Holding

A pension‑scheme option must be exercised within the stipulated time; a belated claim after the deadline is barred by limitation and laches, and a tribunal's direction to consider a stale claim does not revive the cause of action.

Summary

M.K. Sarkar, a railway employee who retired in 1976, did not exercise the option to shift from the Contributory Provident Fund (CPF) to the pension scheme before the statutory deadline of 31 December 1978. After receiving his CPF lump‑sum, he filed a representation in 1998 seeking to switch to the pension scheme, which was initially rejected, then directed for consideration by the Central Administrative Tribunal (CAT), and finally allowed by the Tribunal in 2005. The High Court dismissed his writ petition and the Union appealed. The Supreme Court held that the option had to be exercised within the prescribed period, that the 22‑year delay barred the claim on grounds of limitation and laches, and that a tribunal’s direction to consider a stale claim does not revive a dead cause of action. The Court also clarified that "notice" includes informal or constructive notice and that Article 14 cannot be invoked to obtain an illegal benefit extended to others. Consequently, the appeal was allowed, setting aside the Tribunal and High Court orders and dismissing Sarkar’s application.

Issues considered

The validity of a retiree's claim to exercise the pension‑scheme option after the statutory deadline and after a 22‑year delay.
Whether limitation, laches, and delay bar the claim despite a tribunal's direction to consider the representation.
Whether a court or tribunal's direction to consider a representation revives a dead cause of action.
The interpretation of "notice" under the relevant statutes.
The applicability of Article 14 equality principle when a benefit was illegally extended to others.

Legislation cited

Limitation Act, 1963s. 3

Subjects

service lawpension schemeprovident fundlimitationlachesArticle 14 equalitynoticetribunalstale claimrailway employees

Judgment

[2009) 16 (ADDL.) S.C.R. 249

UNION OF INDIA & ORS. A
v.
M. K. SARKAR
(Civil Appeal No. 8151 of 2009)
DECEMBER 8, 2009
B
[R.V. RAVEENDRAN AND K.S. RADHAKRISHNAN, JJ.)

Delay and /aches:

Provident fund retiree who failed to exercise option to shift c
to the pension scheme within the stipulated time cannot
exercise the option, after the expiry of validity period for the
option scheme, that too after 22 years - Service law.

Claims which are stale or time barred - Cause of action
- Issue of limitation or delay should be considered with D
reference to the original cause of action and not with reference
·'\ . to the date on which an order is passed in compliance with a
court's direction - Court/Tribunal, before directing
'consideration' of a claim or representation should examine
whether it is with reference to a 'live' issue or a 'dead' or 'stale' E
issue - If it is with reference to a 'dead' or 'state' issue or
dispute, courtflribunal should put an end to the matter and
not direct consideration or reconsideration - Cause of action.

Notice: F
When a statute uses word 'notice' it must be presumed
to mean not only a formal intimation but also an informal one
- Similarly, service of notice would include constructive or
informal notice.
G
Constitution of India, 1950: Article 14

Equality clause must be enforced in legality and not
"-•
illegality - Claim on the basis of equality, by reference to
249 H
250 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2009) 16 (ADDL.) S.C.R.

A someone similarly placed, is permissible only when person ...
r
similarly placed was lawfully granted a relief and the person
claiming relief is also lawfully entitled for the same - However,
where benefit was illegally extended to someone else, person
who is not extended a similar illegal benefit cannot approach
B a court for extension of a similar illegal benefit - Equity -
Service law.

Respondent joined railway service on 10.2.1947.
Railways introduced a pension scheme on 16.11.1957. ,.)

c The scheme gave option to switch over to a pension
scheme instead of Contributory Provident Fund Scheme.
The validity period for exercise of option was extended
from time to time upto 31.12.1978. Under the terms of the
option, a retired railway employee who opted for the
pension scheme had to refund the government
D contributions to the provident fund.

The respondent though aware of the scheme and the •"'
options given on eight occasions between the years
1957 to 1974, consciously did not opt for the pension
E scheme and continued with the CPF Scheme. Ultimately
he took voluntary retirement with effect from 15.10.1976.
More than 22 years after his retirement and after receiving
his dues under the Provident Fund Scheme, respondent
made a representation dated 8.10.1998, requesting
F extension of benefit of the pension scheme. It was _.
reject~d. He approached CAT. The Tribunal by order
dated 11.2.2004 disposed of the application directing the
appellants to take a decision on the representation of the
respondent by a reasoned order, making it clear that it l '1\'I
did not examine the claim on merits. The authority .;.
G •;

rejected the belated request of respondent.
Respondent filed second application before Tribunal.
.,,,
Railways remained unrepresented and did not contest
the claim. Tribunal by order dated 25.7.2005 allowed his
H application and directed the appellants to permit
UNION OF INDIA & ORS. v. M. K. SARKAR 251

respondent to opt for pension scheme. Appellant filed A
writ petition before High Court, which was dismissed.
Hence the present appeal.

/
Allowing the appeal, the Court
~·

HELD: 1. When a scheme extending benefit of option B
for switchover, stipulates that the benefit would be
available only to those who exercise the option within a
-. specified time, the option should obviously be exercised
within such time. The option scheme made it clear that
no option could be exercised after the last date. In this c
case, respondent chose not to exercise the option and
continued to remain under the Contributory Provident
Fund Scheme, and also received the entire PF amount on
his retirement. He was the head of his department. All
communications relating to the offer of Eighth Option and D
several communications extending the validity period for
I exercising the option for pension scheme, were sent to
the heads of the departments for being circulated to all
eligible employees/retired employees. Therefore, the
respondent could not feign ignorance. In fact, in his E
application before Tribunal, he referred to all the options.
He was careful to say that he was not 'intimated' about
the contents of the last order relating to extension of the
option, but did. not say that he was unaware of the order
extending the benefit of option. The respondent F
consciously chose not to exercise the option as he
admittedly thought that receiving a substantial amount in
lump sum under the provident fund scheme was more
advantageous than receiving small amounts as monthly
pension under the pension scheme. Having enjoyed the G
benefits and income from the provident fund amount for
more than 22 years, the respondent could not seek
.... switch over to pension scheme which would result in his
getting in addition to the PF amount already received, a
large amount as arrears of pension for 22 years (which
H
252 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 16 (ADDL.) S.C.R.

A will be much more than the provident fund amount that
•·
will have to be refunded in the event of switch over) and
also monthly pension for the rest of his life. If his request
for such belated exercise of option is accepted, the effect
would be to permit the respondent to secure the double
B benefit of both provident fund scheme as also pension
scheme, which is unjust and impermissible. The validity
period of the option to switch over to pension scheme
expired on 31.12.1978 and there was no recurring or
continuing cause of action. The respondent's
c representation dated 8.10.1998 seeking an option to shift
to pension scheme with effect from 1976 ought to have
been straightaway rejected as barred by limitation/delay
and laches. [Paras 7 and 8) (261-8-G; 262-E-H; 263-A)

2.1. The order of the Tribunal allowing the first
D application of respondent directing appellants to
consider his representation gave rise to unnecessary
litigation and avoidable complications. The courts/• r
tribunals proceed on the assumption, that every citizen
deserves a reply to his representation. Secondly they
E assume that a mere direction to consider and dispose of
representation does not involve any 'decision' on rights
and obligations of parties. Little do they realize the
consequences of such a direction to 'consider'. If the
repre~entation is considered and accepted, the ex-·
F employee gets a relief, which he would not have got on
account of the long delay, all by reason of the direction
to 'consider'. If the representation is considered and
rejected, the ex-employee files an application/writ petition,
not with reference to the original cause of action of 1982,
G but by treating the rejection of the representation given
in 2000, as the cause of action. A prayer is made for
quashing the rejection of representation and for grant of
the relief claimed in the representation. The Tribunals/ ...
High Courts routinely entertain such applications/
H petitions ignoring the huge delay preceding the
UNION OF INDIA & ORS. v. M. K. SARKAR 253

representation, and proceed to examine the claim on A
~,

,, merits and grant relief. In this manner, the bar of limitation
or the laches gets obliterated or ignored. [Para 9)
[263-A-G]
C. Jacob v. Director of Geology and Mining & Anr. 2009 B
(1 O) sec 115, relied on.

2.2. When a belated representation in regard to a
'stale' or 'dead' issue/dispute is considered and decided,
in compliance with a direction by the Court/Tribunal to do
so, the date of such decision cannot be considered as c
furnishing a fresh cause of action for reviving the 'dead'
issue or time-barred dispute. The issue of limitation or
delay and laches should be considered with reference to
the original cause of action and not with reference to the
date on which an order is passed in compliance with a D
court's direction. Neither a court's direction to consider
<l a representation issued without examining the merits, nor
a decision given in compliance with such direction, will
extend the limitation, o,r erase the delay and laches. A
Court or Tribunal, before directing 'consideration' of a E
claim or representation should examine whether the claim
or representation is with reference to a 'live' issue or
whether it is with reference to a 'dead' or 'stale' issue. If
it is with reference to a 'dead' or 'stale' issue or dispute,
...... .. the court/Tribunal should put an end to the matter and F
should not direct consideration or reconsideration. If the
court or Tribunal deciding to direct 'consideration'
without itself examining of the merits, it should make it
- clear that such consideration will be without prejudice to
any contention relating to limitation or delay and laches.
Even if the court does not expressly say so, that would
G
. be the legal position and effe.ct. [Para 9) [263-G-H; 264-A-
-.. . DJ
Krishena Kumar v. Union of India, 1990 (4) SCC 207,
relied en . H
...
254 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 16 (ADDL.) S.C.R.

A Union of India v. D.R.R. Sastri 1997 (1) SCC 514, •
distinguished.

3. The Tribunal assumed that being 'aware' of the
scheme was not sufficient notice to a retiree to exercise
8 the option and individual written communication was
mandatory. The Tribunal was of the view that as the
Railways remained unrepresented and failed to prove by
positive evidence, that respondent was informed of the
availability of the option, it should be assumed that there
C was non-compliance with the requirements relating to
notice. The High Court impliedly accepted and affirmed
this view. The assumption is not sound. The Tribunal was
examining the issue with reference to a case where there
was a delay of 22 years. A person, who is aware of the
availability of optica, cannot r.ontend that he was not
D served a written notice of the availability of the option after
22 years. In such a case, even if Railway administration
was represented, it was 11ot reasonable to expect the
department to maintain the records of such intimation/s
of individual notice to each employee after 22 years. In
E fact by the time the matter was considered more than
nearly 27 years had elapsed. Further when notice or
knowledge of the availability of the option was clearly

F
inferable, the employee cannot after a long time (in this
case 22 years) be heard to contend that in the absence
of written intimation of the option, he is still entitled to
exercise the option. When the Legislature used the word
;. ..
'notice' it must be presumed to have borne in mind that
it means not only a formal intimation but also an informal
one. Similarly, it must be deemed to have in mind the fact
G that service of a notice would include constructive or
informal notice. If its intention were to exclude the latter
sense of the words 'notice,. and 'service' it would have . ,,
said so explicitly. (Para 12] [266-C-H: 267-A-B]

Nilkantha Sidramappa Ningasnetti v. Kashinath
UNION OF INDIA & ORS. v. M. K. SARKAR 255

Somanna Ningashetti etc. AIR 1962 SC 666, relied on. A
-"';

4.1. If someone has been wrongly extended a benefit,
that cannot be cited as a precedent for claiming similar
benefit by others. Guarantee of equality before law under
Article 14 is a positive concept and cannot be enforced
B
in a negative manner; and that if any illegality or
irregularity is committed in favour of any individual or
group of individuals, others cannot invoke the jurisdiction
on courts for perpetuating the same irregularity or
illegality in their favour also, on the reasoning that they
have been denied the benefits which have been illegaly
c
extended to others. [Para 13) [267-D-F]

Chandigarh Administration v. Jagdish Singh 1995 (1)
SCC 745; Gursharan Singh & Ors. v. New Delhi Municipal
Committee & Ors. 1996 (2) SCC 459; Faridabad C. T. Scan D
Centre v. Director General, Health Services 1997 (7) SCC
'<
') 752; State of Haryana v. Ram Kumar Mann 1997 (3) SCC
~
, 321; State of Bihar & Ors. v. Kameshwar Prasad Singh &Anr.
' 2000 (9) SCC 94 and Union of India v. International Trading
Company 2003 (5) sec 437, relied on. E
4.2. A claim on the basis of guarantee of equality, by
reference to someone similarly placed, is permissible only
when the person similarly placed has been lawfully
granted a relief and the person claiming relief is also
,-"
• lawfully entitled for the same. On the other hand, where F
a benefit was illegally or irregularly extended to someone
else, a person who is not extended a similar illegal benefit
..... cannot approach a court for extension of a similar illegal
benefit. If such a request is accepted, it would amount to
perpetuating the irregularity. When a person is refused a G
benefit to which he is not entitled, he cannot approach
the court and claim that benefit on the ground that
'<-.
someone else has been illegally extended such benefit.
If he wants, he can challenge the benefit illegally granted
to others. The fact that someone who may be not entitled H
256 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2009) 16 (ADDL.) S.C.R.

A to the relief has been given relief illegally is not a ground
,...
to grant relief to a person who is not entitled to the relief.
[Para 13) (268-A-D]

Case Law Reference

B 2009 (10) sec 115 relied on Para 9

1990 (4) sec 201 relied on Para 10

1997 (1) sec 514 distinguished Para 11

AIR 1962 SC 666 relied on Para 12
c
1995 (1) sec 745 relied on Para 13

1996 (2) sec 459 relied on Para 13

1997 (7) sec 752 relied on Para 13
D
1997 (3) sec 321 relied on Para 13

2000 (9) sec 94 relied on Para 13 ~
(
...
2003 (5) sec 437 relied on Para 13 ,
E CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No.
8151 of 2009.

From the Judgment & Order dated 25.1.2006 of the High
Court of Calcutta in WPCT No. 467 of 2005.
F Mohan Jain, ASG, Dinesh Thakur, Rohini Mukherjee, A.K. ...
Srivastava, Y.P. Mahajan, A.K. Sharma, D.S. Mahra for the
Appellants.

Jaideep Gupta, Raja Chatterjee, Sachin Das, Malay
G Kumar Singh, G.S. Chatterjee for the Respondent.

The following Order of the Court was delivered by
-
. _,
R.V. RAVEENDRAN, J. 1. Leave granted.

H 2. The respondent joined the Railway service on
l

UNION OF INDIA & ORS. v. M. K. SARKAR 257
[R.V. RAVEENDRAN, J.]
"' 10.2.1947. He was a subscriber to Contributory Provident Fund A
Scheme. Railways introduced the pension scheme vide
Railway Board's letter dated 16.11.1957. Under the said
scheme, those who entered Railway service on or after
16.11.1957, were automatically governed by the pension
scheme. Those employees who were in service as on 1.4.1957 B
and those who joined between 1.4.1957 and 16.11.1957 were
given an option to switch over to pension scheme instead of
• continuing under the Contributory Provident Fund Scheme.
Those who did not opt for the pension scheme were given
further opportunities to exercise options to switch over to the c
pension scheme, whenever the pension scheme was
liberalised or made more beneficial, vide Notifications dated
17.9.1960, 26.10.1962, 17.1.1964, 3.3.1966, 13.9.1968,
15. 7. 1972, and 23. 7.1974. The validity period of the Eighth
Option under Notification dated 23.7.1974, which was from D
\ 1.1.1973 to 22.1.1975, was extended from time to time upto
· 31.12.1978. Under the terms of the option, a retired railway
' employee who opted for the pension scheme had to refund to
the government's contributions to the provident fund.

3. The respondent though aware of the introduction of the E
pension scheme and the options given on eight occasions
between the years 1957 to 1974, consciously did not opt for
the pension scheme and continued with the Contributory

-- . .l
Provident Fund Scheme. Ultimately the respondent while
serving as Controller of Stores, took voluntary retirement with
effect from 15.10.1976. As on the date of his retirement, the
F

eighth option to shift to pension scheme, was still open for
exercise. But the respondent did not opt for the pension
scheme, but received the Contributory Provident Fund dues, on
his retirement. G
". 4. More than 22 years after his retirement, and after
receiving his dues under the Provident Fund Scheme, the
respondent made a representation dated 8.10.1998,
requesting that he may be extended the benefit of the pension
H
•
t

258 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009) 16 (ADDL.) S.C.R. • ,

.•
A scheme. He stated that he was willing to refund the amount
received under the Provident Fund Scheme (by way of
adjustment against the arrears of pension that would become
payable to him on acceptance of his request for switch over to
the pension scheme). The said request was not accepted. The
B respondent therefore approached the Central Administrative
Tribunal, in OA No.657 of 1999, seeking a direction to the
Railway Administration to permit him to exercise an option to
switch over to pension scheme. The Tribunal by order dated ~

11.2.2004 disposed of the application by directing the
c appellants to take a decision on the representation of the
respondent by a reasoned order, making it clear that it did not
examine the claim on merits. In compliance with the said
direction of the Tribunal, the chairman, Railway Board,
considered the representation and passed a reasoned order
dated 15.5.2004, rejecting the belated request of the
D
respondent for switching over to the pension scheme as being i
untenable. He also distinguished the cases of other employees ~

who were allegedly extended the benefit of exercising the option
for belated switch overs, cited and relied upon by the
respondent. The relevant portion of the order is extracted below:
E
"Thus, the cases referred to in the preceding para are not
relevant to the case of Shri Sarkar who had eight occasions
to come over to the Pension Scheme during his service
period. By the time, VIII Pension option was thrown open, J. ~.

F vide Board's letter dated 23.7.1974 as extended from time
to time upto 31.12.1978, Shri Sarkar was in service till
15.10.1976. He resumed as COS/NF Railway on
11.6.1976. Board's instructions dated 30.6.1976
extending the last date for exercising of option available
G under Board's letter dated 23.7.1974 to come over to the
pension scheme upto 31.12.1976 was circulated by NF
Railway vide their letter dated 17.7.1976. The said letter ' .;

was circulated as per standard mailing list including HODs.
Shri Sarkar, being the HOD himself at the relevant time,
H
UNION OF INDIA & ORS. v. M. K. SARKAR 259
[RV. RAVEENDRAN, J.]

..., cannot deny having knowledge of the aforesaid Railway A
Board's instructions.

5. The respondent challenged the ord~r dated 15.5.2004
by filing a second application before the Tribunal. The
following averments in the application made by the
B
respondent are relevant:

" ... those employees appointed earlier (to 1.4.1957),
however continued to be on PF system, but were periodically
"' given the opportunity to opt for pension, on inspection of merits
of the scheme as and when new pension scheme was c
offered ...... The applicant retired in 1976 and that in the
meantime periodically for certain range of time, the
employees were asked to submit options .......... A
considerable number of employees including the applicant
did not submit option as the then scheme for pension D
introduced for the said limited period was not considered
\ beneficial, since upto VII amended option, the scheme
would hardly give any benefit to the said employees
including the applicant. Later on, however, came the VIII
option, through which a break through order vide railway E
Board's letter No. PC II (75) PB/3 dated 23.7.1974 was
1
issued on the acceptance of the recommendation of the
3rd Pay Commission. The validity of the order although
initially for six months was extended from time to time till

... ... 31.12.1978. It was, inter alia, laid down in the said order
that in the case of those Railway Servants who are eligible
F
for exercising option under this order but who have retired
and settled up under the SRPF (contributory) Rules, the
""""!""' option for pension will be valid if they refund the entire
government contribution. The Railway administration was
G
accordingly to take urgent steps to bring the contents of
the said letter to the notice of all concerned employees
\. . under their administrative control including those on leave
or on deputation etc. It was also laid down that to facilitate
circulation of this order, the Board desired that the contents
H
260 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2009] 16 (ADDL.) S.C.R.

A of the order should be published by the Railway in their •
Gazette in an extra-ordinary issue as well suitable press
releases also be issued.

The applicant states that he was on deputation from June
1972 to 8th January, 1975. Moreover on July 28, 1974 the
B
applicant suffered an acute heart attack almost coinciding
with the date of the issue of this order. Thereafter he was
hospitalised for post Cardiac convalescence and
/<
accordingly was on leave for a long period. He was not
even intimated about the content of the order by the
c respondents through any communication during his
deputation .......................The applicant also states that
after retirement in October, 1976 the applicant was cut off
from railway and was in darkness about their Pension
policy. In 1998 the applicant came to know that some
D officers of administrative grades were given pensionary
benefit with or without intervention of court since they had
not been informed about option for pension."
,
The Tribunal by order dated 25.7.2005 allowed the
E application of the respondent and directed the appellants
to permit the respondent to opt for pension scheme and
also inform the respondent the amount that was required to be
refunded in case he exercised the option. The Tribunal extracted
the reasons assigned by the Chairman of the Railway Board
F in his order dated 15.5.2004 rejecting the request of
. respondent. Significantly, the Tribunal did not disagree with the
~

..
said finding, nor refer to the enormous delay in making the
claim. The Tribunal allowed the application, as the Railways had
remained unrepresented and had not contested the claim, even
though in the entire application there was no averment denying
G knowledge of the availability of the VI 11 Option dated 23. 7.1974.

6. The appellants challenged the order of the Tribunal in WP .J

(CT) No.467/2005. The High Court dismissed the writ petition
by order dated 25.1.2006. The said order of the High Court is
H challenged in this appeal by special leave. The question for
UNION OF INDIA & ORS. v. M. K. SARKAR 261
[R.V. RAVEENDRAN, J.]
consideration is whether the respondent was entitled to exercise A
' an option to switch over pension scheme, beyond the
stipulated last date, that too twenty two years after retirement
and receipt of the retirement dues under the Contributory
Provident Fund Scheme.
B
7. When a scheme extending the benefit of option for
switchover, stipulates that the benefit will be available only to
those who exercise the option within a specified time, the option
" should obviously be exercised within such time. The option
scheme made it clear that no option could be exercised after
the last date. In this case, the respondent chose not to exercise
c
the option and continued to remain under the Contributory
Provident Fund Scheme, and more !mportant, received the
entire PF amount on his retirement. The fact that the respondent
was the head of his department and all communications relating
to the offer of Eighth Option and the several communications D
extending the validity period for exercising the option for pension

,.,.._
' scheme, were sent to the heads of the departments for being
circulated to all eligible employees/retired employees, is not in
dispute. Therefore, the respondent who himself was the head
of his department could not feign ignorance of the Eighth Option E
or the extensions of the validity period of the Eighth Option. In
fact, as noticed above, in his application before the Tribunal the
respondent refers to all the options. He is careful to ,say that
he was not 'intimated' about the contents of the last order
~
relating to extension of the option, but does not say that he was F
unaware of the order extending the benefit of option. The
respondent consciously chose not to exercise the option as he
admittedly thought that receiving a substantial amount in a lump
sum under the provident fund scheme (which enabled creation
of a corpus for investment) was more advantageous than G
receiving small amounts as monthly pension under the pension
scheme, In those days (between 1957 when the pension
" .
scheme was introduced and 1976 when the respondent retired)
the benefits under the provident fund scheme and pension
scheme were more or less equal; and there was a general H
262 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 16 (ADDL.) $.C.R.

A impression among employees that having regard to average ~

life expectancy and avenues for investment of the lump sum PF
amount, it was prudent to receive a large PF amount on
retirement rather than receive a small pension for a few years
(particularly as there was a ceiling on the pension and as
B dearness allowance was not included in the pay for computing
the pension).

8. From 1980 onwards, gradually the pension scheme
became more and more attractive as compared to the
Contributory Provident Scheme, on account of various factors,
"'
c like dearness allowance being included in the pay for computing
pension, ceiling on pension being removed and liberalisation
of family pension etc. But the respondent was well aware that
not having opted for pension scheme and having received the
PF amount on retirement, he was not entitled to seek switch
D over to pension scheme. But in 1996, when the respondent
learnt that some others who had retired in and around 1973 to
1976 had been permitted to exercise the option in 1993-94 on
,
the ground that they had not been notified about the option, he ,...
decided to take a chance and gave a representation seeking
E an option to switch over to pension scheme. Having enjoyed
the benefits and income from ·the provident fund amount for
more than 22 years, the respondent could not seek switch over
to pension scheme which would result in respondent getting in
addition to the PF amount already received, a large amount as
F arrears of pension for 22 years (which will be much more than >
the provident fund amount that will have to be refunded in the
event of switch over) and also monthly pension for the rest of
his life. If his request for such belated exercisf' .Jf option is
accepted, the effect would be to permit the respondent to
G secure the double benefit of both provident fund scheme as also
pension scheme, which is unjust and impermissible. The validity
period of the option to switch over to pension scheme expired
on 31.12. 1978 and there was no recurring or continuing cause
of action. The respondent's representation dated 8.10.1998
seeking an option to shift to pension scheme with effect from
H
UNION OF INDIA & ORS. v. M. K. SARKAR 263
[R.V. RAVEENDRAN, J.]
1'
1976 ought to have been straight away rejected as barred by A
limitation/delay and laches.

9. The order of the Tribunal allowing the first application
of respondent without examining the merits, and directing
appellants to consider his representation has given rise to
unnecessary litigation and avoidable complications. The ill-
B
effects of such directions have been considered by this Court
in C. Jacob vs. Director of Geology and Mining & Anr. - 2009
-(
" (10) sec 115:

"The courts/tribunals proceed on the assumption, that every c
citizen deserves a reply to his representation. Secondly they
assume that a mere direction to consider and dispose of the
representation does not involve any 'decision' on rights and
obligations of parties. Little do they realize the
consequences of such a direction to 'consider'. If the D
l
I representation is considered and accepted, the ex-
employee gets a relief, which he would not have got on
account of the long delay, all by reason of the direction to
'consider'. If the representation is considered and rejected,
the ex-employee files an application/writ petition, not with E
reference to the original cause of action of 1982, but by
treating the rejection of the representation given in 2000,
as the cause of action. A prayer is made for quashing the
;.._
rejection of representation and for grant of the relief
claimed in the representation. The Tribunals/High Courts
F
routinely entertain such applications/petitions ignoring the
huge delay preceding the representation, and proceed to
examine the claim on merits and grant relief. In this
manner, the bar of limitation or the laches gets obliterated
or ignored."
G
When a belated representation in regard to a 'stale' or
' 'dead' issue/dispute is considered and decided, in
compliance with a direction by the Courtrrribunal to do so,
the date of such decision can not be considered as furnishing
a fresh cause of action for reviving the 'dead' issue or time- H
264 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 16 (ADDL.) S.C.R.
_,..
A barred dispute. The issue of limitation or delay and laches
should be considered with reference to the original cause of
action and not with reference to the date on which an order is
passed in compliance with a court's direction. Neither a court's
direction to consider a representation issued without examining
B the merits, nor a decision given in compliance with such
direction, will extend the limitation, or erase the delay and
laches. A Court or Tribunal, before directing 'consideration' of
a claim or representation should examine whether the claim or ,,
representation is with reference to a 'live' issue or whether it """
c isreference
with reference to a 'dead' or 'state' issue. If it is with
to a 'dead' or 'state' issue or dispute, the courV
Tribunal should put an end to the matter and should not direct
consideration or reconsideration. If the court or Tribunal deciding
to direct 'consideration' without itself examining of the merits,
it should make it clear that such consideration will be without
D prejudice to any contention relating to limitation or delay and
laches. Even if the court does not expressly say so, that would I '
be the legal position and effect.

10. Even on merits, the application has to fail. In Krishena
E Kumar vs. Union of India - 1990 (4) s:c 207, a Constitution
Bench of this Court considering the options given to the Railway
employees to shift to pension scheme, held that prescription
of cut off dates while giving each option was not arbitrary or
lacking in nexus. This Court also held that provident fund retirees -"-
F who failed to exercise option within the time were not entitled
to be included in the pension scheme on any ground of parity.
Therefore, the respondent who did not exercise the option
J;..
available when he retired in 1976, was not entitled to seek an
opportunity to exercise option to shift to the pe~::.ion scheme,
after the expiry of the validity period for nption scheme, that too
G
in the year 1998 after 22 years.

11. The respondent relied on the decision of a two-Judge
Bench of this Court in Union of India vs. D.R.R. Sastri - 1997
(1) SCC 514 in support of his claim. The said decision is
H
UNION OF INDIA & ORS. v. M. K. SARKAR 265
[R.V. RAVEENDRAN, J.]
,.._ clearly distinguishable on facts. In that case, the respondent, a A
railway employee, had gone on deputation to Heavy
Engineering Corporation, and later resigned from railway
service with effect from 26.6.1973 and was absorbed in the
service of the said Corporation. When the Liberalised Pension
Scheme was introduced by the Railway Board by letter dated B
23.7.1974, an opportunity was given to all persons governed
by the Provident Fund Scheme who were in service of Railways
as on 1.1.1973 to opt for the pension scheme. The Railway
;-.. Board directed that the availability of such option should be
brought to the notice of all retired railway servants who were in c
service as on 1.1.1973, The respondent therein who had left
the Railway service on 26.6.1973 was not informed of the
availability of the option. He could not therefore exercise the
option. In fact, he retired from service of the Heavy Engineering
Corporation without any pension as that Corporation had also 0
no pension scheme. The respondent therein approached the
~ Central Administrative Tribunal in 1993 alleging that he came
I
to know about the said option only in 1993 and that his
representation dated 12.6.1993 for relief was rejected by the
Railway Board on 13.7.1993. The Tribunal held that the
respondent should be given the opportunity to exercise his E
option to shift to pension scheme, in terms of the Railway
Board's letter dated 23.7.1974, as he was prevented from
exercising his option by the failure of Railways to inform him
about the option. The Tribunal also took note of the fact that
J another railway employee was allowed to exercise the option F
long after the date for exercising the option had expired, but
the respondent was not given a similar benefit. T~e said
decision of the Tribunal was affirmed by this Court. The decision
in D.R.R. Sastri is of no assistance as it does not lay down
any proposition that the last date prescribed for exercising G
option is not relevant or that option could be exercised at any
time, even if a last date had been stipulated for exercise of the
"" option. That case was decided on its peculiar facts as the
employee (who was on deputation and who resigned from the
service of railways on 26.6.1973 when on deputation) was not H
' / _...
266 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2009) 16 (ADDL.) S.C.R.

A made aware of the option to which he was entitled, even though
there was a specific instruction that all employees who had
retired after 1.1.1973 should be informed about the option. The
facts of this case are completely different. Here the employee
was in service of the Railways itself before and at the time of
B retirement. He was working as the Head of the Department and
was receiving all communications relating to option for being
circulated to all employees in his department. Therefore, the
question of respondent not being aware of the option does not
arise. ,\

c 12. The Tribunal in this case has assumed that being
'aware' of the scheme was not sufficient notice to a retiree to
exercise the option and individual written communication was
mandatory. The Tribunal was of the view that as the Railways
remained unrepresented and failed to prove by positive
D evidence, that respondent was informed of the availability of the
option, it should be assumed that there was non-compliance
(
with the requirements relating to notice. The High Court has I

impliedly accepted and affirmed this view. The assumption is
not sound. The Tribunal was examining the issue with reference
E to a case where there was a delay of 22 years. A person, who
is aware of the availability of option, cannot contend that he was
not served a written notice of the availability of the option after
22 years. In such a case, even if Railway administration was
represented, it was not reasonable to expect the department
F to maintain the records of such intimation/s of individual notice
to each employee after 22 years. In fact by the time the matter
was considered more than nearly 27 years had elapsed. Further
when notice or knowledge of the availability of the option was
clearly inferable, the employee cannot after a long time (in this
G case 22 years) be heard to contend that in the absence of
written intimation of the option, he is still entitled to exercise the
option. This Court considered the meaning of 'notice' in
Nilkantha Sidramappa Ningashetti v. Kashinath Somanna
Ningashetti etc. [AIR 1962 SC 666). This Court held :
H
UNION OF INDIA & ORS. v. M. K. SARKAR 267
[R.V. RAVEENDRAN, J.]
"We see no ground to construe the expression 'date of A
service of notice' in col. 3 of Art. 158 of the Limitation Act to
mean only a notice in writing served in a formal manner. When
the Legislature used the word 'notice' it must be presumed
to have borne in mind that it means not only a formal
intimation but also an informal one. Similarly, it must be B
deemed to have in mind the fact that service of a notice
would include constructive or informal notice. If its intention
were to exclude the latter sense of the words 'notice' and
'service' it would have said so explicitly."

13. Learned counsel for the respondent lastly submitted C
that one K.V. Kasturi who had retired in 1973, was granted
the benefit of exercising the option by an order dated
19.9.1994, and .therefore, principles of equality and equal
opportunity required that the Railways should give him the
option. The Chairman of Railway Board, while rejecting the D
, respondents' representation by order dated 15.5.2004 has
' clarified that K. V. Kasturi's case was similar to that of D.R.R.
Shastri as he had also not been informed of the availability of
option. There is another angle to the issue. If someone has
been wrongly extended a benefit, that cannot be cited as a E
precedent for claiming similar benefit by others. This court in a
series of decisions has held that guarantee of equality before
law under Article 14 is a positive concept and cannot be
enforced in a negative manner; and that if any illegality or
,_ irregularity is committed in favour of any individual or group of F
individuals, others cannot invoke the jurisdiction on courts for
perpetuating the same irregularity or illegality in their favour
also, on the reasoning that they have been denied the benefits
which have been illegaly extended to others. See : Chandigarh
Administration vs. Jagdish Singh - 1995 (1) SCC 745; G
Gursharan Singh & Ors. vs. New Delhi Municipal Committee
& Ors. - 1996 (2) SCC 459; Faridabad C. T. Scan Centre vs.
., Director General, Health Services - 1997 (7) SCC 752; State
of Haryana vs. Ram Kumar Mann - 1997 (3) SCC 321, State
of Bihar & Ors. vs. Kameshwar Prasad Singh & Anr. - 2000 H
268 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009) 16 (ADDL.) S.C.R.

A (9) SCC 94 and Union of India vs. International Trading
Company - 2003 (5) SCC 437. A claim on the basis of
guarantee of equality, by reference to someone similarly
placed, is permissible only when the person similarly placed
has been lawfully granted a relief and the person claiming relief
8 is also lawfully entitled for the same. On the other hand, where
a benefit was illegally or irregularly extended to someone else,
a person who is not extended a similar illegal benefit cannot
approach a court for extension of a similar illegal benefit. If such
a request is accepted, it would amount to perpetuating the ..
C irregularity. When a person is refused a benefit to which he is
not entitled, he cannot approach the court and claim that benefit
on the ground that someone else has been illegally extended
such benefit. If he wants, he can challenge the benefit illegally
granted to others. The fact that someone who may be not
entitled to the relief has been given relief illegally is not a ground
D to grant relief to a person who is not entitled to the relief.
\
14. The appeal is therefore allowed and the orders of the •
Tribunal and the High Court are set aside and the original
application of the respondent before the tribunal is dismissed.
E
D.G. Appeal allowed.

'