment has also been
particularly relied upon by the learned COlUlsel for the claimants. The Court
has also agreed with the observations made in the case of Susamma Thomas
that there should be no departure from the multiplier method, particularly on
the ground of awarding just compensation, as it was provided under Section F
1108 of the Motor Vehicles Act 1939 corresponding to the present Section
168 of the Motor Vehicles Act 1988. It is further observed that multiplier
method is accepted method for determining just compensation, which also
brings about uniformity and certainty of award. In paragraph 18 it has however,
been observed about Second Schedule that neither the Tribunals nor the
Court can go by the ready recknor, it can only be used as guide. The Court G
has emphasized that in no case a multiplier should exceed 18 years purchase
factor. It is however, observed as follows:-

"It can only be used as a guide. Besides the selection of muJtipJier,
cannot in all cases be solely dependent on the age of the deceased.
For example, ifthe deceased, a bachelor, dies at the age of 45 and his H
1190 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2002] 3 S.C.R.

A dependents arc his parents, age of the parents would also be relevant
in the choice of mutiplier." (emphasis supplied)

What thus emerge from the above decisions is that the Court must
adhere to the system of multiplier in arriving at the proper amount of
compensaiion, and also with a view to maintain uniformity and certainty. Use
B of higher multiplier has been depricated and it is emphasized that it can not
exceed 18. The multiplier, as would be evident from the observations quoted
earlier, may differ in the peculiar facts and circumstances of a particular case
as according to the example cited where bachelor dies at the age of 45, the ..
age of his dependent parents may be relevant for selecting a proper multiplier.
C Meaning thereby that a multiplier less than what is provided in the schedule
could be applied in special facts and circumstances of a case. In the later
cases also this Court has taken the same view that multiplier system is more
appropriate and proper method for calculating the amount of compensation.
[200 I] 8 SCC 197 Lata Wadhwa and Ors. v. State of Bihar and Ors. may
be referred to. Decision in the case of Sushamma Thomas (supra) and other
D English decision considered in the judgments referred earlier namely, Devis
v. Tailor ( 1997) AC 207, Devis v. Paul Dujfryn Associated limited. 1942 (I)
All Er. 657 (HL). Malleett v. Mc Monagle (1970) AC 166 have been referred
to.

E In Jyoti Kaul and Ors. v. State of Madhya Pradesh, JT (2000) 7 SC
page 367 this Court again referring, to the decision in the case of Susamma
Thomas (supra) reiterated that multiplier system should be applied for the
purposes of calculation of amount of compensation. It has also been observed.
that the question as to what mutiplier should be applied would depend upon
various facts and circumstances of the case, hence the multiplier may change
F to some degree.

In the case in hand it is amply clear that it is not the case of any party
that proper method of computing the amount of compensation, namely the
multiplier method has not been applied. We have already seen that in the
G decisions referred to, in the earlier part of this judgment it is clearly stated
that except in very rare cases, multiplier system should not be deviated from.
The other methods, which were in vogue prior to introduction of multiplier
system have been held to be no more good system. The choice of multiplier
may differ to some degree as observed in the case of Jyoti Kaul (supra)
depending upon various facts and circumstances of the case. Though, normally
H the multiplier as indicated in 2nd schedule should be applied as it is as found
UNITED INDIA INSURANCE CO. LTD. 1·. PATRICA JEAN MAHAJAN [BRIJESH KUMAR, J.] ] ] 9}

to be a safe guide for the purpose of calculation of amount of compensation. A
The Tribunal had applied the mutiplier of 7, which obviously was very low.
While applying the mutiplier of7, the Tribunal has observed that it had taken
into consideration the age of the deceased and the yield, which, would have
come by way of interest on the amount of compensation. The Tribunal though
had also discussed that the two daughters of the deceased were age of 19 and B
17 years and the age of son was 13 years, parents of the deceased were 69/
73 years: The Tribunal was of the view that period of dependency may not
be long for the children. Then in consideration of the fact that amount awarded
by apr'ying multiplier of 7 would yield an interest of about 87,000 US
Dollars if invested at the rate of 12% per annum. The learned Single Judge
of the High Court considering the age of the deceased and his dependants and C
the provisions of the Second Schedule and the decision of this Court in the
case of Trilok Chand (supra) took the view that the application of mutiplier
of I 0 would be appropriate in the present case. The Division Bench in appeal
has laid much stress on the fact that according to the decision in Susamma
Thomas and Trilok Chand (supra) there should not be any deviation in the
method of working out the amount of compensation applying multiplier D
method. There is nothing wrong in the statement of above propositions as
indicated by the Division Bench. Different method can be resorted to only in
rare and exceptional cases but the learned Single Judge had applied only
mutiplier method and none-else, however looking to the facts and
ci~cumstances of the case, applied the multiplier of I 0 instead of 13 as provided E
for the victi1ns of the age group of deceased as in this case between 45 to 50
years. It is true as also noticed by the High Court that the 2nd Schedule
should be taken as a guide, but it does not mean that no deviation in the
figure of mutiplier itself, would be permissible in any case whatsoever.
Normally, Second Schedule may provide a guide for applicati_on of multiplier
but for valid and proper reasons, different mutiplier can be applied, indeed F
not exceeding 18 in any case on the upper side. As indicated in the case of
Susamma Thomas (supra) itself the Court gave an example of a situation
where the age of the victim may be 45 years, but who may be a bachelor with
his parents alone as dependents, obviously, meaning thereby that lesser
mutiplier could be applied in such a case. By applying a mutiplier other than G
the scheduled multiplier does not mean that any method other than multiplier
1nethod has been applied. For some special reasons some deviation from the
scheduled multiplier can be made.

In the present case we find that the parents of the deceased were 69/
73 years. Two daughters were aged 17 and 19 years. Main question, which H
1192 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2002] 3 S.C.R.

A strikes to us in this case is that in the given circumstances the amount of
multiplicant also assumes relevance. The total amount of dependency as found
by the learned Single Judge and also rightly upheld by the Division Bench
comes to 226297 Dollars. Applying multiplier of 10, the amount with interest
and the conversion rate of Rs. 47 comes to Rs. 10.38 crores.and with multiplier
of 13 at the conversion rate of Rs. 30 the amount came to Rs. 16.12 crores
B with interest. These amounts are huge indeed. Looking to the Indian economy,
fiscal and financial situation, the amount is ce1tainly a fabulous amount though
in the background of American conditions it may not be so. Therefore, where 'r
there is so much of disparity in the economic conditions and affluence of the
two places viz. the place to which the victim belongs and the place where the
C compensation is to be paid, a golden balance must be struck somewhere, to
arrive at a reasonable and fair mesne. Looking by the Indian standards they
may not be much too overcompensated and similarly not very much under
compensated as well, in the background of the country where most of the
dependent beneficiaries reside. Two of the dependants namely, parents aged
69173 years live in India, but four of them are in the United States. Shri Soli
D J. Sorabjee submitted that the amount of multiplicand shall surely be relevant
and in case it is a high amount, a lower mulitplier can appropriately be
applied. We find force in this submission. Considering all the facts and factors
as indicated above, to us it appears that application of multiplier of 7 is
definitely on the lower side. Some deviation in the figure of multiplier would
E not mean that there may be a wide difference between the multiplier applied
and the scheduled multiplier which in this case is 13. The difference between
7 and 13 is too wide. As observed earlier, looking to the high am~unt of
multiplicand and the ages of the dependants and the fact that parents are
residing in India in our view application of multiplier of 10 would be
reasonable and would provide a fair compensation i.e. purchase factor of 10
F years, .We accordingly hold that multiplier of 10 as applied by the learned
Single Judge should be restored instead of multiplier of 13 as applied by the
Division Bench, We find no force in the submission made on behalf of the
claimants that in no circumstances the amount of multiplicand would be a
relevant consideration for application of appropriate multiplier. We have
G already given our reasons in the discussion held above.
The court can not be totally oblivion to the realities. The 2nd Schedule
while prescribing the multiplier, had maximum income of Rs. 40,000 p.a. in
mind , but it is considered to be a safe guide for applying prescribed multiplier
in cases of higher income also but in cases where the gap in income is so
H wide as in the present case income is 2,26,297$, in such a situation, it can
UNITED INDIA INSURANCE CO. LTD. r. PATRICA JEAN MAHAJAN /BRIJESH KUMAR, J.} 1193

not be said that some deviation in the multiplier, would be impermissible. A
Therefore, a deviation from applying the multiplier as provided in the 2nd
Schedule may have to be made in this case. Apart from factors indicated
earlier the amount of multiplicand also becomes a factor to be taken into
account which in this case comes to 226297$ that is to say an amount of
around Rs. 68 lacs per annum by converting it at the rate of Rs .30. By Indian
standards it is certainly a high amount. Therefore, for the purposes of fair B
compensation, a lesser multiplier can be applied to a heavy amount of
multiplicand. A deviation would be reasonably permissible in figure of
multiplier even according to the observations 1nade in the case of Susan1ma
Tho111as where a specific exa1nple was given about a person dying at the age
of 45 leaving no heirs being a bachelor except his parents. C
The purpose to compensate the dependants of the victims is that they
may not be suddenly deprived of source of their maintenance and as far as
possible they may be provided with the means as were available to them
before the accident took place. It will be just and fair compensation, But in
cases where the amount of compensation may go much higher than the amount D
providing the same amenities, comforts and facilities and also the way of life,
in such circumstances also it may be a case where, while applying the multiplier
system, the lesser multiplier may be applied. In such cases amount of
multiplicand becomes relevant. The intention is not to over compensate.

We therefore hold that ordinarily while awarding comprehension, the E
provisions contained in the Second Schedule may be taken as a guide including
the multiplier, but there may arise some cases, as one in hand, which may fall
in the category having special feature or facts calling for deviation from the
multiplier usually applicable. •

Now we come to the next point raised by Mr. Soli J. Sorabjee, learned
F
senior counsel appearing on behalf of the Insurance Company,. about
deductions, from the amount of compensation as received by the claimants
on account of social security system. In this connection. It has been submitted
that admittedly, the claimants had received 2,50,000 Dollars on account of
life insurance policy of the deceased. Apart from that, Patricia Mahajan had G
also received unemployment allowance for a period of 8 and 9 months as
well as two children out of the three. It may be noted here that the Tribunal
had deducted the said amount, but it was disallowed by the learned Single
Judge and upheld by the Division Bench.

M>. Soli J. Sorabji submitted that while assessing the amount of H ,
1194 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2002] 3 S.C.R.

A compensation, the benefits which have accrued to the claimants by reason of
death must also be taken into account. A kind of balancing of losses and the
gains or benefit by reason of death would be necessary. In support of the
above contention he has referred to a decision reported in [1962] I SCR 929
Goba/d Motors Service limited v. R. M. K. Ve/11swa111i and Ors. It is a decision
B by three judges Bench of this Court, and at page 93 8 the observations made
by the House of lords in Davies v. Powell Dufjiyn Associated Collieries ltd. 1
( 1942 AC page 601) has been quoted which reads as follows:-

"The general rule which has always prevailed in regard to the
assessment of damages under the fatal Accidents Acts is well settled,
namely, that any benefit accruing to a dependant by reason of the
c relevant death must be taken into account. Under those Acts the
balance of loss and gain to a dependant by the death must be
ascertained, the position of each dependant being considered
separately."

D To further elaborate .the above proposition, observations made by Lord
Wright in Devies case (supra) have also been quoted. It reads as follows:-

"The damages are to be based on the reasonable expectation of
pecuniary benefit of benefit reducible to money value. In assessing
the damages all circumstances which may be legitimately placed in
E diminution of the damages must be considered. The actual pecuniary
loss of each individual entitled to sue can only be ascertained by
balancing, on the one hand, the loss to him of the future pecuniary
benefit, and on the other, any pecuniary advantage which from.
whatever so:.irce comes to him by reason of the death"

F The learned counsel laid stress on the last part of observation made to the
effect that - for the purposes of balancing losses and gains any pecuniary
advantage which from whatever source come to them , has to be considered.

It is submitted in Gaba/d's case the principle of Devies case was referred
and taken into consideration. Reliance has also been placed on a decision
G reported in [1971] I SCC page 785 M\s Shekhupura Transport Co. ltd. v.
Northern India Transport Company particularly to the observations made by
the Court in paragraph 6 of judgment where the principle in the case of
Gobalds Motors, (supra) has been reiterated. In this connection learned counsel
for the Insurance Company has also drawn our attention to the decision in the

-\
H case of Susamma thomas, (supra) particularly on paragraph 8 of the report,
UNITED INDJA INSURANCE CO. LTD. I". PATRICA JEAN MAHAJAN [BRIJESl-I KUMAR, J.] J 195

where it is observed that the principle in the case of Devies v. I'ol-ve// was A
adopted, in the case of Gobald Motors (supra) It is thus submitted that principle
of balancing of loss and gains, so as. to arrive at a just and fair amount of
compensation has been accepted by this court as well, On behalf of the
Insurance company 1988 (3) All ER. 870 Hodgson v. Trapp and Anr. has
been relied in which our attention has particularly been drawn to the following B
observations n1ade at page 873.

"........... the basic rule is that it is the net consequential loss and expense
which the Court must measure, it, in consequence of the injuries
sustained, the plaintiff has enjoyed receipts to which he would not
otherwise have been entitled, prima facie, those receipts are to be set C
against the aggregate of the plaintiffs losses and expenses in arriving
at the measure of his damages. All this is elementary and has been
said over and over again. To this basic rule there are of course,
certain well established, though not always precisely defined and
delineated, exceptions. But the Courts are, I think, sometimes in danger,
in seeking to explore the rationale of the exceptions, of forgetting D
that they are exceptions. It is the rule which is fundamental and
axiomatic and exceptions to it which are only to be admitted on
grounds which clearly justify their treatment as such"

Fron1 the above passage it is clear that the deductions are admissible
fro1n the amount of compensation in case the claimant receives the benefit as E
a consequence of injuries sustained, which otherwise he would not have been
entitled to. It does not cover cases where the payment received is not dependent
upon an injury sustained on meeting with an accident. The other observation
to which our attention has been drawn at Page 876 plassitam F also does not
help the contention raised on behalf of the Insurance Company for deduction
F
of amounts in the present case. The Court was considering a situation where
due to the injuries received the victim was clain1ing cost of care necessary
in future in respect of which statutory provision, provided for attendant's
allowance. It was found that the statutory benefit and the damages claimed
were designed to meet the identical expenses. This is however not so at least
not shown, to be so in the case in hand. G
Shri Soli J. Sorabjee has also made references from ALR Digests
under., the heading Damages, Fro1n An1erican Law Report 84 ALR2d. Jn
some cases, depending upon the provisions of the Act, it was held that the
amount of compensation for death by wrongful act should not be diminished
on receipt of social security bt:nefit. In general, such pay1nents have been H
1196 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2002] 3 S.C.R.

.A regarded as being in the same category as amount paid to a surviving
beneficiary on a life or casualty insurance policy or as a pension, which, it
is well settled, are not to be considered in mitigating all damages sustained
as a result of tortious death. (It is extracted from page 765 with reference to
• 16 Am Jur, Death $$ 222 and 223). In some cases a different view was taken
B by the American Courts. But it all depended upon the terms of the provisions
of the policies.

A reference was also made to the report of the Royal Commission on
civil liability and compensation for personal injury under the Chairmanship
of lord Pearson Volume-/ At pages 106 and 107 it recommended for taking
C into account the benefits which may be deducted from the amount of damages
payable to the claimants. At page I 09 it has recommended as fol lows:-

"Benefits to be offset-

481-We agree with the principle in the 1948 Acts that the benefits
D deducted should be limited to those payable to the plaintiff as a result
of injury for which damages are awarded. In practice, this means that
such benefits as state retirement pensions, child benefits and maternity
. '
benefits should be disregarded.

482-We recommend that the full value of social security benefits
E payable to an injured person or his dependents as a result of an injury
for which damages are awarded should be deducted in assessment of
damages."

And at page 118 under para 537 our attention has also been drawn
to a passage which reads as under:-
F
"537. Under the present law in England, Wales and Northern Ireland,
pecuniary benefits derived by a dependent of a deceased person from
his estate are taken into account in assessing damages under the Fatal
Accidents Acts. Usually, any deduction is unimportant because, ifthe
sum would have been paid to the plaintiff in any event in the future
G (for example, under a will), it is not deducted in full. Instead, an
allowance may be made for accelerated payment and certainty of
receipt. Nor does the rule apply to payments under a life insurance
policy or to the use of a home or property. A full deduction is,
however, made where the dependant receives a sum awarded to the
H estate of the d~~eased for non pecuniary loss."
"' \JNllTJ> INDIA INSURANCE CO. LTD. r PATRICA JEAN MAHAJAN [BRLIESll KUMAR. J.] J J 97

A perusal of the recon1n1endations of the Royal Co1111nission headed by A
Lord Pearson as referred to and relied upon on behalf of the Insurance
Company also does not indicate that, all kinds of receipts or benefits as may
be payable to the clain1ants fron1 whatever source and under whatever statutory
provisions have to be deducted. The recomn1endations 1nade specific mention
about non deductibility of amount of pension the benefit on account of Life
Insurance. Child benefit and maternity benefit etc. !t is also specifically B
provided under para 482 quoted above that the recommendation is for
deducting full value of social security benefits payable as a result of· i11}111J'
for \vhich dan1ages are a\varded. That is to say benefits not related to the
injury are not to be taken into account for deductions.

A reference to Mac Grager on da111ages 16 Edition has also been made
c
in relation to deduction of social security benefits. Our attention is dravvn to
page 1065 paragraph 1628 and paragraph 642 at page 1071 where reference
of the decision in Hodgson case (supra) has been made. It is stated that unless
receipts fell within one of the very few exceptions to the basic rules, all
benefits received as a result of injuries should now be deductible in order to D
achieve the proper compensation, and not over compensation of the plaintiff.
It is further observed that payments by way of social security are not
exceptional for these purposes according to the Hodgson 's case.

Shri Soli J. Sorabjee, learned senior counsel also referred to Encyclopedia
America page 186(/). There seems to be social security Act 1935 in force in E
America, providing for different kinds of social security. It is also indicated
how the social security fund is constituted and utilized for pay1nents under
the social security of unemployed, dependent children, to the needy aged and
to the disabled people etc. Tax is also realizable contributing into social
security fund. F
Shri P.P. Rao, learned senior counsel appearing for the claimants has
submitted that only such amount received on account of social security can
be deducted, which becomes payable by reason of death by accident and not
otherwise. We find force in the submissions of the learned counsel on this
score. It is further submitted that the unemployment allowance or other such G
social security benefit under the social security Act etc. are not necessarily
•
dependent upon the accidental death of the bread earner. Such allowances are
payable other\vise even though the victi111 111ay not have died and may be still
alive. Therefore, such payments which are unconnected and unrelated with
the event of an accident resulting in injury or death, have to be disregarded H
1198 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2002] 3 S.C.R.

A for the purposes of deduction from the amount of damages. He has also
refe1Ted to some American decisions one of them is 230 SO. 2(d}(I) 1968 ...
Flaapp lexis'5073 Marc A. O'NEAL.. ...... Appeal No. H-303. The Court of
Appeals Florida first Districts the opinion of judge Carrol was countered by
the other judges and the Chief Justice. He has drawn our attention to the
following observation:
B
"Stated broadly the general Rule founded upon decisional law as well
as logic and justice seems to be that a dependent can not reduce the
damages for which there was otherwise be liable by showing that the
plaintiff received compensation from a Collateral source such as
c benefits received from welfare and pension funds."

Learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of the claimants also submits
that the High Court has rightly placed reliance upon a decision of this Court
reported in [ 1999] I SCC page 90 Hefen Rebel/as' case. It is further submitted
that this Court has rightly made a distinction between the claims under the
D Fatal Accidents Act and the Motor Vehicles Act. Both parties have relied
upon and referred to the above decision. The main question for consideration
of the Court was in respect to the amount of Life Insurance as to whether the
same was to be deducted from the amount of compensation payable to the
claimants or not.

E Shri P.P. Rao, learned counsel appearing for the claimants submitted
that the scope of the provisions relating to award of comper~sation under the
Motor Vehicles Act is wider as compared to the provisions of the Fatal
Accident Acts. It is further indicated that the Gobald's case (supra) is a case
under the Fatal Accident Acts. For the above contention he has relied upon
F the observation made in the Rebe/le 's case. It has also been submitted that
only such benefits, which accrued to the claimants by reason of death, occurred
due to an accident and not otherwise, can be deducted. Apart from drawing
distinction between the scope .:>f provisions of the two Acts namely, Motor
Vehicles Act and the Fatal Accident Act, this Court in the Helen Rebello 's
case accepted the argument that amount of insurance policies wou Id be payable
G to the insured, the death may be accidental or otherwise, and even where the
death may not occur the amount will be payable on its maturity. The insured
chooses to have insurance policy and he keeps on paying the premium for the
same, during all the time till maturity or his death. It has been held that such
...
a pecuniary benefit by reason of death would not be such as may be deductible ~ '""
H from the amount of compensation.
UNITED INDIA INSURANCE CO. LTD. 1· PATRICA JEAN MAllAJAN [BRIJESl-1 KUMAR, J.] } } 99

It may be useful to quote paragraph 33 of the decision which reads as A
under:-

"Thus it would not include that which the claimant receives on account
of other forms of deaths, which he would have received even apart
from accidental death. Thus, such pecuniary advantage would have
no correlation to the accidental death for which compensation is B
-:'"' computed. Any a1nount received or receivable not only on account of
the accidental death but that which would have come to the claimant
even other\vise, could not be construed to be the "pecuniary advantage"
liable for deduction. However, where the employer insures his
e1nployee, as against injury or death arising out of an accident, any
a1nount received out of such insurance on the happening of such
c
incident may be an amount liable for deduction. However, our
legislature has taken note of such contingency through the proviso of
Section 95. Under it the liability of the insurer is excluded in respect
of injury or death, arising out of and in the course of en1ployment of
an employee." D

•
-
The Court has observed in the last part of the para 34:-

"Ho\v can an a1nount of loss and gains of all one contract be nlade
applicable to the loss and gain of an other contract."
E
Si111ilarly, how an an1ount receivable under a statute has any co-relation \Vith
an a1nount earned by an individual. Principle of loss and gain has to be on
the same line within the same sphere, of course, subject to the contract to the
contrary or any provisions of la\V. The court has further referred to receipts
of Provident Fund which is a deferred payment out of contribution made by
an e1npl,oyee during tenure of his service Such an a111ount is payable F
irrespective of accidental death of the employee. The same is the position
relating to family pension. There is no co-relation between the compensation
payable on account of accidental death and the amounts receivable irrespective
of such accidental death which otherwise in the normal course one would be
entitled to receive. This Cou1t for taking the above view has also referred to G
certain English decisions as discussed in paragraph 18 of the judgment.

.... -, We are in full agree1nent \Vith the observations 1nade in the case of
Helen Rebello (supra) that principle of balancing between losses and gains,
by reason of death, to arrive at a1nount of con1pensation is a general rule, but
\Vhat is n1ore i111po11ant is that such receipts by the ~lai1nants 1nust have son1e H
1200 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2002] 3 S.C.R.

A co-relation with the accidental death by reason of which alone the claimants
have received the amounts. We do not think it would be necessary for us to
go into the question of distinction made between the provisions of the Fatal
Accident Act and the Motor Vehicles Act. According to the decisions referred
to in the earlier part of this Judg!flent, it is clear that amount on account of
social security as may have been received must have nexus or relation with
B the accidental injury or death, so far to be deductible from the amount of
compensation. There must be some co-relation between the amount received
and the accidental death or it may be in the same sphere, absence the amount
-
'

received shall not be deducted from the amount of compensation. Thus the
amount received on a::count of insurance policy of the deceased cannot be
C deducted from the amount of compensation though no doubt the receipt of '
the insurance amount is accelerated due to pre-mature death of the insured.
So far other items in respect of which learned counsel for the Insurance
Company has vehemently urged for example some allowance paid to the
children, and Mrs. Patricia Mahajan under the social security system no co-
relation of those receipts with the accidental death has been shown much less
D established. Apart from the fact that contribution comes from different sources
for constituting the fund out of which, payment on account qf social security
system is made one of the constituent of fund is tax which is deducted from
income for the purpose. We feel that the. High Court has rightly disallowed
.
any deduction on account of receipts under the Insurance Policy and other
E receipts under social security system which the claimant would have also
other wise entitled to receive irrespective of accidental death of Dr. Mahajan.
If the proposition "receipts from whatever source" is interpreted so widely
that it may cover all the receipts, which may come into the hands of the
claimants, in view of the mere death of the victim, it would only defeat the
purpose of the Act providing for just compensation on account of accidental
F death. Such gains may be on account of savings or other investment etc.
made by the deceased would not go to the benefit of wrong doer and the
claimant should not be left worse of, if he had never taken an Insurance
Policy or had not made investments for future returns.

We therefore, do not allow any deduction as pressed by the Insurance
G Company an account ofreceipt5 oflnsurance Policy and social security benefits
received by the claimants.

We may no.w pass on to the next question of rate of interest payable on
the amount of compensation. It has been awarded at the rate of 12%. r-

H Learned senior counsel for the respondent Shri P.P. Rao took an objection
UNITED INDIA INSURANCE CO. LTD. 1·. PATRICA JEAN MAl-li\.JAN [BRIJESH KUMAR, J.) 120]

Ilia! the question relating to rate interest was not under challenge before the A
" High Court. He has referred to the observations made by the Division Bench
in i.ts judgment to the effect "in any case, the rate of interest is not in dispute
before us". Thereafter it is observed that the Tribunal had awarded interest
@ 12% per annum which was maintained by the learned Single Judge.
Consequently, the Division Bench also did not think it appropriate to interfere
with the award of interest @ 12% per annum. It is however refuted by the B
learned for the Insurance Company that the rate of interest was not in dispute.
The learned counsel for the respondent has however submitted that the factual
position as recorded by the Court that the rate of interest was not in dispute
before the Court, should not be allowed to be disputed and it should be
treated conclusive of the fact that the rate of interest was not is dispute before c
the Division Bench. He has in support of his contention referred to decisions
of this Court, reported in [ 1982] 2 SCC 463; State of Maharashtra v. Ramdas
Shrinivas Nayak and Anr. and [1992] Supp. I SCC; Apar (P) ltd and Anr.
v. Union of India and Ors. in which it has been held that concession made
by a party and an observation made to that effect in the judgment, cannot be
allowed to be denied. Only the Court which recorded the statement itself was D
competent to rectify the error if the Court recording the statement was
approached to consider the matter without delay. The position as indicated in
the above-noted decisions is undoubtedly correct and cannot be doubted. But
in certain cases where a stray remark or observation made by the Court
which is not very clear and is vague, and a different picture emerges from E
other part of judgment it may be open for th is Court to ascertain the correct
position on the basis of totality of the observations made in the judgment
itself In that light we may see the observations of the Division Bench in its
judgment. It is nowhere indicated that the counsel appearing for the Insurance
Company had made any statement conceding the rate of interest nor it is
indicated how the concession was made. Then the observation that the "rate F
of interest was not in dispute before the Court" may only lead to an inference
that the rate of interest was not disputed before the Court in the arguments
advanced on behalf of the party concerned. But we, on the other hand, find
that, on behalf of the Insurance Company, the learned counsel had cited the
decisions to indicate that the lower rate of interest was awarded in certain
G
decisions, which had been relied upon by him. This is enough to indicate that
the rate of interest \Vas actually disputed. More than one case, a reference of
which has been made in the judgment of the Division Bench itself, has been.
.., relied upon by the counsel for the Insurance Company for reducing the rate
·of interest. The Division Bench in its judgment observed as follows:
H

' ' '
1202 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2002] 3 S.C.R.

A "It has, however, also been brought to our notice that in A. Ravert v.
United Insurance Co. ltd., [ 1999] 8 SCC 228 the Supreme Court
awarded interest at 6% from the date of the application till actual
payment to the claimant. In Kanshnuma Begum (Smt.) and Ors v.
United Insurance Co. Ltd, (2001] 2 SCC 9 this Court awarded interest
at the rate of 9% per annum."
B
Thereafter the observations made in the case of Kanshnuma Begum (Supra)
have been quoted. After so much .of discussion on the point of rate of interest
and after mentioning the decisions relied upon by both the sides on their part,
it could not be said that rate of interest was not in dispute before the Court.
C As indicated earlier the observation is not indicated to have been made in
reference to any statement of the counsel for the party nor ~t comes out that
the respective parties may not have advanced arguments for maintaining the
rate of interest as awarded and the other party for reducing the rate of interest.
In the light of the position indicated above, we do not think it will be possible
to shut out the Insurance Company from urging before us that lesser rate of
D interest should have been awarded in place of 12% as awarded by the High
Court. Before us also, learned counsel for the Insurance Company has referred
the decision of this Court reported in [ 1999] 8 SCC 226-A Robert v.
Insurance Company limited to indicate that interest at the rate 6% was awarded
in that case. Another case cited awarding 6% interest· is reported in 200 I
E ACC 540, particularly paragraph 34 has been referred (1970] All ER 1202
Jefford and Anr v. Gee has also been referred to indicate. that the amount
awarded is on account of loss of future earnings whereas the interest is
payable on being kept out of the money. It is therefore submitted that the
interest may not be payable on the loss of future earning. Another decision
which has been referred to is reported in (1995] I SCC 551-R.D. Hattangadi
F v. Pest Control (India) Pvt. ltd. and Ors. more particularly Para 18 of the
judgment where it has been held that no interest is awardablt: on the amount
of future expenditure. It is further observed: "It need not be pointed out that
interest is to be paid over the amount which has become payable on the date
of award and not which is to be paid for expenditures to be incurred in
G future" But it is not indicated by the learned counsel for the appellant Insurance
Company as to which is that amount out of the amount awarded which is on
account of future expenditure yet to be incurred by the claimants. The interest
is to be awarded on the amount which is payable on the date of the award.
It is also to be noted that in some cases interest at the rate of 6% was ....
awarded. This case however does not help the appellant Insurance Company.
H The next case which has been cited is reported in (2001] 2 sec 9 Kaushnuma
UNITED JNDIA ·INSURANCE CO. LTD. 1·. PATRICA JEAN MAHAJAN [BRIJESH KUMAR, J.J 1203

Begum (Smt.) and Ors. v. New India Assurance Company ltd. In this case A
interest at the rate of 9% was awarded. The reason indicated in Paragraph 24
of the Judgment, we quote hereunder:

"Now, we have to fix up the rate of interest. Section 171 of the MY
Act empowers the Tribunal to direct that "in addition to the amount B
of compensation simple interest shall also be paid at such rate and
from such date not earlier than the date of making the claims as may
be specified in this behalf. Earlier, 12% was found to be the reasonable
rate of simple interest. With a change in economy and the policy of
Reserve Bank of India the interest rate has been lowered. The
nationalized banks are now granting interest at the rate of 9o/o on C
fixed deposit for one year. We, therefore, direct that the compensation
amount fixed hereinbefore shall bear interest at the rate of 9% per
annum from the date of the claim made by the appellants."

In our view the reason indicated in the case of Kaushnuma Begum (supra) is
a valid reason and it may be noticed that the rate of interest is already on the D
decline. We therefore, reduce the rate of interest to 9% in place of 12% as
awarded by the High Court.

The next point which remains to be considered is in relation to the
exchange rate of the Dollar in Rupee. The Motor Accident Claims Tribunal
allowed the exchange rate of the Dollar at Rs. 30. The learned Single Judge
E
allowed it at the then current rate of Rs. 4 7. The Division Bench restored the
exchange rate at Rs. 30 observing that the matter was closed since the claimants
had withdrawn the amount as awarded by the Tribunal and the matter was
now on the second stage relating to enhanced amount of compensation. Shri
P.P. Rao, learned senior counsel appearing for the appellants has vehemently F
urged that it is only the current rate which should be allowed since the value
of the Rupee has fallen in exchange of Dollar after the application for claim
was made and award was given. Therefore, the amount of Rupees as arrived
at the change rate of Rs. 47 should be allowed. In connection with this
submission about rate of conversion, a reference to a case reported in 1984 G
Supp SCC 263-0il and Natural Gas Commission v. Forasa/ has been made.
This Court held that rate of conversion as on the date of passing of the decree
should be taken on the basis of which conversion should be allowed. We
however find that the facts in that case are different. According to the contract
itself, a part of the payment was to be made in French currency. The question
then arose as to what rate of conversion should be allowed. The Court was H
1204 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2002] 3 S.C.R.

A of the view that there would be three relevant dates for the purpose, namely, ·
the date on which the amount became payable, the date of the filing of the
suit and the date of the judgment and it was further held that it would be
fairer to both the parties to take the latest of these dates, namely, the date of
passing the decree as the relevant date for applying the conversion rate. In
B the present case since the deceased was an American citizen, settled there and
income accrued to him in America in terms of Dollars, details of income etc.
have been given in Dollars but so far the prayer for passing a decree is
concerned, it was for a sum indicated in Rupees which figure was arrived at
-
by the claimants applying Rs. 30 as the conversion rate. Therefore, in the
present case there is no such dispute as to what rate of conversion was to be
C applied. As a matter of fact, whatever rate may have been applied by claimants,
the fact remains that the decree in terms of Rupees specified for a sum of Rs.
54 crores was prayed for. In terms of the prayer whatever amount in rupee
was found to be payable to the claimants was decreed. In the.present case the
exchange rate of Dollar against Rupee was relevant for the purpose of arriving
at a fair assessment of the loss of the dependency of the claimants at the
D relevant time. In such a situation we are of the view that no such question
as in the case of Oil and Natural Gas Commission (supra) is involved. The
decree was for a definite sum it terms of Rupees, a part of which was found
admissible which amount was decreed. There is no occasion to convert the
amount of decree in Rupees into Dollars applying Rs. 30 as rate of conversion
E and then re-convert it in Rupees at the rate of Rs. 47 The claimants cannot
ask for more than what was prayed for iii the claim petition. We are therefore
not inclined to accede to the request made for calculi;ition of the amount of
award at the conversion rate of Rs. 47.

Shri T.R. Rajagopalan, learned senior counsel appearing for the Insurance
F Company in SLP (c) 20874/2001 preferred on the question of rash and
negligent driving against the driver of the Troller advanced some arguments
but we do not think that the finding of fact recorded by the Courts of fact
namely the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal and upheld by the learned Single
Judge as well as the Division Bench can be re-opened to re-assess the evidence
G on the point.

In view of the discussion held above, we partly allow the appeals of the
Insurance Company (SLP © Nos. 20875 and 21858/200 I) and set aside the
part of the judgment of the Division Bench of the High Court by which it
applied the multiplier of 13 in accordance with 2nd Schedule of the Motor
H Vehicles Act. We restore the 'Order of the learned Single Judge to the extent
UNITED INDIA INSURANCE CO. LTD.''· PATRICA JEAN MAHAJAN [BRIJESH KUMAR, J.) 1205

it applied the multiplier of 10. The amount of compensation shall be calculated A •
and be payable accordingly. So far rate of interest on the enhanced amount
is concerned, we set aside the order passed by the High Court awarding
interest at the rate of 12% per annum and we reduce it to 9% per annum. The
appeal of the Insurance Company challenging the award against the finding
of negligence (S.L.P. © 20874/200 I) on the part of the driver of the Troller
is dismissed. So far the appeal of the cfaimants (SLP © No. 22304/200 I) for B
applying the conversion rate at Rs. 47 is concerned, it is dismissed and the
order passed by the Division Bench for applying conversion rate at Rs. 30 is
upheld. The appeal for allowing the deduction on account of receipt of the
sums received by the claimants on social security system is dismissed and the
order passed by the High Court dis-allowing any deduction is upheld. C
The Motor Accident Claims Tribunal Tis Hazari, Delhi shall calculate
the amount of compensation in accordance with the Judgment passed above
that is to say it shall take the dependency amount as $ 226297 and shall apply
the multiplier of 10. The conversion rate shall be@ Rs. 30. The amount shall
bear interest @ 9% per annum as awarded instead of 12%.

Parties to bear their own costs.

K.K.T. Appeals disposed of.