UNION OF INDIAversusSH. GANSHYAM DASS KEDIA AND ORS.

A                                UNION OF INDIA
                                            v.
                   SH. GANSHYAM DASS KEDIA AND ORS.

                                DECEMBER 12 1995
B
                 [K. RAMASWAMY AND B.L. HANSARlA, JJ.)

           Land Acquisition Act, 1894-Secs. SA, 17(1) & 17(4}--Acquisition for
    planned development-Dispensing with enquiry-Notification without specifi-
c   cally reciting the nature of urgencr-fleld, subjective satisfaction of the govern-
    ment sufficient.

        The Birla Cotton Spinning and Weaving mill after obtaining the
  sanction of Delhi Municipal Corporation in 1951 had earmarked 3 acres
  of land for the construction of Staff Quarters. The Mill had become
D nonfunctional and the employees purchased the lands by registered sale
  deeds for residential purpose. Thereafter, the lands became part of ac-
  quired lands for planned development of Delhi under sections 17(1) and
  17(4) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, dispensing with the enquiry under
  section SA. These lands were located in midst of area reserved for Ednca-
E lion and Research.
          The acquisitions were challenged before the High Court on the
    ground that the Government was not justified in invoking section 17(1)
    read with Section 17(4) of the Act of 1894. The High Court quashed the
    notification on the ground that the notification did not recite the nature
F
    of the urgency. On appeal before this Court, it was pointed out that the
    respondents have purchased the lands long before the masterplans were
    prepared.

           Partly allowing the appeals the Court
G                                                                                        '
       HELD : 1. The view taken by High Court is not legal and correct. It
  cannot be said that the notification should specifically recite the nature of
  urgency in an acquisition wherever an enquiry is dispensed with. It is
  enough, if the record discloses the consideration by the Government on
H urgency for taking action under Ss.17(1) and (2). (625-G, 626-C]
                                       624
                            U.0.l. v. G.D. KEDIA                         625

        Aflatoon & Ors. v. Lt. Governor Delhi & Ors., [1975] 1 SCR 802 relied   A
on.

       The Court directed that since the Respondents have purchased the
land long before the master plans have been prepared for residential
pnrpose and on the eastern side residential Oats are in existence, there
may not be snch difficulty of change of user of the land and the plan leaving   B
ont the portion of the land for the residential purpose. The appropriate
Government would suitably consider withdrawal from acquisition to the
above extent only and allow nse for residential purpose. They would take
proper steps to release that part of the land which is necessary for the
respondents to construct their houses. The area needed for amenities like       C
road etc. need to be provided to these 19 plots and the same would also be
set apart. Necessary permission accordingly be given to the respondents
as per rulcJ by granting sanction to construct their honses. The direction
for release ol lla< land not be treated as a precedent in any other case. It
would be confined to the special facts in this case. [627-G-H, 628-A]
                                                                                D
        CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 4579 of
1995.

      From the Judgment and Order dated 25.1.91 of the Delhi High Court
in C.W. No. 3084 of 1987.
                                                                                E
        V.C. Mahajan, S.N. Sikka and Ms. Sushma Suri for the Appellants.

        Ravinder Sethi and V.B. Saharaya for D .D .A for the Respondents.

     Dr. R.F. Nariman, for M.P. Shorawala and B.R. Sabharwal for the
Respondent.                                                                     F
        The following Order of the Court was delivered :

       We have heard the counsel for the parties. The mam question
canvassed before the Division Bench in W.P. Nos. 3084/87 was that the
Government was not justified in invoking s.17(1) read with s.17(4) of Land      G
AcquisJ'tion Act, 1894 (for short 'the Act') dispensing with the enquiry
under s.5A. The High Court following its earlier decision has quashed the
notification on the ground that the notification did not recite the nature of
the urgency. Planned Development of Delhi is not urgent and, therefore,
the exercise of the power under s.17(4) was illegal. We do not find that the    H
    626             I;
                         SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1995) SUPP. 6 S.C.R.

A view taken by tbe High Court is legal and correct. lnAjlatoon & Ors. v. Lt.
    Governor of Delhi & Ors., [1975) 1 SCR 802, tbe Constitution Bench of this
    Court had upheld the exercise of power under s.17(4) dispensing tbe
    enquiry under s5-A. It was for planned development of Delhi which would
    take long time for development. Yet tbis court upheld tbe exercise of the
B   power of urgency..It is subjective satisfaction of tbe Government based on
    tbe material on record. The High Co~i is not a court of appeal over
    subjective satisfaction and tbe opinion of tbe Government is entitled to
    great weight. Therefore, it cannot be said that tbe notification should
    specifically recite the nature of tbe urgency. It is enough,. if tbe record .
C   discloses tbe consideration by the Government on urgency for taking action
    under ss.1151) and (2).

           However, this conclusion does not solve the problem in tbis case. It
    is seen that tbe employer of tbe respondents had obtained sanction from
    tbe Delhi Municipal Corporation as early as in 1951. A plan tbereof has .
D   been annexed in the paper book as annexure to tbe Additional Affidavit
    filed by Laxman Prasad Mittal It is an admitted fact that tbe plan has not
    so far seen tbe light of tbe day except production for the first time in tbis
    Court. No application under Order 41Rule27 CPC was filed. So it cannot
    be received in evidence. Be it as it may, it is not in dispute that abent 3
E   acres of land was earmarked by tbe Birla Cotton, Spinnin&    am     Weaving
    Mill for tbe construction of tbe staff quarters. The Mill has become disused
    but tbe respondenis had purchased under registered sale deeds from tbeir
    employer certain extents of land and most of tbem had 330 sq. yds. Some
    of tbem purchased in excess also. It is seen that tbey purchased tbese lands
F   for residential purpose long prior to tbe notification and master plan..

         This Court on November 9, 1995, issued direction as stated
    hereunder:

             'It transpires that the respondents are now retired. employees of
G            tbe Birla Cotton Spinning and Weaving Mills Ud. and tbey needed
             tbese sites for residential construction. When we requested Shri
             Saharya, learned counsel for the DDA to show us the localisation .
             of tbe land in the existing zonal plan, counsel is handicapped for
             not having tbe details. He sought for and is granted two weeks,
H            time to produce tbe zonal plan. Witb tbe assistance of his officers
                          U.0.1. v. G.D. KEDIA                         627

        and also after notice to Shri Venugopal, learned senior counsel A
        and his instructing counsel they would localise the land of 6600 sq.
        yds. purchased by the 20 respondents and needed for their housing
        purchase. If it would be possible to demarcate and delete this part
        of the land, perhaps much of the controversy may not survive.
        Under these circumstances, the matter is adjourned to do the B
        needful."

Shri V.B. Sahariya, the learned counsel appearing for the DOA, has placed
before us additional affidavit of P.C. Jain, Additional Commissioner (Area
Planning) DOA, Delhi together with annexures. In Annexure I, they have C
identified the land originally held by the Mill approximating three acres.
Thereunder, they identified in north-east Corner the land which the
respondents !:ad purchased. In the Area Plan, Annexure-2, the land is
reserve.<! for inst;~.itional purpose and for Education and Research in
Annexure-3. It is marked as red and in Annexure-4, it was identified
abutting the road by name Mehrauli Road. It is in the ll)iddle of the area D
reserved for institution (Education & Research). It is stated in Annexure
I that on the eastern side, Azad Apartments are situated; on the northern
side, it is abutting the Mehrauli Road. In that view of the matter, it would
be expedient that since the respondents have purchased long before the
master plans have been prepared for residential purpose and on the E
eastern side residential flats are in existence, there may not be much
difficulty for change of user of the land and the plan, leaving out the
portion of the land for the residential purpose.


      It is not in dispute that 19 persons now want construction of their F
houses in this area. Though some of them had purchased more than 330
sq. yds, uniformly everyone should have 330 sq. yds. We are of the con-
sidered view that it is appropriate for the appellant- Union of India to
change user of land in the Master and Zonal Plans to the above extent and
direct the Lt. Governor to carve out the above land a part of the residential G
purpose which is adjacent to already existing residential apartment. The
appropriate Government would suitably consider withdrawal from acquisi-
tion to the above extent only and allow use for residential purpose. They
would take proper steps to release that part to the land which is necessary
for the respondents to construct their houses. The area needed for H
    628                  SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1995] SUPP.6S.CR.

A amenities like road etc. need to be provided to these 19 plots and the same
    would also be set part. Necessary permission accordingly be given to the
    respondents as per rules by granting sanction to construct their houses.

          The appeal is accordingly allowed to the above extent. The direction
    for release of the land should not be treated as a precedent in another
B   case. It would be confined to the special facts in this case. No costs.

    V.M.                                              Appeals partly allowed.