UNION OF INDIA & ORS.versusP. S. GILL

                         [2019] 17 S.C.R. 405                           405


                    UNION OF INDIA & ORS.                               A
                                 v.
                             P. S. GILL
                 (Criminal Appeal No. 404 of 2013)
                      NOVEMBER 27, 2019                                 B
     [L. NAGESWARA RAO AND HEMANT GUPTA, JJ.]
      Armed Forces Tribunal Act, 2007: ss.14 and 15 – Allegations
pertaining to irregularities in procurement of ration – Investigation
– Prima facie case against 12 Army Personnel including the
                                                                        C
respondent – A hearing of the charge under r.22 against the
Respondent was convened – The Commanding Officer of the
Respondent i.e. General Officer Commanding (GOC), 15 Infantry
Division found no prima facie case made out against the
Respondent – The said view was approved by the GOC, 15 Corps
– Meanwhile, Respondent retired on attaining the age of                 D
superannuation – However, appellants invoked s.123 of the Army
Act, 1950 to continue the proceedings against him – The GOC-in-
C, Western Command disagreed with the recommendations made
by the GOC, 15 Infantry Division and GOC, 15 Corps and arrived
at a conclusion that a prima facie case was made out against
                                                                        E
Respondent – General Court Martial convened – Respondent filed
O.A. under ss.14 and 15 assailing the validity of the order
convening the General Court Martial – Tribunal held that a prima
facie case to proceed against the Respondent by a General Court
Martial was not made out – Aggrieved appellant filed instant
appeal – Appellant contended that jurisdiction is conferred on the      F
Tribunal only for adjudication of complaints and disputes regarding
service matters and appeals arising out of the verdicts of the Court
Martial and as such, an order by which the General Court Martial
was convened cannot be the subject matter of an appeal before
the Tribunal – Held: s.15 confers jurisdiction and power on the
                                                                        G
Tribunal to entertain appeal against any order, decision, finding
or sentence passed by a Court Martial – The order challenged in
the OA in this case is a proceeding by which the General Court
Martial was convened – As there was no order, decision, finding
or sentence by the Court Martial, an appeal under s.15 per se was
                                                                        H
                                405
406            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                       [2019] 17 S.C.R.


A     not maintainable – As regards the maintainability of s.14, the said
      section enables a person aggrieved to make an application to the
      Tribunal in any service matter – ‘Service matters’ are defined in
      s.3(o) to mean all matters relating to the conditions of their service,
      which shall include termination of service – ‘Conditions of service’
      mean those conditions which regulate the holding of a post by any
B
      person right from the time of his appointment till his retirement and
      even after his retirement including pension etc. – Therefore,
      conditions of service also include dismissal from service – s.14 of
      the Act which confers jurisdiction over service matters of the Army
      personnel should receive wide construction – The object with which
C     the Act was made is to provide adjudication of complaints and
      disputes regarding service matters and not only appeals against
      the verdicts of the Court Martial – It is trite law that statement of
      objects and reasons can be used as a tool for interpretation – The
      impugned judgment of the Tribunal did not suffer from lack of
      jurisdiction – Regarding the charges sought to be framed against
D
      the Respondent, there was no error in the approach of the Tribunal
      – The material on record was perused by the Tribunal to come to
      a conclusion that no prima facie case is made out against the
      Respondent – No reason to interfere with the said findings.
            Dismissing the appeal, the Court
E
            HELD: 1.1 The O.A. was filed both under Sections 14 and
      15 of the Act. Section 15 confers jurisdiction and power on the
      Tribunal to entertain appeal against any order, decision, finding
      or sentence passed by a Court Martial. Section 15(2) of the Act
      provides for an appeal which can be filed by the person aggrieved
F
      by an order, decision, finding or sentence passed by a Court
      Martial. The order challenged in the OA in this case is a
      proceeding by which the General Court Martial was convened.
      As there was no order, decision, finding or sentence by the
      Court Martial, an appeal under Section 15 per se is not
G     maintainable. Section 14 enables a person aggrieved to make
      an application to the Tribunal in any service matter. ‘Service
      matters’ are defined in Section 3(o) to mean all matters relating
      to the conditions of their service, which shall include termination
      of service, inter alia. Any matter relating to the conditions of
H     service falls within the definition of ‘service matters’ under
            UNION OF INDIA & ORS. v. P. S. GILL                       407


Section 3(o) of the Act and can be the subject matter of an           A
application filed before the Tribunal. ‘Conditions of service’ mean
those conditions which regulate the holding of a post by any
person right from the time of his appointment till his retirement
and even after his retirement including pension etc. Therefore,
conditions of service also include dismissal from service. [Paras     B
13-16] [419-E-H; 420-A-B]

      1.2 The words ‘relating to’ appearing before the words
‘conditions of service’ in the definition of ‘service matters’ in
Section 3 (o) of the Act should be given a wide interpretation.
Any proceeding which leads to an order of termination. would          C
fall within the expression ‘relating to conditions of service’. In
any event, the proceedings initiated against the Respondent
cannot be said to be not related to his service. A final order to
be passed by the General Court Martial, apart from the
imposition of other penalties, might have led to the termination      D
of the service of the Respondent. Section 14 of the Act which
confers jurisdiction over service matters of the Army personnel
should receive wide construction. An interpretation which
confers jurisdiction should be preferred over an interpretation
which takes away jurisdiction. [Paras 17, 18, 19] [420-C-E-F]         E

      State of Maharashtra v. Marwanjee Desai (2002) 2
      SCC 318 ; Mansukhlal Dhanraj Jain v. Eknath Ogale
      (1995) 2 SCC 665 : [1995] 1 SCR 996 ; Mantri
      Technozone v. Forward Foundation (2019) SCC
                                                                      F
      Online SC 322 – relied on.

      S.S. Bola v. B.D. Sharma (1997) 8 SCC 522 – relied on.

                      Case Law Reference

(2002) 2 SCC 318                          relied on      Para 16      G

[1995] 1 SCR 996                          relied on      Para 17

(2019) SCC Online SC 322                  relied on      Para 19

(1997) 8 SCC 522                          relied on      Para 20      H
408            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                        [2019] 17 S.C.R.


A           CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal
      No. 404 of 2013.
            From the Judgment and Order dated 24.05.2011 of the Armed
      Forces Tribunal (Principal Bench), New Delhi in O.A. No. 147 of 2010/
      order dated 30.05.2012 in M.A. No. 203 of 2012.
B
              Ms. Diksha Rai, Rajesh Ranjan, Ms. Snidha Mehra, Hemant
      Arya, Ishan Bisht, Ms. Palak Mahajan, Mukesh Kumar Maroria, Advs.
      for the Appellants.
          Manoj K. Ramesh, Ms. Archana Ramesh, Vibhuti Sushant Gupta,
C     Ram Naresh Yadav, Advs. for the Respondent.
            The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
            L. NAGESWARA RAO, J.
            1. The Union of India is in Appeal against the judgment of the
      Armed Forces Tribunal, Principal Bench, New Delhi (hereinafter, ‘the
D
      Tribunal’) quashing the order dated 23.02.2010, by which General Court
      Martial was convened against the Respondent.
             2. In the year 2005, the Chief of the Army Staff directed an
      investigation by the Court of Inquiry into the allegations pertaining to
E     irregularities in procurement of ration, as a result of which the quality
      of supplies for the troops was compromised. A Court of Inquiry was
      convened on 10.10.2005 by the General Officer Commanding-in-Chief
      (GOC-in-C) Western Command to identify the Army personnel
      responsible for the aforementioned irregularities. Twenty-three witnesses
      were examined by the Court of Inquiry. The Court of Inquiry identified
F     Twelve Army personnel who were prima facie responsible for the said
      improprieties. The Respondent who was working as the Chief Director
      of Purchase (CDP), Army Purchase Organisation, Ministry of Defence
      was one out of the twelve persons against whom a prima facie case
      was found. Disciplinary action was also initiated against the Respondent
      by the GOC-in-C, Western Command on 14.06.2006 which was
G
      challenged by the Respondent by filing a Writ Petition in the High Court
      of Delhi. By an order dated 11.01.2007, the High Court quashed the
      Court of Inquiry on the ground that Rule 180 of the Army Rules, 1954
      (hereinafter, ‘the Army Rules’) was violated. However, an option was
      given to the Appellants to either hold a fresh Court of Inquiry after
H     complying with Rule 180 of the Army Rules or to proceed directly under
              UNION OF INDIA & ORS. v. P. S. GILL                           409
                  [L. NAGESWARA RAO, J.]

Rule 22 by hearing the charge without relying on the Court of Inquiry.      A
The Court of Inquiry was re-constituted pursuant to the option given
by the High Court. Later, the Appellants sought a modification of the
order dated 29.07.2008 and informed the High Court that proceedings
would be initiated under Rule 22 of the Army Rules since most of the
officers involved had already retired and that it would be difficult to
                                                                            B
re-constitute a Court of Inquiry. The High Court permitted the Appellants
to proceed under Rule 22 with the condition that no reliance can be
placed on the old Court of Inquiry. The order of the Chief of the Army
Staff by which cognizance was taken of the offences and the
attachment order issued on 26.09.2008 were the subject matter of
another Writ Petition filed by the Respondent in the High Court of Delhi,   C
which was dismissed on 03.10.2008.
      3. A hearing of the charge under Rule 22 against the Respondent
was convened on 08.12.2008 and recording of summary of evidence
under Rule 23 of the Army Rules was ordered against the Respondent
on 24.12.2008. The Commanding Officer of the Respondent i.e. General        D
Officer Commanding (GOC), 15 Infantry Division found that no offence
was prima facie made out against the Respondent. The said view was
approved by the GOC, 15 Corps on 28.04.2009. In the meanwhile,
the Respondent retired on attaining the age of superannuation on
31.05.2009. However, Section 123 of the Army Act, 1950 was invoked          E
by the Appellants to continue the proceedings against the Respondent.
The GOC-in-C, Western Command examined the matter and the
recommendations made by the GOC, 15 Infantry Division and GOC,
15 Corps. He disagreed with the views taken by the GOC, 15 Infantry
Division and GOC, 15 Corps and arrived at a conclusion that a prima         F
facie case was made out against the Respondent. An attempt was
made by the Respondent to challenge the findings of the GOC-in-C,
Western Command, but in vain. The General Court Martial was
convened by a letter dated 23.02.2010. The Respondent filed O.A.
No.147 of 2010, assailing the validity of the order convening the General
Court Martial. He also sought for quashing the proceedings of the Court     G
of Inquiry, summary of evidence and the conclusion of the GOC-in-C,
Western Command holding him prima facie guilty. He further
questioned the invocation of Section 123 of the Army Act against him
to continue the proceedings even after his retirement. He also sought
promotion to the rank of Major General along with his batchmates.           H
410            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                       [2019] 17 S.C.R.


A            4. The Tribunal held that a prima facie case to proceed against
      the Respondent by a General Court Martial was not made out. The
      Tribunal was of the opinion that even if the entirety of evidence of the
      prosecution is taken to be true, no offence was made out against the
      Respondent. The Appellants made an attempt to obtain leave to Appeal
B     under Section 31 of the Armed Forces Tribunal Act, 2007 (hereinafter,
      ‘the Act’) to approach this Court, which was not entertained. Aggrieved
      by the judgment of the Tribunal, the above Appeal is filed.
            5. The Charges against the Respondent are as follows:
            “First Charge
C
            AA Sec 52 (f) SUCH AN OFFENCE AS IS MENTIONED IN
            CLAUSE (f) OF SECTION 52 OF THE ARMY ACT, WITH
            INTENT TO DEFRAUD in that he, at New Delhi, on 15 Mar
            2005, which came to the knowledge of the authority
            competent to initiate action on 25 Sep 2008, while performing
D           the duties of Chief Director of Purchase, Army Purchase
            Organization, Ministry of Defence, contrary to Army
            Purchase Organization, Ministry of Defence, Department of
            Defence Consolidated Order no.3 of 1987, with intent to
            defraud, approved addition of two more tendering stations
E           (namely Gadarwara, District Narsingpur (MP) and
            Narsingpur (MP) in Acceptance of Tender for Risk Purchase
            Contract No.J-13028/1/4-03/45- RP/2005-PUR III dated 28
            Feb 2005 for Masur Whole awarded to M/s. GREEN FED
            (Gujrat Co-operative Grain Grower’s Federation Ltd.,) after
            issue of Acceptance of Tender on the last day of Delivery
F           Period.
            Second Charge
            AA Sec 63 (Alternative to first charge) AN ACT
            PREJUDICIAL TO GOOD ORDER AND MILITARY
G           DISCIPLINE in that he, at New Delhi, on 15 Mar 2005,
            which came to the knowledge of the authority competent to
            initiate action on 25 Sep 2008, while performing the duties
            of Chief Director of Purchase, Army Purchase Organization,
            Ministry of Defence, contrary to Army Purchase
            Organization, Ministry of Defence, Department of Defence
H           Consolidated Order no.3 of 1987, improperly approved
      UNION OF INDIA & ORS. v. P. S. GILL                       411
          [L. NAGESWARA RAO, J.]

addition of two more tendering stations (namely Gadarwara,      A
District Narsingpur (MP) and Narsingpur (MP) in
Acceptance of Tender for Risk Purchase Contract No. J-
13028/1/4-03/45-RP/2005- PUR III dated 28 Feb 2005 for
Masur Whole awarded to M/s. GREEN FED (Gujrat Co-
operative Grain Grower’s Federation Ltd) after issue of
                                                                B
Acceptance of Tender on the last day of Delivery Period.
THIRD CHARGE
 AA SEC. 52(f) SUCH AN OFFENCE AS IS MENTIONED IN
CLAUSE (f) OF SECTION 52 OF THE ARMY ACT, WITH
INTENT TO DEFRAUD in that he, at New Delhi, on or about         C
29 July 2005, which came to the knowledge of the authority
competent to initiate action on 25 Sep 2008, while performing
the duties of Chief Director of Purchase, Army Purchase
Organization, Ministry of Defence, and being aware that
para 4(VI) of No. J11011/1/2000-CDN, Govt of India, Min
of Def, APO Guidelines to prevent legal complications dt 30     D
Mar 2000 prohibited any deviation from ASC Specification
and Price reduction in Risk Purchase contracts, with intent
to defraud acquiesced with decision of Director General of
Supply and Transport vide letter No.69642/5/1-05/163-RP/
05/Q/ST-7 dt 29 Jul 2005 granting relaxation to M/s Punjab      E
State Civil Supplies Corporation Ltd in a Risk Purchase
Contract Acceptance Tender No. J-13075/5/163/2005-PUR
III dt 27 Jun 2005 for 350/400 grains per 100 gms of Kabli
Chana on price reduction of 0.5% instead of 300-350 grains
per 100 gms as stipulated in Revised ASC specification No.
97.                                                             F

FOURTH CHARGE
AA SEC. 63 (Alternative to third charge) AN OMISSION
PREJUDICIAL TO GOOD ORDER AND MILITARY
DISCIPLINE in that he, at New Delhi, on or about 29 July        G
2005, which came to the knowledge of the authority
competent to initiate action on 25 Sep 2008, while performing
the duties of Chief Director of Purchase, Army Purchase
Organisation, Ministry of Defence and being aware that para
4(VI) of No. J- 11011/1/2000/CDN, Govt of India, Min of
Def, APO Guidelines to prevent legal complications dt 30        H
412     SUPREME COURT REPORTS                     [2019] 17 S.C.R.


A     Mar 2000 prohibited any deviation from ASC Specification
      and Price reduction in Risk Purchase contracts, improperly
      acquiesced with decision of Director General of Supply and
      Transport vide letter No. 69642/5/1-05/163-RP/05/Q/ST-7 dt
      29 Jul 2005 granting relaxation to M/s Punjab State Civil
      Supplies Corporation Ltd in a Risk Purchase Contract
B
      Acceptance Tender No. J-13075/5/163/2005-PUR III dt 27
      Jun 2005 for 350-400 grains per 100 gms of Kabli Chana
      on price reduction of 0.5% instead of 300-350 grains per
      100 gms as stipulated in Revised ASC specification No. 97.
      FIFTH CHARGE
C
      AA SEC. 52(f) SUCH AN OFFENCE AS IS MENTIONED IN
      CLAUSE (f) OF SECTION 52 OF THE ARMY ACT, WITH
      INTENT TO DEFRAUD in that he, at New Delhi, on or about
      23 Aug 2005, which came to the knowledge of the authority
      competent to initiate action on 25 Sep 2008, while performing
D     the duties of Chief Director of Purchase, Army Purchase
      Organization, Ministry of Defence, and being aware that
      para 4(VI) of No. J11011/1/2000-CDN, Govt of India, Min
      of Def, APO Guidelines to prevent legal complications dt 30
      Mar 2000 prohibited any deviation from ASC Specification
E     and Price reduction in Risk Purchase contracts, with intent
      to defraud acquiesced with decision of Director General of
      Supply and Transport vide letter No.69644/7/4-05/165-R/05/
      Q/ST-7 dt 23 Aug 2005 granting relaxation to M/s MMTC
      in a Risk Purchase Contract Acceptance Tender No. J13075/
      7/165/2005-PUR III dt 27 Jun 2005 for 350-400 grains per
F     100 gms of Kabli Chana on price reduction of 0.5% instead
      of 300-350 grains per 100 gms as stipulated in Revised ASC
      specification No. 97.
      SIXTH CHARGE

G     AA SEC. 63 (Alternative to fifth charge) AN OMISSION
      PREJUDICIAL TO GOOD ORDER AND MILITARY
      DISCIPLINE in that he, at New Delhi, on or about 23 Aug
      2005, which came to the knowledge of the authority
      competent to initiate action on 25 Sep 2008, while performing
      the duties of Chief Director of Purchase, Army Purchase
H     Organisation, Ministry of Defence and being well aware that
             UNION OF INDIA & ORS. v. P. S. GILL                           413
                 [L. NAGESWARA RAO, J.]

      para 4(VI) of No. J11011/1/2000/CDN, Govt of India, Min              A
      of Def, APO Guidelines to prevent legal complications dt 30
      Mar 2000 prohibited any deviation from ASC Specification
      and Price reduction in Risk Purchase contracts, improperly
      acquiesced with decision of Director General of Supply and
      Transport vide letter No. 69644/7/4-05/165-R/05/Q/ST-7 dt
                                                                           B
      23 Aug 2005 granting relaxation to M/s MMTC in a Risk
      Purchase Contract Acceptance Tender No. J-13075/7/165/
      2005-PUR III dt 27 Jun 2005 for 350-400 grains per 100
      gms of Kabli Chana on price reduction of 0.5% instead of
      300-350 grains per 100 gms as stipulated in Revised ASC
      specification No. 97.”                                               C
       6. The Tribunal, being aware of the law that it is only the
probative value of the material on record that has to be looked into at
the time of framing of charge, proceeded to decide as to whether a
prima facie case is made out. In respect of the first charge which is
related to the addition of two more tendering stations namely Gadarwara    D
and Narsingpur, Madhya Pradesh, the Tribunal examined the exhibits
that were placed on record in support of the said charges. The Tribunal
held that the addition of two tendering stations was not within the
jurisdiction of the Respondent. Brigadier P.P.S. Bal of CDP, Army
Purchase Organisation, Army Headquarters, New Delhi in his testimony
stated that he was aware of the consolidated order No.3 of 1987            E
permitting the inclusion of two additional tendering stations. Moreover,
a decision was taken by the competent authority that there should be
additional tendering stations for which there was no objection from the
audit authorities or by the Principal Controller of Defence Accounts
(PCDA). The Tribunal further held that no monetary benefit was             F
derived by the Respondent by adding two tendering stations and there
was no extra expenditure borne out by the Appellants due to the addition
of two new stations.
       7. In so far as the second charge is concerned, which deals with
the extension of the delivery period and the issue of final performance
                                                                           G
notice, the Tribunal was of the opinion that there is nothing on record
to substantiate any act or omission on the part of the Respondent by
which the supplier was benefited. Moreover, evidence suggested that
extra expenditure was incurred by the supplier for transportation. The
Tribunal opined that there was no violation of any Government
instructions. The evidence of DW-1, Mr. P.V.D. Prasada Rao, Deputy         H
414            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                          [2019] 17 S.C.R.


A     Secretary to the Government of India, Ministry of Agriculture,
      Department of Agriculture & Cooperation, New Delhi was recorded
      in the summary of evidence and was perused by the Tribunal. It was
      concluded that there was no foundation even to prima facie show the
      lapses on the part of the Respondent.
B            8. Deviation from ASC specifications and price reduction in risk
      purchase contract was the subject matter of charges Nos.3 to 6. After
      pursuing the evidence of PW-1, Brigadier PPS Bal and PW-2, Col.
      Ambrish Malhotra, the Tribunal accepted the contention of the
      Respondent that Director General of Supplies and Transport (DGST)
      was the sole authority to grant relaxation of specifications and the
C
      Respondent who was a CDP did not have the power to over-rule the
      decision of DGST. For the aforesaid reasons, the submission of the
      Appellants that the Respondent was under an obligation to protest the
      violation of guidelines by the DGST was not accepted by the Tribunal.
      Even the seventh charge pertaining to the issuance of letters on
D     02.08.2005, 12.09.2005 and 13.09.2005 without taking into account the
      existing guidelines regarding the price reduction in R.P. contracts was
      held in favour of the Respondent by the Tribunal. On the basis of the
      above evidence, the Tribunal found that no prima facie case was made
      out against the Respondent and the charges framed against him were
E     found unsustainable. Consequently, the charges were quashed.
             9. Ms. Diksha Rai, learned counsel appearing for the Appellant
      contended that the judgment of the Tribunal is vitiated due to a
      jurisdictional error. According to her, the O.A. in this case was filed
      under Sections 14 and 15 of the Act against an order by which the
F     Court Martial was convened. The Tribunal, according to Ms. Rai, did
      not have jurisdiction to entertain the O.A. at the interlocutory stage.
      She relied on the statement of objects and reasons of the Act to submit
      that jurisdiction is conferred on the Tribunal only for adjudication of
      complaints and disputes regarding service matters and appeals arising
      out of the verdicts of the Court Martial. According to her, a verdict is
G
      a final judgment or order passed by the Court Martial and as such, an
      order by which the General Court Martial was convened cannot be the
      subject matter of an appeal before the Tribunal. On the merits of the
      case, she contended that the Tribunal has transgressed its limit by delving
      deep into the merits of the case which can be done only by the Court
H     Martial.
              UNION OF INDIA & ORS. v. P. S. GILL                            415
                  [L. NAGESWARA RAO, J.]

       10. Mr. K. Ramesh, learned counsel for the Respondent argued          A
that Section 14 of the Act provides that the Tribunal shall exercise all
jurisdiction, powers and authorities exercisable by all Courts (except
the Supreme Court or the High Courts exercising jurisdiction under
Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution), in relation to service matters.
Mr. Ramesh further submitted that according to Section 14 (2), any
                                                                             B
person aggrieved by an order pertaining to any service matter may make
an application to the Tribunal. He submitted that jurisdiction of the
Tribunal cannot be curtailed on pedantic grounds and the order by which
General Court Martial was convened was rightly set aside by the
Tribunal.
                                                                             C
      11. Sections 14 and 15 of the Armed Forces Tribunal Act, 2007
which are relevant for adjudication of the dispute in this case are as
follows:
      “14. Jurisdiction, powers and authority in service matters.
      —(1) Save as otherwise expressly provided in this Act, the
                                                                             D
      Tribunal shall exercise, on and from the appointed day, all
      the jurisdiction, powers and authority, exercisable
      immediately before that day by all courts (except the Supreme
      Court or a High Court exercising jurisdiction under articles
      226 and 227 of the Constitution) in relation to all service
      matters.                                                               E
      (2) Subject to the other provisions of this Act, a person
      aggrieved by an order pertaining to any service matter may
      make an application to the Tribunal in such form and
      accompanied by such documents or other evidence and on
      payment of such fee as may be prescribed.                              F
      (3) On receipt of an application relating to service matters,
      the Tribunal shall, if satisfied after due inquiry, as it may
      deem necessary, that it is fit for adjudication by it, admit such
      application; but where the Tribunal is not so satisfied, it may
      dismiss the application after recording its reasons in writing.        G
      (4) For the purpose of adjudicating an application, the
      Tribunal shall have the same powers as are vested in a Civil
      Court under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908),
      while trying a suit in respect of the following matters,
      namely—                                                                H
416     SUPREME COURT REPORTS                     [2019] 17 S.C.R.


A         (a) summoning and enforcing the attendance of any
              person and examining him on oath;
          (b) requiring the discovery and production of
              documents;
          (c) receiving evidence on affidavits;
B
          (d) subject to the provisions of sections 123 and 124
              of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872),
              requisitioning any public record or document or
              copy of such record or document from any office;

C         (e) issuing commissions for the examination of witnesses
              or documents;
          (f) reviewing its decisions;
          (g) dismissing an application for default or deciding it
              ex parte;
D
          (h) setting aside any order of dismissal of any
              application for default or any order passed by it ex
              parte; and
           (i) any other matter which may be prescribed by the
               Central Government.
E
      (5) The Tribunal shall decide both questions of law and facts
      that may be raised before it.
      15. Jurisdiction, powers and authority in matters of appeal
      against court martial. —
F     (1) Save as otherwise expressly provided in this Act, the
      Tribunal shall exercise, on and from the appointed day, all
      the jurisdiction, powers and authority exercisable under this
      Act in relation to appeal against any order, decision, finding
      or sentence passed by a court martial or any matter
G     connected therewith or incidental thereto.
      (2) Any person aggrieved by an order, decision, finding or
      sentence passed by a court martial may prefer an appeal in
      such form, manner and within such time as may be prescribed.
      (3) The Tribunal shall have power to grant bail to any
H     person accused of an offence and in military custody, with
      UNION OF INDIA & ORS. v. P. S. GILL                          417
          [L. NAGESWARA RAO, J.]

or without any conditions which it considers necessary:            A
Provided that no accused person shall be so released if there
appears reasonable ground for believing that he has been
guilty of an offence punishable with death or imprisonment
for life.
(4) The Tribunal shall allow an appeal against conviction          B
by a court martial where—
    (a) the finding of the court martial is legally not
        sustainable due to any reason whatsoever; or
    (b) the finding involves wrong decision on a question          C
        of law; or
    (c) there was a material irregularity in the course of the
        trial resulting in miscarriage of justice, but, in any
        other case, may dismiss the appeal where the
        Tribunal considers that no miscarriage of justice is       D
        likely to be caused or has actually resulted to the
        appellant: Provided that no order dismissing the
        appeal by the Tribunal shall be passed unless such
        order is made after recording reasons therefor in
        writing.
                                                                   E
(5) The Tribunal may allow an appeal against conviction,
and pass appropriate order thereon.
(6) Notwithstanding anything contained in the foregoing
provisions of this section, the Tribunal shall have the power
to—                                                                F
    (a) substitute for the findings of the court martial, a
        finding of guilty for any other offence for which the
        offender could have been lawfully found guilty by
        the court martial and pass a sentence afresh for the
        offence specified or involved in such findings under       G
        the provisions of the Army Act, 1950 (46 of 1950)
        or the Navy Act, 1957 (62 of 1957) or the Air Force
        Act, 1950 (45 of 1950), as the case may be; or
    (b) if sentence is found to be excessive, illegal or unjust,
        the Tribunal may—                                          H
418            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                       [2019] 17 S.C.R.


A                    (i) remit the whole or any part of the sentence, with
                         or without conditions;
                     (ii) mitigate the punishment awarded;
                    (iii) commute such punishment to any lesser
                          punishment or punishments mentioned in the
B                         Army Act, 1950 (46 of 1950), the Navy Act, 1957
                          (62 of 1957) and the Air Force Act, 1950 (45 of
                          1950), as the case may be;
                 (c) enhance the sentence awarded by a court martial:
                     Provided that no such sentence shall be enhanced
C                    unless the appellant has been given an opportunity
                     of being heard;
                 (d) release the appellant, if sentenced to imprisonment,
                     on parole with or without conditions;
                 (e) suspend a sentence of imprisonment;
D
                 (f) pass any other order as it may think appropriate.
            (7) Notwithstanding any other provisions in this Act, for the
            purposes of this section, the Tribunal shall be deemed to be
            a criminal court for the purposes of sections 175, 178, 179,
            180, 193, 195, 196 or 228 of the Indian Penal Code (45 of
E           1860) and Chapter XXVI of the Code of Criminal Procedure,
            1973 (2 of 1974).”
            12. It is also relevant to examine Section 3 (o) of the Act which
      defines ‘service matters’ which is as under:
            “(o) “service matters”, in relation to the persons subject to
F
            the Army Act, 1950 (46 of 1950), the Navy Act, 1957 (62 of
            1957) and the Air Force Act, 1950 (45 of 1950), mean all
            matters relating to the conditions of their service and shall
            include—
                 (i) remuneration (including allowances), pension and
G                    other retirement benefits;
                 (ii) tenure, including commission, appointment,
                      enrolment, probation, confirmation, seniority,
                      training, promotion, reversion, premature retirement,
                      superannuation, termination of service and penal
H                     deductions;
              UNION OF INDIA & ORS. v. P. S. GILL                           419
                  [L. NAGESWARA RAO, J.]

          (iii) summary disposal and trials where the punishment            A
                of dismissal is awarded;
          (iv) any other matter, whatsoever, but shall not include
               matters relating to—
                (i) orders issued under section 18 of the Army Act,
                                                                            B
                    1950 (46 of 1950), sub-section (1) of section 15
                    of the Navy Act, 1957 (62 of 1957) and section
                    18 of the Air Force Act, 1950 (45 of 1950); and
               (ii) transfers and postings including the change of
                    place or unit on posting whether individually or        C
                    as a part of unit, formation or ship in relation
                    to the persons subject to the Army Act, 1950 (46
                    of 1950), the Navy Act, 1957 (62 of 1957) and
                    the Air Force Act, 1950 (45 of 1950);
              (iii) leave of any kind;                                      D
              (iv) summary court martial except where the
                   punishment is of dismissal or imprisonment for
                   more than three months;
        13. At the outset, it is relevant to note that the O.A. was filed
both under Sections 14 and 15 of the Act. Section 15 confers                E
jurisdiction and power on the Tribunal to entertain appeal against any
order, decision, finding or sentence passed by a Court Martial.
       14. Section 15 (2) of the Act provides for an appeal which can
be filed by the person aggrieved by an order, decision, finding or
sentence passed by a Court Martial. The order challenged in the OA          F
in this case is a proceeding by which the General Court Martial was
convened. As there was no order, decision, finding or sentence by
the Court Martial, an appeal under Section 15 per se is not maintainable.
       15. Section 14 enables a person aggrieved to make an application
to the Tribunal in any service matter. ‘Service matters’ are defined in     G
Section 3 (o) to mean all matters relating to the conditions of their
service, which shall include termination of service, inter alia. There
are some matters which are excluded from the purview of the definition
of ‘service matters’. There is no dispute in this case that the said
exclusions do not come into play.                                           H
420             SUPREME COURT REPORTS                         [2019] 17 S.C.R.


A           16. Any matter relating to the conditions of service falls within
      the definition of ‘service matters’ under Section 3 (o) of the Act and
      can be the subject matter of an application filed before the Tribunal.
      ‘Conditions of service’ mean those conditions which regulate the holding
      of a post by any person right from the time of his appointment till his
B     retirement and even after his retirement including pension etc.
      Therefore, conditions of service also include dismissal from service.1

             17. The words ‘relating to’ appearing before the words ‘conditions
      of service’ in the definition of ‘service matters’ in Section 3 (o) of the
      Act should be given a wide interpretation.2 In Mansukhlal Dhanraj
C     Jain v. Eknath Ogale (supra) this Court referred to Blacks’ Law
      Dictionary where ‘relate’ was defined as under:

            “to stand in some relation; to have bearing or concern; to
            pertain; refer; to bring into association with or connection
D           with; ‘with to’.”

             18. It is clear from the above that any proceeding which leads
      to an order of termination would fall within the expression ‘relating to
      conditions of service’. In any event, the proceedings initiated against
      the Respondent cannot be said to be not related to his service. A final
E     order to be passed by the General Court Martial, apart from the
      imposition of other penalties, might have led to the termination of the
      service of the Respondent.

             19. We have no doubt in our mind that Section 14 of the Act
      which confers jurisdiction over service matters of the Army personnel
F
      should receive wide construction. This Court had held that an
      interpretation which confers jurisdiction should be preferred over an
      interpretation which takes away jurisdiction3.

            20. We are also conscious that the object with which the Act
G     was made is to provide adjudication of complaints and disputes regarding
      service matters and not only appeals against the verdicts of the Court
      Martial. It is trite law that statement of objects and reasons can be
      1
        State of Maharashtra v. Marwanjee Desai, (2002) 2 SCC 318
      2
        Mansukhlal Dhanraj Jain v. Eknath Ogale, (1995) 2 SCC 665
      3
H       Mantri Technozone v. Forward Foundation, 2019 SCC Online SC 332 (3JB)
                UNION OF INDIA & ORS. v. P. S. GILL                                 421
                    [L. NAGESWARA RAO, J.]

used as a tool for interpretation4. The sequitur of the above discussion            A
is that the impugned judgment of the Tribunal does not suffer from lack
of jurisdiction.

      21. Regarding the charges sought to be framed against the
Respondent, we do not find any error in the approach of the Tribunal.
                                                                                    B
The material on record was perused by the Tribunal to come to a
conclusion that no prima facie case is made out against the Respondent.
We do not see any reason to interfere with the said findings.
       22. Accordingly, the Appeal is dismissed.
                                                                                    C
Devika Gujral                                                   Appeal dismissed.




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                                                                                    F




                                                                                    G




4
  S.S. Bola v. B.D. Sharma (1997) 2 SCC 522, State of Maharashtra v. Marwanjee F.
Desai, (2002) 2 SCC 318                                                             H