UNION OF INDIA & ORS.versusM/S UNICORN INDUSTRIES

270                      [2019]REPORTS
               SUPREME COURT    12 S.C.R. 270                 [2019] 12 S.C.R.


A                          UNION OF INDIA & ORS.
                                          v.
                            M/S UNICORN INDUSTRIES
                          (Civil Appeal No. 7432 of 2019)
B                             SEPTEMBER 19, 2019
          [ARUN MISHRA, M. R. SHAH AND B. R. GAVAI, JJ.]
             Doctrines – Doctrine of Promissory Estoppel – When cannot
      be invoked – Appellant vide notification dated 09.09.2003,
C     exempted certain goods from the payment of excise duty – By
      notification dated. 25.04.2007, earlier notifications issued were
      amended with the result that pan masala, tobacco, manufactured
      tobacco substitutes and plastic carry bags of less than 20 microns
      were no longer entitled for exemption from the excise duty–
      Respondent in the Civil Appeal arising out of SLP (C) No.36926 of
D
      2012, approached the High Court of Sikkim by way of Writ Petition
      – Allowed – Respondent in the Civil Appeal Nos.2345 and 2346 of
      2017, approached the High Court of Gauhati – Writ Petition
      dismissed by Single Judge vide order dated. 10.12.2010 – Writ
      appeals allowed – Held: Exemption granted, even when the
E     notification granting exemption prescribes a particular period till
      which it is available, can be withdrawn by the State, if it is found
      that such withdrawal is in the public interest– Larger public interest
      would outweigh the individual interest, if any – In such case, even
      the doctrine of promissory estoppel would not come to the rescue of
F     the persons claiming exemptions and compel the State not to resile
      from its promise, if the act of the State is found to be in public interest
      – Scientific research conducted by Experts in the field has found
      that the consumption of pan masala with tobacco as well as pan
      masala sans tobacco is hazardous to health – It was further found
      that the percentage of teenagers consuming the hazardous product
G
      was very high and as such exposing large chunk of young population
      of the country to the risk of oral cancer – Taking into consideration
      this aspect, if the State has decided to withdraw the exemption
      granted for manufacture of such products, it is not understood as
      to how it can be said to be not in the public interest – Withdrawal of
H
                                         270
   UNION OF INDIA & ORS. v. M/S UNICORN INDUSTRIES                         271


the exemption to the pan masala with tobacco and pan masala sans           A
tobacco is in the larger public interest – Doctrine of promissory
estoppel could not have been invoked in the present matter –
Judgments passed by the High Court of Sikkim and Appellate Bench
of the Gauhati High Court set aside – Order passed by Single Judge
dated. 10.12.2010 upheld – Central Excise Act, 1944 – s.5A –               B
Additional Duties of Excise (Goods of Special Importance) Act,
1957 – s.3 – Additional Duties of Excise (Textiles and Textile Articles)
Act, 1978 – s.3(3) – Central Excise Tariff Act, 1985 – CENVAT
Credit Rules, 2002 – Finance Act, 2003 – s.154 – Excise Duty.

      Allowing the appeals, the Court                                      C

      HELD: 1.1 The issue raised in these appeals is no more
res integra. The exemption granted, even when the notification
granting exemption prescribes a particular period till which it is
available, can be withdrawn by the State, if it is found that such a
withdrawal is in the public interest. In such a case, the larger           D
public interest would outweigh the individual interest, if any. In
such a case, even the doctrine of promissory estoppel would not
come to the rescue of the persons claiming exemptions and
compel the State not to resile from its promise, if the act of the
State is found to be in public interest. [Paras 12, 19 and 25][279-        E
F; 283-E; 285-G-H]

       1.2 A judicial notice can be taken of the fact that by various
scientific studies on betel quid and substitutes, tobacco and their
substitutes, i.e., pan masala with tobacco and without tobacco,
these products have been found to be one of the main causes for            F
oral cancer. By a scientific research conducted by Experts in the
field, it has been found that the consumption of pan masala with
tobacco as well as pan masala sans tobacco is hazardous to health.
It has further been found that, the percentage of teenagers
consuming the hazardous product was very high and as such                  G
exposing a large chunk of young population of this Country to
the risk of oral cancer. Taking into consideration this aspect, if
the State has decided to withdraw the exemption granted for
manufacture of such products, it cannot be understood as to how
it can be said to be not in the public interest. [Paras 26, 31]
[285-A; 290-D-E]                                                           H
272            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                     [2019] 12 S.C.R.


A            1.3 The legislative policy as reflected in Section 154 of the
      Finance Act, 2003 was to withdraw the exemption granted to the
      manufacturers of cigarettes as well as pan masala with tobacco
      and that too with retrospective effect. Apart from the fact that, it
      is a common knowledge that tobacco is highly hazardous, the
      legislative intent was also unambiguous. In these circumstances,
B
      the finding of the High Court that the withdrawal of exemption
      for tobacco products was not in the public interest, to say the
      least is shocking. The approach of the Appellate Bench of the
      High Court was totally unsustainable. The withdrawal of the
      exemption to the pan masala with tobacco and pan masala sans
C     tobacco is in the larger public interest. As such, the doctrine of
      promissory estoppel could not have been invoked in the present
      matter. The State could not be compelled to continue the
      exemption, though it was satisfied that it was not in the public
      interest to do so. The larger public interest would outweigh an
      individual loss, if any. The appeals are allowed. The judgments
D
      and orders passed by the Appellate Bench of the Gauhati High
      Court dated 20.04.2016 and 25.05.2016 are quashed and set
      aside. The Order passed by the Single Judge dated 10.12.2010
      dismissing the writ petitions is upheld. [Paras 35, 36 and 39][292-
      A-D, F]
E           Kasinka Trading v. Union of India (1995) 1 SCC 274 :
            [1994] 4 Suppl. SCR 448; STO v. Shree Durga Oil Mills
            (1998) 1 SCC 572 : [1997] 6 Suppl. SCR 488; Shrijee
            Sales Corpn. v. Union of India (1997) 3 SCC 398 :
            [1996] 10 Suppl. SCR 888; State of Rajasthan v.
F           Mahaveer Oil Industries (1999) 4 SCC 357 : [1999] 2
            SCR 798; Shree Sidhbali Steels Ltd. v. State of U.P.
            (2011) 3 SCC 193 : [2011] 3 SCR 134; DG of Foreign
            Trade v. Kanak Exports (2016) 2 SCC 226 : [2015] 15
            SCR 287 – relied on.
G           Darshan Oils (P) Ltd. v. Union of India (1995) 1 SCC
            345 : [1994] 5 Suppl. SCR 278; Pappu Sweets and
            Biscuits v. Commr. Of Trade Tax, U.P. (1998) 7 SCC
            228 : [1998] 2 Suppl. SCR 119; Commr. of Customs v.


H
  UNION OF INDIA & ORS. v. M/S UNICORN INDUSTRIES             273


     Dilip Kumar & Co. (2018) 9 SCC 1 : [2018] 7 SCR          A
     1191; M/s Motilal Padampat Sugar Mills Co. Ltd. v.
     State of Uttar Pradesh and Ors. (1979) 2 SCC 409 :
     [1979] 2 SCR 641; Union of India & Ors. v. Godfrey
     Philips India Ltd. & Ors. (1985) 4 SCC 369 : [1985] 3
     Suppl. SCR 123; Pawan Alloys & Casting Pvt. Ltd. v.
                                                              B
     U.P. State Electricity Board & Ors. (1997) 7 SCC 251 :
     [1997] 3 Suppl. SCR 266 – referred to.
     Research Paper titled “Alert for an epidemic of oral
     cancer due to use of the betel quid substitutes gutkha
     and pan masala: A review of agents and causative
     mechanisms”- Mutagenesis Vol. 19 No. 4; Study Paper      C
     titled “Smokeless Tobacco and Its Adverse Effects on
     Hematological Parameters: A Cross-Sectional Study”-
     Advances in Preventive Medicine 2019; Study Report
     titled “A review on Harmful Effects of Pan Masala”-
     Indian Journal of Cancer (October-December 2015)         D
     Volume 52, Issue 4 – referred to.
                     Case Law Reference
[1994]4 Suppl. SCR 448       relied on              Para 10
[1994] 5 Suppl. SCR 278      referred to            Para 10   E
[1997] 6 Suppl. SCR 488      relied on              Para 10
[1996] 10 Suppl. SCR 888     relied on              Para 10
[1999] 2 SCR 798             relied on              Para 10
[2011] 3 SCR 134             relied on              Para 10   F
[2015] 15 SCR 287            relied on              Para 10
[1998] 2 Suppl. SCR 119      referred to            Para 10
[2018] 7 SCR 1191            referred to            Para 10
[1979] 2 SCR 641             referred to            Para 11   G
[1985] 3 Suppl. SCR 123      referred to            Para 11
[1997] 3 Suppl. SCR 266      referred to            Para 11


                                                              H
274             SUPREME COURT REPORTS                          [2019] 12 S.C.R.


A           CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 7432
      of 2019.
            From the Judgment and Order dated 11.05.2012 of the High
      Court of Sikkim at Gangtok in Writ Petition (C) No. 22 of 2007.
                                             With
B           Civil Appeal Nos. 2345, 2346 of 2017.
             Dhruv Aggarwal, Dr. Ashok Saraf, Nakul Dewan, Balbir Singh,
      Guru Krishan Kumar, K. V. Viswanathan, S. Ganesh, Tarun Gulati, Sr.
      Advs., Ms. Nisha Bagchi, Rupesh Kumar, Ms. Aruna Gupta, Dharmendra
      Gupta, B. K. Prasad, Shriram P. Pingle, Gangdeep Sharma, M. L. Lahoty,
C     Paban K. Sharma, Anchit Sripat, Himanshu Shekhar, Vishal Gupta,
      M/s. AP & J Chambers, Kaushik Choudhary, Mukunda Rao, Pawanshree
      Agrawal, K. J. John, M/s. K J John & Co. Ajoy K. Roy, Shantanu Tyagi,
      Ms. Nandita Chauhan, Ravinder Nijhawan, S. S. Shroff, Rahul Narayan,
      Shashwat Goel, Ajoy K. Roy, Ajay Aggarwal, Ms. Mallika Joshi, Ishan
      Narain, Rajan Narain, Ms. Kavita Jha, Ms. Swati Agarwal, Pawanshree
D     Agrawal, Ms. Devika Jain, Kumar Visalaksh, Udit Jain, Mahfooz A.
      Nazki, Rana Ranjit Singh, Vivek Kumar Singh, Ms. Akanksha Singh,
      Shuvodeep Roy, Kabir Shankar Bose, Satropp Das, Ms. Neelima Tripathi,
      Ms. Gunjan Singh, K. V. Mohan, Vishal Gupta, Sumeet Sharma,
      Diviyanshu Gupta, Rakesh Sinha, Partha Sil, Parthiv K. Goswami, Ishan
      Bisht, Vivek Gupta, Ms. Palak Mahajan, Ms. Diksha Rai, Raghvendra
E     Kumar, Ms. Aruna Mathur, Sunil Murarka, Kunal Chatterji,
      Ms. Maitrayee Banerjee, Supratik Sarkar, V. Lakshmikumaran,
      Ms. Charanya Lakshmikumaran, Aditya Bhattacharya, Mrs. Ishita
      Mathur, Ms. Apeksha Mehta, Ms. Monica Kasturi, R. Parthasarthy,
      Kshitij Vaibhav, Ms. Bina Gupta, Ms. Sheona Taqvi, R. Jawahar Lal,
      Siddharth Bawa, Shaymal Anand, Mayank Kshirsagar, Nikhil Singhvi,
F     Mohit Seth, Ms. Sonia Dubey, Obhirup Ghosh, M/s. Legal Option, Gaurav
      Juneja, Aayush Jain, M/s. Khaitan & Co., V. K. Sidharthan, Ramendra
      Lal Auddy, B. Krishna Prasad, M/s. Arputham Aruna & Co., Satya
      Mitra, Ms. Hemantika Wahi, Gopal Singh, Advs. for the appearing parties.
            The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
G           B. R. GAVAI, J.
            1. Leave granted in S.L.P.(C) No. 36926 of 2012.
              2. The question of law that arises for consideration in these appeals
      is, ‘as to whether, by invoking the doctrine of promissory estoppel, can
      the Union of India be estopped from withdrawing the exemption from
H     payment of Excise Duty in respect of certain products, which exemption
   UNION OF INDIA & ORS. v. M/S UNICORN INDUSTRIES                               275
                      [B. R. GAVAI, J.]

is granted by an earlier notification; when the Union of India finds that        A
such a withdrawal is necessary in the public interest.
        3. Since the factual position as well as the question of law arising
in the present three appeals are common, they are heard together and
disposed of by this common judgment. The appellant, Union of India, in
exercise of powers conferred by sub-section (1) of Section 5A of the
Central Excise Act, 1944 (1 of 1994) (hereinafter referred to as the             B
“Central Excise Act”) read with sub-section (3) of Section 3 of the
Additional Duties of Excise (Goods of Special Importance) Act, 1957
(58 of 1957) and sub-section (3) of Section 3 of the Additional Duties of
Excise (Textiles and Textile Articles) Act, 1978 (40 of 1978), being satisfied
that it is necessary in the public interest, by Notification No. 71 of 2003
dated 09.09.2003, exempted the goods specified in the First Schedule             C
and the Second Schedule to the Central Excise Tariff Act, 1985 (5 of
1986) other than the goods specified in Annexure-I to the said Notification,
from the payment of duties under the said statutes. The notification
provided that so much of the duty of excise or additional duty of excise,
as the case may be, leviable thereon under any of the said Acts as was
equivalent to the amount of duty paid by the manufacturer of the said            D
goods, other than the amount of duty paid by utilisation of CENVAT
credit under the CENVAT Credit Rules, 2002, was exempted. This
exemption was available to the units located in Industrial Growth Centre
or Industrial Infrastructure Development Centre or Export Promotion
Industrial Park or Industrial Estate or Industrial Area or Commercial
Estate or Scheme Area, as the case may be, in the State of Sikkim, as            E
specified in Annexure-II appended to the said notification. A procedure
was also prescribed under the said notification for availing the benefit of
exemption. Annexure-I thereto provides the list of the products which
were not entitled for exemption. Clause 1 of the said Annexure reads
thus:
                                                                                 F
       “1. Tobacco and Tobacco products including Cigarettes/
           Cigars/ Gutkha”
       Similar notifications were issued by the Union of India being
Notification Nos. 32 of 1999-CE and 33 of 1999-CE dated 08.07.1999
insofar as the State of Assam is concerned.
                                                                                 G
       4. By Notification No. 21 of 2007-CE dated 25.04.2007, the earlier
notifications issued by it were amended. The effect of the amendment
was that the product ‘pan masala’ falling under Chapter 21 of the First
Schedule of the Central Excise Tariff Act, 1985, the goods falling under
Chapter 24 of said First Schedule, i.e., tobacco and manufactured tobacco
substitutes and plastic carry bags of less than 20 microns were included         H
276             SUPREME COURT REPORTS                            [2019] 12 S.C.R.


A     in the negative list and as such were no longer entitled for exemption
      from the excise duty. Being aggrieved by the said notification, the
      respondent, namely, Unicorn Industries in the Civil Appeal arising out of
      Special Leave Petition (C) No. 36926 of 2012, approached the High
      Court of Sikkim by way of Writ Petition (C) No. 22 of 2007. The High
      Court of Sikkim vide its judgment and order dated 11.05.2012 allowed
B     the writ petition and held that the petitioner therein was entitled to
      exemption from payment of excise duty on the manufacture of pan
      masala from its unit situated in the State of Sikkim for a period of 10
      years from the date of commencement of the commercial production,
      i.e., 27.06.2006.
C             5. Similarly, the respondent in Civil Appeal No. 2346 of 2017,
      namely, M/s Dharampal Satyapal Ltd., which was a manufacturer of
      pan masala with tobacco and other tobacco products, approached the
      Gauhati High Court by way of a petition bearing No. PW(C) 749 of
      2010. The said petition was with regard to withdrawal of exemption in
      respect of pan masala with tobacco. The Single Judge of the Gauhati
D     High Court vide judgment and order dated 10.12.2010 found no substance
      in the petition and as such dismissed the petition. Being aggrieved thereby,
      the said respondent filed Writ Appeal No. 81 of 2011 before the Appellate
      Bench of Gauhati High Court. Vide the judgment and order dated
      20.04.2016, the Appellate Bench of the High Court allowed the appeal;
      set aside the judgment and order passed by the Single Judge dated
E
      10.12.2010 and quashed Notification No. 11 of 2007-CE dated
      01.03.2007. It further directed the Investment Appraisal Committee to
      give an opportunity of hearing to the appellant before it (respondent
      herein) so that it can prove the amount it had actually invested in the
      specified items for availing the benefits under the earlier notifications
F     and further directed that if the appellant proves that it had actually invested
      the amount, the respondent authorities shall refund to the appellant so
      much of the excise duty to which the appellant therein would be entitled
      as per the earlier notifications.
             6. The respondent in Civil Appeal No. 2345 of 2017, namely, M/s
      Dharampal Satyapal Ltd., had also filed another petition being Writ Petition
G
      (C) No. 749 of 2010 insofar as its product ‘pan masala without tobacco’,
      is concerned. The same was also dismissed by the learned Single Judge
      of the Gauhati High Court vide the common judgment and order dated
      10.12.2010. It appears that the appeal arising from the said petition being
      Writ Appeal No. 223 of 2011 was separately heard by another Appellate
H
   UNION OF INDIA & ORS. v. M/S UNICORN INDUSTRIES                                277
                      [B. R. GAVAI, J.]

Bench of the Gauhati High Court. However, noticing that the writ appeal           A
arising out of the order of the Single Judge regarding the product of the
appellant therein, i.e., ‘pan masala containing tobacco’ was already
allowed by the Appellate Bench of the High Court by Order dated
20.04.2016, the said writ appeal was also allowed, by the judgment and
order dated 25.05.2016 thereby setting aside the Order passed by the
learned Single Judge in Writ Petition (C) No. 749 of 2010 so also the             B
Notification dated 25.04.2007. The respondent therein was directed to
refund the excise duty component to the appellant as is admissible under
the law.
       7. Being aggrieved by the aforesaid judgments and orders, one
passed by the Sikkim High Court in the writ petition and the other two            C
passed by the Gauhati High Court in the writ appeals, the Union of India
is before this Court.
       8. Mr. Dhruv Agrawal, learned senior counsel appearing on behalf
of the appellants, submits that both, the Sikkim High Court as well as the
Appellate Benches of the Gauhati High Court have grossly erred in                 D
allowing the writ petition and the writ appeals of the assessees. It is
submitted that, though the Union of India had specifically contended
before both the High Courts that the 2007 Notifications were issued in
the public interest, the same has not been considered. It is submitted that
the Union of India, in exercise of its delegated powers, is always
empowered to modify and withdraw the exemptions granted by it under               E
the earlier notification(s). It is submitted that the Union of India, taking
into consideration the public interest, that the consumption of pan masala
with tobacco or pan masala without tobacco is hazardous to the human
health and, therefore, for curbing its consumption, had issued the 2007
Notifications thereby including pan masala in Chapter 21 and all products
contained in Chapter 24, i.e., tobacco and manufactured tobacco                   F
substitutes, in the negative list. It is submitted that, after taking into
consideration that the 2007 Notification was issued in public interest, the
Sikkim High Court ought not to have interfered with it. He further
submitted that the reasoning given by the Sikkim High Court that pan
masala is not hazardous and, therefore, the 2007 Notification cannot be
                                                                                  G
said to be in the public interest is totally erroneous. It is further submitted
that while doing so, the Sikkim High Court has assumed the role of an
expert in the field and, therefore, travelled beyond its jurisdiction.
      9. Insofar as the Gauhati High Court is concerned, the learned
senior counsel submitted that the learned Single Judge of the Gauhati
                                                                                  H
278             SUPREME COURT REPORTS                         [2019] 12 S.C.R.


A     High Court had rightly dismissed the writ petitions, finding that in the
      conflict between the interest of an individual and the public interest,
      individual interest should give way to the larger public interest. It is
      submitted that, the Appellate Bench of the Gauhati High Court in its
      judgment dated 20.04.2016 has grossly erred in interfering with the
      reasoned order passed by the learned Single Judge. It is submitted that,
B     in the said appeal, the product that fell for consideration before the
      Appellate Bench of the High Court was Zarda scented tobacco and pan
      masala containing tobacco. It is submitted that, the products containing
      tobacco are indisputably hazardous to health and, therefore, the
      Notification which withdraws exemption granted for the manufacture
      of the said products is undoubtedly in the larger public interest. However,
C
      overlooking this aspect, the appeals have been allowed. It is submitted
      that insofar as the other appeal is concerned, the another Appellate Bench
      has only relied upon the judgment by the earlier Appellate Bench and
      has observed that the only distinction in both the matters was that in the
      earlier matter, the issue was with regard to pan masala containing tobacco
D     and in the matter before them, the issue was with regard to pan masala
      without tobacco and with these observation allowed the appeal.
              10. The learned senior counsel relied on the following judgments
      of this Court in the cases of Kasinka Trading vs. Union of India1, Darshan
      Oils (P) Ltd. vs. Union of India2, STO vs. Shree Durga Oil Mills3, Shrijee
E     Sales Corpn. vs. Union of India4, State of Rajasthan vs. Mahaveer Oil
      Industries5, Shree Sidhbali Steels Ltd. vs. State of U.P.6, DG of Foreign
      Trade vs. Kanak Exports7, Pappu Sweets and Biscuits vs. Commr. Of
      Trade Tax, U.P.8 and Commr. of Customs vs. Dilip Kumar & Co.9,.
             11. Shri Balbir Singh and Shri Nakul Dewan, learned senior counsel
F     appearing on behalf of the respondents, have supported the impugned
      judgments and orders. It is submitted that, the Sikkim High Court as well
      as the Appellate Benches of the Gauhati High Court have rightly relied
      upon the doctrine of promissory estoppel and allowed the appeals. It is
      1
        (1995) 1 SCC 274
      2
G       (1995) 1 SCC 345
      3
        (1998) 1 SCC 572
      4
        (1997) 3 SCC 398
      5
        (1999) 4 SCC 357
      6
        (2011) 3 SCC 193
      7
        (2016) 2 SCC 226
      8
        (1998) 7 SCC 228
H     9
        (2018) 9 SCC 1
     UNION OF INDIA & ORS. v. M/S UNICORN INDUSTRIES                            279
                        [B. R. GAVAI, J.]

submitted that, it is only on account of the representation given by the        A
Union of India and the State Governments that the industries established
in the notified areas of Sikkim as well as Assam would be entitled for
100% exemption from central excise, the writ petitioners before the
High Court had established the industries in such remote areas. It is
submitted that, the exemption notifications were issued in view of the
industrial policy of the Union of India as well as the State Governments        B
that on account of backwardness in these areas, the industrialisation in
these areas should be promoted so that the economic development takes
place. It is submitted that, only on the assurance of the Central as well
as the State Governments, the writ petitioners have invested huge amount
and, as such, now the Union of India could not be permitted in law to           C
resile from the assurance given by them to the writ petitioners. It is
submitted that, considering these principles, the Sikkim High Court and
the Appellate Bench of the Gauhati High Court have granted relief to
the writ petitioners. It is submitted that, this Court has consistently held
that, if a party changes its position to its detriment, on account of a
promise given by the other party, the other party cannot be permitted to        D
resile from such a promise. It is submitted that the doctrine of promissory
estoppel is equally applicable to the State and its functionaries. Reliance
in this respect is placed on the following judgments of this Court. M/s
Motilal Padampat Sugar Mills Co. Ltd. vs. State of Uttar Pradesh and
Ors.10, Union of India & Ors. Vs. Godfrey Philips India Ltd. & Ors.11
                                                                                E
and Pawan Alloys & Casting Pvt. Ltd. vs. U.P. State Electricity Board
& Ors.12.
       12. The issue raised in these appeals is no more res integra. This
Court in a catena of decisions has considered the issue with regard to
inapplicability of the doctrine of promissory estoppel, when the larger
                                                                                F
public interest demands so. We will refer, in brief, to the earlier judgments
of this Court.
      13. In the case of Kasinka Trading (supra), this Court was
considering the case of the appellant, who were manufacturing certain
products, requiring PVC resin as one of the raw materials for its
manufacturing process. By Notification No. 66 dated 15.03.1979 issued           G
under Section 25 of the Customs Act, 1962 which is pari materia with
Section 5A of the Central Excise Act, the PVC resin was exempted
10
   (1979) 2 SCC 409
11
   (1985) 4 SCC 369
12
   (1997) 7 SCC 251                                                             H
280            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                          [2019] 12 S.C.R.


A     from basic import duty. The exemption was to be effective till 31.03.1981.
      However, by Notification No. 205 dated 16.10.1980 issued under Section
      25 of the Customs Act, the exemption granted earlier came to be
      withdrawn. A challenge similar to the one which is raised herein was
      raised before this Court. This Court observed thus:
B           “12. It has been settled by this Court that the doctrine of
            promissory estoppel is applicable against the Government also
            particularly where it is necessary to prevent fraud or manifest
            injustice. The doctrine, however, cannot be pressed into aid to
            compel the Government or the public authority “to carry out a
            representation or promise which is contrary to law or which was
C           outside the authority or power of the officer of the Government
            or of the public authority to make”. There is preponderance of
            judicial opinion that to invoke the doctrine of promissory estoppel
            clear, sound and positive foundation must be laid in the petition
            itself by the party invoking the doctrine and that bald expressions,
            without any supporting material, to the effect that the doctrine is
D
            attracted because the party invoking the doctrine has altered its
            position relying on the assurance of the Government would not be
            sufficient to press into aid the doctrine. In our opinion, the
            doctrine of promissory estoppel cannot be invoked in the
            abstract and the courts are bound to consider all aspects
E           including the results sought to be achieved and the public
            good at large, because while considering the applicability
            of the doctrine, the courts have to do equity and the
            fundamental principles of equity must for ever be present
            to the mind of the court, while considering the applicability
            of the doctrine. The doctrine must yield when the equity so
F           demands if it can be shown having regard to the facts and
            circumstances of the case that it would be inequitable to
            hold the Government or the public authority to its promise,
            assurance or representation.”
                                                            (emphasis supplied)
G
            14. It could thus be seen that, this Court has clearly held that the
      doctrine of promissory estoppel cannot be invoked in the abstract and
      the courts are bound to see all aspects including the objective to be
      achieved and the public good at large. It has been held that while
      considering the applicability of the doctrine, the courts have to do equity
H     and the fundamental principle of equity must forever be present in the
   UNION OF INDIA & ORS. v. M/S UNICORN INDUSTRIES                            281
                      [B. R. GAVAI, J.]

mind of the Court while considering the applicability of the doctrine. It     A
has been held that the doctrine of promissory estoppel must yield when
the equity so demands and when it can be shown having regard to the
facts and circumstances of the case, that it would be inequitable to hold
the Government or the public authority to its promise, assurance or
representation. After considering the earlier judgments on the issue, which
have been heavily relied upon by the assesses, this Court has observed        B
thus:
      “21. The power to grant exemption from payment of duty, additional
      duty etc. under the Act, as already noticed, flows from the
      provisions of Section 25(1) of the Act. The power to exempt
      includes the power to modify or withdraw the same. The liability        C
      to pay customs duty or additional duty under the Act arises when
      the taxable event occurs. They are then subject to the payment of
      duty as prevalent on the date of the entry of the goods. An
      exemption notification issued under Section 25 of the Act had the
      effect of suspending the collection of customs duty. It does not
                                                                              D
      make items which are subject to levy of customs duty etc.
      as items not leviable to such duty. It only suspends the
      levy and collection of customs duty, etc., wholly or partially
      and subject to such conditions as may be laid down in the
      notification by the Government in “public interest”. Such
      an exemption by its very nature is susceptible of being                 E
      revoked or modified or subjected to other conditions. The
      supersession or revocation of an exemption notification in
      the “public interest” is an exercise of the statutory power
      of the State under the law itself as is obvious from the
      language of Section 25 of the Act. Under the General
      Clauses Act an authority which has the power to issue a                 F
      notification has the undoubted power to rescind or modify
      the notification in a like manner.”
                                                      (emphasis supplied)
      15. It could thus be seen that, it has been held by this Court that
                                                                              G
an exemption notification does not make the items which are subject to
levy of customs duty etc. as items not leviable to such duty. It only
suspends the levy and collection of customs duty etc. subject to such
conditions as may be laid down in the “public interest”. It has further
been held that, such an exemption by its very nature is susceptible of
being revoked or modified or subjected to other conditions. It has been       H
282             SUPREME COURT REPORTS                          [2019] 12 S.C.R.


A     held that the supersession or revocation of an exemption notification in
      the public interest is an exercise of the statutory power by the State
      under the law itself. It has further been held that under the General
      Clauses Act an authority which has the power to issue a notification has
      the undoubted power to rescind or modify the notification in a like manner.
B           16. This Court, after considering the objections that the exemption
      could not be withdrawn prior to the date prescribed in the notification
      granting exemption has observed thus:
            “23. The appellants appear to be under the impression that even
            if, in the altered market conditions the continuance of the exemption
C           may not have been justified, yet, Government was bound to
            continue it to give extra profit to them. That certainly was not the
            object with which the notification had been issued. The withdrawal
            of exemption “in public interest” is a matter of policy and
            the courts would not bind the Government to its policy
            decisions for all times to come, irrespective of the
D           satisfaction of the Government that a change in the policy
            was necessary in the “public interest”. The courts, do not
            interfere with the fiscal policy where the Government acts
            in “public interest” and neither any fraud or lack of bona
            fides is alleged much less established. The Government
            has to be left free to determine the priorities in the matter
E           of utilisation of finances and to act in the public interest
            while issuing or modifying or withdrawing an exemption
            notification under Section 25(1) of the Act.”
                                                            (emphasis supplied)
             17. It has been observed, that the withdrawal of exemption in
F
      public interest is a matter of policy and the courts would not bind the
      Government to its policy decisions for all times to come, irrespective of
      the satisfaction of the Government that a change in the policy was
      necessary in the public interest. It has been held that, where the
      Government acts in public interest and neither any fraud or lack of bona
G     fides is alleged much less established, it would not be appropriate for this
      Court to interfere with the same. Ultimately, this Court came to the
      conclusion that the withdrawal of the exemption was in the public interest
      and, therefore, refused to interfere with the order of the Delhi High
      Court dismissing the petitions.

H
   UNION OF INDIA & ORS. v. M/S UNICORN INDUSTRIES                              283
                      [B. R. GAVAI, J.]

       18. In the case of Shree Durga Oil Mills (supra), the Government         A
of Orissa had withdrawn the sales tax exemption which was granted
earlier under the Orissa Sales Tax Act, 1947. Considering a similar
challenge, while reversing the judgment and order of the High Court,
this Court observed thus:
      “21. Moreover withdrawal of notification was done in public               B
      interest. The Court will not interfere with any action taken by the
      Government in public interest. Public interest must override any
      consideration of private loss or gain.
      23. In the instant case, it has been stated on behalf of the State
      that various notifications granting sales tax exemptions to the           C
      dealers resulted in severe resource crunch. On reconsideration
      of the financial position, it was decided to limit the scope of the
      earlier exemption notifications issued under Section 6 of the Orissa
      Sales Tax Act. Because of this new perception of the economic
      scenario of the State, the scope of the earlier notifications had to
      be restricted. They were first abrogated altogether on 20-5-1977.         D
      Thereafter, it was decided to grant exemption at a limited scale.
      24. In our opinion, the plea of change of policy trade on the basis
      of resource crunch should have been sufficient for dismissing the
      respondent’s case based on the doctrine of promissory estoppel.
      Public interest demanded modification of the earlier IPR.”                E
       19. It could thus be seen that, it has been held that when withdrawal
of the exemption is in public interest, the public interest must override
any consideration of private loss or gain. In the said case, the change in
policy and withdrawal of the exemption on the ground of severe resource
crunch have been found to be a valid ground and to be in public interest.
                                                                                F
       20. A similar issue came up for consideration before the Bench
consisting three Judges of this Court in the case of Shrijee Sales
Corporation (supra). The notification which came up for consideration
was similar with the notifications that fell for consideration in the case of
Kasinka Trading (supra). While considering the argument that when the
notification prescribes a period during which the exemption would be            G
available, such an exemption cannot be withdrawn till the end of the
period prescribed, this Court observed thus:
      “7. The next question is whether the fact that the Notification
      No. 66 mentioned the period during which it was to remain in
                                                                                H
284            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                          [2019] 12 S.C.R.


A           force, would make any difference to the situation. In other words,
            could it be said that an exemption notified without specifying the
            period within which the exemption would remain in force, would
            be withdrawn in public interest but not the one in which a period
            has been so specified? Once public interest is accepted as
            the superior equity which can override individual equity,
B           the principle should be applicable even in cases where a
            period has been indicated. The Government is competent to
            resile from a promise even if there is no manifest public interest
            involved, provided, of course, no one is put in any adverse situation
            which cannot be rectified. To adopt the line of reasoning in
C           Emmanuel Ayodeji Ajayi v. Briscoe, (1964) 3 All ER 556, quoted
            in M.P. Sugar Mills [Motilal Padampat Sugar Mills Co. Ltd. v.
            State of U.P., (1979) 2 SCC 409, even where there is no such
            overriding public interest, it may still be within the competence of
            the Government to resile from the promise on giving reasonable
            notice which need not be a formal notice, giving the promisee a
D           reasonable opportunity of resuming his position, provided, of course,
            it is possible for the promisee to restore the status quo ante. If,
            however, the promisee cannot resume his position, the promise
            would become final and irrevocable.”
                                                            (emphasis supplied)
E            21. It could thus be seen that this Court observed that once public
      interest is accepted as a superior equity which can override an individual
      equity, the same principle should be applicable in such cases where the
      period is prescribed.
             22. The another three Judges Bench of this Court in the case of
F     Mahavir Oil Industries (supra) has taken a similar view. In the case of
      Shree Sidhbali Steels Ltd. (supra), this Court was considering the question
      with regard to validity of the notification which withdrew 33.33% of the
      hill development rebate, on the total amount of electricity bill, granted
      under the earlier notification. This Court while considering the similar
      challenge observed thus:
G
            “33. Normally, the doctrine of promissory estoppel is being applied
            against the Government and defence based on executive necessity
            would not be accepted by the court. However, if it can be shown
            by the Government that having regard to the facts as they have
            subsequently transpired, it would be inequitable to hold the
H
   UNION OF INDIA & ORS. v. M/S UNICORN INDUSTRIES                               285
                      [B. R. GAVAI, J.]

       Government to the promise made by it, the court would not raise           A
       an equity in favour of the promisee and enforce the promise
       against the Government. Where public interest warrants, the
       principles of promissory estoppel cannot be invoked. The
       Government can change the policy in public interest.
       However, it is well settled that taking cue from this doctrine, the
       authority cannot be compelled to do something which is not allowed        B
       by law or prohibited by law. There is no promissory estoppel against
       the settled proposition of law. Doctrine of promissory estoppel
       cannot be invoked for enforcement of a promise made contrary
       to law, because none can be compelled to act against the statute.
       Thus, the Government or public authority cannot be compelled to           C
       make a provision which is contrary to law.”
                                                        (emphasis supplied)
      23. It could thus be seen that, this Court again reiterated the position
that where public interest warrants, the principle of promissory estoppel
cannot be invoked. Observing the aforesaid, the said challenge, as raised        D
by the petitioner, came to be rejected.
       24. In the case of Kanak Exports (supra), this Court again while
considering the challenge for withdrawal of incentives to the exporters
of some specified items held that, the incentive scheme in question was
in the nature of concession or incentive which was a privilege of the            E
Central Government. It was for the Government to take a decision to
grant such a privilege or not. Grant of exemption, concession or incentive
and modification thereof are the matters in the domain of public decisions
of the Government. It further reiterated that when the withdrawal of
such incentives was shown to have been done in public interest, the
courts would not tinker with the policy decisions. This Court, after             F
considering the materials on record as a matter of fact, held that
withdrawal of exemption was in the public interest.
       25. It could thus be seen that, it is more than well settled that the
exemption granted, even when the notification granting exemption
prescribes a particular period till which it is available, can be withdrawn      G
by the State, if it is found that such a withdrawal is in the public interest.
In such a case, the larger public interest would outweigh the individual
interest, if any. In such a case, even the doctrine of promissory estoppel
would not come to the rescue of the persons claiming exemptions and
compel the State not to resile from its promise, if the act of the State is
found to be in public interest.                                                  H
286                SUPREME COURT REPORTS                         [2019] 12 S.C.R.


A            26. A judicial notice can be taken of the fact that by various
      scientific studies on betel quid and substitutes, tobacco and their
      substitutes, i.e., pan masala with tobacco and without tobacco, these
      products have been found to be one of the main causes for oral cancer.
      A detailed study has been considered by three Experts, namely, Urmila
      Nair, Helmut Bartsch and Jagadeesan Nair in the Division of Toxicology
B     and Cancer Risk Factors, German Cancer Research Centre (DKFZ),
      Heidelberg, Germany. The research paper is titled as “Alert for an
      epidemic of oral cancer due to use of the betel quid substitutes gutkha
      and pan masala: a review of agents and causative mechanisms13”. After
      considering the entire material in detail and considering the various earlier
C     studies, the paper observes thus:
                “Perspectives
                       Banning of gutkha and pan masala has been strongly
                advocated by oncologists as a preventive measure to reduce oral
                cavity cancers. Recently, a number of States in India have banned
D               the manufacture and sale of both products and this should reduce
                the incidence rate. Similar regulations regarding other health-
                impairing tobacco products which have been on the market for
                centuries, together with cigarettes and bidis (an indigenous smoking
                product), should also be reinforced.
E                       However, for those who are addicted to these products or
                are already affected by premalignant lesions, educational
                interventions to encourage stopping the habit are essential.
                Additionally, chemopreventive interventions are being explored.
                Retinoids, NSAIDS and green tea are among the promising agents
                (Garewal, 1994; IUSHNCC, 1997; Papadimitrakopoulou and
F               Hong, 1997; Lin et al., 2002a). Although a large percentage of
                lesions did respond to treatment, recurrence after terminating the
                chemopreventive regime was also observed (Sankaranarayanan
                et al., 1997), perhaps due in part to continuation of the addictive
                habit.
G                     As with all cancers, early diagnosis is important for
                successful treatment of oral cancer, as its prognosis is still very
                poor. There is, nowadays, a strong drive to apply proteomics
                technology to molecular diagnosis of cancer. Expression profiling
                of tumour tissues, molecular classification of tumours and
      13
H          Mutagenesis Vol. 19 No. 4
UNION OF INDIA & ORS. v. M/S UNICORN INDUSTRIES                               287
                   [B. R. GAVAI, J.]

  identification of markers to allow early detection, sensitive diagnosis     A
  and effective treatment are now being explored for oral cancers.
  Genes with significant differences in expression levels between
  normal, dysplastic and tumour samples have been reported and
  this should help in better understanding the progression of oral
  squamous cell carcinoma (Kuo et al., 2002; Leethanakul et al.,
  2003).                                                                      B

         DNA aneuploidy in oral leukoplakia in Caucasian tobacco
  users has been found to signal a very high risk for subsequent
  development of oral squamous cell carcinomas and associated
  mortality (Sudbo and Reith, 2003; Sudbo et al., 2004). A risk
  assessment model to predict progression of premalignant lesions             C
  that includes histology and a score combining chromosomal
  polysomy, expression and loss of heterozygosity on 3p or 9p has
  also been described (Lee et al., 2000; Rosin et al., 2002). Once
  diagnosed, these premalignant lesions could be treated at a much
  earlier stage by chemo preventive agents, surgery, chemotherapy
                                                                              D
  and/or intense radiotherapy to prevent new lesions and
  premalignant lesions from progressing to invasive cancer.
  Conclusions
         Gutkha and pan masala have flooded the Indian market as
  cheap and convenient BQ substitutes and become popular across               E
  all age groups wherever this habit is practised. There is sufficient
  evidence that chewing of tobacco with lime, BQ with tobacco,
  BQ without tobacco and areca nut are carcinogenic in humans
  (IARC, 1985, 2004). These evaluations in conjunction with the
  available evidence on the BQ substitutes gutkha and pan masala
  implicates them as potent carcinogenic mixtures that can cause              F
  oral cancer. Additionally, these products are addictive and enhance
  the early appearance of OSF, especially so in young users who
  could be more susceptible to the disease. Although recently some
  curbs have been put on the manufacture and sale of these products,
  urgent action needs be taken to permanently ban gutkha and pan
                                                                              G
  masala, together with the other well-established oral cancer-
  causing tobacco products. Finally, as the consequences of these
  habits are significant and likely to intensify in the future, an emphasis
  on education aimed at reducing or eliminating the use of these
  products as well as home-made preparations should be
  accelerated.”                                                               H
288                SUPREME COURT REPORTS                             [2019] 12 S.C.R.


A           27. Recently, the Department of Oral Medicines and Radiology,
      Dental Institute, Rajendra Institute of Medical Sciences, Ranchi has
      through its experts, namely, Anjani Kumar Shukla, Tanya Khaitan,
      Prashant Gupta and Shantala R. Naik conducted a study on the subject
      “Smokeless Tobacco and Its Adverse Effects on Hematological
      Parameters: A Cross-Sectional Study14”. The study paper considered
B     the consumption of smokeless tobacco (SLT) in various forms in India
      such as pan (betel quid) with tobacco, zarda, pan masala, khaini, areca
      nut. After conducting an in-depth analysis, the paper concludes and
      recommends as under”
                “Conclusion and Recommendation
C
                SLT use has severe adverse effects on hematological parameters.
                The present study might serve as an early diagnostic tool in any
                systemic diseases and be helpful in spreading awareness on the
                deleterious effect in the populace consuming SLT. Timely
                intervention among students can prevent the initial experimentations
D               with tobacco from developing into addiction in adulthood. People
                should be counselled to avoid all habits of tobacco and undergo
                nicotine replacement therapy along with antioxidants. Knowledge
                and awareness about systemic and oral ill effects of tobacco should
                be spread through tobacco control programs in the pursuit for a
                tobacco-free world.”
E
             28. It was sought to be argued on behalf of the manufacturers of
      pan masala without tobacco, that the pan masala without tobacco stands
      on a different pedestal than the pan masala with tobacco. It was sought
      to be argued that, pan masala without tobacco cannot be considered to
      be hazardous to health. The Department of Head and Neck Surgery,
F     Tata Memorial Hospital, Mumbai through its experts Garg A, Chaturvedi
      P. Mishra A. and Datta S. had conducted a study on “A review on
      Harmful Effects of Pan Masala15”. It is to be noted that this study is of
      ‘pan masala without tobacco’. It will be apposite to refer to the following
      observations of the said report:
G               “Policy Issues Concerning Pan Masala
                      Pan masala use is rampant in India by all the sections and
                age groups of the society. It has emerged as a major cause of oral
                cancer in India. National Family Health Survey-2 showed that
      14
           Advances in Preventive Medicine 2019
      15
H          Indian Journal of Cancer (October-December 2015) Volume 52, Issue 4
   UNION OF INDIA & ORS. v. M/S UNICORN INDUSTRIES                           289
                      [B. R. GAVAI, J.]

      21% of people over 15 years of age consumed PM or tobacco.             A
      Study in the state of Tamil Nadu showed that the age at which
      people start consuming areca nut products ranges from 12 to 70
      years. 58% of the subjects chewed the products more than twice
      a day. Advertising tobacco products including PM containing
      tobacco is banned in India since May 1, 2004. To bypass this ban
      tobacco companies are advertising PM ostensibly without tobacco,       B
      heavily in all forms of media. PM is surrogate for tobacco products
      as the money spent on marketing, and advertising is many times
      of the revenue generated from the sale of PM. In Mumbai after
      the ban on PM and gutka the sale has come down and the
      percentage of users quitting and reducing the habit was 23.53%         C
      and 55.88% respectively. The main reason of quitting and reduction
      in consumption was non availability of these products. In spite of
      the ban gutka was still available but in different forms or at
      increased cost. Strict law in the form of Cigarettes and other
      Tobacco Products Act 2003 has been made in India, but the
      enforcement and compliance is lax. There is a need for strong          D
      enforcement and compliance of laws throughout the country. The
      genotoxic, carcinogenic properties and numerous other harmful
      effects of PM need immediate and strict action by the government
      on PM without tobacco as it has banned PM with tobacco. The
      consumers should also be made aware of the harmful effects of
                                                                             E
      PM as they are under a false impression that it is not harmful.
      “Conclusion
             Pan masala is widely used across all the strata of society
      and is freely available in many parts of the country. It is
      carcinogenic, genotoxic, and has harmful effects on the oral cavity,   F
      liver, kidneys and reproductive organs. Government action is
      immediately required to restrict the consumption and to make the
      people aware about its harmful effects.”
       29. The study which has been conducted in 2004, found that gutkha
and pan masala have been one of the major causes of oral cancer. The
                                                                             G
Oncologists as early as in 2004 had strongly advocated banning of gutkha
and pan masala. They further find that banning the manufacture and
sale of these products would reduce oral cancer incidence rates. It is
found that gutkha and pan masala have flooded the Indian markets and
become popular amongst all age groups. It is observed that pan masala
with tobacco as well as without tobacco have been found to be having a       H
290            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                          [2019] 12 S.C.R.


A     potent carcinogenic mixtures that can cause oral cancer. It further found
      that, these products are an addictive and enhance the early appearance
      of oral sub-mucous fibrosis (OSMF). It is especially so in the young
      users who could be more susceptible to the disease.
             30. The report further finds that, in the National Family Health
B     Survey-2, it has been found that 21% of people over 15 years of age
      consumed pan masala or tobacco. The report finds that, though advertising
      tobacco products including pan masala containing tobacco is banned in
      India since 01.05.2004, to bypass this ban, tobacco companies are
      advertising pan masala ostensibly without tobacco, heavily in all forms
      of media. It has been found that, after the ban on pan masala and gutkha,
C     the sale has come down. The 2016 report finds that, in Mumbai, after
      the ban on pan masala and gutkha, the sale has come down and the
      percentage of users quitting and reducing the habit was 23.53% and
      55.88% respectively.
             31. It could thus be seen that, by a scientific research conducted
D     by Experts in the field, it has been found that the consumption of pan
      masala with tobacco as well as pan masala sans tobacco is hazardous to
      health. It has further been found that, the percentage of teenagers
      consuming the hazardous product was very high and as such exposing a
      large chunk of young population of this Country to the risk of oral cancer.
      Taking into consideration this aspect, if the State has decided to withdraw
E     the exemption granted for manufacture of such products, we fail to
      understand as to how it can be said to be not in the public interest.
              32. The Sikkim High Court has observed that the appellant herein
      has been unable to establish any overriding public interest, which would
      make the doctrine of promissory estoppel inapplicable. It has further
F     observed that, the pan masala has not been declared as hazardous to
      health by any notification or order of the Government of India or the
      State Government. It found that, no material or scientific report had
      been placed on record to demonstrate that the pan masala is a health
      hazard. We find that the reasoning arrived at by the Sikkim High Court
      is totally erroneous.
G
            33. Insofar as the Gauhati High Court is concerned, the learned
      Single Judge by an elaborate reasoning had found that the notifications
      impugned before it was in the public interest and further observed that in
      view of the overriding public interest, the doctrine of promissory estoppel
      could not be invoked. Not only that, but the learned Single Judge in the
H     judgment has specifically observed thus:
   UNION OF INDIA & ORS. v. M/S UNICORN INDUSTRIES                             291
                      [B. R. GAVAI, J.]

             “Having regard to the background that had preceded the            A
      Policy 2007 and the curtailment of the benefits of exemption earlier
      granted by the Policy 1997 through various instruments of law in
      the form of Section 154 of the Finance Act 2003 read with Schedule
      9 thereto as well as the notifications under Section 5A of the
      Central Excise Act and other related legislations it would be in
      defiance of logic to conclude that all these notwithstanding, with       B
      the specific intention of excluding the industries engaged in the
      manufacture of goods under Chapter 24 and pan masala under
      Chapter 21 of the First Schedule to the Tariff Act, 1985, these
      would still continue to avail the benefits/incentives under the Policy
      1997 only because the units concerned had commenced                      C
      commercial production on and from 31/3/2007.”
       34. The learned Single Judge has also specifically observed in his
judgment that the vires of Section 154 of the Finance Act, 2003 vide
which the exemption granted to the manufacturers of cigarette was
rescinded with retrospective effect, has been upheld by this Court in the
                                                                               D
case of R.C. Tobacco (P) Ltd. and Another Vs. Union of India and
Another, reported in 2005(7)SCC 725. We are surprised at the approach
of the Appellate Bench of the Gauhati High Court. It is pertinent to note
that the contention of the learned A.S.G. appearing on behalf of the
Union of India to the following effect have been specifically recorded
by the Judges of the Appellate Bench of the High Court in paragraph 14         E
of the judgment, which reads thus:
             “that the legality of the withdrawal of the benefit granted to
      the tobacco manufacturing units such as the appellant under the
      1997 Industrial Policy by Section 154 of the Finance Act, 2003
      was already upheld the Apex Court in R. C. Tobacco (P) Ltd. vs.          F
      Union of India, (2005)7 SCC 725.”
       35. The Appellate Bench of the High Court observed that some
of the notifications providing modalities for exemption were issued
subsequent to the enactment of Section 154 of the Finance Act, 2003
and, therefore, Section 154 of the Finance Act, 2003 has no relevance in
                                                                               G
the said case. However, the Appellate Bench does not find it necessary
to even make a reference to the judgment of this Court which was relied
on by the learned Single Judge while dismissing the writ petitions and
which is specifically put in service by the Union of India. We are unable
to appreciate as to how the Appellate Bench of the Gauhati High Court
finds that withdrawal of exemption in respect of ‘pan masala with tobacco’     H
292             SUPREME COURT REPORTS                          [2019] 12 S.C.R.


A     is not in the public interest. The legislative policy as reflected in Section
      154 of the Finance Act was to withdraw the exemption granted to the
      manufacturers of cigarettes as well as pan masala with tobacco and
      that too with retrospective effect. Apart from the fact that, it is a common
      knowledge that tobacco is highly hazardous, the legislative intent was
      also unambiguous. In these circumstances, the finding of the High Court
B     that the withdrawal of exemption for tobacco products was not in the
      public interest, to say the least is shocking. We find that the approach of
      the Appellate Bench of the High Court was totally unsustainable.
             36. As already discussed hereinabove, we have no hesitation to
      hold that the withdrawal of the exemption to the pan masala with tobacco
C     and pan masala sans tobacco is in the larger public interest. As such, the
      doctrine of promissory estoppel could not have been invoked in the present
      matter. The State could not be compelled to continue the exemption,
      though it was satisfied that it was not in the public interest to do so. The
      larger public interest would outweigh an individual loss, if any. In that
      view of the matter we find that the appeals deserve to be allowed.
D
            Civil Appeal arising out of S.L.P.(C) No. 36926 of 2012:
            37. The appeal is allowed. The judgment and order passed by the
      High Court of Sikkim dated 11.05.2012 is quashed and set aside.
            38. No order as to costs.
E
            Civil Appeal Nos. 2345 of 2017 and 2346 of 2017:
             39. The appeals are allowed. The judgments and orders passed
      by the Appellate Bench of the Gauhati High Court dated 20.04.2016 and
      25.05.2016 are quashed and set aside. The Order passed by the learned
      Single Judge dated 10.12.2010 dismissing the writ petitions is upheld.
F
            40. No order as to costs.


      Divya Pandey                                                  Appeals allowed.


G




H