UNION OF INDIA & ORS.versusSHAIK ALI

                          UNION OF INDIA & ORS.
A
                                    v.
                                SHAIK ALI

                              OCTOBER 17, 1989

B                [A.M. AHMADI AND K.N. SAIKIA, JJ.]

          Indian Railway Establishment Code: Rule 2046(h)(ii)-Prema-
    ture retirement-Permissible only when railway servant has attained the
    age of55 years-Similar to F.R. 56(j).

          Liberalised Pension Rules, 1950/Railway Pension Manual: Rule
c   2(2)/paragraph 620(ii)-Premature retirement-Requirement of public
    interest-Need for incorporation by way of amendment-Stressed.

            The .respondent, employed as Yard Master In the South Central
    Railway, was on duty between 14.00 and 22.00 hours on 23rd
D   February' 86. In the absence of a reliever, he was to continue his duty
    till 8.00 hours on 24th February' 86. He allowed his staff to take meals and
    since they did not return within a reasonable time, he went towards the
    cabin where the staff usually took their meals. The Divisional Safety
    Officer who was coming down from the cabin, enquired of the respon-
    dent's identity. The respondent in turn asked for the identity of the said
B   officer. The officer was annoyed at this and threatened the respondent
    with dire consequences. Immediately thereafter the respondent was
    placed under suspension. Further suspension followed and the respon-
    dent was visited with the order of premature retirement under Rule
    2046 of Indian Railway Establishment Code.

F         Respondent challenged the said order before the Central
    A.dministrative Tribunal and the Tribunal, relying on its decision in
    Shri Gafoor Mia & Ors. v. Director, DMRL, AISW 1988 2 CAT 277
    held that the Divisional Railway Manager who passed the impiugned
    order of premature retirement was not competent to make such an
    order, and set aside the order.
G
          This appeal, by special leave, is against the Tribunal's order.
    Though under sub-clause (ii) of rule 2046(h), a class Ill employee can-
    not he retired prematurely after he has attained the age of 55 years,
    (unlike officers of class I & II) this clause was Invoked In the case of
    respondent who was adniittedly in class III service and did not attain. the
H   age of sS-years. Appellant relied on para 620(11) of the Railway Pension

                                        456
                          U .0 .I. v. SHAIK ALI                      457

Manual which gives the authority power to remove from service a rail-
way servant ·;Iller he completed 30 years service.
                                                                            A

      On behiiJf of Respondent, it was contended that the appellant had
been shifting its stand and trying to support the order on an extraneous
ground which did not fmd a place in the order viz. unsatisfactory
service record of the respondent; and there is no basis for it in view of   B
the promotio~ secured by the respondent, the last of which was just
before the premature retirement.

      Dismissing the appeal, Ibis Court,

      HELD: 1.1 The order was passed under Rule 2046(b)(ii)'i1f the
Indian Railway Establishment Code without verifying whether or not c
the incumbent had attained the age of fifty-five years. Since the respon-
dent was indisputably in class III service at the time the order came to
be made, his case was governed by the second clause of Rule 2046(h).
The impugned or•r recites that the respondent bad already completed
thirty years of qualifying service but it does not state that be had D
attained the age of fifty-five years. According to the respondent be was
running 54th year on that date. That obvionsly took bis case out of the
purview of the said role. Even if the order was intended to be under
Rule 2(2) of the Liberalised Pension Rules, 1950, this requirement had
to be satisfied. Th~ immediate and proximate reason for passing the
impugned order was undoubtedly the unfortunate incident of 23/24th E
February, 1986. But for that incident there was no occasion for the
Review Committee to examine the case of the respondent. If the service
record of the respondent was so bad as is now sought to be made out, be
would not have been promoted to the post of Asstt. Yard Master on
22nd August, 1984 and later to the post of Yard Master on 31st
January, 1986. The order of premature retirement is punitive in nature F
and having been passed in flagrant violation of the principles of natural
justice, cannot he allowed to stand. [426G-H; 460F-G; 463A-B)

      1.2 F .R. 56(j) of the Fundamental Rules is substantially the same
as Rule 2046(h)(ii) of the Railway Establishment Code and Rule 2(2) of
the Liberalised Pension Rules, 1950 is substantially the same as G
paragraph 620 of Railway Pension Manual. Since Rule 2(2) bas been
struck down as violative of Article 14 of the Constitution, paraprapb
620(ii) would m~t the same fate. Apart from the competence of the
Divisional Railway Manager to pass the order, the order cannot also be
supported under paragraph 620(ii). [462B-D}
                                                                            H
    458         SUPREME COURT REPORTS               [1989] Supp. 1 S.C.R.

          Senior Superintendent of Post Office & Ors., v. Izhar Hussain,
A   [1989] 2 Scale 222, relied on.

          Union of India v. R. Narasimhan, [1988] Suppl. SCC 636, refer-
    red to.

B         2. The authorities concerned will do well to amend Rule 2(2) of
    the Liberalised Pension Rules, 1950, and paragraph 620(ii) of the Rail-
    way Pension Manual, so as to incorporate therein the requirement of
    public interest, making it clear that premature retirement on comple-
    tion of qualifying service of thirty years can he ordered in public
    interestonly. (463C-D]

c         CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 2413
    of 1989.

         From the Judgment and Order dated 3.10.1988/12.10.1988 of the
    Central Administrative Tribunal, Hyderabad in O.A. No. 307 of 1987.
D
        Anil Dev Singh, B. Parthasarthy, Hemant Sharma and C.V.
    Sobba Rao for the Appellants.

         Mrs. Kitty Kumaramangalam, Ms. Vijayalaxmi, Kailash Vasdev,
    P. Parmeshwaran and A. T .M. Sam path for the Respondent.

          The Judgment of the Court was delivered bv

          AHMADI, J. The Central Administrative Tribunal, Hyderabed
    by its order dated 3rd 'October, 1988 held that the Divisional Railway
    Manager (BG) SC Railway, Secunderabad was not competent to pass
    the impugned order dated 25th April, 1986 retiring the railway servant
    Shaik Ali from service under Rule 2046(h)(ii) of Indian Railway
    Establishment Code, ·Volume II-Pension Rules {hereinafter called
    'the Code'}. The Union of India feeling aggrieved by the said order has
    come in appeal to this Court by special leave.

G         The respondent Shaik Ali joined the erstwhile Nizam State Rail-
    way Service as Pointsman in 1953 or thereabouts and secured promo-
    tions from time to time in the course of his service, the last promotion
    being as Yard Master in the revised scale of Rs.550-750 on 31st
    January, 1986. The facts show that he was on duty between 14.00 and
    22.00 hours on 23rd February, 1986 at Sanatnagar Station. As his
H   reliever did not tum up at 23.00 hours, he was compelled to perform
                     U.0.1. v. SHAIK ALI (AHMADI, J.! .                 459

  duty from 22.00 hours to 08.00 hours of 24th February, 1986. At about
  23 .15 hours, he permitted the staff working under him to have their         A
. meals and report for duty as soon as possible. As the staff members did
  not return to duty within a reasonable time he went towards the cabin
  where they usually took their meals. At that time the Divisional Safety
  Officer, A. Bharat Bhushan, came down from the cabin and inquired
  of the respondent's identity. The respondent countered by inquiring          B
  about the identity of the said officer. It is the respondent's say that as
  he did not know the said officer he asked for his identity before dis-
  closing his identity. The officer was annoyed at the behaviour of the
  respondent and thretened him with dire consequences. It is the
  respondent's case that immediately thereafter he was placed under
 .suspension. When _he went to meet the officer at the suggestion of the
  Station Superintendent, the said officer behaved rudely and refused to       C
  listen to his explanation. By. a ·subsequent order dated 19th March,
  1986, the respondent was kept under further suspension w.e.f. 4th
  March, 1986, He was not charge-sheeted nor was any inquiry held
  against him but he was visited with the order of premature retirement
  dated 25th April, 1986, the relevant part whereof reads as under:            D

             "Whereas the Divisional Railway Manager (BG), Secµn-
             detabad is of the opinion that it is in the public interest to
             do so.

                   Now therefore, .. in exercise of the powers conferred E
             by Clause (h)(ii) of Rule 2046 of Indian Railway Establish-
             ment Code, Volume II-Pension Ruless, the Divisional
             RailwayManager- (BG), Secunderabad he;eby retires Shri
             Shaik Ali, Assistant Ward Master, Sanatnagar with
             immediate effect that he having already completed 30 years
             of qualifying service.            .   .                     F

  It was further directed that the respondent should be paid a sum equi-
  valent to the amount of his pay plus allowances for a period of three
  months in lieu of three months notice calculated at the rate at which he
. was drawing salary immediately before his retirement. The respondent
  challenged this order of premature retirement by preferring an appli- G
  cation under Section 19 of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985.
  The Central Administrative Tribunal after reading the relevant Rule
  2046(h)(ii) with Para 620(ii) of the Railway Pension Manual came to
  the conclusion that the Divisional Railway Manager who passed the
  impugned order of premature retirement was not competent to make
  such an order. In taking this view the Tribunal relied on an earlie_r H
    460          SUPREME COURT REPORTS                  [1989) Supp. 1 S.C.R.

A   decision of the Full Bench in AISLJ 1988 2 CAT 277 wherein it held
    that the highest authority among the appointin~g authorities alone was
    competent to impose any of the punishments specified in Article 311 of
    the Constitution. In this view that the Tribunal took, the Tribunal set
    aside the impugned order of premature retirement dated 25th April,
    1986. It is against the said order that the Union of India has preferred
B   this appeal.

          Under Rule 2046(a) of the Code ordinarily every railway servant
    would retire on the day he attains the age of 58 years. However,
    notwithstanding the said provision, Rule 2046(h) entitles the appoint-
    ing authority to retire him before he reaches the age of superannua-
    tion. Rule 2046(h), insofar as it is relevant for our purposes, reads as
c   under:

                "2046(h). Notwithstanding anything contained in this rule,
                the appointing authority shall, if it is of the opinion that it is
                in the public interest to do so, have the absolute right to
D               retire any railway servant giving him notice of not less than
                three months in writing or three months' pay and
                allowances in lieu of such notice-

                (i) if he is in Class I or Class II service or post and had
                entered Government service before attaining the age of
E               thirty-five years, after he has attained the age of fifty years.

                (ii) in any other case after he has attained the age of fifty-
                five years."

    Since the respondent was indisputably in Class III service at the time
F   the impugned order came to be ma<;!e his case was governed by the
    second clause of Rule 2046(h). The impugned order recites that the
    respondent had already completed thirty yeats of qualifying service
    but it does not state that he had attained the age of fifty-five years. The
    respondent's contention was that he could not be prematurely retired
    under. clause (ii) of Rule 2046(h) since he had not attained the age of
G   fifty-five years on the date of the impugned order. According to him he
    was running 54th year on that date. That obviously took his case out of
    the purview of the said rule.

           Realising this difficulty an attempt was made by the department
    to fall back on paragraph 620(ii) of the Railway Pension Manual which
H   reads as under:
                    U.OJ. v. SHAIK ALI [AHMADI, J.]                    461

            "620(ii). The authority competent to remove the railway
                                                                              A
            servant from service may also require him to retire any
            time after he has completed thirty years' qualifying service
            provided that the authority shall give in this behalf, a notice
            in writing to the railway servant, at least three months
            before the date on which he is required to retire or three
            month's pay and allowances in lieu of such notice."               B

Reliance was also placed on the decision of this Court in Union of
India v. R. Narasimhan, (1988] Suppl. SCC 636 in support of the
contention that a railway servant governed by the Railway Pension
 Manual may be prematurely retired by 'the authority competent to
 remove him from service' on his completing thirty years of qualifying        C
service. Under this rule, power is conferred on the authority compe-
 tent to remove him from service to retire a railway servant who has
 completed thirty years of qualifying service regardless of his age. The
Tribunal took the view that although Rule 2046(h)(ii) would not be
 attracted in the absence of evidence that the incumbent had attained
 the age of fifty-five years, the department would be entitled to rely on     D
 para 620(ii) to support the order if it can show that the. officer who
 passed the order was competent to do so_ under ihe said paragraph.
 The· Tri bun.al w.as; however,. of the opinion that since the power under
 paragrap_h 620(ii) could be exercised only by _the authority competent
 to remove the railway servant from service, the Divisional Railway
 Manager not being such authority was not competent to pass the               E
 impugned order and hence the order was clearly void and inoperative
 in law. In taking this view, the Tribunal relied on an earlier Full Be)lch
-decision referred to above. We were told that as the said Full Bench
 decision of the Tribunal was under scrutiny by this Court, this Civil
 Appeal should be taggeq on with similar matters pending in this Cour.t.
 However, the learned counsel for the respondent-employee submitted           F
 that it was not necessary to tag on this matter with other matters
 arising out of the Tribunal's Full Bench decision since in the instant
 case she proposed to support the Tribunal's order on the twin grounds
 (i) that paragraph 620(ii}was ultra vires Artcle 14 of the Constitution
 and (ii) that the impugned order was punitive in nature and could not
 have been passed without a proper enquiry. Insofar as the first conten-      G
 lion is concerned she placed reliance on this Court's decision in Senior
 Superintendent of Post Office & Ors. v. Jzhar Hussain, [1989] 2 Scale
 222 wherein a similar Rule 2(2) of the Liberalised Pension Rules, 1950
was struck down as offending Article 14 of the Constitution. So far as
 the second limb of her submission is concerned she stated that the
 respondent had been promoted to the post of Yard Master on 31st              H
     462         SUPREME COURT REPORTS                [1989] Supp. 1 S.C.R.

    January, 1986 and hence there was no occasion to prematurely ter-
A
    minate his service by the impugned order. In·lzhar Hussain's case the
    Court was concerned with F.R. 56(j) and Rule 2(2) of the Pension
    Rules. F.R. 56(j) is substantially the same as Rule 2046(h)(ii) of the
    Code and Rule 2(2) is substantially the same as paragraph 620 with
    which we are concerned. Since Rule 2(2) has been struck down as
B   violative of Article 14 of the Constitution, paragraph 620(ii) would
    meet the same fate. The learned counsel for the Railway Administra-
    tion, realising this difficulty tried to support the impugned order on the
    ground that it was in public interest to retire the respondent. Counsel
    for the respondent contended that the railway administration has been
    shifting its stand, it first passed the impugned order under Rule
    2046(h)(ii) of the Code and then relied 'on Rule 2(2) of the Pension
c   Rules and when that was found to be of no assistance switched over to
    paragraph 620(ii) of the Railway Pension Manual and is now trying to
    support the order on an extraneous ground which does not find a
    mention in the impugned order. We think the criticism is well founded.
    We are, therefore, of the view that apart from the competence of the
D   Divisional Railway Manager to pass the order, the impugned order
    cannot be supported under paragraph 620(ii) for the aforesaid reason.

        We next find that the learned counsel Jor the respondent-
  employee is on terra firma so far as the second limb of her contention is
  concerned. The facts clearly reveal that after the respondent joined
E the Nizam State Railway service in 1953 he secured promotions in due
  cour:se and was appointed an Assistant Yard Master by an order dated
  22nd August, 1984. Thereafter, he was promoted to the next higher
  post of Yard Master by the order of 3 lst January, 1986. While he was
  discharging duties as Yard Master qn 24th February, 1986, the incident
  in question occurred which is sak! to be forming the basis for the
p impugned order of 25th April, 1986. ·we find from the facts that the
  Divisional Safety Officer was annoyed by the fact that the respondent
  had demanded that he disclose his identity before he (the respondent)
  did so. The respondent was immediately placed under suspension and
  the said officer refused to listen to his explanation. The suspension
  order was further extended by the order of 19th March, 1966. This was
G followed by the impugned order of retirement dated 25th April, 1986.
  The order was passed under Rule 2046(h)(ii) of the Code without
  verifying whether or not the incumbent had attained the age of fifty-
  five years. Even if the order was intended to be under Rule 2(2) of the
  Pension Rules, this requirement had to be satisfied. The immediate
  and proximate reason for passing the impugned order was undoub-
H tedly the unfortunate incident of 23/24th February, 1986. But for that
                   U.0.1. v. SHAIK ALI [AHMADI, J.[                  463

incident there was no occasion for the Review Comittee to examine           A
the case of the respondent. If the service record of the respondent was
so bad as is now sought to be made out, he would not have been
promoted to the post of Assistant Yard Master on 22nd August, 1984
and later to the post of Yard Master on 31st January, 1986. We are,
therefore, satisfied that the impugned order of premature retirement is
                                                                            B
punitive in nature and having been passed in flagrant violation of the
principles of natural justice cannot be allowed to stand.

      For the above reasons (different from the one on which the Tri-
bunal founded its decision), we are of the opinion that the ultimate
order passed by the Tribunal does not require interference. We, there-
fore, dismiss this appeal with costs. Cost quantified at Rs.3,000.          c
      Before we part we may observe that the concerned authorities
will do well to amend Rule 2(2) of the Pension Rules and Paragraph
620(ii) referred to above so as to incorporate therein the requirement of
public interest, that is to say, the premature retirement on completion
                                                                            D
of qualifying service of thirty years can be ordered in public interest
only.

G.N.                                                  Appeal dismissed.