Holding

Section 47 of the PwD Act imposes a mandatory, non‑discriminatory duty on the employer that cannot be defeated by a prospective exemption notification or by an alleged waiver, and therefore the respondent is entitled to reinstatement benefits and back wages.

Summary

Bali Ram, a CRPF constable, was medically invalidated in 1998 after developing severe ophthalmic disability. He sought only a disability pension, but the Single Judge invoked Section 47 of the Persons with Disabilities Act, 1995 and ordered his reinstatement with full service benefits. The Union of India and other CRPF officials appealed, arguing that a 2002 notification exempted the force from Section 47, that the petitioner had waived his rights, and that the Single Judge exceeded the pleadings. The Supreme Court held that the 2002 notification was prospective, could not retroactively defeat the mandatory duty under Section 47, and that no waiver existed. Consequently, the Court modified the Single Judge's award, granting Bali Ram Rs.1.25 crore as back wages, interest and costs, and dismissed the appeal.

Issues considered

The applicability of Section 47 of the Persons with Disabilities Act, 1995 to a CRPF employee invalidated in 1998.
Whether the 2002 Ministry of Social Justice notification exempting combatant personnel of CPMFs from Section 47 applies retrospectively.
Whether the respondent waived his statutory right under Section 47 by accepting a pension and not seeking reinstatement.
Whether the Single Judge exceeded the scope of the writ petition by granting relief beyond the prayers.

Legislation cited

Central Reserve Police Force Act, 1949
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908
Constitution of Indias. Article 12, s. Article 14, s. Article 21
Persons with Disabilities (Equal Opportunities, Protection of Rights and Full Participation) Act, 1995s. 47

Headnote

Issue for Consideration Whether the Single Judge rightly enforced the appellants’ duty under s.47 of the Persons with Disabilities (Equal Opportunities, Protection of Rights and Full Participation) Act, 1995 by directing inter alia that he be reinstated in service with all consequential Bench was grossly wrong in not reversing such directions. Headnotes† Persons with Disabilities (Equal Opportunities, Protection of Rights and Full Participation) Act, 1995 – s.47 – Respondent- Constable (Driver) in CRPF, was medically invalidated from service on account of

Subjects

Section 47Persons with Disabilities ActCRPFMedical invalidationWaiver of statutory rightDelegated legislationService continuityReinstatementBack wagesArticle 14Article 21

Judgment

[2026] 8 S.C.R. 218 : 2026 INSC 689

Union of India & Ors.
v.
Bali Ram No. 850808321
(Civil Appeal No. 13783 of 2015)
13 July 2026
[Dipankar Datta* and Augustine George Masih, JJ.]

Issue for Consideration
Whether the Single Judge rightly enforced the appellants’ duty
under s.47 of the Persons with Disabilities (Equal Opportunities,
Protection of Rights and Full Participation) Act, 1995 by directing
inter alia that he be reinstated in service with all consequential
benefits; whether the Division Bench was grossly wrong in not
reversing such directions.

Headnotes†
Persons with Disabilities (Equal Opportunities, Protection of
Rights and Full Participation) Act, 1995 – s.47 – Respondent-
Constable (Driver) in CRPF, was medically invalidated from
service on account of an ophthalmic condition resulting in
complete blindness in the left eye and partial impairment
of vision in the right eye – His claim seeking grant of full
financial and service benefits upon his invalidation from
service was rejected holding that he was entitled only to
a lump-sum payment of Rs.15,000/- in accordance with the
applicable rules – Respondent filed writ petition for grant of
invalid/disability pension on account of 100% disability with
consequential benefits and interest – Allowed by Single Judge
directing that he be reinstated in service with all consequential
benefits – Appeal filed by appellants, dismissed by Division
Bench – Challenge to – Appellants contend that the Single
Judge erroneously placed reliance upon s.47, PwD Act as in
view of the notification dtd.10.09.2002 issued by Ministry of
Social Justice and Empowerment in exercise of the powers
conferred by proviso to s.47, PwD Act, all categories of
combatant personnel of the Central Para Military Forces
including the CRPF were exempted from the application of

* Author
[2026] 8 S.C.R. 219

Union of India & Ors. v. Bali Ram No. 850808321

the said provision; respondent waived his statutory rights
u/s.47, PwD Act as he did not seek any relief founded
thereupon, nor did he ever pray for reinstatement in service
instead, he accepted pension and other benefits extended
to him thus, he cannot subsequently seek, nor could the
Court grant, relief of reinstatement and continuation in
service founded upon a statutory provision that was
neither invoked by him nor attracted in the given factual
scenario:
Held: 1.1 The statutory mandate of s.47, PwD Act is too
peremptory to be ignored – PwD Act is an enactment for persons
with disabilities intended to guarantee them equal opportunities
and full participation apart from protection of rights – Importantly,
s.47 starts with “No” – Negative words in a statute convey a
clear prohibition – It is a legislative device to make a statute
imperative – An employee like the respondent, while retaining
the status of a public servant, is entitled to security of service –
A physical disability that he acquires while in service rendering
him unfit for the work assigned to him has to be dealt with by the
employer in the manner ordained by s.47 – Either he is shifted
to some other post carrying same pay and service benefits, or,
if it is not possible, the employer is under a duty to adjust him
on any other post – If that too is not possible, a supernumerary
post has to be created for him which, for all intents and purposes,
would be personal to him. [Para 74]
1.2 Further, the PwD Act came into force in the year 1995,
whereas the respondent was medically invalidated from service
in 1998 – The Notification saw the light of the day as late as in
2002 – Neither by express words nor by necessary implication
was it made to apply retrospectively from the date the PwD Act
was enforced – Also, the PwD Act being a beneficial legislation,
any notification exempting an establishment from the duty
imposed by s.47 has to be strictly construed to protect the
interests of disabled employees who acquire disability while in
service – The duty imposed by the PwD Act being mandatory
and not discretionary, the law did not leave the appellants with
an option to discharge their duty at their convenience – By not
offering alternate posting, the appellants failed in their role as a
model employer and converted a welfare provision into a dead
letter. [Paras 57, 75]
220 [2026] 8 S.C.R.

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1.3 Furthermore, waiver of a statutory right is generally disfavoured
particularly when the statute is for public welfare or the waiver
would be contrary to public policy – Moreover, elements to
constitute a waiver are absent in the present case – Objection
founded on waiver is thoroughly misconceived and is, thus,
overruled – Single Judge justified in finding the appellants to be
remiss. [Paras 47, 50, 52, 79]
1.4 Order of the Single Judge modified – Respondent awarded
an amount of Rs.1,25,00,000/- (Rupees one crore twenty five lakh
only), inclusive of back wages, interest and costs of the present
proceedings. [Para 82]

Central Reserve Police Force Act, 1949 – CRPF, an
instrumentality of the State, ought to be fully cognizant of
the provisions of the PwD Act:
Held: CRPF, being a force constituted under the Central Reserve
Police Force Act, 1949 and functioning under the administrative
control of the Ministry of Home Affairs, Government of India,
failed to respond in time – Being an instrumentality of the
State, it was expected to be fully cognizant of the provisions
of the PwD Act and the statutory protection conferred upon
the respondent u/s.47 thereof – In such circumstances, it is
difficult to comprehend how the order of medical invalidation
came to be passed in the first place, particularly when at the
relevant point in time no notification exempting the CRPF from
the operation of the PwD Act had been issued – Action of the
appellants was taken in disregard of the statutory mandate then
in force – Single Judge justified in finding the appellants to be
remiss. [Paras 77, 79]

Pleadings – Absence of requisite pleadings and specific
prayers – When not fatal – Granting relief beyond what is
prayed – Writ Jurisdiction – Absence of pleadings and prayers
in the writ petition in relation to invocation of the PwD Act
by the respondent – Effect, if any:
Held: No ground was raised by the appellants either in their LPA
before the Division Bench or in the present civil appeal to the
effect that the Single Judge travelled beyond the pleadings and
the prayers in the writ petition – Since no ground has been raised,
this aspect cannot be dilated any further – Justice is a virtue
[2026] 8 S.C.R. 221

Union of India & Ors. v. Bali Ram No. 850808321

which transcends all barriers – Neither the rules of procedure nor
technicalities of law can stand in its way – Even the law bends
before justice – The entire concept of writ jurisdiction exercised
by the higher courts is founded on equity and fairness – Art.226
confers a power that is plenary, equitable and discretionary, and
is not one bound by the rigidities of law – Although in exercise
of writ jurisdiction the high courts are guided by the principles
flowing from the CPC, they are not bound by it – High courts’
writ jurisdiction under Art.226 is wider than the jurisdiction of
the civil courts – Art.226 is a reservoir of equity meant to secure
justice to the party aggrieved by omission or failure to perform a
duty by an authority within the meaning of Art.12 – Rather than
being stifled by technical pleas raised by such authority to resist
its exercise, in an exceptional case, the high court may do what
the justice of the case demands – One of such exceptions is
when the court is convinced that the petitioner is legally entitled
to more than what has been claimed, but might have claimed
less due to ignorance or bona fide mistake or inelegant drafting
of the writ petition by his lawyer – Since substantive justice
cannot be allowed to be trumped by technicalities, if the record
before the high court clearly evinces entitlement of the suitor
to a wider relief than what is claimed, the opponent is put on
notice and he/it has no answer, much less adequate answer,
and thereby, no prejudice is caused to him/it, and it is found that
the opponent is seeking to use a procedural technicality as a
shield for its own statutory breach, the court in an appropriate
case may, in its discretion, grant such relief as the suitor is
found entitled – However, the exception to the rule of doing
justice despite deficient pleadings in a writ petition ought to be
sparingly invoked and judiciously applied where the law and the
record disclose a clear entitlement of the suitor and the court
is convinced that upholding the plea raised by the opponent,
based on technicality, would defeat the right – Code of Civil
Procedure, 1908 – Order VII – secundum allegata et probata.
[Paras 38-44]

Service Jurisprudence – Distinction between initial
disqualification and subsequent disability – Respondent’s
claim seeking grant of full financial and service benefits upon
his invalidation from service was rejected holding that he
was entitled only to a lump-sum payment of Rs. 15,000/- in
222 [2026] 8 S.C.R.

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accordance with the applicable rules, as his disability was
not found to be attributable to his service:
Held: The point as to whether or not the impaired vision
from which the respondent suffered was attributable to
and/or aggravated by service in the CRPF need not detain this
Court – Nothing has been brought on record by the appellants
to suggest that the respondent had been suffering from an
ophthalmic condition since his enrolment in the CRPF – Medical
fitness of the respondent must have been assessed at the time
of his enrolment and appointment as a driver – Had he been
found short of the required standards, whether the recruitment
process would have resulted in an appointment in the first place –
Even if it is assumed that the ophthalmic condition was neither
attributable to nor aggravated by service in the CRPF, nothing
turns on it – Parliament did not limit s.47 to disabilities attributable
to service; the protection is unqualified and unconditional – It
operates irrespective of how the disability was acquired – The
relevant question is not hypothetical fitness at appointment, but
whether the appellants explored alternatives before ending the
respondent’s service – More than ten years of unblemished driving
followed by an acquired ophthalmic condition, indeed, provided
a case for accommodation or alternate posting, not medical
invalidation – Service jurisprudence distinguishes between initial
disqualification and subsequent disability, and the law ought to
lean towards retention over ouster from service unless, of course,
ouster becomes inevitable. [Para 76]

Delegated Legislation – Nature – Prospective:
Held: Delegated legislation is ordinarily prospective in nature
and a right or liability created for the first time cannot be given
retrospective effect – Unless and until there is a clear intention
expressed in the notification issued in pursuance of delegated
power that it would also apply retrospectively, the same cannot
be given a retrospective effect and would always operate
prospectively – An exemption notification which takes out cases
from the purview of a beneficial legislation has to be strictly
construed – The rule deducible from Federation of Indian Mineral
Industries would govern all delegated legislation including an
exemption notification because (i) absence of any distinction
carved out by such rule between “imposition of duty” and “removal
of duty” and (ii) the law may not be read in a manner providing one
[2026] 8 S.C.R. 223

Union of India & Ors. v. Bali Ram No. 850808321

rule for liability and another for immunity – The Notification upon
which the appellants place heavy reliance, exempting combatant
personnel of the CPMF from the application of s.47, PwD Act,
was issued only on 10.09.2002 – Neither by express words nor
by necessary implication was it made to apply retrospectively
from the date the PwD Act was enforced – Also, the PwD Act
being a beneficial legislation, any notification exempting an
establishment from the duty imposed by s.47 has to be strictly
construed to protect the interests of disabled employees who
acquire disability while in service – So long as the proviso is
not invoked by the appropriate Government for exempting an
establishment from the provision of sub-section (1) of s.47, the
employer has a duty to offer an alternate post and the employee
a right to be accommodated; however, once a notification is
issued in terms of the proviso below sub-section (2) of s.47
exempting an establishment from the provisions of the section,
not only does the duty of the employer cease from the date
the same takes effect, the employee would lose the statutory
protection of continuity in service – Issuance of the notification on
10.09.2002 aids the respondent more than advancing the cause
of the appellants – It shows that even the Government of India
in the appropriate ministry felt the need to carve the CMPFs out
of the coverage of s.47 seven years after the enactment of the
PwD Act, meaning thereby that the said provision applied with
full force to the CMPFs and covered them between 1995 and
10.09.2002 – Notification has no bearing on the legality of the
order of medical invalidation – Respondent’s medical invalidation
vide order dtd.11.03.1998 was made at a point of time when
s.47, PwD Act operated and the appellants were bound by its
categorical mandate – The said order being ultra vires s.47 read
with Arts.14 and 21 of the Constitution as on date the same
was made, the subsequent issuance of the Notification cannot
have retrospective effect so as to legitimise an act that is void
ab initio – The right of the respondent crystallised on the date of
ouster; and a later exemption from the statutory mandate cannot
efface the breach already committed. [Paras 55-57]

Waiver – Elements – If, absent in the present case:
Held: Yes – Waiver, in law, is an intentional relinquishment of a
known right or advantage, benefit, claim or privilege by a person
which, except for such waiver, he would have enjoyed – Waiver
224 [2026] 8 S.C.R.

Supreme Court Reports

must have three elements – To constitute waiver, what is required
to be proved by the party raising the plea is that (i) a person
(the other party to the lis against whom waiver is claimed) has
a right; (ii) such person has clear knowledge of that right; and
(iii) despite the knowledge (of an existing right), that person has
voluntarily and consciously given up that right – Mere silence or
inaction or delay to enforce the existing right does not constitute
waiver, since there must be a clear conduct revealing that the
right has been given up – Waiver of a statutory right is generally
disfavoured particularly when the statute is for public welfare
or the waiver would be contrary to public policy – Moreover,
whether or not a party has waived his right has to flow from his
conduct and is, essentially, a question of fact – Neither in the
LPA nor in this appeal, no point of waiver has been pleaded
by the appellants – Without a pleading, a plea of waiver need
not be adjudicated – Single Judge, recorded a finding of fact
accepting the respondent’s version that he had no knowledge
of s.47, PwD Act conferring a right on him to be continued in
service notwithstanding his impairment of vision – In the LPA, no
challenge was laid to such finding – Appellants neither disputed
before the Single Judge nor before the Division Bench or this
Court that the respondent’s disability was not covered by the
beneficial provisions of the enactment – In such a situation,
to attract waiver, what was required of the appellants was to
demonstrate that the respondent was aware of his right u/s.47,
yet, he elected to give it up while preferring to receive invalid/
disability pension – However, there is no material on record
to suggest that the respondent had been informed by the
appellants of a right available to him under the PwD Act and
that he relinquished his claim for enforcement of such right –
Therefore, the elements to constitute a waiver are absent in
the present case – Objection founded on waiver is thoroughly
misconceived and is, thus, overruled – Persons with Disabilities
(Equal Opportunities, Protection of Rights and Full Participation)
Act, 1995 – s.47. [Paras 46, 47, 49, 50, 52]

Principle of ‘no work, no pay’ – Inapplicability – Persons
with Disabilities (Equal Opportunities, Protection of Rights
and Full Participation) Act, 1995 – s.47:
Held: Appellants having failed to provide an alternate post
commensurate with the respondent’s disability as mandated by
[2026] 8 S.C.R. 225

Union of India & Ors. v. Bali Ram No. 850808321

s.47, PwD Act, cannot be permitted to take shelter behind the
principle of ‘no work, no pay’ – The situation of non-employment
of the respondent is entirely the appellants’ creation – Respondent
is, thus, entitled to full back wages and the appellants must bear
the consequences of their own inaction – The preambular promise
of the Constitution cannot remain symbolic. [Para 81]

Case Law Cited
Union of India v. Dileep Kumar Singh [2015] 2 SCR 882 : (2015)
4 SCC 421 – distinguished.
Kunal Singh v. Union of India [2003] 1 SCR 1059 : (2003) 4 SCC
524; Bhagwan Dass v. Punjab State Electricity Board (2008) 1
SCC 579; Federation of Indian Mineral Industries v. Union of India
[2017] 12 SCR 724 : (2017) 16 SCC 186 – relied on.
Dharamvir Singh v. Union of India [2013] 8 SCR 1119 : (2013)
7 SCC 316; National Federation of Blind v. Union Public Service
Commission and Others [1993] 2 SCR 556 : (1993) 2 SCC 411;
Javed Abidi v. Union of India and Ors. [1998] Supp. 3 SCR
610 : (1999) 1 SCC 467; Bharat Amratlal Kothari v. Dosukhan
Samadkhan Sindhi [2009] 15 SCR 662 : (2010) 1 SCC 234;
S. Nagaraj v. State of Karnataka [1993] Supp. 2 SCR 1 : (1993)
Supp. 4 SCC 595; Dwarka Nath v. ITO [1965] 3 SCR 536 : AIR
1966 SC 81; ABL International Ltd. v. Export Credit Guarantee
Corporation of India (2004) 3 SCC 553; Puran Singh v. State of
Punjab [1996] 1 SCR 730 : (1996) 2 SCC 205; Krishan Lal v.
State of J & K [1994] 2 SCR 149 : (1994) 4 SCC 422; Union
of India v. Kartick Chandra Mondal [2010] 1 SCR 1099 : (2010)
2 SCC 422; Mohinder Lal v. Smt Saroj Kumari Verma [2000] 1
SCR 246 : (2000) 2 SCC 6; Ravinder Kumar Dhariwal v. Union
of India [2021] 13 SCR 823 : (2023) 2 SCC 209 – referred to.

List of Acts
Persons with Disabilities (Equal Opportunities, Protection of Rights
and Full Participation) Act, 1995; Central Reserve Police Force
Act, 1949; Civil Procedure, 1908; Constitution of India.

List of Keywords
Section 47, Persons with Disabilities (Equal Opportunities,
Protection of Rights and Full Participation) Act, 1995; Constable
226 [2026] 8 S.C.R.

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(Driver) in CRPF; Medical invalidation; Medically invalidated;
Invalidation from service; Ophthalmic condition; Disseminated
Choroiditis and Retinal Atrophic Patches with Macular Involvement;
Complete blindness in left eye; Partial impairment of vision
in right eye; Disabled employees; Invalid/disability pension;
PwD Act imposes positive obligation on employer to shift the
disabled employee; Physical disability acquired while in service;
Supernumerary post to be created; PwD Act is a beneficial
legislation; Beneficial legislation; Alternate posting not offered;
Model employer; Waiver; Waiver of a statutory right; No waiver;
CRPF, an instrumentality of State; Denial of wider relief; Want of
proper legal assistance; secundum allegata et probata; Service
Jurisprudence; Initial disqualification; Subsequent disability;
Impaired vision; Attributable to service in CRPF; Aggravated by
service in CRPF; Delegated legislation prospective; Pleadings;
Absence of requisite pleadings and specific prayers not fatal;
Granting relief beyond what is prayed in writ jurisdiction; Parties
to strictly confine to pleadings, not an inflexible rule in writ
jurisdiction; Deficient pleadings in writ petition; Post medical
invalidation benefits; Full back wages; Principle of ‘no work,
no pay’; Writ jurisdiction wider than the jurisdiction of the civil
courts; Entitled to more than what has been claimed; Claimed
less due to ignorance or bona fide mistake; Inelegant drafting of
writ petition by lawyer; Substantive justice cannot be trumped by
technicalities; Entitlement to a wider relief than what is claimed.

Case Arising From
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 13783
of 2015
From the Judgment and Order dated 23.12.2014 of the High Court
of Himachal Pradesh at Shimla in LPA No. 25 of 2009

Appearances for Parties
Advs. for the Appellant(s):
Vikramjeet Banerjee, A.S.G., Navanajay Mahapatra, Shantanu
Sharma, Rajendra Singh Rana, Abhishek Singh, Arvind Kumar
Sharma.
Advs. for the Respondent(s):
Aditya Dhawan, Mrs. Kiran Dhawan, Anirudh Negi, Saurabh
Duggal, Aditya Gupta, Tushar Bukkle, Chander Shekhar Ashri.
[2026] 8 S.C.R. 227

Union of India & Ors. v. Bali Ram No. 850808321

Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court

Judgment

Dipankar Datta, J.

The Appeal
1. We are called upon to examine in this appeal by special leave
preferred by the Union of India, the Director General, Central Reserve
Police Force1 and two other officers2 of the CRPF, the legality
and correctness of the judgment and order dated 23rd December
20143 of a Division Bench of the High Court of Himachal Pradesh4
dismissing the appellants’ intra-court appeal [Letters Patent Appeal
No. 25 of 20095], which was laid by them to challenge the judgment
and order of a Single Judge dated 11th August 2008 allowing the
respondent’s writ petition6 directing that he be reinstated in service
with all consequential benefits.

Facts
2. The facts are simple and undisputed.
3. Respondent was enrolled in the CRPF as a Constable (Driver)
in 1985, upon being found medically fit at the material time. He
continued in service until 1996, when he developed an ophthalmic
condition. A medical examination conducted at the Government
Hospital, Jammu, revealed that the respondent was suffering from
Disseminated Choroiditis and Retinal Atrophic Patches with Macular
Involvement, resulting in complete blindness in the left eye and
partial impairment of vision in the right eye.
4. In view of the respondent’s medical condition, the Chief Medical
Officer, Station Hospital, CRPF, Jammu, recommended that his
case be placed before the Departmental Rehabilitation Board.

1 CRPF
2 appellants
3 impugned judgment
4 High Court
5 LPA
6 Civil Writ Petition No. 1371 of 2005
228 [2026] 8 S.C.R.

Supreme Court Reports

Upon assessment, the respondent was found unfit to perform
driving as well as combatant duties and was, accordingly, referred
to the Medical Invalidation Board in 1997. The Medical Board
constituted at the Base Hospital, CRPF, Hyderabad, conducted
a medical examination of the respondent and concluded that he
was permanently incapacitated and unfit for further service in any
capacity in the CRPF.
5. Pursuant thereto, a notice was served on the respondent calling
upon him to submit a representation, if any, against the proposed
action of medical invalidation. In response, the respondent submitted
an application seeking grant of full financial and service benefits
upon his invalidation from service. Thereafter, by an order dated 11th
March, 1998, the respondent was medically invalidated from service.
Subsequently, on 15th October, 2000, the respondent submitted a
further representation seeking redressal of his grievance; however,
the same came to be rejected by the competent authority.
6. Aggrieved thereby, the respondent approached the High Court with
a writ petition7. The High Court disposed of the same on 5th January,
2005 with a direction to the appellants to consider and decide the
grievance expressed in the legal notice submitted on behalf of the
respondent, on or before 15th February, 2005. Pursuant thereto,
the appellants reconsidered the matter but once again rejected the
respondent’s claim vide an order dated 27th June, 2005, holding that
the ailment suffered by him was neither attributable to nor aggravated
by service conditions. It was further held that the respondent was
entitled only to a lump-sum payment of Rs. 15,000/- in accordance
with the applicable rules, as his disability was not found to be
attributable to his service.
7. Thereafter, the respondent instituted the writ petition, out of which
this appeal arises. He prayed for directions to grant invalid /
disability pension on account of 100% disability from the date of his
discharge together with consequential benefits and interest @ 18%
per annum and to constitute a fresh Medical Board for assessment
of his disability; and to declare the orders of medical invalidation
and rejection of his prayers as null and void.

7 Civil Writ Petition No. 206 of 2003
[2026] 8 S.C.R. 229

Union of India & Ors. v. Bali Ram No. 850808321

Proceedings before the Single Judge
8. The Single Judge heard the contesting parties on affidavits. In
allowing the writ petition on contest, vide the judgment and order
dated 11th August, 2008, the Single Judge travelled beyond the
pleadings and the prayers of the respondent by not limiting the
scrutiny to examining the correctness of the order of medical
invalidation and / or his entitlement to invalid / disability pension;
instead, the Single Judge invoked the provisions of the Persons
with Disabilities (Equal Opportunities, Protection of Rights and Full
Participation) Act, 19958 to secure the appellants’ statutory duty in the
light of the decisions of this Court in Kunal Singh v Union of India9
and Bhagwan Dass v Punjab State Electricity Board10. Specific
findings were returned by the Single Judge that the appellants had
acted in breach of Section 47 of the PwD Act.
9. The operative directions given by the Single Judge read as follows:
“In view of the aforesaid observations and reasoning,
Annexure P-2 dated 11.3.1998, Annexure P-6 dated
December, 2000 and Annexure P-9 dated 27.6.2005,
respectively are quashed and set aside. The petitioner will
be deemed in service and he is entitled to all the annual
increments till the date of his retirement. The amount of
terminal benefits which has been paid in (sic, to) him
shall be adjusted against the amount of his salary from
11.3.1998 till date the (sic, he) will continue in service till the
date of his superannuation according to the service record.
He is directed to be reinstated and all due payments, after
adjustments as directed, should be made to him within
ten weeks from the date of presentation of the copy of
the judgment before respondent No.2. the writ petition is
allowed with costs, which are quantified at Rs.3,000/-.”

The Impugned Judgment
10. Appellants, however, did not accept the judgment and order of the
Single Judge with grace; instead, they preferred the LPA wherein

8 PwD Act
9 (2003) 4 SCC 524
10 (2008) 1 SCC 579
230 [2026] 8 S.C.R.

Supreme Court Reports

an interim order of stay resulted in suspension of the directions of
the Single Judge. The Division Bench of the High Court took nearly
seven years to decide the LPA. After tracing the history as well as
the object and purpose the PwD Act was intended to serve and
upon considering the decisions of this Court in Dharamvir Singh v.
Union of India11, Kunal Singh (supra), National Federation of
Blind v. Union Public Service Commission12 and Javed Abidi v.
Union of India13, the Division Bench reasoned that mere grant of
invalid / disability pension was no ground to deny the protection
of Section 47 of the PwD Act to the respondent. While holding the
appellants to be at fault in breaching Section 47 of the PwD Act
and recording that the findings of the Single Judge did not suffer
from any infirmity, the LPA stood dismissed vide the impugned
judgement.

Proceedings before this Court
11. Appellants did not let the matter to rest; they set out to defeat the
verdicts delivered by the High Court by applying before this Court
for special leave to appeal under Article 136 of the Constitution with
an application for condonation of delay.
12. On 23rd November, 2015, a coordinate Bench condoned the delay,
granted leave and stayed implementation of the impugned judgment.
13. The civil appeal, having awaited its turn across Benches for a
decade, now awaits its quietus before us. So does the respondent,
who has awaited justice for more than two decades.

Contentions on behalf of the Appellants
14. Mr. Banerjee, learned Additional Solicitor General, for the appellants
urged several grounds to assail the impugned judgment and prayed
for its reversal.
15. First, Mr. Banerjee asserted that, in the present case, the respondent
was found to have completely lost vision in one eye and was suffering
from partial loss of vision in the other. At the relevant time, he was

11 (2013) 7 SCC 316
12 (1993) 2 SCC 411
13 (1999) 1 SCC 467
[2026] 8 S.C.R. 231

Union of India & Ors. v. Bali Ram No. 850808321

serving as a driver in the CRPF. In view of his medical condition,
he was rendered wholly unsuitable for driving duties. Moreover, he
was also found unfit to perform any function of a combatant. These
findings stand duly affirmed by the Medical Board constituted at
the Base Hospital, CRPF, Hyderabad, which concluded that the
respondent was permanently incapacitated for further service in any
capacity in the CRPF. Thus, the question of retaining the respondent
in the service of the CRPF did not arise and regard being had to
his ophthalmic condition and the nature of disability acquired by
him, the respondent could not have been accommodated on an
alternate post. He sought to impress upon us that the appellants not
being at fault, the Division Bench seized of the LPA was expected
to correct the egregious exercise of jurisdiction by the Single Judge
in ordering reinstatement of the respondent on an alternate post
which it erroneously failed to do.
16. Mr. Banerjee invited our attention to the relevant averment that
post medical invalidation, the respondent was granted whatever
financial benefits he was entitled to under the prevailing rules/
circulars including monthly pension.
17. Secondly, Mr. Banerjee submitted that the Single Judge erroneously
placed reliance upon Section 47 of the PwD Act. Such reliance, he
contended, was wholly misplaced in view of the notification dated
10th September, 200214 issued by the Ministry of Social Justice
and Empowerment, Government of India in exercise of the powers
conferred by the proviso to Section 47 of the PwD Act, whereby
all categories of combatant personnel of the Central Para Military
Forces15, including the CRPF, were exempted from the application
of the said provision.
18. Relying on the decision of this Court in Union of India v. Dileep
Kumar Singh16, Mr. Banerjee contended that the validity of the
Notification was upheld therein. This Court, it was highlighted,
had recognized that the exemption granted under the proviso
to Section 47 was justified having regard to the nature of duties
performed by personnel of the CRPF and the other armed forces,

14 Notification
15 CPMF
16 (2015) 4 SCC 421
232 [2026] 8 S.C.R.

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where type of work discharged by the personnel is an important
consideration and continuation in service may not always be feasible
in the event of disability.
19. Thirdly, Mr. Banerjee contended that the doctrine of waiver is clearly
attracted in the facts of the present case. It was submitted that at no
stage did the respondent seek any relief founded upon Section 47
of the PwD, Act, nor did he ever pray for reinstatement in service;
instead, he accepted pension and other benefits extended to him.
In all his representations, as well as the writ petition filed by him
in 2005, the respondent confined his claim to the grant of 100%
invalid / disability pension and other consequential benefits. Having
consciously elected to pursue only such relief, the respondent cannot
subsequently seek, nor could the Court grant, relief of reinstatement
and continuation in service founded upon a statutory provision that
was neither invoked by him nor attracted in the given factual scenario.
20. In the alternative, Mr. Banerjee submitted that much water
having flown under the bridge since the impugned judgment was
rendered and the respondent, by now, having attained the age of
superannuation, question of his reinstatement in service does not
arise. While appealing to our conscience, he urged that the directions
made by the Single Judge, since affirmed by the Division Bench, if
allowed to stand, would impose a substantial financial burden upon
the State exchequer (in excess of Rs.82 lakh on account of salary
and allowances only). He, therefore, prayed that the impugned
judgment be suitably modified in the interests of justice and equity
in such manner we consider just and proper.

Contentions on behalf of the Respondent
21. Mr. Dhawan, learned counsel appearing for the respondent,
assiduously opposed the submissions advanced by Mr. Banerjee.
22. Mr. Dhawan urged that the PwD Act, 1995, and in particular Section 47
thereof, is a social welfare legislation intended to protect employees
who acquire a disability during service. Relying on Kunal Singh
(supra), he submitted that Section 47 casts a statutory obligation
on the employer to protect an employee acquiring disability during
service.
23. According to Mr. Dhawan, the respondent was fully entitled to the
protection afforded by Section 47 at the time of his invalidation
[2026] 8 S.C.R. 233

Union of India & Ors. v. Bali Ram No. 850808321

from service, as the order of medical invalidation was passed on
11th March, 1998 whereas the Notification exempting combatant
personnel of the CRPF and other CPMFs from the application of
Section 47 came to be issued only on 10th September, 2002. It
was contended that the Notification operates prospectively and
contains no indication of any retrospective application. Therefore,
the order of invalidation was in the teeth of Section 47 of the PwD
Act.
24. Mr. Dhawan further submitted that the respondent had, at no stage,
waived his statutory rights under Section 47 of the PwD Act. It was
contended that the respondent, having lost his vision, was not even
aware of the protection available to him under the said provision
and, consequently, confined his claims to seeking invalid / disability
pension and other service benefits admissible under the applicable
rules. It was further urged that the appellants never informed the
respondent of his entitlement under Section 47 of the PwD Act,
despite being under an obligation to act fairly. He submitted that
this lack of awareness on the part of the respondent was rightly
noticed by the Single Judge in the judgment dated 11th August,
2008, which also granted the protection of Section 47 of the PwD
Act in ordering relief.
25. Next, Mr. Dhawan argued that to constitute waiver, there has to be
an intentional relinquishment of a known right; and the respondent
being wholly unaware of the right guaranteed to him under Section
47, no question of relinquishment of a known right did arise. In these
circumstances, he argued that no inference of waiver can be drawn
against the respondent.
26. That apart, it was Mr. Dhawan’s contention that the plea of waiver
was never raised either in the LPA or in the grounds of appeal
presented before this Court. Submission was made that a plea taken
for the first time in course of hearing ought not to be entertained.
27. Finally, Mr. Dhawan submitted that the appellants having breached
the statutory duty imposed by Section 47 of the PwD Act cannot
and should not be heard to urge that the Single Judge overreached
in protecting the respondent.
28. On the aforesaid grounds, Mr. Dhawan prayed for dismissal of the
civil appeal.
234 [2026] 8 S.C.R.

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Question
29. These being the rival contentions, we are tasked to decide the
following question:
Whether the Single Judge rightly enforced the appellants’
duty under Section 47 of the PwD Act by making the
directions noted above in paragraph 9 and also as to
whether the Division Bench was grossly wrong in not
reversing such directions?

Analysis and Reasons
30. Learned counsel for the parties have been heard and the impugned
judgment as well as the judgment of the Single Judge perused
together with the other materials on record.
31. Section 47 of the PwD Act being at the centre of debate, it is required
to be noted. It reads:
47. Non-discrimination in Government employment.—
(1) No establishment shall dispense with, or reduce in rank,
an employee who acquires a disability during his service:
Provided that, if an employee, after acquiring disability
is not suitable for the post he was holding, could be
shifted to some other post with the same pay scale and
service benefits:
Provided further that if it is not possible to adjust the
employee against any post, he may be kept on a
supernumerary post until a suitable post is available or
he attains the age of superannuation, whichever is earlier.
(2) No promotion shall be denied to a person merely on
the ground of his disability:
Provided that the appropriate Government may, having
regard to the type of work carried on in any establishment,
by notification and subject to such conditions, if any,
as may be specified in such notification, exempt any
establishment from the provisions of this section.
32. The answer to the question formulated by us seems to squarely lie
in Kunal Singh (supra), rendered more than two decades back,
[2026] 8 S.C.R. 235

Union of India & Ors. v. Bali Ram No. 850808321

where this Court held that the PwD Act imposes a positive obligation
on the employer to shift the disabled employee and not wait for him
to ask for such shifting.
33. However, without truncating the adjudicatory process by merely
relying on Kunal Singh (supra), we propose to deal with each
of Mr. Banerjee’s objections while rendering our decision before
we finally draw guidance from Kunal Singh (supra) and the other
precedents in the field.
34. In course of hearing, we had noticed complete absence of pleadings
and prayers in the writ petition in relation to invocation of the PwD
Act by the respondent. At the same time, we do not find any ground
raised by the appellants either in their LPA before the Division Bench
or in the civil appeal before us to the effect that the Single Judge
travelled beyond the pleadings and the prayers in the writ petition.
Since no ground has been raised, it is open to us not to dilate on
this aspect any further. However, we feel it necessary to lay down
the yardstick to be applied where the pleadings are skeletal and
prayers deficient, yet, the material on record establishes that denial
of wider relief would perpetuate injustice merely for want of proper
legal assistance.

A. Absence of requisite pleadings and specific prayers –
when not fatal?
35. The Supreme Court in multiple rulings has cautioned that in exercising
writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution, the High Courts
must confine themselves to the pleadings and the prayer clauses;
and granting relief beyond what is prayed for is not permissible in
law. One may profitably refer to the decision in Bharat Amratlal
Kothari v. Dosukhan Samadkhan Sindhi17 in this regard.
36. The Code of Civil Procedure, 190818, which is applicable to suits,
envisions under Order VII that the court cannot traverse beyond
the pleadings and make out a case which was never pleaded,
such principle having originated from the fundamental legal maxim
secundum allegata et probata, i.e., the court will arrive at its decision
on the basis of the claims and proof led by the parties. Law is,

17 (2010) 1 SCC 234
18 CPC
236 [2026] 8 S.C.R.

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again, well-settled that when a point is not traceable in the pleas
set out either in a plaint or a written statement, findings rendered
on such point by the court would be unsustainable as that would
amount to an altogether new case being made out for the party. The
underlying reason is that of fairness. The opponent must know the
case he/it has to meet. He / it cannot be taken by surprise at the
hearing. To grant unclaimed relief without putting him / it on notice
would obviously result in violation of natural justice and, therefore,
the court ought to desist from doing so.
37. However, the rule that requires the parties to be strictly confined to
the pleadings and the prayer clauses is not an inflexible rule insofar
as exercise of writ jurisdiction is concerned.
38. Justice is a virtue which transcends all barriers. Neither the rules
of procedure nor technicalities of law can stand in its way. Even
the law bends before justice. The entire concept of writ jurisdiction
exercised by the higher courts is founded on equity and fairness
(see: S. Nagaraj v. State of Karnataka19).
39. Ex facie, Article 226 which is couched in comprehensive phraseology
confers wide power on the high courts to reach injustice wherever
it is found. Apart from writs, the high courts may issue orders or
directions in the nature of writs enabling them to mould the reliefs
to meet the peculiar and complicated requirements of this country
(see: Dwarka Nath v ITO20).
40. Article 226 confers a power that is plenary, equitable and discretionary,
and is not one bound by the rigidities of law. Even in the contractual
field, an arbitrary State action could be liable to judicial review (see:
ABL International Ltd. v Export Credit Guarantee Corporation
of India21).
41. Although in exercise of writ jurisdiction the high courts are guided by
the principles flowing from the CPC, they are not bound by it (see:
Puran Singh v. State of Punjab22). Undoubtedly, the high courts’
writ jurisdiction under Article 226 is wider than the jurisdiction of
the civil courts.

19 (1993) Supp. 4 SCC 595
20 AIR 1966 SC 81
21 (2004) 3 SCC 553
22 (1996) 2 SCC 205
[2026] 8 S.C.R. 237

Union of India & Ors. v. Bali Ram No. 850808321

42. Thus, read and understood, we consider Article 226 to be a
reservoir of equity which is meant to secure justice to the party
aggrieved by omission or failure to perform a duty by an authority
within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution. Rather than
being stifled by technical pleas raised by such authority to resist its
exercise, in an exceptional case, the high court may do what the
justice of the case demands. There could be several exceptional
cases warranting such treatment but for the present, we wish to
outline only one.
43. One of the exceptions is when the court is convinced that the
petitioner is legally entitled to more than what has been claimed, but
might have claimed less due to ignorance or bona fide mistake or
inelegant drafting of the writ petition by his lawyer. Since substantive
justice cannot be allowed to be trumped by technicalities, if the
record before the high court clearly evinces entitlement of the
suitor to a wider relief than what is claimed, the opponent is put on
notice and he/it has no answer, much less adequate answer, and
thereby, no prejudice is caused to him/it, and it is found that the
opponent is seeking to use a procedural technicality as a shield for
its own statutory breach, the court in an appropriate case may, in
its discretion, grant such relief as the suitor is found entitled.
44. However, there is a need to sound a word of caution. While the high
courts are expected to stick to the pleadings and the prayers, and
not wander beyond, by observing the rule of discipline that exists
to prevent judicial overreach and surprise, the exception to the rule
of doing justice despite deficient pleadings in a writ petition ought
to be sparingly invoked and judiciously applied where the law and
the record disclose a clear entitlement of the suitor and the court
is convinced that upholding the plea raised by the opponent, based
on technicality, would defeat the right. A judge who ignores both the
rule and the exception, ends up either shackled by technicality or
exposes himself to be accused of judicial activism.

B. What is Waiver? When can such plea be successfully
pursued?
45. The meaning of ‘waiver’ has been explained by this Court in numerous
decisions. Reference to the same would add to the length of this
judgment and, hence, we refrain from adverting to the same.
238 [2026] 8 S.C.R.

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46. The essence, however, of all such decisions is that waiver, in law, is
an intentional relinquishment of a known right or advantage, benefit,
claim or privilege by a person which, except for such waiver, he
would have enjoyed. As per the precedents, waiver must have three
elements. To constitute waiver, what is required to be proved by the
party raising the plea is that (i) a person (the other party to the lis
against whom waiver is claimed) has a right; (ii) such person has
clear knowledge of that right; and (iii) despite the knowledge (of an
existing right), that person has voluntarily and consciously given up
that right. Mere silence or inaction or delay to enforce the existing
right does not constitute waiver, since there must be a clear conduct
revealing that the right has been given up.
47. It is important to remember that waiver of a statutory right is generally
disfavoured particularly when the statute is for public welfare or the
waiver would be contrary to public policy.
48. We may only refer to the decision in Krishan Lal v. State of J & K23,
where this Court was considering whether the requirement of giving
copy of the proceeding of the inquiry mandated by Section 17(5) of
the provisions of the Jammu and Kashmir (Government Servants)
Prevention of Corruption Act, 1962 is for the benefit of the individual
concerned or serves a public purpose. Having noted the legal position
that a mandatory provision can be waived if the same is aimed to
safeguard the interest of an individual and such provision has not
been conceived in the public interest, it was held that if it be the
former then the same can be waived; if it be the latter, it cannot be.

Did the Respondent Waive his Right?
49. Viewing the objection of waiver raised by Mr. Banerjee in the prism
of the aforesaid settled position in law, we have no doubt that it is
unworthy of consideration and liable to be rejected without much
ado. Whether or not a party has waived his right has to flow from
his conduct and is, essentially, a question of fact. We have not been
able to find either in the LPA or in this appeal, any point of waiver
having been pleaded by the appellants. Without a pleading, a plea
of waiver need not be adjudicated.

23 (1994) 4 SCC 422
[2026] 8 S.C.R. 239

Union of India & Ors. v. Bali Ram No. 850808321

50. The Single Judge, recorded a finding of fact accepting the
respondent’s version that he had no knowledge of Section 47,
PwD Act conferring a right on him to be continued in service
notwithstanding his impairment of vision. In the LPA, no challenge
was laid to such finding. Appellants neither disputed before the
Single Judge nor before the Division Bench that the respondent’s
disability was not covered by the beneficial provisions of the
enactment. It has also not been disputed before this Court. In such
a situation, to attract waiver, what was required of the appellants
was to demonstrate that the respondent was aware of his right
under Section 47, yet, he elected to give it up while preferring to
receive invalid/disability pension. However, there is no material on
record to suggest that the respondent had been informed by the
appellants of a right available to him under the PwD Act and that
he relinquished his claim for enforcement of such right. Therefore,
the second and the third elements to constitute a waiver are absent
in the present case.
51. On the contrary, paragraphs 2 (c)24 of the LPA and 5 (C)25 & (F)26
of this civil appeal make the insensitive approach of the appellants
too obtrusive not to attract attention.
52. The objection founded on waiver is thoroughly misconceived and
is, thus, overruled.

Effect of the Notification
53. According to Mr. Banerjee, the Notification was misread by the
Single Judge as well as by the Division Bench. We disagree.

24 (c) That the Hon’ble Single Judge has erred in directing the present appellants to reinstate the respondent
in service against the supernumerary post in the face of the fact that the respondent had turned blind and
his services could not have been utilized anywhere in the department. He was completely disabled and
cannot be paid salary while sitting idle. The respondent has rightly been granted pension @ Rs.1275/-
p.m.
25 (C) Because the Hon’ble High Court erred in not (sic) Union of India & Ors. V/s Dileep Kumar Singh (Civil
Appeal Nos. 2466-67/2015) decided on 26.02.2015, approving the application of exemption notification
to Central Para Military Forces like CRPF etc. for promotion as well as continuing in service. Further even
if it is held that the GOI notification is prospective in nature still would the humble court be justified to pass
order’s that the individual be allowed to serve in the force till superannuation or till suppernummary (sic,
supernumerary) post is created.
26 (F) Because the High Court failed to appreciate that the respondent is paid admissible terminal benefits
namely pension @ Rs. 1275/- per month for life, DCRG Rs. 24,832/-, GIS Rs. 5,746/-, Leave encashment
Rs. 11,207/-, GPF Rs. 37,048/-, Risk Fund Rs. 15,000/-.
240 [2026] 8 S.C.R.

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54. The Notification upon which the appellants place heavy reliance,
exempting combatant personnel of the CPMF from the application
of Section 47 of the Act, was issued only on 10th September, 2002.
The Notification, for the sake of completeness of discussion, is
reproduced hereunder:
“In exercise of the powers conferred by proviso to Section
47 of The Persons With Disabilities (Equal Opportunities,
Protection of Rights And Full Participation) Act, 1995
(1 of 1996) the Central Government having regard to
the type of work carried on hereby exempt all categories
of posts of ‘combatant personnel’ only of the Central
Para Military Forces (CPMFs), namely, Central Reserve
Police Force (CRPF), Border Security Force (BSF)
Indo-Tibetan Border Police (ITBP), Central Industrial
Security Force (CISF) and Assam Rifles from the
provisions of the said section.”
55. Three principles of law, which are well-settled, must inform us. First,
delegated legislation is ordinarily prospective in nature and a right
or liability created for the first time cannot be given retrospective
effect (see: Federation of Indian Mineral Industries v. Union
of India27); secondly, unless and until there is a clear intention
expressed in the notification issued in pursuance of delegated
power that it would also apply retrospectively, the same cannot be
given a retrospective effect and would always operate prospectively
(see: Union of India v. Kartick Chandra Mondal28); and thirdly, an
exemption notification which takes out cases from the purview of
a beneficial legislation has to be strictly construed (see: Mohinder
Lal v. Saroj Kumari Verma29).
56. The rule deducible from Federation of Indian Mineral Industries
(supra) would govern all delegated legislation including an exemption
notification because (i) we find absence of any distinction carved
out by such rule between “imposition of duty” and “removal of duty”
and (ii) the law may not be read in a manner providing one rule for
liability and another for immunity.

27 (2017) 16 SCC 186
28 (2010) 2 SCC 422
29 (2000) 2 SCC 6
[2026] 8 S.C.R. 241

Union of India & Ors. v. Bali Ram No. 850808321

57. Turning attention now to the terms of the Notification, it is clear
from a bare perusal thereof that neither by express words nor by
necessary implication was it made to apply retrospectively from
the date the PwD Act was enforced. Also, the PwD Act being a
beneficial legislation, any notification exempting an establishment
from the duty imposed by Section 47 has to be strictly construed to
protect the interests of disabled employees who acquire disability
while in service.
58. We, therefore, hold that so long as the proviso is not invoked by
the appropriate Government for exempting an establishment from
the provision of sub-section (1) of Section 47, the employer has
a duty to offer an alternate post and the employee a right to be
accommodated; however, once a notification is issued in terms
of the proviso below sub-section (2) of Section 47 exempting an
establishment from the provisions of the section, not only does the
duty of the employer cease from the date the same takes effect, the
employee would lose the statutory protection of continuity in service.
59. In our considered opinion, issuance of the Notification on 10th
September, 2002 aids the respondent more than advancing the
cause of the appellants. It shows that even the Government of India
in the appropriate ministry felt the need to carve the CMPFs out
of the coverage of Section 47 seven years after the enactment of
the PwD Act, meaning thereby that the said provision applied with
full force to the CMPFs and covered them between 1995 and 10th
September, 2002.
60. Therefore, the Notification has no bearing on the legality of the
order of medical invalidation. Respondent’s medical invalidation vide
order dated 11th March, 1998 was made at a point of time when
Section 47 of the PwD Act operated without any strings attached
and the appellants were bound by its categorical mandate. The said
order being ultra vires Section 47 read with Articles 14 and 21 of
the Constitution as on date the same was made, the subsequent
issuance of the Notification cannot have retrospective effect so as
to legitimise an act that is void ab initio. The right of the respondent
crystallised on the date of ouster; and a later exemption from the
statutory mandate cannot efface the breach already committed.
61. The case of Dileep Kumar (supra) relied upon by Mr. Banerjee
would also not be helpful to advance the appellants’ case.
242 [2026] 8 S.C.R.

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In Dileep Kumar (supra), the respondent therein was relieved from
service in 2011 after issuance of the Notification in 2002. It is in
this context that this Court interpreted the proviso to Section 47 of
the PwD Act, held the order of invalidation from service valid and,
consequently, allowed the appeal of the appellants therein. Therefore,
it is clear that Dileep Kumar (supra) is clearly distinguishable on facts.

Other Precedents Touching Section 47, PwD Act
62. Kunal Singh (supra) happens to be the first decision on the contours
of Section 47, PwD Act.
63. Appellant therein was recruited as a Constable in the Special
Service Bureau30. During the course of his service, he sustained an
injury to his left leg, which ultimately necessitated its amputation.
A Medical Board at Kullu thereafter assessed his condition and
declared him permanently incapacitated for further service. On the
basis of the said medical opinion, the Commandant, Group Centre,
SSB, Shamshi (Kullu), passed an order dated 20th November, 1998
invalidating the appellant from service. Challenge laid to the said
order before the High Court by way of a writ petition, failed. The High
Court dismissed the petition holding that since the appellant had
been invalidated from service on the basis of the Medical Board’s
opinion, there was no scope for his continuance in service. Aggrieved
thereby, the appellant approached this Court. It is pertinent to note,
particularly in the context of the present case and the discussion
above regarding the absence of specific pleadings, that this Court
in Kunal Singh (supra) expressly recorded that no argument on
Section 47 of the PwD Act had been advanced before the High
Court. The said contention was raised for the first time before this
Court. Nevertheless, this Court proceeded to entertain and adjudicate
the issue, ultimately granting relief on the basis of Section 47 of
the PwD Act.
64. In Kunal Singh (supra), this Court held that the language, scheme,
and contents of Section 47 of the PwD Act render the provision
mandatory in nature and cast a statutory obligation upon the employer
not to dispense with the services of, or reduce in rank, an employee
who acquires a disability during the course of service. The disability

30 SSB
[2026] 8 S.C.R. 243

Union of India & Ors. v. Bali Ram No. 850808321

suffered by the appellant therein squarely fell within the ambit of
the PwD Act, since it was acquired while in service. Consequently,
this Court held that the appellant was entitled to the protection and
benefits envisaged under Section 47 of the PwD Act. This Court
further observed that, once an employee acquires a disability during
service, it is incumbent upon the employer to shift such employee
to another post carrying the same pay scale and service benefits.
In the event that no suitable post is immediately available, the
employee is required to be retained on a supernumerary post until
a suitable post becomes available or until he attains the age of
superannuation, whichever is earlier.
65. Relevant paragraphs from Kunal Singh (supra) are reproduced
hereunder:
9. Chapter VI of the Act deals with employment relating
to persons with disabilities, who are yet to secure
employment. Section 47, which falls in Chapter VIII,
deals with an employee, who is already in service and
acquires a disability during his service. It must be borne
in mind that Section 2 of the Act has given distinct
and different definitions of “disability” and “person with
disability”. It is well settled that in the same enactment
if two distinct definitions are given defining a word/
expression, they must be understood accordingly in
terms of the definition. It must be remembered that a
person does not acquire or suffer disability by choice.
An employee, who acquires disability during his service,
is sought to be protected under Section 47 of the Act
specifically. Such employee, acquiring disability, if not
protected, would not only suffer himself, but possibly
all those who depend on him would also suffer. The
very frame and contents of Section 47 clearly indicate
its mandatory nature. The very opening part of the
section reads “no establishment shall dispense with, or
reduce in rank, an employee who acquires a disability
during his service”. The section further provides that
if an employee after acquiring disability is not suitable
for the post he was holding, could be shifted to some
other post with the same pay scale and service benefits;
if it is not possible to adjust the employee against any
244 [2026] 8 S.C.R.

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post he will be kept on a supernumerary post until
a suitable post is available or he attains the age of
superannuation, whichever is earlier. Added to this no
promotion shall be denied to a person merely on the
ground of his disability as is evident from sub-section (2)
of Section 47. Section 47 contains a clear directive that
the employer shall not dispense with or reduce in rank
an employee who acquires a disability during the service.
In construing a provision of a social beneficial enactment
that too dealing with disabled persons intended to give
them equal opportunities, protection of rights and full
participation, the view that advances the object of the
Act and serves its purpose must be preferred to the one
which obstructs the object and paralyses the purpose
of the Act. Language of Section 47 is plain and certain
casting statutory obligation on the employer to protect
an employee acquiring disability during service.
10. The argument of the learned counsel for the
respondent on the basis of the definition given in
Section 2(t) of the Act that benefit of Section 47 is not
available to the appellant as he has suffered permanent
invalidity cannot be accepted. Because, the appellant
was an employee, who has acquired “disability” within
the meaning of Section 2(i) of the Act and not a person
with disability.
11. We have to notice one more aspect in relation to
the appellant getting invalidity pension as per Rule 38 of
the CCS Pension Rules. The Act is a special legislation
dealing with persons with disabilities to provide equal
opportunities, protection of rights and full participation to
them. It being a special enactment, doctrine of generalia
specialibus non derogant would apply. Hence Rule 38
of the Central Civil Services (Pension) Rules cannot
override Section 47 of the Act. Further, Section 72 of the
Act also supports the case of the appellant, which reads:
“72. Act to be in addition to and not in derogation
of any other law.—The provisions of this Act, or
the rules made thereunder shall be in addition to,
[2026] 8 S.C.R. 245

Union of India & Ors. v. Bali Ram No. 850808321

and not in derogation of any other law for the time
being in force or any rules, order or any instructions
issued thereunder, enacted or issued for the benefit
of persons with disabilities.”
12. Merely because under Rule 38 of the CCS (Pension)
Rules, 1972, the appellant got invalidity pension is no
ground to deny the protection mandatorily made available
to the appellant under Section 47 of the Act. Once it is
held that the appellant has acquired disability during
his service and if found not suitable for the post he was
holding, he could be shifted to some other post with same
pay scale and service benefits; if it was not possible
to adjust him against any post, he could be kept on a
supernumerary post until a suitable post was available
or he attains the age of superannuation, whichever is
earlier. It appears no such efforts were made by the
respondents. They have proceeded to hold that he was
permanently incapacitated to continue in service without
considering the effect of other provisions of Section 47
of the Act.
(emphasis ours)

66. The decision in Bhagwan Dass (supra) is the next decision providing
guidance.
67. Appellant therein was an employee of the Punjab State Electricity
Board31. During the course of his service, he lost his eyesight
completely on 17th January, 1994 and consequently became totally
blind. Thereafter, he remained absent from duty without authorization
from 18th January, 1994 to 21st March, 1997. Although the Board
repeatedly directed him to report for duty, he failed to do so, leading
to the issuance of a charge-sheet against him. Subsequently, by a
letter dated 17th July, 1996, the appellant explained that his absence
was attributable to the sudden loss of vision. He further sought
retirement from service and requested that a suitable appointment
be provided to his wife in his place and stead. Following a series of
internal communications, wherein it was concluded that the appellant

31 Board
246 [2026] 8 S.C.R.

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was not interested in availing the protection under Section 47 of the
PwD Act, the Board relieved him from service vide Office Order dated
13th January, 1999 with effect from 21st March, 1997 and directed
him to submit a leave application covering the period of his absence.
Thereafter, the appellant submitted representations challenging the
action of the Board, contending that he was unaware of the relevant
service rules and of the protection available to employees who acquire
a disability during service. He, accordingly, sought reinstatement.
As no relief was forthcoming and the severance was completed by
payment of his terminal dues, the appellant approached the High
Court by way of a writ petition seeking the benefit of Section 47
of the PwD Act and, in the alternative, appointment of his son in
his place. The High Court dismissed the writ petition, primarily
addressing the alternative prayer for compassionate appointment,
without undertaking any discussion on the applicability of Section 47
of the PwD Act. Aggrieved thereby, the appellant preferred an appeal
before this Court.
68. This Court held that the action of the Board in relieving the appellant
from service vide Office Order dated 13th January, 1999 was illegal
and unsustainable in law, and that the appellant was entitled to the
protection afforded under Section 47 of the PwD Act. In arriving at
this conclusion, this Court placed reliance on its earlier decision in
Kunal Singh (supra). It was further observed that, following the onset
of his disability, the appellant was unaware of the legal protections
available to him and was labouring under the mistaken belief that
retirement from service was the only course open to him. In such
circumstances, it was incumbent upon the senior officers of the
Board to apprise him of the statutory safeguards available under
Section 47 of the PwD Act rather than proceed on the assumption
that he had voluntarily chosen to forgo them. Accordingly, this Court
held that the appellant must be deemed to have continued in service
until the date of his superannuation and directed his reinstatement
with all consequential service and monetary benefits.
69. Reference in this regard may also be profitably made to a decision
of recent origin of this Court in Ravinder Kumar Dhariwal v. Union
of India32.

32 (2023) 2 SCC 209
[2026] 8 S.C.R. 247

Union of India & Ors. v. Bali Ram No. 850808321

70. In the said case, the appellant was serving as an Assistant
Commandant in the CRPF. It was alleged that on 18th April, 2010,
in the presence of the Deputy Inspector General of Police33, he
stated that he was obsessed with either killing or being killed and
further threatened that he could shoot. Pursuant thereto, a complaint
was lodged by the DIGP, leading to the initiation of departmental
proceedings against the appellant. A charge memorandum was issued
and six articles of charge were framed against him. Subsequently,
he was placed under suspension with effect from 8th October, 2010.
The departmental enquiry culminated in a report dated 3rd October,
2013 submitted by the Enquiry Officer. Pursuant thereto, a notice
dated 7th August, 2015 was issued to the appellant calling upon him
to respond to the findings recorded therein. Parallelly, from the year
2009 onwards, the appellant had been suffering from obsessive
compulsive disorder34 and secondary major depression, for which
he underwent psychiatric treatment at various medical institutions.
He was ultimately referred to Dr. Ram Manohar Lohia Hospital,
New Delhi, where he was certified as suffering from a permanent
disability assessed between 40% and 70%. Consequent thereto,
he was declared medically unfit for duty and placed in the S5(P)
medical category. Aggrieved by the notice dated 7th August, 2015,
the appellant approached the High Court by way of a writ petition.
The writ petition was allowed and the CRPF directed to reconsider
the appellant’s case in light of the protections available under Section
47 of the PwD Act. An intra-court appeal was thereafter preferred by
the respondents. The Division Bench partly allowed the appeal and
restored the departmental proceedings to the stage of recording of
evidence, so as to afford the appellant an opportunity to establish
his claim of mental disability.
71. Aggrieved thereby, a special leave petition came to be filed by the
appellant which was allowed and the departmental enquiry was set
aside. For the purposes of the present discussion, it is unnecessary
to delve into the entirety of the reasoning adopted by this Court in
Ravinder Kumar Dhariwal (supra). It would suffice to advert to
those observations and findings that bear upon the interpretation

33 DIGP
34 OCD
248 [2026] 8 S.C.R.

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and application of Section 47 of the PwD Act, which are directly
relevant to the issues arising in the present case.
72. Relevant paragraphs from the said decision are reproduced
hereinunder:
36. *** While Sections 44 to 46 impose positive
obligations on the State to reasonably accommodate
persons with disabilities, Section 47 imposes both
positive and negative obligations on the Government.
Sub-sections (1) and (2) of Section 47 state that the
government employer must not terminate, demote or
deny promotion on the ground of disability. The proviso
provides a positive obligation on the employer that if
the post is not suitable to the employee after acquiring
disability, then he could be shifted to another post with
the same pay and service benefits. However, if it is
not possible to adjust the employee against any post,
then he may be kept on a supernumerary post until he
obtains superannuation.
37. Article 14 of the Indian Constitution states that “[t]
he State shall not deny to any person equality before
the law or the equal protection of the laws within the
territory of India”. The right to equality under the Indian
Constitution has two facets — formal equality and
substantive equality. While formal equality means that
every person, irrespective of their attributes must be
treated equally and must not be discriminated against;
substantive equality is aimed at producing equality of
outcomes through different modes of affirmative action.
The principle of reasonable accommodation is one of
the means for achieving substantive equality, pursuant
to which disabled individuals must be reasonably
accommodated based on their individual capacities.
Disability, as a social construct, precedes the medical
condition of an individual. The sense of disability is
introduced because of the absence of access to facilities.
38. This Court in Vikash Kumar v. UPSC [Vikash Kumar v.
UPSC, (2021) 5 SCC 370 : (2021) 2 SCC (L&S) 1],
recognised the social construction of disability and
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Union of India & Ors. v. Bali Ram No. 850808321

the necessity to provide reasonable accommodation
to such persons to comply with the full purport of the
equality provisions under the Constitution. One of us
(D.Y. Chandrachud, J.) writing for the three-Judge Bench
observed: (SCC p. 405, para 62)
“62. The principle of reasonable accommodation
acknowledges that if disability as a social construct
has to be remedied, conditions have to be
affirmatively created for facilitating the development
of the disabled. Reasonable accommodation
is founded in the norm of inclusion. Exclusion
results in the negation of individual dignity and
worth or they can choose the route of reasonable
accommodation, where each individual’s dignity
and worth is respected. Under this route, the
‘powerful and the majority adapt their own rules and
practices, within the limits of reason and short of
undue hardship, to permit realisation of these ends’.
[Reasonable Accommodation in A Multicultural
Society, Address to the Canadian Bar Association
Continuing Legal Education Committee and the
National Constitutional and Human Rights Law
Section, 7-4-1995, Calgary, Alberta at 1.]”
39. ***
40. The facets of non-discrimination that guide the PwD
Act are threefold: (i) right to formal equality, where no
person shall be discriminated based on her disability; (ii)
affirmative action in pursuance of substantive equality
under Section 33; and (iii) reasonable accommodation
of persons with disabilities such as provided under
Section 47. There may be no specific provision in
the PwD Act—unlike the RPwD Act—which provides
persons with disability the right of non-discrimination.
However, since the principle of substantive equality (of
providing equal outcomes through affirmative action and
reasonable accommodation) is premised on the principle
of non-discrimination, there is no reason to hold that the
principle of non-discrimination, of treating every person
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equally irrespective of her disability does not guide the
entire statute.
(emphasis ours)

The brass tacks
73. Having thus noticed the facts and the law, the test is simple: did
the facts and circumstances warrant the relief granted by the Single
Judge?
74. The statutory mandate of Section 47, PwD Act is too peremptory to
be ignored. The title of the PwD Act says it all. It is an enactment
for persons with disabilities intended to guarantee them equal
opportunities and full participation apart from protection of rights.
Section 47, importantly, starts with “No”. Negative words in a statute
convey a clear prohibition. It is a legislative device to make a statute
imperative. An employee like the respondent, while retaining the
status of a public servant, is entitled to security of service. A physical
disability that he acquires while in service rendering him unfit for the
work assigned to him has to be dealt with by the employer in the
manner ordained by Section 47. Either he is shifted to some other
post carrying same pay and service benefits, or, if it is not possible,
the employer is under a duty to adjust him on any other post. If
that too is not possible, a supernumerary post has to be created for
him which, for all intents and purposes, would be personal to him.
75. The PwD Act came into force in the year 1995, whereas the
respondent was medically invalidated from service in 1998. The
Notification saw the light of the day as late as in 2002. The duty
imposed by the PwD Act being mandatory and not discretionary,
the law did not leave the appellants with an option to discharge
their duty at their convenience. Appellants were required to find a
chair for the respondent, and not wait for the respondent to beg
for one. By not offering alternate posting, the appellants failed in
their role as a model employer and converted a welfare provision
into a dead letter.
76. The point as to whether or not the impaired vision from which
the respondent suffered was attributable to and / or aggravated
by service in the CRPF need not detain us for long. Nothing has
been brought on record by the appellants to suggest that the
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Union of India & Ors. v. Bali Ram No. 850808321

respondent had been suffering from an ophthalmic condition since
his enrolment in the CRPF. Medical fitness of the respondent must
have been assessed at the time of his enrolment and appointment
as a driver. Had he been found short of the required standards,
we wonder whether the recruitment process would have resulted
in an appointment in the first place. Even if it is assumed that the
ophthalmic condition was neither attributable to nor aggravated by
service in the CRPF, nothing turns on it. Parliament did not limit
Section 47 to disabilities attributable to service; the protection is
unqualified and unconditional. It operates irrespective of how the
disability was acquired. The relevant question is not hypothetical
fitness at appointment, but whether the appellants explored
alternatives before ending the respondent’s service. More than ten
years of unblemished driving followed by an acquired ophthalmic
condition, indeed, provided a case for accommodation or alternate
posting, not medical invalidation. Service jurisprudence distinguishes
between initial disqualification and subsequent disability, and the law
ought to lean towards retention over ouster from service unless, of
course, ouster becomes inevitable.
77. It would not be inapt to dwell on another aspect, before we conclude.
It is intriguing that the CRPF, being a force constituted under the
Central Reserve Police Force Act, 194935 and functioning under the
administrative control of the Ministry of Home Affairs, Government
of India, failed to respond in time. Being an instrumentality of the
State, it was expected to be fully cognizant of the provisions of the
PwD Act and the statutory protection conferred upon the respondent
under Section 47 thereof. In such circumstances, we find it difficult
to comprehend how the order of medical invalidation came to be
passed in the first place, particularly when at the relevant point in
time no notification exempting the CRPF from the operation of the
PwD Act had been issued. The action of the appellants, therefore,
appears to have been taken in disregard of the statutory mandate
then in force.
78. We are, thus, not persuaded to accept Mr. Banerjee’s contention
that the provisions of the PwD Act are inapplicable on facts and in
the circumstances of the present case.

35 Act No. 66 of 1949
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79. For all the reasons aforesaid, we are unhesitatingly of the opinion
that the Single Judge was perfectly justified in finding the appellants
to be remiss. Therefore, we are of the considered opinion that the
civil appeal is devoid of merit and is liable to be dismissed.

The Relief
80. By an interim order passed in the present proceedings on 20th May,
2026, we directed Mr. Banerjee to place on record the quantum of
salary and allowances that the respondent would have drawn had
he continued in service till his superannuation. Pursuant thereto,
a calculation sheet has been furnished by the appellants. As per
the said calculation, which we do not doubt for a moment, had the
respondent remained in service until the date of his superannuation,
the total salary and allowances payable to him would be an
amount of Rs.82,80,195/- excluding any adjustment on account of
the invalidation pension received by him. The calculation further
indicates that had the respondent continued in service only up to 10th
September 2002, i.e., the date on which the Notification came into
force, the salary and allowances payable to him would amount to a
meagre Rs. 2,66,180/-. We see no reason to accept Mr. Banerjee’s
prayer that the respondent is entitled, if at all, to such sum till the
Notification was issued.
81. Pertinently, the respondent is now a sexagenarian. Consequently,
the question of his reinstatement in service does not arise and the
relief granted to the respondent by the Single Judge warrants suitable
modification. We are conscious that an award of full back wages
would impose a substantial burden on the State exchequer, but the
fault for the mess rests solely on the appellants. We have noticed
that the quantum of post medical invalidation benefits given to the
respondent is a pittance. He has been made to suffer the pangs
of deferred justice and economic destitution despite the favourable
verdict of the Single Judge dating back to 11 th August, 2008.
Respondent having suffered visual impairment, the possibility of his
gainful employment as a driver stood foreclosed. Given the nature
of his disability, we presume that his other employment prospects
were also rendered bleak. No evidence of the respondent’s gainful
employment has been placed on record. Appellants, having failed
to provide an alternate post commensurate with the respondent’s
disability as mandated by Section 47, PwD Act, cannot be permitted
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Union of India & Ors. v. Bali Ram No. 850808321

to take shelter behind the principle of ‘no work, no pay’. The situation
of non-employment of the respondent is entirely the appellants’
creation. Respondent is, thus, entitled to full back wages and the
appellants must bear the consequences of their own inaction. The
preambular promise of the Constitution cannot remain symbolic.
Restitution of status with full back wages, interest and costs for the
indignity of delay are the minimum we ought to order.
82. We, therefore, deem it appropriate to suitably modify the order
of the Single Judge by awarding to the respondent an amount of
Rs.1,25,00,000/- (Rupees one crore twenty five lakh only), inclusive of
back wages, interest and costs of the present proceedings. Ordered
accordingly. The said amount shall be electronically transferred to
the respondent’s savings bank account by the appellants within a
period of eight weeks from the date of this judgment. Advocate-on-
record for the respondent may inform the particulars of his savings
bank account to the advocate-on-record for the appellants within
seven days to facilitate compliance of this order.
83. Since the respondent is visually impaired, we direct the Member-
Secretary, State Legal Services Authority, Himachal Pradesh or
the Member-Secretary, District Legal Services Authority, Kangra, if
that is more convenient, to appropriately guide the respondent for
safe investment of a part of the amount received in a fixed deposit
account of a nationalised bank attracting maximum interest with
facility of credit of monthly interest in his savings bank account as
well as to oversee his future medical needs.

Conclusion
84. The civil appeal is dismissed on the aforesaid terms.
85. Connected application(s), if pending, shall stand disposed of.

Result of the case: Appeal dismissed.

†
Headnotes prepared by: Divya Pandey