UNION OF INDIA THR. SECRETARY & ORS.versusUDAI BHAN SINGH

                         [2019] 17 S.C.R. 527                           527


         UNION OF INDIA THR. SECRETARY & ORS.                           A
                                 v.
                       UDAI BHAN SINGH
                  (Civil Appeal No. 9303 of 2013)
                       NOVEMBER 21, 2019                                B
        [DR. DHANANJAYA Y CHANDRACHUD AND
                 AJAY RASTOGI, JJ.]
       Service Law: Reinstatement – Respondent functioning as
Postal Assistant – Charge of misconduct – Authorising payments
                                                                        C
of commission under the NSC Scheme to agents who were found
to be fake – Charges were essentially based on the failure to verify
the bills which had been submitted by so-called NSC agents and
the failure to make entries of payment in the ledger – Receipts were
found to be prepared in the names of fake agents as a result of
which payment of NSC commission in the amount of Rs.6.65 lakhs          D
was wrongfully made – Inquiry officer found that charges were
proved/partially proved against respondent – Disciplinary
Authority awarded penalty of reduction of pay of five years –
Appellate Authority ordered dismissal from service – However,
Tribunal set aside both the orders and restored the proceedings to
                                                                        E
the Disciplinary Authority with liberty to issue notice to show cause
to respondent and after allowing him opportunity of submitting
representation to arrive at final decision – After order of Tribunal,
a notice to show cause was issued to respondent – Disciplinary
Authority found that charges were proved against the respondent
which warranted dismissal from service – The said findings were         F
upheld by Appellate Authority – Tribunal dismissed OA by
respondent – However, High Court directed reinstatement of
respondent on the ground of violation of principle of natural
justice and vitiation of inquiry by delay following an earlier order
of remand of Tribunal – High Court held that there was a failure
                                                                        G
on the part of the inquiry officer to provide documents to the
respondent during the course of disciplinary inquiry and that
notice was issued by Disciplinary Authority nearly eight years
following the first order of Tribunal – Appeal by employer-UOI –
Held: Tribunal, while dealing with the submission, came to the
conclusion that the respondent was attempting to take undue             H
                                 527
528            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                       [2019] 17 S.C.R.


A     advantage of the non availability of cash receipts but the payment
      could be verified from other records and documents which were
      maintained in the Head Post Office – High Court merely observed
      that the respondent was not provided the documents which were
      relied upon – High Court did not consider which documents were
      not supplied, the relevance of those documents to the charge of
B
      misconduct and the prejudice, if any, that resulted to the respondent
      by the non availability of the relevant documents – Even in the
      pleadings of the respondent, the plea that there was a failure to
      supply documents was vague and there was no reference to which
      specific document ought to have been made available – Tribunal
C     restored the proceedings back to the Disciplinary Authority to
      enable the appellants to issue a fresh notice to show cause to the
      respondent and to arrive at a conclusion on the nature of the
      misconduct, if any, after furnishing an opportunity to the
      respondent of making a representation – Neither was the inquiry
      required to be held afresh nor was fresh evidence to be recorded
D
      – After the order of the Tribunal, a notice to show cause was issued
      to the respondent after eight years – But respondent had been
      reinstated following the order of the Tribunal setting aside the
      disciplinary action, pending the conclusion of the process by the
      Disciplinary Authority – Therefore, the delay on the part of the
E     Disciplinary Authority in issuing a show cause notice in the first
      instance and in passing a final order thereafter was not a matter
      of any prejudice to the respondent – For the said reasons, the High
      Court was in error in interfering with the exercise of the disciplinary
      jurisdiction of the appellants – The misconduct was proved – The
      penalty imposed cannot be held to be disproportionate or arbitrary
F
      – High Court erred in setting aside the punishment and ordering
      reinstatement with back wages and continuity of service.
            Allowing the appeal, the Court
            HELD: 1. According to the Tribunal, the non availability
G     of a particular document on the record did not make any
      difference to the charge of misconduct which was established by
      other materials which were available on the record. The High
      Court merely observed that the respondent was not provided
      the documents which were relied upon and that there was an
      error apparent on the face of the record in the order of the
H     Tribunal. The High Court did not consider which documents
 UNION OF INDIA THR. SECRETARY v. UDAI BHAN SINGH                      529


were not supplied, the relevance of those documents to the             A
charge of misconduct and the prejudice, if any, that resulted to
the respondent by the non availability of the relevant documents.
In fact, in the pleadings of the respondent, the plea that there
was a failure to supply documents was vague and there was no
reference to which specific document ought to have been made
available. Without analyzing this aspect of the case, the High         B
Court interfered with the disciplinary jurisdiction of the appellant
on a vague plea that documents were not supplied. High Court
ought to have enquired into the question of prejudice. [Para 13]
[536-D-F]
                                                                       C
      2. The aspect of delay must be considered in the context
of the admitted facts. The inquiry had been concluded by the
inquiry officer. Evidence was recorded during the course of the
inquiry. The order of the disciplinary authority holding that all
the three charges had been proved was without issuing a notice
to the respondent on the reasons for disagreement with the             D
report of the inquiry officer. The appellate authority enhanced
the punishment without indicating adequate reasons. The
Tribunal restored the proceedings back to the disciplinary
authority to enable the appellants to issue a fresh notice to show
cause to the respondent and to arrive at a conclusion on the
                                                                       E
nature of the misconduct, if any, after furnishing an opportunity
to the respondent of making a representation. Neither was the
inquiry required to be held afresh nor was fresh evidence to be
recorded. After the order of the tribunal, a notice to show cause
was issued to the respondent after eight years. But it must
equally be noted that the respondent had been reinstated               F
following the order of the tribunal setting aside the disciplinary
action, pending the conclusion of the process by the disciplinary
authority. Hence, the delay on the part of the disciplinary
authority in issuing a show cause notice in the first instance and
in passing a final order thereafter is not a matter of any prejudice
                                                                       G
to the respondent. In the present case, the appellants have
not condoned the lapse on the part of the respondent. The delay
was not a matter of prejudice. For the said reasons, the High
Court was in error in interfering with the exercise of the
disciplinary jurisdiction of the appellants. The misconduct was
proved. The penalty which has been imposed cannot be held to           H
530            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                        [2019] 17 S.C.R.


A     be disproportionate or arbitrary. The High Court was in error
      in setting aside the punishment and ordering reinstatement with
      back wages and continuity of service. [Paras 14, 16, 17] [536-
      H; 537-A-C; 538-D-E]
            State of Madhya Pradesh v. Bani Singh and Another
B           1990 (Supp) SCC 738 ; State of Punjab and Others v.
            Chaman Lal Goyal (1995) 2 SCC 570 : [1995] 1 SCR
            695 ; State of A.P. v. N. Radhakrishan (1998) 4 SCC
            154 : [1998] 2 SCR 693 ; Secretary, Forest Department
            and Others v. Abdur Rasul Chowdhury (2009) 7 SCC
            305 ; Government of Andhra Pradesh and Others v.
C
            V. Appala Swamy (2007) 14 SCC 49 : [2007] 2 SCR 19
            – referred to.
                              Case Law Reference
      (1990) (Supp) SCC 738               referred to            Para 15
D     [1995] 1 SCR 695                    referred to            Para 15
      [1998] 2 SCR 693                    referred to            Para 15
      (2009) 7 SCC 305                    referred to            Para 15
      [2007] 2 SCR 19                     referred to            Para 15
E
            CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 9303
      of 2013.
            From the Judgment and Order dated 01.05.2012 of the High
      Court of Judicature at Allahabad in CMWP No. 40964 of 2009.
F           Ms. Kiran Suri, Sr. Adv., Merusagar Samantaray, Sachin Sharma,
      Ms. Smita Choudhury, Gurmeet Singh Makker, Ms. Aishwarya Kumar,
      Advs. for the Appellants.
            S. D. Singh, Ms. Bharti Tyagi, Mrs. Surabhi Shukla, Ram Kripal
      Singh, Dhiraj Kumar, Jitender Singh, Advs. for the Respondent.
G           The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
            DR. DHANANJAYA Y CHANDRACHUD, J.
            1. This appeal arises from a judgment of a Division Bench of
      the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad dated 1 May 2012. While
H     allowing the writ petition filed by the respondent raising a challenge to
    UNION OF INDIA THR. SECRETARY v. UDAI BHAN SINGH                            531
          [DR. DHANANJAYA Y CHANDRACHUD, J.]

an order of the Central Administrative Tribunal1, the High Court came           A
to the conclusion that (i) there was a violation of the principles of natural
justice in that the appellants failed to provide relevant documents to the
respondent during the course of the departmental inquiry; and (ii) the
inquiry was vitiated by delay, following an earlier order of remand of
the Tribunal. On these two counts, the High Court interfered with the
                                                                                B
punishment of dismissal imposed on the respondent and directed
reinstatement with full backwages and consequential benefits. The
Union of India is in appeal.
      2. On 13 December 1978, the respondent was appointed as a
Postal Assistant in the Head Post Office at Allahabad. A charge-sheet
                                                                                C
was issued to him on 31 August 1988. There were four articles of
charge pertaining to the conduct of the respondent during the period
from 15 July 1985 until 10 February 1986 when he was functioning as
a Miscellaneous P.A. at the Allahabad Head Office.
       3. The charge of misconduct relates to the appellant authorising
                                                                                D
payments of commission under the National Savings Certificate Scheme
to agents who were found to be fake. Article-I of the charges was in
the following terms:
         “Shri Udai Bhan Singh while working as Misc. Asstt. Allahabad
         HO during the period from 15.07.1985 to 10.02.1986 did not verify
                                                                                E
         the commission bills submitted by NSC Agents properly and did
         not make entries of payment in ledger of NS Agents. He also
         did not watch the following particularised irregular and forged
         NSC commission bills to fake agents. He also managed to prepare
         money receipts on the number of fake agents and managed their
         payment. This resulted fraudulent payments of NS commission            F
         to the tune of Rs.6,65,693.60 to the following fake agents”
       The names of 79 fake agents to whom fraudulent payments of
commission were allegedly made were thereafter elucidated. Article
II of the charges was in the following terms:
                                                                                G
         “That the said Shri Udai Bhan Singh while functioning as Misc.
         PA Allahabad HO during the period from 15.07.1985 to
         10.02.1986 managed to prepare three following particularized
         money paid receipts in duplicate and managed their payment at
1
    “Tribunal”                                                                  H
532            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                            [2019] 17 S.C.R.


A           Allahabad HO as well as at Allahabad City PO on the following
            date by using the two copy of each.”
            A tabulated chart below the charge contained details. Article III
      was as follows:
            “That the said Shri Udai Bhan Singh while functioning as Misc.
B           Asstt. Allahabad RO during the period from 15.07.1985 to
            10.02.1986 did not submit prepare schedule of commission paid
            to authorised agents for sale of NSCs and did not submit the
            schedule with the voucher and bills to the Audit office though
            Account branch of Allahabad HO and did not tally the amount
C           of NS commission with those of HO summary and HO cash book
            in r/o commission paid to the fake authorized NS Agents shown
            in Article No.1 and put the department into a loss of Rs.6,65,63.60.
            By his above acts he contravened the provisions of rule 543(10)
            (b) of P&T Man. Vol.VI Part II.”

D            4. An inquiry officer was appointed to inquire into the charges.
      The inquiry officer submitted a report dated 18 July 1990. The inquiry
      officer found that the first charge was proved to the following extent:
            “Shri Udai Bhan Singh is not fully proved but it is proved to the
            extent that he had helped to put in loss to the department by
            violating the rules for tallying the account putting his initial in token
E
            of checking against every payment of commission bill, submission
            of vouchers and schedule to audit office even though he was
            fully aware with the rules.”
             The second head of charge was held to be partially proved while
      the third charge was held to be proved.
F
             5. Upon receipt of the inquiry report, the disciplinary authority
      awarded a penalty on 31 August 1990 of a reduction of pay for a period
      of five years with consequential loss of annual increments. The
      respondent filed an appeal before the appellate authority. The appellate
      authority issued a notice of enhancement of punishment. The appellate
G     authority by its order dated 9 March 1992 came to the conclusion that
      the charge against the respondent was proved and that it warranted
      his dismissal from service.
             6. Aggrieved by the order of the appellate authority, the respondent
      instituted proceedings before the Central Administrative Tribunal at the
H     Allahabad Bench. By a judgment and order dated 3 July 1992, the
 UNION OF INDIA THR. SECRETARY v. UDAI BHAN SINGH                            533
       [DR. DHANANJAYA Y CHANDRACHUD, J.]

Tribunal set aside both the original order dated 31 August 1990 as well      A
as the order of the appellate authority dated 9 March 1992. The
proceedings were restored back to the disciplinary authority with liberty
to issue a notice to show cause to the respondent and, after allowing
him an opportunity of submitting a representation to arrive at a fresh
decision.
                                                                             B
       7. After the order of the Tribunal, a notice to show cause was
issued to the respondent by the disciplinary authority on 12 September
2000. The disciplinary authority, by an order dated 2 July 200, agreed
with the inquiry officer that the first and second articles of charge were
partly proved while the third charge was fully established. The
disciplinary authority came to the conclusion that the charges which         C
were proved against the respondent would warrant dismissal from
service. An appeal against the order of the disciplinary authority was
dismissed by the appellate authority on 28 November 2008.
       8. On 18 May 2009, the Central Administrative Tribunal dismissed
OA No.151 of 2009 instituted by the respondent. That led to the              D
institution of proceedings before the High Court of Judicature at
Allahabad. By its impugned judgment and order, the Division Bench of
the High Court interfered with the order of the disciplinary authority
and came to the conclusion that there was a violation of the principles
of natural justice. The High Court held that there was a failure on the
                                                                             E
part of the inquiry officer to provide documents to the respondent during
the course of the disciplinary inquiry. The High Court was also of the
view that a notice was issued by the disciplinary authority, following
the first order of the Tribunal, nearly eight years thereafter and there
was a violation of “Rule 27 of the Central Administrative Tribunal, Rules
regarding execution of its orders”. On these grounds, the High Court         F
set aside the order of penalty imposed on the respondent and directed
his reinstatement with full back wages and consequential benefits.
       9. Ms.Kiran Suri, learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf
of the appellants submitted that the High Court was in error in
interfering with the exercise of the disciplinary jurisdiction on both the   G
grounds which have weighed with it. Insofar as the non production of
documents is concerned, it was urged on behalf of the appellants that
the ground has been correctly assessed both by the appellate authority
and by the Tribunal. Ms.Suri submitted that there has been a non
application of mind by the High Court. The provisions of Rule 27 of
the Central Administrative Tribunal Rules have no bearing on the issue.      H
534            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                         [2019] 17 S.C.R.


A     That apart, it is urged that it was found by the appellate authority and
      by the Tribunal that the charges of misconduct were established
      independently. The respondent failed to indicate before the High Court
      which specific documents ought to have been supplied or the prejudice,
      if any, that was caused. Moreover, it has emerged during the course
      of the proceedings that the receipts were not available for inspection
B     since it was the respondent who was in charge of maintaining them at
      the relevant time. On the aspect of delay it is urged that this is not a
      case where there was any delay in the initiation of the disciplinary
      inquiry. Ms.Suri submitted that the Tribunal had in the first instance
      remanded the proceedings to the disciplinary authority and the
C     respondent was reinstated in service during the pendency of the further
      proceedings. It was urged that delay by itself in the present case will
      not result in the invalidation of the disciplinary proceedings; delay has
      to be assessed in each case having regard to the prejudice which is
      caused to the charge-sheeted employee. In the present case, it is
      submitted, evidence had already been recorded prior to the remand, the
D     documentary evidence was filed and the only ground on which the
      Tribunal found fault with the disciplinary authority was that it had
      furnished no reasons for differing with the conclusion which was arrived
      at by the inquiry officer. Ms.Suri submitted that after the Tribunal
      rendered its decision in the first instance, the proceedings were at large
      before the disciplinary authority. On remand, the disciplinary authority
E     agreed with the findings of the inquiry officer, but it came to the
      conclusion that having regard to the misconduct which was proved, the
      penalty of dismissal from service was warranted. Hence, it is submitted
      that no prejudice has been caused to the respondent as a result of the
      delay which was occasioned on account of the issuance of a show
F     cause notice and in the conclusion of the proceedings after the order
      of the Tribunal. In this context, Ms.Suri relied upon decisions of this
      Court to which we will turn during the course of this judgment.
             10. On the other hand, it has been urged on behalf of the
      respondent by Mr.S.D. Singh, learned counsel that (i) the respondent
G     specifically raised the ground of non production of documents during
      the course of the disciplinary proceedings; (ii) the charge against the
      respondent did not indicate any defalcation of funds or loss caused to
      the department; (iii) after the order of the Tribunal in 1992, a notice to
      show cause was issued to him eight years later and it was only after a
      further delay of eight years that a final order was passed by the
H     disciplinary authority. On these grounds, it was submitted that it was
 UNION OF INDIA THR. SECRETARY v. UDAI BHAN SINGH                              535
       [DR. DHANANJAYA Y CHANDRACHUD, J.]

not open to the appellant to proceed against the respondent after a lapse      A
of time. Moreover, it was urged that in the absence of documents being
made available to the respondent, he was handicapped in preparation
of his defence and there was a breach of the principles of natural justice.
      11. The rival submissions fall for consideration.
       12. The charges against the respondent were essentially based           B
on the failure to verify the bills which had been submitted by so-called
NSC agents and the failure to make entries of payment in the ledger.
There was a charge that the respondent did not supervise the process
as a result of which payments were made to NSC agents who were
found to be fake. Receipts were found to be prepared in the names of           C
fake agents as a result of which payment of NSC commission in the
amount of Rs.6.65 lakhs was wrongfully made. The inquiry officer in
the course of the disciplinary inquiry found the first and second heads
of charge to be partially proved while the third charge was held to be
fully proved. The disciplinary authority, however, came to the conclusion
that all the three charges were fully proved and, in consequence,              D
directed a penalty of reduction in scale for a period of five years with
a consequential loss of increments. There was evidently a failure on
the part of the disciplinary authority to give a notice to the charge-
sheeted employee before differing with the findings of the inquiry officer
on the first and second heads of charge which had been held to be              E
partially proved. When the respondent filed an appeal, the appellate
authority issued a notice of enhancement which eventually resulted in
an order of dismissal from service. In this backdrop, the Tribunal by its
judgment dated 3 July 1992 set aside the order of the appellate authority
as well as the order of the disciplinary authority and remanded the
proceedings back to the disciplinary authority. The disciplinary authority     F
was directed to issue a fresh notice to the respondent before it came
to a conclusion in the matter. It was following the order of the Tribunal
that a notice was issued to the respondent. While issuing its notice on
22 September 2000, the disciplinary authority did not propose to differ
with the findings of the inquiry officer on the charges of misconduct.
                                                                               G
The disciplinary authority held that the first and second articles of charge
were partially proved and the third was fully proved in terms of the
findings of the inquiry officer. However, the disciplinary authority came
to the conclusion that the charges which were proved against the
respondent were serious enough to warrant a punishment of dismissal.
Following the order of the Tribunal in the first instance, the disciplinary    H
536             SUPREME COURT REPORTS                         [2019] 17 S.C.R.


A     authority was at liberty to take a fresh view of the matter after issuing
      a notice to show cause and furnishing an opportunity of making a
      representation to the respondent. This, the disciplinary authority did
      by issuing a notice which furnished to the respondent an opportunity to
      submit his response.
B            13. This leads us to the issue as to whether there was a breach
      of the principles of natural justice. The submission found favour with
      the High Court in the impugned judgment. The question as to whether
      there was a failure of natural justice was dealt with by the disciplinary
      authority. Thereafter,the issue was considered by the appellate
      authority. The Tribunal, while dealing with the submission, came to the
C     conclusion that the respondent was attempting to take undue advantage
      of the non availability of cash receipts but the payment could be verified
      from other records and documents which were maintained in the Head
      Post Office. In other words, according to the Tribunal, the non availability
      of a particular document on the record did not make any difference to
      the charge of misconduct which was established by other materials
D     which were available on the record. The High Court merely observed
      that the respondent was not provided the documents which were relied
      upon and that there was an error apparent on the face of the record in
      the order of the Tribunal. The High Court did not consider which
      documents were not supplied, the relevance of those documents to the
E     charge of misconduct and the prejudice, if any, that resulted to the
      respondent by the non availability of the relevant documents.. In fact,
      in the pleadings of the respondent, the plea that there was a failure to
      supply documents was vague and there was no reference to which
      specific document ought to have been made available. Without analyzing
      this aspect of the case, the High Court interfered with the disciplinary
F     jurisdiction of the appellant on a vague plea that documents were not
      supplied. The High Court ought to have enquired into the question of
      prejudice. There is also substance in the submission which has been
      urged by Ms.Suri, learned Senior Counsel with regard to the erroneous
      reference to Rule 27 of the Central Administrative Tribunal Rules. Rule
      27 has no bearing at all on the controversy in the present case. Section
G     27 of the Administrative Tribunals Act 1985 deals with execution of
      the orders of the Tribunal.
             14. The aspect of delay must be considered in the context of
      the admitted facts. The inquiry had been concluded by the inquiry officer.
      Evidence was recorded during the course of the inquiry. The order of
H     the disciplinary authority holding that all the three charges had been
    UNION OF INDIA THR. SECRETARY v. UDAI BHAN SINGH                            537
          [DR. DHANANJAYA Y CHANDRACHUD, J.]

proved was without issuing a notice to the respondent on the reasons            A
for disagreement with the report of the inquiry officer. The appellate
authority enhanced the punishment without indicating adequate reasons.
The Tribunal restored the proceedings back to the disciplinary authority
to enable the appellants to issue a fresh notice to show cause to the
respondent and to arrive at a conclusion on the nature of the
misconduct, if any, after furnishing an opportunity to the respondent of        B
making a representation. Neither was the inquiry required to be held
afresh nor was fresh evidence to be recorded. After the order of the
tribunal, a notice to show cause was issued to the respondent after eight
years. But it must equally be noted that the respondent had been
reinstated following the order of the tribunal setting aside the disciplinary   C
action, pending the conclusion of the process by the disciplinary
authority. Hence, the delay on the part of the disciplinary authority in
issuing a show cause notice in the first instance and in passing a final
order thereafter is not a matter of any prejudice to the respondent.
      15. Now, it is well settled that the aspect of delay has to be dealt
                                                                                D
with on the facts of each case. In the decision of this Court in State
of Madhya Pradesh vs. Bani Singh and Another2, the irregularities,
which were the subject matter of an inquiry related to 1975-1977.
Hence this Court held that it was not reasonable that the department
had taken more than twelve years to initiate a disciplinary proceeding
despite being aware of the irregularities. That was a case where there          E
was an unexplained delay in the initiation of disciplinary proceedings.
Subsequently, the position of law has been clarified by the decisions of
this Court in State of Punjab and Others vs. Chaman Lal Goyal3,
State of A.P. vs. N.Radhakishan 4 and Secretary, Forest
Department and Others vs. Abdur Rasul Chowdhury5.
In Government of Andhra Pradesh and Others vs. V.Appala                         F
Swamy6, this Court after referring to the earlier decisions held thus:
       “12..So far as the question of delay in concluding the
       departmental proceedings as against a delinquent officer is
       concerned, in our opinion, no hard-and-fast rule can be laid down
       therefor. Each case must be determined on its own facts. The             G

2
  1990 (Supp) SCC 738
3
  (1995) 2 SCC 570
4
  (1998) 4 SCC 154
5
  (2009) 7 SCC 305
6
  (2007) 14 SCC 49                                                              H
538              SUPREME COURT REPORTS                        [2019] 17 S.C.R.


A            principles upon which a proceeding can be directed to be quashed
             on the ground of delay are:
             (1) where by reason of the delay, the employer condoned the
             lapses on the part of the employee:
             (2) where the delay caused prejudice to the employee.
B
             Such a case of prejudice, however, is to be made out by the
             employee before the inquiry officer.
             13. This aspect of the matter is now squarely covered by the
             decisions of this Court in Secy. to Govt., Prohibition & Excise
             Deptt. v. L. Srinivisan; 7 P.D.Agrawal v. State Bank of
C
             India 8 ; Registrar, Coop. Societies v. Sachindra Nath
             Pandey9.”
            16. In the present case, the appellants have not condoned the
      lapse on the part of the respondent. The delay was not a matter of
      prejudice.
D
             17. For the above reasons, we have come to the conclusion that
      the High Court was in error in interfering with the exercise of the
      disciplinary jurisdiction of the appellants. The misconduct was proved.
      The penalty which has been imposed cannot be held to be
      disproportionate or arbitrary. The High Court was in error in setting
E     aside the punishment and ordering reinstatement with back wages and
      continuity of service.
            18. Accordingly, we allow the appeal and set aside the impugned
      judgment and order of the High Court dated 1 May 2012. We affirm
      the judgment of the Central Administrative Tribunal dismissing the
F     Original Application filed by the respondent and uphold the finding and
      penalty imposed in the disciplinary proceedings. Since the respondent
      was reinstated following the first order of the Tribunal dated 3 July 1992,
      no recovery shall be made from him for the period for which he has
      worked and during which salary has been paid to him. There shall be
      no order as to costs.
G

      Devika Gujral                                                Appeal allowed.

      7
        (1996) 3 SCC 157
      8
        (2006) 8 SCC 776
H     9
        (1995) 3 SCC 134