UNION OF INDIA & ORS.versusV.N. SINGH

                         [2010] 4 S.C.R. 454


A                     UNION OF INDIA & ORS.
                                   v.
                             V.N. SINGH
                  {Civil Appeal No (s). 32 of 2003)

                           APRIL 08, 2010
8
        [HARJIT SINGH BEDI AND J.M. PANCHAL, JJ.]

        Army Act, 1950:

c      s. 122 - Period of limitation for trial - Irregularities with
  regard to local purchase of certain goods in a Army Depot -
  Disciplinary action against an officer - General Court Martial
  convened and punishment of forfeiture of 11 years past
  service for purposes of pension, imposed - Set aside by High
0 Court holding that GCM proceedings time barred -
  Sustainability of - Held: Not sustainable - Period of limitation
  for trial of the officer commenced when GOG-in-Chief-next
  superior authority in chain of command in terms of s. 122(1)(b),
  came to know about the commission of offence by the officer
E and issued direction to take disciplinary action against him -
  GCM commenced trial after two years, thus was within the
  period of limitation in terms of s.122(1)(b) - Staff officer who
  ordered preliminary investigation, was not the person
  aggrieved by the offence - He only had technical control over
  the department - Thus, order of High Court set aside.
F
       s. 122(1)(b) - Term 'person aggrieved by the offence' -
  Held: Is attracted to natural persons-human beings who are
  victims of an offence and not to juristic persons like an
  organisation.
G
       Words and Phrases: 'Aggrieved' - Meaning of

      During the inspection of Reserved Petroleum Depot,
  Delhi Cantonment, certain irregularities were noticed with
  regard to local purchase of certain goods. The
H                           454
        UNION OF INDIA & ORS. v. V.N. SINGH                455


respondent was the Officiating Commandant in RPO. The A
Technical Court of Inquiry and Staff Court of Inquiry was
convened. The disciplinary action was initiated against
the respondent. The Commanding Officer invoked s.123
of the Army Act and took the respondent into close
custody. The respondent challenged the said order. The B
High Court stayed the order of the Commanding Officer.
As directed by the High Court, General Court Martial was
convened and the respondent was found guilty of some
charges and the punishment of forfeiture of 8 year's past
service for purpose of pension was imposed subject to c
the confirmation by the Major General, GOC. The
Confirming Authority sent back the report to GCM to
revise/reconsider the exoneration of respondent from
some charges. The respondent filed writ petition. On
direction from the Confirming Authority, GCM was 0
convened. It passed a fresh order forfeiting 11 years of
past service of respondent for the purpose of pension as
well as the punishment of severe reprimand. The
Confirming Authority approved the finding of GCM and
imposition of sentence but did not approve the E
punishment of severe reprimand. The said order was
promulgated and was handed over to the respondent.
The respondent filed application for amendment. The
High Court holding that GCM proceedings were initiated
after expiry of the period of limitation prescribed by
s.122(1)(b), quashed the GCM proceedings as well as the F
sentence imposed upon the respondent. Hence the
present appeal.

    Allowing the appeal, the Court
                                                                  G
      HELD: 1.1. Section 122 of the Army Act, 1950
prescribes period of limitation for trial by Court Martial of
any person subject to the provisions of the Act for ..any
offence committed by him. A fair reading of s. 122 makes
it clear that after the expiry of the period of limitation, the   H
   456      SUPREME COURT REPORTS              [2010] 4 S.C.R.


A Court Martial will ordinarily have no jurisdiction to try the
  case. Section 122 is a complete Code in itself so far as
  the period of limitation is concerned for not only it
  provides in Sub-section (1) the period of limitation for
  such trials but specifies in Sub-section (2) thereof, the
B offences in respect of which the limitation clause would
  not apply. Since the Section is in absolute terms and no
  provision has been made under the Act for extension of
  time, it is obvious that any trial commenced after the
  period of limitation will be patently illegal. The question
c of limitation to be determined u/s. 122 of the Act is not
  purely a question of law. It is a mixed question of fact and
  law and therefore in exercise of Writ Jurisdiction under
  Article 226 of the Constitution, ordinarily the High Court
  will not interfere with the findings of Court Martial on
  question of limitation decided u/s. 122 of the Army Act.
0
  Section 122 in substance prescribes that no trial by Court
  Martial of any person subject to the provisions of the Act
  for any offence shall commence after the expiration of a
  period of three years. It further explains as to when period
E of three years shall commence. It provides that the period
  of three years shall commence on the date of the offence
  or where the commission of the offence was not known
  to the person aggrieved by the offence or to the authority
  competent to initiate action, the first day on which such
  offence comes to the knowledge of such person or
F authority whichever is earlier. [Paras 6 and 7] [469-F; 470-
  F-H; 471-A-F]

      1.2. With regard to the question as to who is the
  person aggrieved within the meaning of s. 122(1)(b),
G according to the respondent Brigadier KS was the
  person aggrieved and the period of three years shall
  commence from the date when commission of offence by
  the respondent came to his knowledge on May 17, 1993
  when Lt Col. PO submitted his report to KS. The term "the
H person aggrieved by the offence" would be attracted to
       UNION OF INDIA & ORS. v. V.N. SINGH              457


natural persons i.e. human beings who are victims of an         A
offence complained of, such as offences relating to a
person or property and not to juristic persons like an
organisation as in the instant case. The plain and
dictionary meaning of the term "aggrieved" means hurt,
angry, upset, wronged, maltreated, persecuted,                  B
victimised etc. It is only the natural persons who can be
hurt, angry, upset or wronged or maltreated etc. If a
Government organisation is treated to be an aggrieved
person then the second part of s. 122(1)(b) i.e. "when it
comes to the knowledge of the competent authority to            c
initiate action" will never come into play as the
commission of offence will always be in the knowledge
of the authority who is part of the organisation and who
may not be the authority competent to initiate the action.
[Para 7] [471-F-H; 472-A-D]

      1.3. A meaningful reading of the provisions of s.
122(1)(b) makes it absolutely dear that in the case of
Government organisation, it will be the date of knowledge
of the authority competent to initiate the action, which will
determine the question of limitation. Therefore, the            E
finding of the High Court that KS was an aggrieved
person is legally and factually incorrect and
unsustainable. Neither KS nor BS were competent to
initiate action against the respondent because the term
"competent to initiate action" refers to the competency         F
of the authority to initiate or direct disciplinary action
against any person subject to the provisions of the Army
Act. When an offence or misconduct is alleged to have
been committed by a person subject to the Army Act,
then the Officer in chain of command is required to take        G
action for investigation of the charges and trial by court
martial as per s. 1, Chapter V of the Army Rules or order
Court of Inquiry and subsequently finalise the Court of
Inquiry u/s. 2 Chapter VI of the Army Rules. These
                                                                H
    458    SUPREME COURT REPORTS              [2010] 4 S.C.R.

A powers are vested in the officers in chain of command.
    Those powers are not vested with staff Officers. Since the
    respondent was commanding 4 RPO, his next officer in
    command was GOC, Delhi Area and the power to take
    disciplinary action was vested with him in terms of para
B 16(a)(i) of the Defence Service Regulations, read with the
    Command and Control instructions dated January 1,
    1991 issued by the Headquarter Western Command.
    Therefore, KS had only technical control of 4RPD and
    had therefore recommended to his higher authority to
c close down the case but himself had not taken a decision
    to close down the case or to continue the case against
    the respondent. The power to initiate action in terms of
    s. 122(1)(b) of the Army Act was only with GOC Delhi
                                                     '
    Area who is next superior authority in chain of command.
    The record shows .that even the power to convene a
0
  , Court of Inquiry was available only with GOC Delhi Area
    and GOC-in-C Western command since they are the
    authorities in command of body of troops and the power
    to convene a Court of Inquiry in terms of Army Rule 177
E is vested only with an Officer in command of body of
    troops. [Para 7] [472-D-H; 473-A-D]

       1.4. The facts of the instant case establish that the
  Technical Court of Inquiry was convened by DOST
  Headquarter Delhi Area on January 8, 1994 which
F recommended examination of certain essential witnesses
  for bringing into light the correct details and the persons
  responsible for the irregularities by a Staff Court of
  Inquiry and accordingly the Staff Court of Inquiry was
  ordered on May 7, 1994 by GOC-in-C Western Command
G which concluded in its report dated August 31, 1994,
  mentioning for the first time the involvement of the
  respondent in the offence. The GOC Delhi Area i.e. the
  next Authority in chain of command to the respondent
  recommended on October 19, 1994 initiation of
H disciplinary action against the respondent whereas the
       UNION OF !NOIA & ORS. v. V.N. SINGH             459


GOC-in-C Western Command gave directions on                   A
December 3, 1994, to initiate disciplinary action against
the respondent. Therefore, the date of commencement of
the period of limitation for the purpose of GCM of the
respondent, commenced on December 3, 1994 when
direction was given by GOC-in-C Western Command to            B
initiate disciplinary action against the respondent. The
plea that the date of submission of the report by Technical
Court of Inquiry should be treated as the date from which
period of limitation shall commence has no substance.
No definite conclusion about the correct details and the      c
persons responsible for the irregularities were mentioned
in the report of Technical Court of Inquiry. [Para 7] [473-
D-H; 474-A-B]

     1.5. The High Court wrongly concluded that the
period of limitation expired on March 4, 1996. The letter D
dated May 27, 1!!93 written by KS to Major General ASC
Headquarter Western ·Command does not mention at all,
the respondent as the person who had committed the
irregularities except for a reference that there had been
certain procedural lapses on the part of 4RPD. The said E
letter was addressed by KS apparently with a view to
close the case in total disregard to the facts and the
circumstances emerging from the case. This fact has
been observed by the GOC-in-C Western Command who
while giving direction to initiate administrative action F
against KS ordered initiation of departmental inquiry
against the respondent. Even the reference to ACR of the
respondent written by BS only mentions that the
respondent had failed to monitor the local purchase of
Hygiene and Chemicals but there is no mention that the G
respondent was himself responsible for the irregularities
found to have been committed in the purchase of Hygiene
and Chemicals. It was only after the detailed investigation
by Staff Court of Inquiry that the irregularities committed
by the respondent and his role in the purchase of H
    460      SUPREME COURT REPORTS                [2010] 4 S.C.R.


A Hygiene and Chemicals came to light. The period of
  limitation for the purpose of trial of the respondent
  commenced on December 3, 1994 when the GOC-in-C
  Western Command being the competent authority
  directed disciplinary action against the respondent in
B terms of s. 122{1){b). The period of three years from the
  direction dated December 3, 1994 would expire on
  December 2, 1997, whereas the GCM commenced the trial
  against the respondent on December 17, 1996 which was
  well within the period of limitation of three years.
c Therefore, the GCM commenced trial, against the
  respondent within the period of limitation as prescribed
  bys. 122{1)(b) of the Army Act. The impugned judgment
  is legally unsustainable and is set aside. [Paras 7 and 8]
  [474-8-H; 475-A-B]

D        CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 32
    of 2003.

        From the Judgment & Order dated 15.3.2002 of the High
    Court of Delhi at New Delhi in CWP No. 5451 of 1998.
E
         Indira Jaisingh, ASG, V. Subramanium, SWA Qadri,
    Aditya Sharma, Anil Katiyar, S. Bakshi, Ram Bastian, B.V.
    Balaram Das for the Appellants.

      Yatish Mohan, Vinita Y. Mohan, K.J. Janjani for the
F Respondent.

        The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

       J.M. PANCHAL, J. 1. The instant appeal is directed
  against Judgment dated March 15, 2002 rendered by the High
G Court of Delhi in C.W.P. No. 5451 of 1998 by which (1) the order
  dated October 30, 1996 invoking Section 123 of the Army Act
  and taking the respondent in close custody (2) the findings
  recorded by General Court Martial holding the respondent guilty
  of some of the charges and imposing punishment of forfeiture
H of 8 years past service of the respondent for the purposes of
         UNION OF INDIA & ORS. v. V.N. SINGH                    461
                 [J.M. PANCHAL, J.]
  the pension vide order dated April 3, 1997 (3) the order dated        A
  June 14, 1997 passed by Mr. K.K. Verma, the then Major
  General, General Officer Commanding, 22 Infantry Division,
  directing the General Court Martial to re-assemble in open Court
  at Meerut on June 28, 1997 for reconsidering its findings on
  the first, second, third, fourth, sixth, seventh and eighth charges   B
  levelled against the respondent and the adequacy of the
  sentence of forfeiture of 8 years of past service for the purpose
  of pension awarded to him by the General Court Martial (4) the
  revised order dated July 2, 1997 passed by General Court
  Marital adhering to its earlier findings but revoking its earlier     c
  order of sentence and imposing sentence of forfeiture of 11
  years past service for the purposes of pension and severe
  reprimand subject to he confirmation by Major General, General
  Officer Commanding and (5) the communication dated April 8,
  2000 addressed by Col. Dy .. CDR Mr. P.K.Sharma                       0
  promulgating the order of the Confirming Authority by which
  sentence of forfeiture of 11 years past service of the respondent
. for the purposes of pension, was confirmed and (6) the
  communication dated May 15, 2000 by ODA and OMG Mr.
  G.Vinod for CDR mentioning that the promulgation order                E
  carried out on May 15, 2000 was handed over to the
  respondent and order dated April 17, 2000 promulgating
  punishment of forfeiture of 8 years past service of the
  respondent for the purposes of pension and severe reprimand
  was de-promulgated and cancelled, are set aside, on the
  ground that trial of the respondent by Court Martial was time         F
  barred in view of the provisions of Section 122 (1)(b) of the
  Army Act, 1950 .

      1. The facts emerging from the record of the case are as
 under:-                                                                G

      The respondent i.e. Mr. V.N.Singh who was Lt. Col. was
      posted as Officiating Commandant in 4 Reserved
      Petroleum Depot ('4 RPO' for short), Delhi Cantonment.
      During the inspection of 4RPD, certain irregularities were        H
    462     SUPREME COURT REPORTS                  [2010] 4 S.C.R.


A        noticed with regard to local purchase of the Hygiene and
         Chemicals in the month of May 1993. Therefore, by a letter
         dated May 5, 1993, the then Lt. Col. P.Oomen, who was
         Additional Director, Supply and Transport, Delhi area was
         directed by the then Brigadier Mr. K.S.Bharucha, who was
B        holding the post of Deputy Director, Supply and Transport,
         Headquarters Delhi area ('DOST' for short), to carry out
         preliminary investigation of local purchase of Hygiene and
         Chemicals as well as other fuel oils and lubricant items by
         4 RPO, during the year 1992-93. Accordingly, preliminary
c        investigation was carried out by Lt. Col. P.Oomen. On May
       . 17, 1993 he submitted his report to Brigadier
         K.S.Bharucha, DOST, who in turn forwarded the report on
         May 27, 1993 to Major General of Army Supply Corps
         ('ASC' for short) Headquarters Western Command,
         Chandimandir. In that report, the DOST recommended
D
         closure of the case.

         The Major General, ASC, Headquarters Western
    Command, did not consider the case appropriate for closure.
    He therefore, forwarded the papers to the Headquarters
E   Western Command. The Headquarters suggested to the Major
    General by letter dated June 12, 1993 to seek explanation of
    the respondent. The Major General ASC therefore issued a
    show-cause notice dated June 18, 1993 to the respondent and
    sought his explanation on the point of procedural lapses in local
F   purchase. The respondent in his reply dated July 6, 1993
    admitted certain procedural lapses on the part of 4 RPO and
    regretted the same, since such lapses were due to practical
    problems. Thereafter, the DOST accepted the explanation given
    by the respondent and again recommended the Headquarters
G   Western Command (ST) Chandigarh to treat the case as
    closed if deemed fit by communication dated July 9, 1993. On
    September, 9, 1993, the Major General ASC, Headquarters
    Western Command, endorsed certain remarks in the pen
    picture of the respondent while writing his ACR. On January 8,
H   1994 a Technical Court of Inquiry was convened by Brigadier
        UNION OF INDIA & ORS. v. V.N. SINGH                   463
                [J.M. PANCHAL, J.]

 Narsimhan, who had replaced Brigadier K.S.Bharucha, as               A
 DOST. The Lt. Col. Ram Darshan of 226 Company ASC
 Supplies was asked to act as the Presiding Officer. The report
 along with the proceedings of Technical Court of Inquiry were
 forwarded to the DOST. The DOST recommended to the Major
 General ASC, Headquarters Western Command, vide                      B
 communication dated March 3, 1994 to go for a thorough
 investigation by Staff Court of Inquiry. Therefore, on May 7, 1994
 a Staff Court of Inquiry was convened pursuant to the orders of
 the General Officer Commanding-in-Chief, ('GOC-in-C' for
 short) Western Command. Before Staff Court of Inquiry, ('S.C.I.'     c
 for short) witnesses were examined and documents produced.
 The Staff Court of Inquiry concluded its proceedings and
 submitted its recommendations on August 31, 1994 blaming
 the respondent specifically along with few other personnel for
 irregularities, in the loc;:il purchase of Hygiene and Chemicals
                                                                      0
during the period 1992-93. After examining the
 recommendations of SCI, the GOC, Delhi area, Major General
A.R.K. Reddy, recommended on October 19, 1994, disciplinary
action against the respondent. Thereafter, the GOC-in-C
Western Command, Lt. Gen. R.K. Gulati, directed to initiate
disciplinary action against the respondent vide communication         E
dated December 3, 1994. On August 23, 1995 the disciplinary
action was commenced against the respondent by way of
hearing of parties as required by Rule 22 of the Army Rules
and a direction for recording of summary of evidence was
ordered by the Commanding Officer i.e. Commander 35 Infantry          F
Brigade under whom the respondent was working at the
relevant time. The Commanding Officer, vide order dated
October 30, 1996 invoked the provisions of Section 123 of the
Army Act 1950, and took the respondent into close custody as
superannuation of the respondent was due on October 31,               G
1996 and it was apprehended that the respondent would flee
the course of justice.

    The respondent filed Criminal Writ Petition 726 of 1996
before the Delhi High Court challenging the order dated               H
    464     SUPREME COURT REPORTS                  [2010] 4 S.C.R.


A October 30, 1996 on the ground that Section 123 of the Army
  Act was wrongly invoked and trial if any by GCM was barred
  by limitation under Section 122 of the Army Act. The respondent
  also prayed to direct the authority to pay compensation at the
  rate of Rs. 50,000/- for each day of illegal detention. By an order
B dated December 3, 1996, the High Court stayed the operation
  of order dated October 30, 1996 and directed the respondent
  to raise the points mentioned in his Writ Petition, before
  General Court Martial. On December 11, 1996, the General
  Officer Commanding, 22 Infantry Division issued an order
c convening General Court Martial ('GCM' for short). Accordingly,
  GCM was convened. By order dated April 3, 1997, the GCM
  found the respondent guilty of some charges and not guilty of
  some other charges. By the said order, the GCM imposed the
  punishment of forfeiture of 8 year's past service for the purpose
  of pension on the respondent subject to the confirmation of the
0
  same by the Major General, General Officer Commanding. This
  report of the GCM was sent to the Confirming Authority. The
  Confirming Authority vide order dated June14, 1997, sent back
  the report to GCM, under the provisions of Section 160 of the
  Army Act to revise/reconsider the exoneration of the respondent
E from some of the charges and decide whether the punishment
  imposed on the respondent was lenient or not. Thereupon, the
  respondent filed Writ Petition No. 5451 of 1997 challenging
  aforementioned order dated June 14, 1997 as well as validity
  of Sections 153, 154 and 160 of the Army Act, 1950. Writ
F Petition No. 5451 of 1997 was filed by the respondent without
  prejudice to the contentions and averments made in Criminal
  Writ Petition No. 726 of 1996.

       In view of the directions from the Confirming Authority,
G GCM was convened. The GCM submitted its report dated July
  2, 1997. The report indicates that the GCM adhered to its
  earlier finding but passed a fresh order of sentence forfeiting
  11 years of past service of the respondent for the purpose of
  pension as well as the punishment of severe reprimand. A copy
H of the order dated July 2, 1997 was also forwarded to the
        UNION OF INDIA & ORS. v. V.N. SINGH                 465
                [J.M. PANCHAL, J.]
 respondent. On receipt of the order dated July 2, 1997 the         A
 respondent brought to the notice of the Court hearing Criminal
Writ Petition No. 726 of 1996, the subsequent developments
which had\ taken place. The Court noticed that order dated June
 14, 1997 passed by the Competent Authority, was subject
 matter of challenge, in Writ Petition No. 5451 of 1997 which       B
was pending. On subsequent events being brought to the notice
 of the Court, the Court was of the opinion that keeping Criminal
Writ Petitio~ No. 726 of 1996 pending was of no use and ends
of justice would be met if liberty is reserved to amend
memorandum of Writ Petition No. 5451 of 1997 and to raise           c
all questions in the said pending Writ Petition. After reserving
necessary liberty to the respondent, the Court disposed
Criminal Writ Petition No. 726 of 1996 by an order dated August
19, 1998. The order dated July 2, 1997 passed by GCM was
considered by the Confirming Authority. The Confirming
                                                                    0
Authority approved the finding of GCM and imposition of
sentence of forfeiture of 11 years past service of the respondent
for the purpose of pension. However, the Confirming Authority
did not approve/confirm the punishment of severe reprimand
imposed by the GCM on the respondent. By communication
                                                                    E
dated April 8, 2000 the order of the Confirming Authority was
promulgated. Thereafter, vide communication dated May 15,
2000 promulgation of order was handed over to the
respondent. Thereafter, the respondent moved an application
for amendment of Writ Petition No.5451 of 1997 which was
allowed. By way of amendment the respondent challenged              F
validity of orders dated April 3, 1997, July 2, 1997, October 30,
1996, April 8; 2000 and May 15, 2000 over and above claiming
compensation. The High Court by Judgment dated March 15,
2002 has allowed the Writ Petition and quashed GCM
proceedings as well as the sentence imposed upon the                G
respondent after holding that GCM proceedings were initiated
after expiry of the period of limitation prescribed by Section
122(1) (b) of the Army Act, 1950, which has given rise to the
instant appeal.
                                                                    H
    466     SUPREME COURT REPORTS                   [2010] 4 S.C.R.


A        3. This Court has heard Ms. Indira Jaisingh, the Learned
    Additional Solicitor General for the appellants and Mr. Yatish
    Mohan, the learned advocate for the respondent at great length
    and in detail. This Court has also considered the documents
    forming part of the instant appeal.
B
          4. Ms. Indira Jaisingh, Learned ASG argued that in terms
     of Section 122(1)(b) of the Army Act, the then Brigadier
     K.S.Bharucha was not the person aggrieved by the offence and
     neither the then Brigadier K.S.Bharucha nor Major General BS
     Suhag were competent to initiate action against the respondent
C   but G.O.C. Delhi area was Disciplinary Authority of the
     respondent who learnt about the offence having been
    committed by the respondent for the first time on receipt of the
     report of Staff Court of Inquiry submitted on December 3, 1994
    and as the G.C.M. commenced the trial on December 17, 1996
D   the same could not have been treated as time barred under
    Section 122 (1 )(b) of the Army Act. It was asserted that the
    Technical Court of Inquiry could not come to a definite
    conclusion about the correct details of purchase of Hygiene and
    Chemicals nor any definite conclusion could be reached about
E   the persons rm~ponsible for the irregularities but the involvement
    of the respondent came to the light only in August 1994 when
    the Staff Court of Inquiry submitted its report and therefore the
    High Court was not justified in quashing the proceedings of
    G.C.M. on the ground that they were time barred. What was
F   highlighted by the Learned A.S.G. was that in the letter dated
    May 27, 1993 addressed by Brigadier K.S.Bharucha to MG
    ASC Headquarter Western Command, there was no mention
    whatsoever about the respondent being the person who had
    committed the irregularities except a reference to the fact that
G   certain procedural lapses had taken place on the part of 4RPD
    and as the said letter was apparently addressed with a view
    to closing the case in total disregard of the facts and
    circumstances of the case, the said letter could not have been
    taken into consideration for the purpose of coming to the
H   conclusion that the proceedings of G.C.M. were time barred.
        UNION OF INDIA & ORS. v. V.N. SINGH                  467
                [J.M. PANCHAL, J.]
After referring to the A.C.R. of the respondent written by Major     A
General BS Suhag it was argued that what becomes apparent
therefrom is that the respondent had failed to monitor the local
purchase of Hygiene and Chemicals but there was no mention
that the respondent was himself involved in it and therefore the
date on which the A.C.R. was written also could not have been        B
taken into consideration for the purpose of determining whether
the proceedings of G.C.M. were time barred. The Learned ASG
stressed that the period of limitation for the purpose of trial of
the respondent commenced on December 3, 1994, when the
then GOC-in-Chief Western Command who is competent                   c
authority came to know about the commission of offence by the
respondent and directed to take disciplinary action against the
respondent and as period of limitation of three years in terms
of Section 122(1)(b) expired on December 2, 1997 the same
co.uld not have been treated as time barred. The Learned             0
Counsel asserted that the Judgment of the High Court
questioned in the appeal is not only erroneous on the facts
brought on the record of the case but also misinterprets the
provisions of the Army Act and therefore the same should be
set aside.
                                                                     E
     5. The Learned Counsel for the respondent argued that
after scrutinising the entire documentary evidence the High
Court has rightly reached to the conclusion that the trial of the
respondent by GCM was time barred and rightly allowed the
Writ Petition filed by him. It was maintained that during the        F
inspection of 4RPD, certain irregularities were noticed with
regard to the local purchase of Hygiene and Chemicals by
4RPD Delhi in the month of May 1993 and the respondent who
was Officiating Commandant of said 4 RPO was immediately
removed from the said post and was placed as Officiating             G
Commandant of 5033 Army Service Corps battalion functioning
directly under Headquarters 33 Corps, which indicates that in
May 1993 the so-called involvement of the respondent in the
irregularities noticed with regard to the local purchase of the
Hygiene and Chemicals, had become evident and therefore the          H
    468      SUPREME COURT REPORTS                  [2010] 4 S.C.R.


A   proceedings initiated against him should be treated as time
    barred. The Learned Counsel for the respondent drew the
    attention of the Court to the communication dated May 5, 1993
    addressed by DOST Brigadier K.S.Bharucha on behalf of the
    Headquarter Delhi Area to Lt. Col. P. Oomen, ADST asking
B   him to conduct the inquiry into the lapses found in local purchase
    by 4 RPO, pursuant to which report was submitted to
    Headquarter Delhi Area, wherein it was concluded that
    irregularities were committed in purchase of Hygiene and
    Chemicals and therefore the period of limitation would start
c   running from May 27, 1993 when the said report was submitted
    by Mr. K.S.Bharucha, DOST to Major General, Army Service
    Corps at Headquarter Western Command. According to the
    Learned Counsel for the respondent, the DOST issued a notice
    dated June 18, 1993 calling upon the respondent to explain
    procedural lapses in.local purchase of Hygiene and Chemicals
0
    by 4RPD wherein there is reference to instructions of
    Headq~arter Western Command dated June 12, 1993 and
    therefore the relevant period for the purpose of deciding the
    question whether the proceedings were time barred or not
    should be taken to be June 12, 1993. What was asserted was
E   that while writing the ACR of the respondent on September 6,
    1993 the Headquarter Western Command, Chandigarh in the
    column of brief comments had mentioned that the respondent
    needed to exercise more discretion and caution while dealing
    with funds and therefore the said date would also be relevant
F   for the purpose of determining the question whether the
    proceedings were time barred. It was argued that the order
    dated October 30, 1996, taking the respondent into close
    custody under Section 123 of the Army Act, 1950, was passed
    because the respondent was charged for the offence of
G   procedural lapses in local purchase of Hygiene and Chemicals
    during his tenure as Officiating Commandant of 4RPD Delhi
    Area Cantonment and therefore the date on which the
    respondent was taken into close custody would also be relevant
    for the purpose of determining the question whether the
H   proceedings initiated against the respondent were time barred.
         UNION OF INDIA & ORS. v. V.N. SINGH                  469
                 [J.M. PANCHAL, J.]
 What was asserted was that the respondent was identified as          A
 the offender firstly in May 1993 after the report of Lt. Col. P.
 Oomen and secondly on May 27, 1993 when DOST
 Headquarter Delhi Area on behalf of GOC had submitted the
 report of inquiry to Headquarters ASC Western Command at
 Chandigarh concluding that, there was certainly procedural           B
 lapses in local purchase of Hygiene and Chemicals on the part
 of 4RPD which was under the control of the respondent and
 therefore the proceedings have been rightly treated as time
 barred by the High Court. According to the Learned Counsel
 for the respondent the competent authority of the respondent         c
 was his Commanding Officer i.e. Brigadier K.S.Bharucha,
 DOST and as the competent authority had initiated action on
 October 30, 1996 by detaining the respondent, the proceedings
 in question should be treated as time barred. The Learned
 Counsel argued that the person aggrieved within the meaning
                                                                      0
 of Section 122 of the Act, means the person should be
 answerable to the superiors in chain of command for the 'act,
 commission or omission done by his subordinate and as DOST
 was aggrieved person under whom the respondent was
 discharging duties, the period of limitation would start running     E
 from the date of report of the Court of Inquiry, when identity of
 the offence and offender was ascertained and therefore the well
 reasoned judgment of the High Court should be upheld by this
 Court.

       6. Section 122 of the Army Act, 1950 prescribes period         F
  of limitation for trial by Court Martial of any person subject to
. the provisions of the Act for any offence committed by him. The
  said Section reads as under:-
                      I
                      I

      "Section 122. Period of limitation for trial - (1) Except as    G
      provided by sub-section (2), no trial by court-marital of any
      person subject to tHis Act for any offence shall be
      commenced after the expiration of a period of three years
      and such period shall commence-

      (a) on the date of the offence; or                              H
    470       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                   [2010] 4 S.C.R.

A         (b) where the commission of the offence was not known
          to the person aggrieved by the offence or to the authority
          competent to initiate action, the first day on which such
          offence comes to the knowledge of such person or
          authority, whichever is earlier; or
B
          (c) where it is not known by whom the offence was
          committed, the first day on which the identity of the offender
          is known to the person aggrieved by the offence or to the
          authority competent to initiate action, whichever is earlier.
c         (2) The provisions of sub-section (1) shall not apply to a
          trial for an offence of desertion or fraudulent enrolment or
          for any of the offences mentioned in section 37.

          (3) In the computation of the period of time mentioned in
D         sub-section (1 ), any time spent by such person as a
          prisoner of war, or in enemy territory; or in evading arrest
          after the commission of the offence, shall be excluded.

          (4) No trial for an offence of desertion other than desertion
          on active service or of fraudulent enrolment shall be
E         commenced if the person in question, not being an officer,
          has subsequently to the commission of the offence, served
          continuously in an exemplary manner for not less than three
          years with any portion of the regular Army."

F      A fair reading of the abovementioned Section makes it
  clear that after the expiry of the period of limitation, the Court
  Martial will ordinarily have no jurisdiction to try the case. The
  purpose of Section 122 is that in a civilised society a person
  should not live, for the rest of his natural life, under a Sword of
G Damocles and the prosecution be allowed to rake up any
  skeleton from any cupboard at any time when the accused may
  have no further materials, oral or documentary, to prove that the
  skeleton is not from his cupboard. If the device is left open to
  the prosecution to convene a Court Martial at its leisure and
H convenience, Section 122 will lose all significance. Section 122
        UNION OF INDIA & ORS. v. V.N. SINGH                     471
                [J.M. PANCHAL, J.]
is a complete Code in itself so far as the period of limitation is      A
concerned for not only it provides in Sub-section (1) the period
of limitation for such trials but specifies in Sub-section (2)
thereof, the offences in respect of which the limitation clause
would not apply. Since the Section is in absolute terms and no
provision has been made under the Act for extension of time,            B
it is obvious that any trial commenced after the period of
limitation will be patently illegal. The question of limitation to be
determined under Section 122 of the Act is not purely a
question of law. It is a mixed question of fact and law and
therefore in exercise of Writ Jurisdiction under Article 226 of         c
the Constitution, ordinarily the High Court will not interfere with
the findings of court Martial on question of limitation decided
under Section 122 of the Army Act.

      7. Section 122 of the Army Act in substance prescribes
that no trial by Court Martia"i of any person subject to the D
provisions of the Act for any offence shall be commenced after
the expfration of a period of three years. It further explains as
to when period of three years shall commence. It provides that
the period of three years shall commence on the date of the
offence or where the commission of the offence was not known E
to the person aggrieved by the offence or to the authority
competent to initiate action, the first day on which such offence
comes to the knowledge of such person or authority whichever
is earlier. In view of the provisions of Section 122(1)(b) a
question arises as to who is the person aggrieved within the F
meaning of the said Section. According to the respondent
Brigadier K.S.Bharucha was the person aggrieved and the
period of three years shall commence from the date when
commission of offence by the respondent came to his
knowledge on May 17, 1993 when Lt. Col. P. Oomen submitted G
his report to Mr. Bharucha. The contention of the Union of India
is that in terms of Army Act, Mr. K.S.Bharucha was neither the
person aggrieved nor authority competent to initiate action and
therefore the date on which the Lt. Col. P.Oomen submitted
report would not be relevant for the purpose of determining the · H
    472      SUPREME COURT REPORTS                   [2010] 4 S.C.R.


 A question whether the trial commenced against the respondent
   was time barred. The term "the person aggrieved by the
   offence" would be attracted to natural persons i.e. human
   beings who are victims of an offence complained of, such as
   offences relating to a person or property and not to juristic
 B persons like an organisation as in the present case. The plain
   and dictionary meaning of the term "aggrieved" means hurt,
   angry, upset, wronged, maltreated, persecuted, victimised etc.
   It is only the natural persons who can be hurt, angry, upset or
   wronged or maltreated etc. If a Government organisation is
c  treated to be an aggrieved person then the second part of
   Section 122(1)(b) i.e. "when it comes to the knowledge of the
   competent authority to initiate action" will never come into play
   as the commission of offence will always be in the knowledge
   of the authority who is part of the organisation and who may
. not be the authority competent to initiate t.he action. A
 0
   meaningful reading of the provisions of Section 122(1)(b)
   makes it absolutely clea.r that in the case of Government
   organisation, it will be the date of knowledge of the authority
   competent to initiate the action, which will determine the
   question of limitation. Therefore, the finding of the High Court
 E that Brigadier K.S.Bharucha was an aggrieved person is legally
   and factually incorrect and unsustainable. Further, neither
   Brigadier Mr. K.S.Bharucha, nor Major General BS Suhag were
   competent to initiate action against the respondent because the
   term "competent to initiate action" refers to the competency of
 F the authority to initiate or direct disciplinary action against any
   person subject to the provisions of the Army Act. When an
   offence or misconduct is alleged to have been committed by a
   person subject to the Army Act, then the Officer in chain of
   command is required to take action for investigation of the
 G charges and trial by court martial as per Section 1 Chapter V
   of the Army Rules or order Court of Inquiry and subsequently
   finalise the Court of Inquiry under Section 2 Chapter VI of the
   Army Rules. These powers are vested in the officers in chain
   of command. Those powers are not vested with staff Officers.
 H Since the respondent was commanding 4 RPO, his next officer
       · UNION OF INDIA & ORS. v. V.N. SINGH                  473
                 [J.M. PANCHAL, J.]

in command was GOC, Delhi Area and the power to take                  A
disciplinary action was vested with him in terms of para 16(a)(i)
of the Defence Service Regulations, read with the Command
and Control instructions dated January 1, 1991 issued by the
Headquarter Western Command. Therefore, Brigadier
K.S.Bharucha had only technical control of 4RPD and had               B
therefore recommended to his higher authority to close down
the case but himself had not taken a decision to close down
the case or to continue the case against the respondent. The
power to initiate action in terms of Section 122(1)(b) of the
Army Act was only with GOC Delhi Area who is next superior            c
authority in chain of command. The record shows that even the
power to convene a Court of Inquiry was available only with
GOC Delhi Area and GOC-in-C Westernc ommand since they
are the authorities in command of body of troops and the power
to convene a Court of Inquiry in terms of Army Rule 177 is            0
vested only with an Officer in command of body of troops. The
facts of the present case establish that the Technical Court of
Inquiry was convened by DOST Headquarter Delhi Area on
January 8, 1994 which recommended examination of certain
essential witnesses for bringing into light the correct details and   E
the persons responsible for the irregularities by a Staff Court
of Inquiry and accordingly the Staff Court of Inquiry was ordered
on May 7, 1994 by GOC-in-C Western Command which
concluded in its report dated August 31, 1994, mentioning for
the first time the involvement of the respondent in the offence.
The GOC Delhi Area i.e. the next Authority in chain of command        F
to the respondent recommended on October 19, 1994 initiation
of disciplinary action against the respondent whereas the GOC-
in-C Western Command gave directions on December 3,
1994, to initiate disciplinary action against the respondent.
Therefore, the date of commencement of the period of limitation       G
for the purpose of GCM of the respondent, commenced on
December 3, 1994 when direction was given by GOC-in-C
Western Command to initiate disciplinary action against the
respondent. The plea that the date of submission of the report
by Technical Court of Inquiry should be treated as the date from      H
    474      SUPREME COURT REPORTS                 [2010] 4 S.C.R.


A which period of limitation shall commence has no substance.
   It is relevant to notice that no definite conclusion about the
   correct details and the persons responsible for the irregularities
   were mentioned in the report of Technical Court of Inquiry. On
   the facts and in the circumstances of the case, this Court is of
B the view that the High Court wrongly concluded that the period
   of limitation expired on March 4, 1996. It is relevant to notice
   that the contents of the letter dated May 27, 1993 written by
   Brigadier K.S.Bharucha to Major General ASC Headquarter
   Western Command do not mention at all, the respondent as
c  the person who had committed the irregularities except for a
   reference that there had been certain procedural lapses on '!he
   part of 4RPD. The said letter was addressed by Brigadier
   K.S.Bharucha apparently with a view to closing the case in total
   disregard to the facts and the circumstances emerging from the
D case. This fact has been observed by the GOC-in-C Western
   Command who while giving direction to initiate administrative
  action against Major General K.S.Bharucha ordered initiation
  of departmental inquiry against the respondent. Even the
  reference to ACR of the respondent written by Major General
E Suhag only mentions that the respondent had failed to monitor
  the local purchase of Hygiene and Chemicals but there is no
  mention therein that the respondent was himself responsible for
  the irregularities found to have been committed in the purchase
  of Hygiene and Chemicals. It was only after the detailed
  investigation by Staff Court of Inquiry that the irregularities
F committed by the respondent and his role in the purchase of
  Hygiene and Chemicals came to light. On the facts and in the
  circumstances of the case this Court finds that the period of
  limitation for the purpose of trial of the respondent commenced
  on December 3, 1994 when the GOC-in-C Western Command
G being the competent authority directed disciplinary action
  against the respondent in terms of Section 122(1)(b) of the
  Army Act. The period of three years from the direction dated
  December 3, 1994 would expire on December 2, 1997,
  whereas the GCM commenced the trial against the respondent
H on December 17, 1996 which was well within the period of
       UNION OF INDIA & ORS. v. V.N. SINGH                475
               [J.M. PANCHAL, J.]
limitation of three years. Therefore the impugned Judgment is    A
legally unsustainable and will have to be set aside.

     8. For the foregoing reasons it is held that the GCM
commenced trial, against the respondent within the period of
limitation as prescribed by Section 122(1)(b) of the Army Act.
                                                                 8
The impugned Judgment is set aside. Appeal accordingly
stands allowed. There shall be no orders as to cost.

N.J.                                         Appeal allowed.