Holding

A correction of date of birth made after the prescribed five‑year period is not permissible, and the CAT’s order directing such correction is set aside.

Summary

Harnam Singh, a government servant who joined in 1956, discovered that his date of birth recorded in his service book (20‑May‑1934) differed from that on his matriculation certificate (7‑Apr‑1938). He sought correction in 1991, just months before his scheduled superannuation, but the department rejected his request citing the five‑year limitation under Note 5 to Fundamental Rule 56 (amended 1979). The Central Administrative Tribunal (CAT) allowed the correction, but the Union of India appealed, arguing that the limitation period applied even to servants who entered service before 1979 and that the delay amounted to laches. The Supreme Court held that the five‑year window for correcting a date of birth is mandatory, that the respondent’s thirty‑year delay was unreasonable, and that the CAT’s order was erroneous. Consequently, the appeal was allowed and the CAT’s order set aside.

Issues considered

The applicability of the five‑year limitation under Note 5 to Fundamental Rule 56 (m) for correction of date of birth to a servant who entered service before the 1979 amendment.
Whether the respondent’s long delay (laches) bars the correction of the date of birth in the service record.
Whether a CAT order rendered by a single member is valid under the precedent of Amulya Chandrakalita v. Union of India.
Effect of an uncorrected date of birth on the servant’s right to continue in service and superannuation.

Legislation cited

Fundamental Ruless. 56
General Financial Ruless. 1919

Subjects

date of birth correctionservice recordFundamental Rule 56limitation periodCentral Administrative Tribunalgovernment servantsuperannuationlachessingle member tribunal order

Judgment

A UNION OF INDIA
v.
HARNAM SINGH

FEBRUARY 9, 1993
B [L.M. SHARMA, CJ AND DR. A.S. ANAND, J.]

Civil Services

Fundamental Rules :
c F.R. 56 Note S(a) & MH. A. Notification dated November 30,
1979-<Jovemment Servant-Date of birth-Alteration in service record--Re-
quest fo,.._.cw/ten to be made.

The respondent in the appeal joined Government Service in the
D Ministry of Finance in a Class N post as Peon on 22nd February, 1956.
At the time of entry his service book was prepared and the date of birth
was recorded as 20th May, 1934 and since he failed in the matriculation
examination against the column of educational qualification 'matric
failed' was recorded. The respondent later on again appeared in the
E matriculation examination, passed the said examination in May, 1956, was
appointed as L.D.C. ·in the Ministry of Home Affairs on 9th May, 1957 and
in his service book an entry was made showing his educational qualifica·
tion as 'Matric' underneath the earlier entry 'matric failed' and this
changed entry was signed by the Section Officer of the Ministry of Home
Affairs on 7th September, 1957. Though the date of birth of the respondent
F as recorded in the matriculation certificate was 7.4.1938, while amending
the entry about his educational qualification, the entry relating to his date
of birth was not altered to correspond to the date given in the matricula·
~·\
tion certificate and continued to be recorded as 20th May, 1934. The
respondent W-ds later transferred to the Ministry of Human Resources
G Development and ou being notified about his date of superannuation as
31.5.1992, he realised that he was being retired on the basis of bis date of
birth as originally recorded in the service record as 20.5.1934 ignoring the
date of birth as reflected in the matriculation certificate.

In view 111' the aforesaid position the respondent made a repre·
H sentation in Se1•t•mber, 1991 for alteration of his date of brith but the
862
, U.0.1. v. HARNAM SINGH

same was rejected on 4.12.1991. He submitted another representation on A
863

3.1.1992 for correction on the basis of the date of bi.rth as recorded in the

r
matricnlation certificate but this request was also turned down by the
appellant in view of the Ministry of Home Affairs O.M. dated 29,1.1992.
Yet another representation dated 26th March, 1992 was submitted by the
respondent wherein he had drawn the attention of the Department to the
order of the Principal Bench of the Central Administrative Tribunal in the
B
case of Darshan Singh v. Union of India, wherein the Tribunal had directed
that the date of birth should be corrected on the basis of the matriculation
certificate. This representation was also rejected by the appellant on
22.4.1992 •.
c
·Being aggrieved the respondent challenged the aforesaid order by an .
application before the Central Administrative Tribunal and this was con·
tested by the appellant on various grounds including the plea of limita·
tion. It was a!so urged that the application was barred by F.R. 56 (Note S)
and the General Financial Rules, 1919 and· therefore did not merit and
consideration. It was submitted that the respondent knew about the entry D
of his date of birth as 20.S.1934 since he had signed his service book on
various occasions, eversince he joined service, but his representation for
.
correction of the date of .birth was made only in September, 1991 much
belatedly and even beyond the period of five years from the date of entry
into Government Service as envisaged by S.O. 3997 dated 30th November, E
1979.

The Tribunal did not agree \Vith any of the aforesaid contentions of
the appellant, allowed the application filed by the respondent and directed
the appellant to correct the date of birth in the service record as per the
date of birth recorded in the matriculation certificate. F

In the appeal by the Union of India to this Court it was contented
~ that in view of the law laid down in Amulya Cltandrakalita v. Union of India
& Ors., [1991] 1 SCC 181 the judgment rendered by only a single member
of the Tribunal is invalid and, therefore, the order deserves to be set aside G
and the case remanded to the Tribunal for fresh disposal. The arguments
raised before the Tribunal were also reiterated before this Court•

•_...( Allowing the appeal, this Court,

HELD: 1. A Government servant, after entry into service, acquires H
864 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1993) 1 S.C.R.
1
A the right to continue in service till the age of retirement, as fixed by the·
State in exercise of its powers regulating conditions of sen-ice, unless the
sen-ices are dispensed with on other grounds contained in the relevant
sen-ice rules after following the procedure prescribed therein. [869G]
1
2. The date of birth entered in the sen-ice records of a civil sen-ant
B is of utmost importance for the reason that the right to continue in service
stands decided by its entry in the sen-ice record. [8698]

3. A Government sen-ant who has declared his age at the initial
stage of the employment is, of course, not precluded from making a
request later on for correcting his age. It is open to a civil sen-ant to claim
c correction of his date of birth, if he is in possession of irrefutable proof
relating to his date of birth as different from the one earlier recorded and
even if there is no period of limitation prescribed for seeking correction of
date of birth, the Government sen-ant must do so without any un-
reasonable delay. [8698-8708]
D
4. A Government sen-ant who makes an application for correction
of date of birth beyond the time fixed by the Government, cannot claim, as
a matter of1ight, the correction of his date of birth even if he has good
evidence to establish that the recorded date of birth is clearly erroneous.
[870C]
E
5. Unless altered date of birth as recorded would determine date of
superannuation even if it amounts to abridging the right to continue in
sen-ice on the basis of actual age. [870D]

State of Assam & Anr. v. Daksha Prasad Deka & Ors., [1971] 2 SCR
F 687, referred to.

6. Note (5) to Fundamental Rule 56(m) governing correction of date
of birth in the sen-ice record, as amended by Government of India, with
effect from 30.11.1979 limits the exercise of the right by the Government
G sen-ant to seek alteration of his date of birth only within the specified
period viz. five years of entry into government sen-ice. [871A-B]

In the instant case, the CAT was of the opinion that the bar of five
years could only apply to such Government sen-ants who joined sen-ice
after 1979, when the amendment came into force and that the said period
H of limitation would not apply to Government sen-ants who were in sen-ice
, U.0.l. v. HARNAM SINGH 865

for more than live years prior to 1979. The approach of the Tribunal tends A
to create an invidious discrimination, unsustainable in law, by creating

r two artificial classes of government servants between those who joined
service before and after 1979. It is too simplistic a way of looking at the
issue ignoring the ground realities and the intention of the rule making
authority to discourage stale claims and non suit such government ser-
vants who seek alteration of their recorded date of birth belatedly and
mostly on the eve of their superannuation. [872C, 873E]
B

7. It would be appropriate and in tone with the harmonious con-
struction of the provision if in the case of those government servants who
were already in service before 1979, for a period of more than live years, C
and who intended to have their date of birth corrected after 1979, may seek
the correction of date of birth within a reasonable time after 1979 but in
any event not later than live years after the coming into force of the
amendment in 1979. This view would be in consonance with the intention
~ of the rule making authority. [874C-D] .D

New India Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Smt. Shanti Misra, [1975] 2 SCC 840
and Vi11od Gurudas Raikar v. National Insurance Co., [1991] 4 SCC 333,
referred to.

In the instant case, the date of birth recorded at the time of entry E
into service as 20th May, 1934 had continued to exist, unchallenged be-
tween 1956 and September, 1991, for almost three and a half decades. The
respondent had the occassion to see his service book at different places at
different points of time. Never did he object to the recorded entry. The
same date of birth was also reflected in the seniority lists of L.D.C. and F
U.D.C., which the respondent had admittedly seen. He remained silent and
.,..--. did not seek alteration till September, 1991 just a few months prior to the
date of his superannuation. Inordinate and unexplained delay or laches
on the part of the respondent to seek the necessary correction would in
any case have justified the refusal of relief to him. Even if the respondent G
had sought correction of the date of birth "ithin live years after 1979 when
Note 5 to FR 56 was incorporated the earlier delay would not have non
suited him. His inaction for all this period of about thirty- live years from .
the date of joining service, therefore precludes him from showing that the
entry of his date of birth in the service record was not correct. The
Tribunal, therefore fell in error in issuing the direction to correct his date H
866 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1993) 1 S.C.R. 1
A of birth. [876C-F, 876H, 877A]

Darshan Singh v. Union of India, decided by Principal Bench of CAT
on 9.8.1990, over-ruled.

B
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 502of1993.

From the Judgment and Order dated 29.5.92 of the Central Ad·
1
ministrative Tribunal, Principal Bench, New Delhi in 0.A. No.1252of1992.

V.C. Mahajan, C.V.S. Rao and V.B. Misra for the Appellant.

C S.K. Mehta, Dhruv Mehta, Aman Vachhar and Arvind Verma for
the Respondent.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

DR. ANAND, J. Aggrieved by an order passed by the Central Ad-
D ministrative Tribunal, Principal Bench, New Delhi in 0.A. No. 1252/1992 -.../'
on 29th of May, 1992, allowing an application filed by the respondent and l
directing the petitioner herein to correct the date of birth of the respondent
in the service-record.and not to retire him before 30th of April, 1996, the
petitioner-Union of India has filed this special leave petition.
E Leave granted.
).....
The respondent joined Government service in the Ministry of
Finance (Defence) in class IV post as a peon on 22nd of February, 1956.
At the time of entry into the Government service, his service-book was
F prepared and the date of birth was recorded as 20th of May, 1934 and since
he failed in the matriculation examination, against the column of educa-
tional qualification 'matric failed' was recorded. It appears that the respon-
dent lateron again appeared in the matriculation examination of the Punjab
University under Roll No. 21653 and passed the said examination in May,
1956. On passing the matriculation examination, the respondent was ap-
G pointed as LDC in the Ministry of Home Affairs on 9.5.1957. In the
service-book of the respondent, an entry was, accordingly, made showing
his educational qualification as matric (Punjab University, Roll No. 21653,
year 1956). This entry was made underneath the earlier entry 'matric failed"
and the changed entry was signed by the SO of the Ministry of Home
H Affairs on 7.9.1957. Though, the date of birth of the respondent, as
U.0.1. v. HARNAM SINGH [ANAND, J.] 867

recorded in the matriculation certificate is 7.4.1938 but while amending the A
entry about his educational qualification, the entry relating to his date of
birth was not altered to correspond to the date given in the matriculation
certificate and it continued to be recorded as 20th of May, 1934. In 1963,
. the respondent was transferred to the Ministry of Human Resources
Development, Department of Education. On being notified about his date B
of superannuation as 31.5.1992, the respondent realised that he was being
retired on the basis of his date of birth as originally recorded in the
service-record as 20.5.1934, ignoring the date of birth as reflected in the
matriculation certificate. He made a representation in September 1991 for
the alteration of his date of birth but the same was rejected on 4.12.1991.
He submitted yet another representation of 3.1.1992, wherein a request was C
made, the consider his case for the correction of date of birth afresh on
the basis of the date of birth as recorded in the matriculation certificate.
The request Of the respondent was turned down vide O.M. dated 29.1.1992.
The respondent submitted yet another representation on 26.3.1992,
wherein he asserted that he had submitted the matriculation certificate on D
4.9.1957, when the entry about his educational qualification was altered and
that thereafter since he did not hear anything to the contrary, he presumed
that the appellants had also corrected his date of birth in the service book.
While making that representation, the respondent had also drawn attention
of the Department to an order of the Central Administrative Tribunal in
the case of one Darshan Singh, wherein the Department had been directed E
by the Principal Bench of CAT to correct the date of birth of Darshan
Singh <in the basis of the date of birth given in the matriculation certificate
and it was submitted that his date of birth should also be corrected on the
basis of the matriculation certificate. That representation was rejected on
22.4.1992 by an order which reads thus: F

Subject: Request for alteration in the Date of Birth of Sh.
Harnam Singh, Asstt. in the Service Book.

With reference to his representation dated 26th
March, 1992 regarding alteration in his date of birth, Sh. · G
Harnam Singh, Asstt. is informed that his representation
has been considered once again and it has not been found
possible to accede to his request for changing his date of

r
birth from 20.5.1934 to 7.4.1938. As regards his contention
that he had submitted a copy of matriculation certificate H
868 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1993] 1 S.C.R.

A in 1956, Sh. Harnam Singh, has already been informed
vide OM dated 29.1.1992 about DOP&T's ruling that
furnishing a copy of matriculation certificate does not
automatically imply change in date of birth unless the
Govt. servant specifically applies for it within the
prescribed time limit and the appointing authority accepts
B his request.

2. In so far as CAT's judgment in the case of Sh. Darshan
Singh, a copy of which has been enclosed by Sh. Harnam
Singh with his representation, it may be stated that in the
c said judgment the CAT's order is based on the fact that
Sh. Darshan Singh had not been shown his service book
even once during his entire service. Sh. Harnam Singh had
seen his service book several times latest being in 1976, and
he has signed the Service Book in verification of the Cor-
rectness of the entries made therein and he had never
D pointed out the 'incorrectness' in his date of birth. The
CAT's Judgment enclosed by Sh. Harnam Singh with his
representation is thus distinguishable from the ca5e of Sh.
Harnam Singh. Apart from this Sh. Harnam Singh has not
furnished any new grounds for reconsideration of his case.
E
3. Sh. Harnam Singh is also informed that no further
representation on the subject will be considerer unless he ·
furnished any new facts/information."

f The respondent challenged the above order through OA No. 1252/92
dated 29.5.1992 before the CAT. The application was contested by the
appellant on various grounds including the plea of limitation. It was urged
by the appellant that the OA was barred under FR 56 (Note 5) and
General Financial Rules 1979 and therefore, did not merit any considera-
tim1. The appellant had further asserted that the respondent knew about
G the entry of his date of birth as 20.5.1934 in his service-record since he had
signed his service book on various occassions, eversince he joined the
service, but his representation for correction of date of birth was made only
in September 1991, much belatedly and even beyond a period of five years
from the date of entry into Government service and as envisaged by SO
H 3997 dated 30th of November, 1979 the same could not therefore be
U.0.1. v. HARNAM SINGH [ANAND, J.] 869

entertained. The Tribuna~ however, did not agree with the appellant and A
allowed the application filed by the respondent directing the appellant to
correct his date of birth in the service record as per the date of birth
recorded in the matriculation certificate.

Mr. V.C. Mahajan, the learned Senior Advoeate appearing for the
Union of India, has reiterated the arguments raised before the Tribunal B
and has further submitted that in view of the law laid down in Amulya
Chandrakalija v. Union of India & Ors., [1991) 1 SCC 181 the judgment in
the present case rendered by only a single member of the Tribunal, is
invalid and, therefore, the order deserves to be set aside and the case
remanded to the Tribunal for its fresh disposal in accordance with law. C
Learned counsel for the respondent has, on the other had argued for
dismissal of the appeal and supported the i111pugned order of the Tribunal.

The fact that the date of birth was recorded on the first sheet of the
service book when the respondent joined as a peon as well as in various D
seniority lists of UDC and LDC issued from time to time as 20.5.1934 is
not in dispute. It also is not disputed that the date of birth of the respon-
dent in the matriculation certificate issued by the Punjab University is
7.4.1938. The fact that the matriculation certificate has been produced
before the department by the respondent after he had passed the
matriculation examination and an alteration of his educational qualification E
was made in the service book is also beyond controversy. There is also no
doubt that while submitting the matriculation ceriificate, the respondent
had not requested for any alteration in the date of birth and that he had
filed the representation for correction of his date of birth for the first time
only in September, 1991, just a few months before his notified date of F
superannuation.

A Government servant, after entry into service, acquires the right to
continue in service till the age of retirement, as fixed by the State in
exercise of its powers regulating conditions of service, unless the services
are dispersed with on other grounds contained in the relevant service rules G
after following the procedure prescribed therein. The date of birth entered
in the service records of a civil servant is, thus of utmost importance for
the reason that right to continue in service stands decided by its. entry in
the service record. A Government servant who has declared his age at the
initial stage of the employment is, of course, not precluded from making a H
870 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1993] 1 S.C.R.

A request later on for correcting his age. It is open to a civil servant to claim
correction of his date of birth, if he is in possession of the irrefutable proof
relating to his date of birth as different from the one earlier recorded and
even if there is no period of limitation prescribed for seeking correction of
date of birth, the Government servant must do so without any unreasonable
delay. In the absence of any provision in the rules for correction of date of
B birth, the general principle of refusing relief on grounds of latches or stale
claims, is generally applied to by the courts and tribunals. It is nonetheless
competent for the Government to fix a time limit, in the service rules, after
· which no application for correction of date of birth of a Government
servant can be entertained. A Government servant who makes an applica-
c tion for correction of date of birth beyond the time, so fixed, therefore,
cannot claim, as a matter of right, the correction of his date of birth even
if he has good evidence to establish that the recorded date of birth is clearly
erroneous. The law of limitation may operate harshly but it has to be
applied with all its rigour and the couns or tribunals cannot come to the
D aid of those who sleep over their rights and allow the period of limitation
to expire. Unless altered, his date of birth as recorded would determine
his date of superannuation even if it amounts to abridging his right to
continue in service on the basis of his actual age. Indeed, as held by this
Court in State of Assam & Anr. v. Daksha Prasad Deka & Ors., (1971) 2
SCR 687 a public servant may dispute the date of birth as entered in the
E service record and apply for its correction but till the record is corrected
he can not claim to continue in service on the basis of the date of birth
claimed by him. This court said:

"The date of compulsory retirement under F.R. 56(a) must
in our judgment, be determined on the basis of the service
F record, and not on what the respondent claimed to be his
date of birth, unless the service record is first corrected
consistent with the appropriate procedure. A public ser-
vant may dispute the date ofbirih as entered in the service
record, and may apply for correction of the record. But
G .until the record is corrected, he cannot claim that he has
been deprived of the guarantee under Article 311 (2) of
the Constitution by being compulsorily retired on attaining
the age of superannuation on the footing of the date of
birth entered in the service record."
H
U.0.1. v. HARNAM SINGH [ANAND, J.] 871

Note (5) to Fundamental Rule 56 governing correction of date of A
birth in the service record, substituted by Government of India, Ministry
of Home Affairs, Department of Personnel and Administrative Reforms
Notification No. 19017n9/Estt-A dated 30th November, 1979 published as
SO 3997 in the Government of India Gazette dated 15th of December 1979
limits the exercise of the right by the government servant to seek alteration
B
of his date of birth only within the specified period. The provision reads
as under:

"Note 5 - The date on which a Government servant attains
the age of fifty-eight years or sixty years, as the case may

- be, shall be determined with reference to the date of birth
declared by the Government servant at the time of appoint-
c
ment and accepted by the appropriate authority on produc-
tion, as far as possible, of confirmatory documentary
evidence such as High School or Higher Secondary or
Secondary School Certificate or extracts from Birth
Register. The date of birth so declared by the Government D
servant and accepted by the appropriate authority shall not
be subject to any alteration except as specified in this note.
An alteration of date of birth of a Government servant can
be made, with the sanction of a Ministry or Department of
the Central Government or the Comptroller and Auditor- E
General in regard to persons serving in the Indian Audit
and Accounts Department, or an administrator of a Union
Territory under which the Government servant is serving
if

(a) a request in this regard is made within five years of F
----- his entry into Government service;

(b) it is clearly established that a genuine bona fide mis-
take has occurred; and

\ c) the dale of birth so altered would not make him G
ineligible to appear in any School or University or
Union Public Service Commission examination in
which he had appeared, or for entry into Government
service on the date on which he first appeared at such
·examination or on the date on which he entered H
c
872 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1993) 1 S.C.R,

A Government service. 11

According to the above amendment, it is obvious that the request for ~--
correction of date of birth is required to be made by the Government
servant within five years of his entry into Government service and his date
of birth may be corrected if it is established that a genuine bona fide
B mistake had occurred while recording his date of birth at the time of his
entry into Government service. The CAT in the instant case was of the
opinion that the bar of five years could only apply to such Government
servants who joined service after 1979, when the amendment came into ~

force and that the said period of limitation would not apply to Government
c servants who were in service for more than five years prior to 1979.

The Tribunal while allowing the application filed by the respondent
and directing the appellant to correct his date of birth in the service record
-
noticed the objection raised on behalf of the appellant to the effect that
the mere filing of the matriculation certificate in 1956 did not imply that
~
D the date of birth already recorded in the service record stood altered by
the appellants automatically even without the concerned Government ser-
vant making a prayer in that behalf or raising the issue at the relevant time
after his posting as LDC. CAT held that there was no period of limitation
for the correction of date of birth and in so holding relied upon the
E judgment in the case of Darshan Singh v. Union of India, decided by the
~
Principal Bench of CAT on 9.8.1990 and observed that only on the basis
of coming very late for alteration of the date of birth, the State could not
oust the claim of the respodent. The Tribunal observed :

"It is trite that at any time during the service, it is open to
F an employee to make a request for the alteration of the
recorded date of birth and that if the request is supported .....,...
by cogent evidence to establish that the recorded date is
wrong, correction has to be made. 11

The Tribunal also noticed the submission of the learned counsel for
G the appellant to the effect that the judgment in Darshan Singh 's case
(supra) was not applicable because unlike in Darshan Singh's case, who
had had no occasion to see his service book even once during his entire )-..,.-.'
service career, the respondent herein had not only ~een his service book
several times but had also signed the same at various places in verification
H of the correctness of the entries made therein and had never objected to
_}
r'
U.0.1. v. HARNAM SINGH [ANAND, J.] 873

the date of birth as contained in the first page of the service book or as A
given in various seniority lists prepared and published form time to time
till September 1991. The Tribunal disposed of the submission by observing:

"A perusal of the service record does show that the pages
which the applicant has signed is not the first page where
the date of birth is recorded, but subseqent pages where
B
other service particulars like pay fixation etc. are men-
tioned. As regards the entry of date of birth in the seniority
list, that may be within the knowledge of the applicant, but
seeing to the nature of the job on which the applicant is
engaged, being ministerial, it is not expected that the c
seniority would have mattered much as the promotion is
made only on the basis of seniority-cum-fitness in due
course. Moreover, there is no authenticity regarding the
date of birth recorded in the seniority list and more em-
phasis is attached to the position of the person in the list
vis-a-vis other similarly placed persons in the cadre."
D

The approach of the Tribunal does not commend to us as it tends to
create an invidious discrimination, unsustainable in law, by creating two
artificial classes of Government Servants between those who joined service
......__ before and after 1979. It is a too simplistic way of looking at the issue, E
ignoring the ground realities and the intention of the rule making authority
to discourage stale claims and non-suit such government servants who seek
- the alteration of their recorded date of birth belatedly and mostly on the
eve of their superannuation. To say that the respondent, even though he
signed the service book at a number of places at different times and saw F
the seniority lists, may not have still come to know as to what his recorded
"I' date of birth was, is to ignore human conduct and put premium on
·• negligence. The observations of CAT quoted above are neither logical nor
sound. Of course, Note 5 to FR 56 (m) was incorporated only in 1979 and
it provides for request to be made for correction of date of birth within
five years from the date of entry into urvice but what is necessary to be G
exarr ·.ned is the intention of the rule making authority in providing the
period of limitation for seeking the correction of the date of birth of the
Government Servant viz. to discourage stale claims and belated applica-
tions for alteration of date of birth recorded in the service book at the time
of initial entry. It is the duty of the courts and tribunals to promote !hat H
\

874 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1993] 1 S.C.R.

A intention by an intelligible and harmonious interpretation of the rule rather
than choke its operation. The interpretation has to be the one which
advances the intention and not the one which frustrates it. It would not be
the intention of the rule making authority to give unlimited time to seek
correction of date of birth, after 1979, to those government servent who·
had joined the service prior to 1979 but restrict it to the five year period
B
for those who enter service after 1979. Indeed, if a government servant,
already in. service for a long time, had applied for correction of date of
birth before 1979, it would not be permissil;Jle to non-suit him on the
ground that he had not applied for correction within five years into service,

C
but the case of government servant who applied for correction of date of
birth only after 1979 stands on a different footing. It would be appropriate
and in tune \vith harmonious construction of the provision to hold that in
-
the case of'lhose government servants who were already in service before
1979, for a period of more than five years, and who intended to have their
date
'
of birth corrected after 1979, may seek the correction of date of birth
D within a reasonable time after 1979 but in any event not later than five years
after the coming into force of the amendment in 1979. This view would be
in consonance with the intention of the rule making authority.

The interpretation which we have placed on the provision with
regard to the cases of those government servants who were in service prior
E to 1979 but had not sought the alteration in the date of birth till after the
amendment in 1979 is fortified by the view which this court has taken
earlier. By w~y illustration we may refer to the case of New India Insurance
Co. Ltd. v. Smt. Shanti Misra, [1975] 2 SCC 840 where the husband of the
-
respondent in that case died in an accident in 1966. A period of two years
F was available to the respondent for instituting a suit for recovery of
damages. Jn March, 1967 the Claims Tribunal under Section 110 of the
Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 was constituted, barring the jurisdiction of the
civil court and prescribed 60 days as the period of limitation. The respon-
dent filed the application in July 1967. It was held that not having filed a
suit before March, 1967 the only re.medy of the respondent was by way of
G an application before the Tribunal. So far the period of limitation was
concerned, it was observed that a new law of limitation providing for a
shorter period cannot certainly extinguish a vested right of action. In view
of the change of the law it was held that the application could be filed
within a reasonable time after the constitution of the Tribunal; and, that
H the time of about four months taken by the respondent in approaching the
\
J
U.0.1. v. HARNAM _SINGH [ANAND, J.] 875

Tribunal aft<.. its constitution, could be held to be either reasonable time A
or the delay of about two months could be condoned under the proviso to
- ~- Section 110-A(3).

Similarly in Vinod Gurudas Raikar v. National Insurance Co., [1991]
4 SCC 333 the precise question which was considered by the Bench was:
B
"The period of limitation for filing a claim petition both
under the old Act and the new Act is six months from the
date of the accident. The difference in the two Acts, which
is relevant in the present case, is in regard to the provisions
relating to condonation of delay. In view of the proviso to
c
- sub-section (3) of Section 166 of the new Act, the maximum
period of delay which can be condoned is six months, which
expired on January 22, 1990. If the new Act is held to be
applicable, the appellant's petition filed in March had to
be dismissed. The case of the appellant is that the accident
having taken place before the n~w Act came into force, the D
proceeding is governed by the old Act, where there was no
such restriction as in the new Act. The question is as to
which Act is applicable; the new Act or the old."

The Bench opined:
E
"If in a given case the accident had taken place more than
_) a year before the new Act coming in force and the claimant
had actually filed his petition while the old Act was in force
but after a period of one year, the position could be
different. Having actually initiated the proceeding when F
the old Act covered the field a claimant could say that his
right which has accrued on filing of the petition could not
be taken away. The present case is different. The right or
privilege to claim benefit of a provision for condonation cf
delay can be governed only the law in force at the time of
delay. Even the hope or expectation of getting the benefit G
of an enactment presupposes applicability of the enactment
when the need arises to take its benefit. In the present case
the occasion to take the benefit of the provision for con-
donation of delay in filing the claim arose only after repeal
of the old law. Obviously the ground fcu condonation set H
876 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1993] 1 S.C.R.

A up as 'sufficient cause' also relates to the time after the
repeal. The benefit of the repealed law could not, there-
fore, be available simply because the cause of action for
the claim arose before repeal. 'Sufficient cause' as a ground
of condooation of delay in filing the claim is distinct from
'cause of action' for the claim itself. The question of con-
B donation of dciay must, therefore, be governed by the new
law. We accordingly hold that the High Court was right in
its view that the case was covered by the new Act, and delay
for a longer period than six months could not be condoned."

C In the instant case, the date of birth recorded at the time of entry of
the respondent into service as 20th May 1934 had continued to exist,
unchallenged between 1956 and September 1991, for almost three and a
half decades. The respondent had the occasion to see his service book on
numerous occasions. He signed the service book at different places at
D different points of time. Never did he object to the recorded entry. The
same date of birth was also reflected in the seniority lists of LDC and
UDC, which the respondent had admittedly seen, as there is nothing on
the record to show that he had no occasion to see the same. He remained
silent and did not seek the alteration of the date of birth till September
1991, just a few months prior to the date of his superannuation. Inordinate
E and unexplained delay or !aches on the part of the respondent to seek the
necessary correction would in any case have justified the refusal of relief
to him. Even if the respondent had sought correction of the date of birth
within five years after 1979, the earlier delay would not have non-suited
him but he did not seek correction of the date of birth during the period
F of five years after the incorporation of note 5 to FR 56 in 1979 either. His
inaction for all this period of about thirty five years from the date of joining
service, therefore precludes him from showing that the entry of his date of
birth in service record was not correct.

In the facts and circumstances of this case, we are not satisfied that
G the Tribunal was justified in issuing the direction in the manner in which
it has been done. The application for correction of date of birth, entered
in the service book in 1956, for the first time made in September 1991, was
hopelessly belated and did not merit any consideration. As already notked,
it had not been made even within the period of five years from the date of
H coming into force of Note 5 to FR 56 (m) in 1979. The Tribunal, therefore,
U.0.1. v. HARNAM SINGH [ANAND, J.] 877

fell in error in issuing the direction to correct his date of birth and the A
impugned order of the Tribunal cannot be sustained.

Ordinarily, keeping in view of judgment of this Court in Amulya
Cha11dra Kalita's case (supra), we should have remanded the case to the
Tribunal for a. fresh disposal because of the fact that the order of the
Tribunal was rendered by only one mamber or to have awaited the decision B
of some cases pending in this Court in which the validity of the order
passed by single member of the tribunal is under consideration but since
-( we have ourselves looked into all the facts and circumstances of the case
and given an interpretation to Note 5 to FR 56 (m), we do not consider it_
expedient to adopt either of these course. In view of the interpretation C
placed by us, the appeal succeeds and is allowed. 'I'he impugned order of
the Tribunal is set aside. There shall, however, be no order as to costs.

N.V.K. Appeal allowed .

•