UNITED BANK OF INDIAversusSH. NARESH KUMAR AND ORS.

A                            UNITED BANK OF INDIA
                                            v.
                        SH. NARESH KUMAR AND ORS.

                                SEPTEMBER 18, 1996

B                      [J.S. VERMA AND B.N. KIRPAL, JJ.]

         Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 : Order 6 Rule 14. Order 29 Rule 1 and
    Order 41 Rule 27(1)(b).

C          Pleadings-Suit by companr-f'laint signed and velified by person duly
    auth01ised by company-However, suit was dismissed on ground that it was
    not duly signed and velified by a competent person-Held : Company could
    expressly auth01ise one of its officers to sign plaint or it could ratify, expressly
    or impliedly, act of signing-Court could render finding about ratification on
    basis of evidence on record and circumstances specially with regard to
D   conduct of trial-Even if [lial cowt found plaint was not duly signed and
    velified by competent person, appellate cowt under 0.41 R. 27(l)(b) could
    direct power of attomey to be produced or order competent person of com-
    pany to be examined as witness to prove ratificatiort-ln the circumstances of
    the case, plaint was duly signed and velified by a competent person.
E
          Practice and Procedure :

          PleadingJ.~Substantive lights should not be allowed to be defeated on
    account ofprocedural in-egul01ity or mere technicality which is curable-Code
    of Civil Procedure, 1908, 06 R. 14.
F
           The appellant-Bank instituted a suit for recovery of the loan ad-
    vanced to respondent No. 1 together with interest thereon. One R had
    signed and filed the plaint on behalf of the appellant. The suit had been
    filed in the name of the appellant'Company; full amount of court fee had
    been paid by the appellant bank; documentary as well as oral evidence had
G   been led on behalf of the appellant and the trial of the suit had continued
    for about two years. The co_urts below came to a conclusion that money
    had been taken by respondent No. 1 and that respondent No. 2 and
    husband of respondent No. 3 had stood as gurantors and that claim of the
    appellant was justified. However, the suit was dismissed by the courts
H   below on the ground that the plaint was not duly signed and verified by a
                                            478
                 UNIIBD BANK OF INDIA v. NARF.SH KR.                      479

competent person. The question for consideration before this Court was           A
whether the plaint was duly signed and verified by a competent person.

      Allowing the appeal, this Court

      HELD : 1.1. A company like the appellant can sue and be sued in its
own name. Reading Order 6 Rule 14 together with Order 29 Rule 1 of the           B
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 it would appear that even in the absence of
any formal letter of authority or power of attorney having been executed a
person referred to in Rule 1 of Order 29 can, by virtue of the office which
he holds, sign and verify the pleadings on behalf of the Corporation. In
addition thereto an de hors Order 29 Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure,      C
as a company is Juristic entity, it can duly authories any person to sign
the plaint or the written statement on its behalf and this would be regarded
as sufficient compliance with the provisions of Order 6 Rule 14 of the Code
of Civil Procedure. A person may be expressly authorised to sign the
pleadings on behalf of the company. In absence thereof and in cases where
pleadings have been signed by one of its officers a Corporation can, ratify      D
the said action of its officer in signing the Pleadings. Such ratificatlq~ can
be express or implied. [483-D-F]

        2.1. The courts below could have held that R must have been em-
powered to sign the plaint on behalf of the appellant. In the alternative it     E
would have been legitimate to hold that the manner in which the suit was
conducted showed that the appellant- bank must have ratified the action
of R in singing the plaint. If, for any reason whatsoever, the courts below
were still unable to come to this conclusion, then either of the appellant
courts ought to have exercised their jurisdiction under Order 41 Rule
27 (1) (b) of the Code of Civil Procedure and should have directed a proper      F
power of attorney to be produced or they could have ordered R or any other
competent person to be examined as a witness in order to prove ratification
or the authority of R to sign the plaint. Such a power should be exercised
by a court in order to ensure that injustice is not done by rejection of a
genuine claim. [483-H, 484-A-B]                                                  G
      2.2. In cases like the present where suits are instituted or defended
on behalf of a public corporation, public interest should not be permitted
to be defeated on a mere technicality. Procedural defect which do not go
to the root of the matter should not be permitted to defeat a just cause.
There is sufficient power in the Courts, under the Code of Civil Procedure,      H
    480                   SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1996) SUPP: 6 S.C.R.

A to ensure that injustice is not done to any party who has _a just case. As·.
    far as possible a substantive right should not be allowed to be defeated on
    account of a procedural irregularity which is curable. [482-H, 483-A]

            CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 11884 of
    1986.
B
         From the Judgment and Order dated 30.8.93 of the Punjab &
    Haryana High Co\ll't in R.S.A. No. 869 of 1993.

            Sunil Goyal for Ms .. Mridula Ray Bhardwaj for the Appellant.

C           G.K. Bansal for the Respondent No. 1-2.

            The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

           KIRPAL, J. The main question which arises in this appeal by special
    leave is whether the suit for recovery of money filed by the appellant bank
D   was properly instituted.

          The appellant's branch at Ambala Cantt. had instituted a suit in the
    Court of Sub-ordinate Judge, Ambala Cantt. for recovery of Rs. 1,40,553.91
    from the respondent. The case of the appellant was that on 12th April,
E   1984 a sum of Rs. 50,000 was advanced as loan to respondent No. 1 for the
    purposes of his business and on that date he had executed a demand
    promissory note, hypothecation of goods agreement and other documents.
    Respondent No. 2 and one Sh. Suresh Kumar, husband of respondent No.,
    3 had stood as guarantors for the repayment of the loan. The respondents
    were stated to have agreed to pay interest at the rate of 18 per cent per
F   annum with quarterly rests. When default in payment of the money was
    committed the aforesaid suit was filed for the recovery of the principal
    amount and the interest thereon. The sum total came to Rs. 1,40,553.91.

            In the written statement filed-by respondent No. 1 the plea which
G was taken was that he had never taken loan as alleged by the appellant
    bank and respondent No. 2 and Sh. Suresh Kumar had not executed any
    guarantee deed. It was, however, admitted that certain blank documents
    had been got signed but it was denied that the respondents had agreed to
    pay interest at th~ rate of 18 per cent per annum. He also took an
    additional plea challenging the authority of Sh. L.K. Rohatgi to sign and
H   file the plaint on behalf of the appellant. Respondent No. 2 filed a separate
           UNITED BANK OF INDIA v. NARESH KR. [KIRPAL, J.]                  481

·written statement taking the pleas similar to the one which had been raised A
 by respondent No. 1 in his written statement. A further plea which was
 taken by her was that her guarantee was limited to the extent of Rs. 50,000
 and she was not liable to pay any more amount merely because additional
 credit facilities may have been allowed to respondent No. 1. As the other
 guarantor - Sh. Suresh Kumar had died his widow, namely respondent No. B
 3 was impleaded as one of the defendants but as she did not appear the
 case against her proceeded et parte. The appellant bank filed its replication
 wherein it denied the allegations contained in the written statement filed
 by respondents 1 and 2.

      On the pleadings of the parties the following issues were framed :           C
        "1. Whether the plaint i!rfduly signed and verified by a competent
        person? OPP

        2. Whether the defendant No. 1 raised a loan of Rs. 50,000 from
        the plaintiff bank on 12.4.84 and executed a demand promissory             D
        note, hypothecation of goods agreement, letter of loan and other
        documents in favours of the plaintiff bank? OPP

        3. Whether the defendants No. 2 and 3 stood as guarantors for the
        repayment of the loan and if so, what is the extent of their liability?
        OPP                                                                        E
         4. What is the balance amount? OPP

         5. Whether the plaintiff varied the terms of loan and if so, its effect
         qua the liabilities of defendants No. 2 and 3, Onus on Parties.
                                                                                   F
         6. Whether the statement of account produced by the plaintiff is
         admissible in evidence? OPP

         7. Whether the defendants agreed to pay interest if so, at what rate
         and to what amount? OPP
                                                                                   G
         8. Whether the plaintiff has no cause of action? OPP

         9. Relief."

      The trial judge by his judgment dated 14th November, 1987 decided
issue No. 1, 2 and 7 against the appellant. Issues 3, 4, 5 and 6 were held in      H
    482                   SUPREMECOURTREPORTS (1996] SUPP. 6 S.C.R.

A the appellant's favour. The trial court, however, held, under issues 2 and
    3, that respondent No. 3 was not liable to pay any amount and respondent
    No. 2 was liable to pay only a sum of Rs. 55,699.W as the principal amount
    plus interest at the rate of 18 per cent per annum for the period 12th April,
    1984 to 11th February, 1985. In view, however, of the decision against the
B   appellant of issue No. 1 the suit filed by the appellant was dismissed with
    costs.

          The appellant then filed an appeal which was decided on 2nd
    November, 1992 by the Additional District Judge, Ambala. The Additional
    District Judge reversed the findings of the trial court in so far as issues 2
C   and 7 were concerned and came to the conclusion that the appellant had
    been able to prove that respondent No. 1 had taken a loan of Rs. 50,000
    and had also proved the execution of relevant documents by the respon-
    dents. The principal debtor and the guarantors were also held to have
    agreed to pay interest at the rate of 18 per cent per annum. It affirmed the
    decision of the trial court limiting respondent No. 2's liability to Rs. 50,000
D   and interest thereon. With regard to the liability of respondent No. 3 the
    lower appellate court held that in the absence of any evidence to prove
    that she had inherited any estate from her deceased husband no liability
    could be fastened on her and the decision of the trial court, to that effect,
    was affirmed. The appeal was, however dismissed because the Additional
E   District Judge upheld the decision of the trial court with regard to issue
    No. 1. It was held that it has not been proved that Sh. L.K. Rohatgi had
    held any valid authority to file the suit on behalf of the appellant bank.

          Against the aforesaid decision of the Additional District Judge the
    appellant filed a regular second appeal. By order dated 30th August, 1993
F   a single judge of the Punjab and Haryana High Court dismissed the said
    appeal in limine by observing that there was no ground for interference
    with the concurrent findings of facts recorded by two courts below. Hence
    this appeal by special leave.

G         In this appeal, therefore, the only question which arises for con-
    sideration is whether the plaint was duly signed and verified by a competent
    person.

          In cases like the present where suits are instituted or defended on
    behalf of a public corporation, public interest should not be permitted to
H   be defeated on a mere technicality. Procedural defects which do not go to
          UNffED BANK OF INDIA v., NARESH KR. [KIRP AL, J.]             483

the root of the matter should not be permitted to defeat a just cause. There   A
is sufficient power in the Courts, under the Code of Civil Procedure, to
ensure that injustice is not done to any party who has a just case as for as
possibl~e a substantive right should not be allowed to be defeated on
account of a procedural irregularity which is curable.
                                        I
                                        ,,
        In cannot be disputed that a company like the appellant can sue and
                                                                               B
be sued in its in its own name. Under drder 6 Rule 14 of the Code of Civil
Procedure a pleading is required to be signed by the party and its pleader,
if any. As a company is a juristic entity it is obvious that some person has
to sign the pleadings on behalf of the company. Order 29 Rule 1 of the
Code of Civil Procedure, therefore, provides that in a suit by or against a C
corporation the secretary or any Director or other Principal Officer of the
corporation who is able to depose to the facts of the case might sign and
verify on behalf of the company. Reading Order 6 Rule 14 together with
Order 29 Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure it would appear that even
in the absence of any formal letter of authority or power of attorney having D
 been executed a person referred to in Rule 1 of Order 29 can, by virtue of
 the office which he holds, sign and verify the pleadings on behalf of the
corporation. In addition thereto an de hors Order 29 Rule 1 of the Code
of Civil Procedure, as a company is a juristic entity, it can duly authorise
any person to sign the plaint or the written statement on its behalf and this
would be regarded as sufficient compliance with the provisions of Order 6 E
Rule 14 of the Code of Civil Procedure. A person may be expressly
authorised to sign the pleadings on behalf of the company, for example by
the Board of Directors passing a resolution to that effect or by a power of
attorney being executed in favour of any individual. In absence thereof and
in cases where pleadings have been signed by one of its officers a Corpora- p
 tion can ratify the said action of its officer in signing the pleadings. Such
 ratification can be express or implied. The Court can. on the basis of the
 evidence on record, and after taking all the circumstances of the case,
 specially with regard to the conduct of the trial come to the conclusion that
 the corporation had ratified the act of signing of the pleading by its officer.
                                                                               G
      The courts below could have held that Sh. L.K. Rohatgi must have
been empowered to sign the plaint on behalf of the appellant. In the
alternative it would have been legitimate to hold that the manner in which
the suit was conducted showed that the appellant bank must have ratified
the action of Sh. L.K. Rohatgi in signing t'1e plaint. If, for any reason      H
    484                   SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1996) SUPP. 6 S.C.R.

A   whatsoever, the courts below were still unable to come to this conclusion,
    then either of the appellate ~ourts ought to have exercised their jurisdiction
    under Order 41 Rule 27(1)(b) of the Code of Civil Procedure and should
    have directed a proper power of attorney to be produced or they could
    have ordered Sh. L.K.. Rohaigi or any other competent ·person to be
    examined as a witness in order to prove ratification or the authority of Sh.
B   L.K. Rohatgi to sign the plaint. Such a power should be exercised by a
    court in order to ensure that injustice in not done by rejection-of a genuine
    claim.

        The Courts below having come to a conclusion that money had been
C taken by respondent No. 1 and that respondent No. 2 and husband of
  respondent No. 3 had stood as guarantors and that the claim of the
  appellant was justified it will be a travesty of justice if the appellant is to
  be non suited for a technical reason which does not go to the root of the
  matter. The suit did not suffer from any jurisdietional infirmity and the -only
  defect which was alleged on behalf of the respondents was one which was
D curable.

           The court had to be satisfied that Sh. L.K. Rohatgi could sign the
    plaint on behalf of the appellant. The suit had been filed in the name of
    the appellant company; full amount of. court fee had been paid by the
E   appellant bank; documentary as well as oral evidence had been led on
    behalf of the appellant and the trial of the suit before the Sub Judge,
    Ambala, had continued for about two ye_ars. it is difficult, in these cir-
    cumstances, even to presume that the suit had been filed and tried without
    the appellant having authorised the institution of the same. The only
    reasonable conclusion which we can come to is that Sh. L.K. Rohatgi must
F   have been authorised to sign the plaint and, in any case, it must be ~eld
    that the appellant had ratified the action of Sh. L.K. Rohatgi in signing the
    plaint and thereafter it continued with the suit

    CONCLUSIONS :
G       The suit of the appellant had been dismissed because issue No. 1
  had been decided against it. Counsel for the parties have not challenged
  the decision of the lower appellate court on the other issues, which decision
  was affirmed by the High Court when it dismissed the second appeal in
  limine. For the reasons stated hereinabove we hold that issue No. 1 was
H wrongly decided and this being so the appellant was entitled to a decree
                                                                                     .
          UNITED BANK OF INDIA v. NARESH KR. [KIRP AL, J.)              485

in view of the decision of the lower appellate court on the other issues.     A
      The appeal of the appellant is, accordingly, allowed in the aforesaid
terms. The effect of this would .be that the suit of the appellant would be
decreed in accordance with the decision of the lower appellate court on
the other issues which that cour~ had decided in favour of the appellant.
The appellant will also be entitled to costs.                                 B
v.s.s.                                                     Appeal allowed.