Holding

The suspension order was not communicated because it was dispatched to the wrong address, rendering it ineffective; therefore, the appellant's appeal is dismissed.

Summary

S.P. Singh, an Indian Revenue Service officer, applied for voluntary retirement effective 1 September 2005. While his retirement was pending, a suspension order dated 30 August 2005 was issued but was first dispatched to Nagpur, an address where Singh was not residing; he was actually in Noida. The order reached him on 9 September 2005, after his retirement date. The issue before the Supreme Court was whether the suspension order was effectively communicated to Singh, thereby rendering his retirement ineffective under Rule 48(1)(a) of the Central Civil Services (Pension) Rules, 1972. The Court held that an order is deemed communicated only when it is sent to the correct address of the concerned servant; dispatch to a wrong address does not constitute communication. Consequently, the suspension order was ineffective, and Singh’s voluntary retirement stood. The appeal by the Union of India was dismissed.

Issues considered

Whether a suspension order dispatched to an incorrect address is deemed communicated to the government servant for purposes of Rule 48(1)(a) of the Central Civil Services (Pension) Rules, 1972.
Whether the timing of actual receipt of the order affects its legal effectiveness when the order was issued before the retirement date.

Legislation cited

Central Civil Services (Pension) Rules, 1972s. 48(1)(a)

Subjects

voluntary retirementsuspension ordercommunication of administrative orderservice lawCentral Civil Services (Pension) Ruleseffective date of orderdispatch to wrong address

Judgment

[2008] 7 S.C.R. 989

UNION OF !NOIA A
v.
S.P. SINGH
(Civil Appeal No. 3365 of 2008)
.. MAY 7, 2008
B
[TARUN CHATTERJEE AND HARJIT SINGH BEDI, JJ.]

Service law: Suspension order - Employee applied for
voluntary retirement w. e. f 1. 9. 2005- On 9. 9. 2005, he received
suspension order dated 30.8.2005 - This was dispatched to c
Nagpur- Department was aware that he was residing in Delhi
- Tribunal held that suspension order was dispatched to wrong
address and was therefore not effective as it was received by
him on 9.9.2005 whereas employee retired on 1.9.2005 -
... Correctness of - Held: Correct - Although suspension order
D
was dispatched by facsimile before 1. 9. 2005, yet it was
dispatched to wrong address and hence not deemed to be
communicated to employee - Central Civil Services (Pension)
Rules, 1972 - r48(1)(a).
Administrative law: Communication of an administrative E
order - When effective - Held: Once an order is issued and it
is sent out to the concerned Government servant, it must be
held to be communicated to him, no matter when he actually
received it.
' Words and phrases: Communication - Meaning of. F

The respondent posted as Commissioner (Appeals),
Bhopal in May 2005, filed an application dated 10.5.2005
seeking voluntary retirement w.e. f. 1.9.2005. On 30.6.2005,
the respondent was relieved from Bhopal and posted as G
Commissioner (Appeals) at Hyderabad. He accordingly
handed over charge at Bhopal on 20.6.2005 but as the
officer holding the post at Hyderabad had not been
likewise relieved, the respondent's transfer order was
989 H
990 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 7 S.C.R.
.,
A stayed and a request was made by him seeking a suitable
posting pursuant to his request for voluntary retirement.
The communication dated 25.8.2005 was sent to the
respondent at his residential address at NOIDA, whereby
he was asked to deposit some outstanding dues so that
B his request for retirement could be finalized. Quite to the "
contrary, however, on 9.9.2005, the respondent received
an order dated 30.8.2005 placing him under suspension
and fixing his Head Quarters at Aurangabad and by
another order his request for voluntary retirement was
also declined. An order dated 16.9.2005 was subsequently
c issued whereby he was directed to be attached to Bhopal
for the purpose of receiving payment of his subsistence
allowance. The orders dated 30.8.2005 and 16.9.2005 were
challenged by the respondent before the Central

D
Administrative Tribunal. .
The Tribunal observed that the order dated 30.8.2005
had been dispatched to Nagpur for further transmission
to the respondent at Hyderabad though he was
admittedly at NOIDA at the relevant time, - a fact well within
E the knowledge of the Department as he had not been able
to take up his appointment at Hyderabad. The Tribunal
accordingly concluded that the order had been
dispatched to the wrong address and was therefore not
effective as it had actually been received by him on
9.9.2005 whereas the respondent had retired w.e.f.
F 1.9.2005. The Original Application was accordingly allowed '
by the Tribunal. High Court dismissed the writ petition.
Hence the present appeal.
Dismissing the appeal, the Court
G HELD: 1. The ordinary meaning of the word
"communicate" is to impart, confer or transmit
information. Once an order is issued and it is sent out to
the concerned Government servant, it must be held to
have been communicated to him, no matter when he
H actually received it. The view that it is only from the date
UNION OF !NOIA v. S.P. SINGH 991
'f

of the actual receipt by him that the order becomes A
effective cannot be accepted. If that be the true meaning
of communication, it would be possible for a Government
servant to effectively thwart an order by avoiding receipt
,. of it by one method or the other till after the date of his
retirement even though such an order is passed and B
dispatched to him before such date. An officer against
whom action is sought to be taken, thus, may go away
from the address given by him for service of such orders
or may deliberately give a wrong address and thus
c
prevent or delay its receipt and be able to defeat its service
on him. Such a meaning of the word "communication"
ought not to be given unless the provision in question
expressly so provides. [Para 9] [996-F, 997-D,E,F,G]
State of Punjab vs. Khemi Ram AIR 1970 SC 214 -
relied on. D
Hari Kishan vs. State of Maharashtra AIR 1962 SC 911;
State of Punjab vs. Amar SinghHarika AIR 1966 SC 1313,
State of Punjab vs. Sodhi Sukhdev Singh AIR 1961 SC 493,
and Bachhittar Singh vs. State of Punjab AIR 1963 SC 395;
Municipal Corporation of Delhi vs. Qimat Rai Gupta & Ors. E
(2007) 7 SCC 309; UP State Sugar Corporation Ltd. & Ors.
vs. Kamal Swaroop Tandon (2008) 2 SCC 41 - referred to.
2. It is clear from the record that the respondent was
• in NOIDA and not in Nagpur when the orders had been F
issued. From the documents attached and, in particular,
the letter dated 5.7.2005 written by him from his address
of NOIDA to the Central Board of Excise and Customs in
which he pointed out that he had been transferred from
Bhopal to Hyderabad and on going there he had been G
informed that the incumbent officer at that place had not
been relieved on which he had returned to Bhopal and
had reported for duty at the Board's Office in New Delhi
on 20.6.2005 and further requested that further orders as
to his posting be issued, it is evident that the department H
992 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 7 S.C.R.

A had knowledge as to his whereabouts. The respondent
had also referred to the letter dated 25.8.2005 from the
Under Secretary to the Government of India, Ministry of
Finance addressed to him at his residence in NOIDA
directing him to clear his outstandings before his request
B for voluntary retirement could be finalized. It is also
significant from the record that the order of suspension
dated 30.8.2005 had been marked to Chief Commissioner
of Central Excise, Nagpur with a request that it be served
on the applicant, who had then informed the Board Officer
c in New Delhi that the respondent was not posted at Nagpur
nor his mailing address was available at that place and it
was thereafter on 2.9.2005 (on receipt of the aforesaid letter)
that the suspension order had been dispatched to the
correct address of the respondent at NOIDA, and served
D on him a week later. It is therefore clear that despite the fact
that the Department was well aware that the respondent
was residing in NOIDA and had reported for duty before
the Board on 21.6.2005, yet the suspension order had been
sent to Nagpur. Therefore, though the suspension order
had been dispatched by facsimile before 1.9.2005 yet it had
E been dispatched to the wrong address and could not be
deemed to have been communicated to the respondent.
[Para 1O] [998-B,H, 999-A]
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No.
F 3365 of 2008.
From the final Judgment and Order dated 3.7.2006 of the
'
High Court Court of Delhi at New Delhi in W.P. (C) No. 10460 of
2006.
G R. Mohan, ASG, Gaurav Agrawal and B. Krishna Prasad
for the Appellant.
Rajesh Kumar for the Respondent.
HARJIT SINGH BEDI, J. 1. Leave granted.
H
UNION OF INDIA v. S.P. SINGH 993
[HARJIT SINGH BEDI, J.]

2. The respondent, S.P. Singh, an officer of the 1973 batch A
of the Indian Revenue Service, was posted as Commissioner
(Appeals) Central Excise, Bhopal in May 2005. He filed an
application dated 1oth May, 2005 seeking voluntary retirement
w.e.f. 1st September, 2005, on having completed 30 years of
-~ qualifying service. On 30th June, 2005 the respondent was B
relieved from Bhopal and posted as Commissioner (Appeals)
at Hyderabad. He accordingly handed over charge at Bhopal
on 20th June, 2005 but as the officer holding the post at
Hyderabad had not been likewise relieved, the respondent's
transfer order was stayed and a request was made by him c
seeking a suitable posting pursuant to his request for voluntary
retirement. Vide communication dated 25th August, 2005 sent
to the respondent at his residential address H. No. 225 Sector
15-A, NOIDA, he was asked to deposit some outstanding dues
so that his request for retirement could be finalized. Quite to the
D
contrary, however, on 9th September, 2005, the respondent
received an order dated 30th August, 2005 placing him under
suspension and fixing his Head Quarters at Aurangabad and
by another order dated 31st August, 2005 his request for
voluntary retirement was also declined. An order dated 15th
September, 2005 was subsequently issued whereby he was E
directed to be attached to Bhopal for the purpose of receiving
payment of his subsistence allowance. The orders dated 30th
August, 2005 and 15th September, 2005 were challenged by
the respondent before the Central Administrative Tribunal
• (Principal Bench), New Delhi (hereinafter referred to as "the F
Tribunal"). Before the Tribunal, it was contended on behalf of
the respondent that as the three months' notice period for
voluntary retirement had expired on 31st August, 2005 and the
order of suspension had not been communicated nor received
by him till that date it was to be deemed that the voluntary G
retirement had become effective and as such permission to
j retire could not be withheld thereafter, in the light of Rule 48(1 )(a)
of the Central Civil Services (Pension) Rules, 1972 (hereinafter
called the "Rules"). It was further contended that the letter dated
30th August, 2005 had been sent to Nagpur for further onward H
994 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 7 S.C.R.

A transmission to Bhopal and it was only on 2nd September, 2005
that the suspension order had been issued to the respondent's
residential address in NOIDA, ( a fact which was in the
knowledge of the Department) and had been received by him

B
on 9th September, 2005. It has accordingly been submitted that
the date of communication of the order being 2nd September,
••
>
2005, the respondent could not have been suspended
thereunder as his three months' notice seeking voluntary
retirement had expired on 31st August, 2005 and he was thus
r
deemed to have retired w.e.f. 1st September, 2005. It has
c accordingly been submitted that the order dated 30th August,
2005 was, therefore, ineffective in law.
3. The Union of India in its reply has opposed the pleas
raised by the respondent and has submitted that as the order of
suspension had been dispatched before 31st August, 2005 to
D Nagpur and thereafter transmitted to Bhopal it was deemed to
have been made effective from 30th August, 2005 itself, and as
..
•
such the respondent was deemed to be under suspension.

4. The Tribunal in its order dated 22nd February, 2006
examined the matter in the background of the Rules and the
E dictionary meaning of the word "Communication" and the ratio
of several judgments of this Court, Hari Kishan vs. State of
Maharashtra, AIR 1962 SC 911, State of Punjab vs. Amar Singh
Harika, Al R 1966 SC 1313, State of Punjab vs Sodhi Sukhdev
Singh, AIR 1961 SC 493, and Bachhittar Singh vs. State of
F Punjab Al R 1963 SC 395 and observed that an order had to be
f.
communicated to the person who would be affected by that order
so as to make him bound by it. The Tribunal then examined the
import of the judgment in State of Punjab vs. Khemi Ram AIR
1970 SC 214 and noted that a slight deviation from the principles
G laid down in the first set of cited cases had come about as the
question as to whether the communication of an order meant
its actual receipt by the concerned official as the requirement of
law was that the order to be effective was required to be
dispatched before the proposed date of retirement to the correct
H address of the concerned officer and its receipt after the date
UNION OF INDIA v. SP SINGH 995
~·
[HARJIT SINGH BEDI, J]

of the retirement would be irrelevant. The Tribunal then examined A
the effect of Rule 48 and observed that the respondent had
undoubtedly completed the requisite period of service qualifying
him for voluntary retirement and also fulfilled all the 0th.er
conditions as well and the only impediment to his retirement
was relatable to his suspension by the order dated 30th August, B
" 2005 in terms of the 2nd proviso to Rule 48(1 )(b) which postulated
that permission to seek voluntary retirement could be withheld
by the appointing authority in case the Government Servant was
under suspension. The Tribunal then applied the law to the facts
of the case and observed that the order dated 30th August, 2005 c
had been dispatched to Nagpur for further transmission to the
respondent at Hyderabad though he was admittedly at NOIDA
at the relevant time, - a fact well within the knowledge of the
Department as he had not been able to take up his appointment
"' at Hyderabad. The Tribunal accordingly concluded that the order
,. D
had been dispatched to the wrong address and was therefore
not effective as it had actually been received by him on 9th
September, 2005 whereas the respondent had retired w.e.f. 1st
September, 2005. The Original Application was accordingly
allowed by the Tribunal.
E
5. The matter was thereafter taken before the High Court
in writ proceedings. By the impugned judgment dated 3rd July,
2006 the writ petition has been dismissed and the order of the
Tribunal confirmed.
6. The Union of India is before us by way of special leave. F

7. The learned counsel for the appellant - Union of India
has once again submitted that as the suspension order dated
30th August, 2005 had actually been issued on that date and
the order rejecting the respondent's request for voluntary G
retirement too had been communicated vide order dated 31st
August, 2005, the respondent could not claim to have voluntarily
.;
retired from service in the light of the 2nd proviso to Rule 48
(1 )(a) as the necessary communication should be deemed to
have been made on the respondent. In this connection, the
H
996 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 7 S.C.R.

p
A learned counsel has relied the case of Khemi Ram's case
(Supra) in addition to Municipal Corporation of Delhi vs. Qimat
Rai Gupta & Ors. (2007) 7 SCC 309 and UP State Sugar
'1"'
Corporation Ltd & Ors. vs. Kamal Swaroop Tandon (2008) 2 /""'
SCC 41. The learned counsel for the respondent has however
B supported the judgment of the Tribunal and the High Court and
has contended that in view of the settled law, if the orders were
to be made effective from the date of issue it was essential that
they be issued to the correct address of the officer which was at
NOIDA and as the said orders had been dispatched to Nagpur
c instead and served on him on 9th September, 2005 it could not
be said that the respondent continued to be in service as his
prayer for voluntary retirement had been rejected.

8. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties and
have gone through the record. I
D
9. The Tribunal has relied on several judgments of this .
Court to support the view an order to be made effective it has to
be communicated to the officer at his correct address. In Khemi
Ram's case (supra) the question as to what amounted to
"communication" has been spelt out and it has been observed
E
thus:

16. 'The question then is whether communicating the order
means its actual receipt by the concerned government
servant. The order of suspension in question was published
F in the Gazette though that was after the date when the
respondent was to retire. But the point is whether it was
communicated to him before that date. The ordinary
meaning of the word "communicate" is to impart, confer or
transmit information. (Cf. Shorter Oxford English
G Dictionary, Vol. 1, p. 352). As already stated, telegrams,
dated July 31, and August 2, 1958, were dispatched to
the respondent at the adclress given by him where
communications by Government should be dispatched.
Both the telegrams transmitted or imparted information to
the respondent that he was suspended from service with
H

·'-
• UNION OF INDIA v. S.P. SINGH 997
)4
[HARJIT SINGH EIEDI, J.]
.,,'
-"'
effect from August 2, ,1958. It may be that he actually A
received them in or about the middle of August 1958, after
the date of his retirement. But how can it be said that the
information about his having been suspended was not
imparted or transmitted to him on July 31 and August 2,
,. 1958 i.e. before August 4, 1958,. when he would have B
retired? It will be seen that in all the decisions cited before
us it was the communication of the impugned order which
was held to be essential and not its actual receipt by the
officer concerned and such communication was held to
be necessary because till the order is issued and actually c
sent out to the person concerned the authority making
such order would be in a position to change its mind and
modify it if it thought fit. But once such an order is sent out,
it goes out of the control of such an authority, and therefore,
'-+ there would be no chance whatsoever of it changing its
D
mind or modifying it. In our view, once an order is issued
and it is sent out to the concerned Government servant, it
must be held to have been communicated to him, no matter
when he actually received it. We find it difficult to persuade
ourselves to accept the view that it is only from the date of
the actual receipt by him that the order becomes effective. E
If that be the true meaning of communication, it would be
possible for a Government servant to effectively thwart an
order by avoiding receipt of it by one method or the other
'
...' till after the date of his retirement even though such an
order is passed and dispatched to him before such date. F
An officer against whom action is sought to be taken,
thus, may go away from the address given by him for
service of such orders or may deliberately give a wrong
address and thus prevent or delay its receipt and be able
to defeat its service on him. Such a meaning of the word G
i' "communication" ought not to be given unless the provision
in question expressly so provides. Actually knowledge by
him of an order where it is one of dismissal, may, perhaps,
become necessary because of the consequences which
the decision in AIR 1966 SC 1313 (Supra) contemplated. H
998 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 7 S.C.R. \.'
~

A But the case of an officer who has proceeded on leave ~
and against whom an order of suspension is passed
because in l:iis case there is no question of his doing any
act or passing any order and such act or order being
challenged as invalid''.
B 10. The aforesaid principle must now be applied to the •
facts of this case. It is clear from the record that the respondent
'
was in NOIDA and not in Nagpur when the orders had been Jll
~c
issued. From the ~uments attached and, in particular, the letter
dated 5th Ju~ 2605 written by him from his address ( H. No.
c 226 Sector- 15-A, NOIDA) to the Central Board of Excise and
Customs in ~hich he points out that he had been transferred
from Bhopal to Hyderabad and on going there he had been
informed that the incumbent officer at that place had not been r
relieved on which he had returned to Bhopal and had reported
D for duty at the Board's Office in New Delhi on 20th June, 2005 f'
and further requested that further orders as to liis posting be
issued, it is evident that the department tiad knowledge as to
his whereabouts. The learned counsel for the respondent has
also referred to the letter dated 25th August, 2005 from the Under
E Secretary to the Government of India, Ministry of Finance
addressed to the respondent at his residence in NOIDA
directing him to clear his outstandings before his request for
voluntary retirement could be finalized. It is also significant from
th\record that the order of suspension dated 30th August, 2005
F had been marked to Shri B.S. Ganu, Chief Commissioner of
Central Excise, Nagpur with a request that it be served on the
..
applicant and Shri Ganu had informed the Board Officer in New
Delhi that the respondent was not posted at Nagpur nor his
mailing address was available at that place and it was thereafter ..
I
on Septemb~r 2, 2005 (on receipt of the aforesaid letter) that f'
G
the suspension order had been dispatched to the correct
•
address of the respondent at NOIDA, and served on him a week ~
later. It is therefore clear that despite the fact that the Department
was well aware that the respondent was residing in NGIDA and
had reported for duty before the Board on 21st June, 2005 as
'='
>< UNION OF INDIA v. S.P. SINGH 999
[HARJIT SINGH BEDI, J.]
..
the incumbent in Hyderabad had refused to make way for him, A
yet the suspension order had been sent to Nagpur. We are
therefore of the opinion that though the suspension order had
been dispatched by facsimile before 151 September'2005 yet it
had been dispatched to the wrong address and could not be
·" deemed to have been communicated to the respondent. We 8
have also gone through the other judgments cited by the learned
counsel for the app~llant- Union of India. They have absolutely
r no relevance to the facts of the case and deal with separate
issues. We therefore find no infirmity in the order of the Tribunal
and of the High Court and accordingly dismiss the appeal. No c
order as to costs.
D.G. Appeal dismissed.

'1