UNION OF INDIA ETC.versusGIANI

                        [2011] 2 S.C.R. 978


A                      UNION OF INDIA ETC.
                                  v.
                                GIANI
                  (Civil Appeal No. 1884 of 2011)

                       FEBRUARY 17, 2011
B
    [DR. MUKUNDAKAM SHARMA AND ANIL R DAVE, JJ.]

        DELA YILACHES :

c        Application for condonation of delay in filing appeal -
    Held: the averments in the application do constitute sufficient
    cause for not preferring the appeals within time -There is a
    strong arguable case on behalf of the appellants, therefore,
    Court would decide the matter or merits by giving the
    expression 'sufficient cause' a pragmatic justice oriented
0
    approach - Delay condoned - Constitution of India, 1950 -
    Article 136.

        LAND ACQUISITION ACT, 1894: ·

E        Section 23 (1-A) as inserted by amendment Act 68 of
    1984- Compensation under- Held: Sub - s. (1-A) was made
    applicable to proceedings pending on or after 30.04.1982 -
    In the instant case, land owners would not be entitled to get
    the benefit under Sub - s. (1-A) as the proceedings had
F   culminated in passing the award by the Collector on
    09.07.1980 i.e. before 30.04.1982, the date from which the
    amendment was made applicable to pending and subsequent
    proceedings.

         The Union of India filed the instant appeals, though
G   after considerable delay, contending that the respondent
    land-owners were not entitled to receive compensation
    u/s. 23 (1-A) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1897, which was
    granted in their favour by the High Court.

H                                978
           UNION OF INDIA ETC. v. GIANI                  979

    Partly allowing the appeals the Court,                      A
      HELD : 1.1. The application for condonation of delay
in preferring the appeals must be allowed as the ·
statements in the applications for condonation of delay,
do constitute sufficient cause in not preferring the 8
appeals within the period of limitation. There is a strong
arguable case on behalf of the appellants and, therefore,
it is felt necessary that the Court should decide the matter
on merit by giving the expression 'sufficient cause' a
pragmatic justice oriented approach. Therefore, delay in C
all the appeals is condoned. [para 3) {981-A-C]

     2. Section 23 (1-A) was inserted in the Land
Acquisition Act, 1894 w.e.f., 24.9.1984 by way of
amendment to the Act by Act 68 of 1984, which was made
applicable to proceedings pending on or after 30.04.1982.       D
The said sub-s.(1A) provides that in addition to the market
value of the land, the Court would in every case award
an amount calculated at the rate of twelve per centum per
annum on such market value for the period commencing
on and from the date of the publication of the notification     E
u/s. 4(1 ), in respect of such land to the date of the award
of the Collector or the date of taking possession of the
land, whichever is earlier. In sub-s.(2) of s. 23 of the Act,
the words "thirty per centum" replaced the words "fifteen
per centum", w.e.f., 24.09.1984 and it was also made            F
applicable to certain awards made and order passed after
30.04.1982. [para 6) [981-G-H; 982-A-B]
    K. s. Paripoornan v. State of Kera/a and others 1994 (3)
Suppl. SCR 405 = (1994) 5 sec 593 and Pralhad and
Others v. State of Maharashtra and another 201 O (11 )          G
SCR 916 = (201 O) 1o sec 458 - relied on.
    2.2. In the instant case, the acquisition proceeding
commenced with the notification u/s. 4 issued on
06.03.1965 and it culminated in passing of the award by         H
    980      SUPREME COURT REPORTS                 [2011] 2 S.C.R.


A the Collector on 09.07.1980, i.e., before 30.04.1982, the
  date from which the amending Act 68 of 1984 was made
  applicable to the pending and subsequent proceedings.
  Therefore, in terms of the law laid down by the
  Constitution Bench of this Court in the case of K.S.
B Paripoornan, the respondents are not entitled to the
  benefit of s. 23(1A). [para 8) [983-H; 984-A-B]

                         Case Law Reference:
     ·1994 ( 3 ) Suppl. SCR 405 relied on                 para 6
c     2010 (11 ) SCR 916               relied on          para 7

        CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No.
    1884 of 2011.

0       From the Judgment & Order dated 31.5.2002 of the High
    Court of Delhi at New Delhi in RFA No. 465 of 1986.

                                WITH
    C.A. Nos. 1887, 1885, 1886 of 2011.
E
         P.P. Malhotra, ASG, Brijender Chahar, Rekha Pandey, M.
    P.S. Tomar, Anil Katiyar for the Appellant.

         K.L. Janjani, Raj Singh Rana, Pankaj Kumar Singh, A.
    ~ain, Dr. Vinod Tewari, P.P. Singh for the Respondent.
F
          The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

         Dr. MUKUNDAKAM SHARMA, J. 1. Leave granted in all
    the petitions.

G        2. We propose to dispose of all these appeals by this
    common judgment and order. In all these appeals not only the
    issues arising for our consideration on merit are identical but
    also all these appeals were filed by the appellants herein after
    considerable delay.
H
             UNION OF INDIAETC. v. GIANI                      981
           [DR. MUKUNDAKAM SHARMA, J.]

      3. Having examined the averments made in the                   A
applications for condonation of delay in filing all the appeals
and after hearing the learned counsel for the parties, we are
satisfied that the application for condonation of delay in
preferring the appeals must be allowed as the statements in
the applications for condonation of delay, in our view, do           B
constitute sufficient cause in not preferring the appeals within
the period of limitation. We, therefore, condone delay in all the
appeals. We have taken such a view in this matter as we feel
that there is a strong arguable case on behalf of the appellants
and, therefore, it is felt necessary that the court should decide    c
the matter on merit by giving the expression sufficient cause a
pragmatic justice oriented approach.

     4. In all these appeals counsel appearing for the appellant
has raised just one issue, namely, that the respondent in each
of the appeals is not entitled to receive compensation under         D
Section 23 (1A) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1891 [for short "the
Act"] which has been granted in their favour by the orders of
the High Court.

     5. On 06.03.1995 by issuing notification under Section 4        E
of the Act, land situated in village-Ziauddinpur, Delhi was sought
to be acquired for public purpose, namely, planned
development of Delhi. The aforesaid notification was followed
by issuance of a declaration under Section 6 of the Act which
was issued on 07.01.1969. The Collector passed the award             F
on 09.07.1980 vide his award No. 39/80-81.

      6. Section 23 (1A) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 was
inserted, w.e.f., 24.9.1984, by way of amendment to the Act
which was made applicable to proceedings pending on or after
30.04.1982. The said sub-section (1 A) provides that in              G
additional to the market value of the land, the Court would in
every case award an amount calculated at the rate of twelve
per centum per annum on such market value for the period
commencing on and from the date of the publication of the
notification under Section 4, sub-Section (1), in respect of such    H
    982      SUPREME COURT REPORTS                  [2011) 2 S.C.R.


A land to the date of the award of the Collector or the date of
  taking possession of the land, whichever is earlier. In sub-
  section 2 of Section 23 of the Act the words "thirty per centum"
  replaced the words "fifteen per centum", w.e.f., 24.09.1984 and
  it was also made applicable to certain awards made and order
B passed after 30.04.1982. The specific and the only issue which
  was agitated by the counsel appearing for the appellant before
  us, during the course of hearing was that, since the aforesaid
  amendment by Act No. 68 of 1984 inserted a new provision in
  the nature of sub-section (1A), which was inserted, w.e.f.,
c 24.09.1984 [and was made applicable to proceedings pending
  on or after 30.04.1982) sub-section (1A) would not be
  applicable in the present case. In support of the said contention
   reference was made to the decision of the Constitutional Bench
  of this Court in K. S. Paripoornan v. State of Kera/a and others
D reported in (1994) 5 SCC 593 in which this Court upon a
   combined reading of Section 23(1A) and Section 30(1) of the
  Act held as follows: -

          "74 ........... A perusal of sub-section (1) of Section 30 of
          the amending Act shows that it divides the proceedings
E         for acquisition of land which had commenced prior to the
          date of the commencement of the amending Act into two
          categories, proceedings which had commenced prior to
          30-4-1982 and proceedings which had commenced after
          30-4-1982. While clause (a) of Section 30(1) deals with
F         proceedings which had commenced prior to 30-4-1982,
          clause (b) deals with proceedings which commenced after
          30-4-1982. By virtue of clause (a), Section 23(1-A) has
          been made applicable to proceedings whic": had
          commenced prior to 30-4-1982 if no award had been
G         made by the Collector in those proceedings before 30-4-
          1982. It covers (i) proceedings which were pending before
          the Collector on 30-4-1982 wherein award was made after
          30-4-1982 but before the date of the commencement of
          the amending Act, and (ii) such proceedings wherein
H          award was made by the Collector after the date of the
             UNION OF INDIA ETC. v. GIANI                983
           [DR. MUKUNDAKAM SHARMA, J.]

    commencement of the amending Act. Similarly Section. A
    30(1)(b) covers (i) proceedings which had commenced'
    after 30-4-1982 wherein award was made prior to the
    commencement of the amending Act, and (ii) such
    proceedings wherein award was made after the
    commencement of the amending Act. It would thus appear B
    that both the clauses (a) and (b) of sub-section (1) of
    Section 30 cover proceedings for acquisition which were
    pending on the date of the commencement of the
    amending Act and to which the provisions of Section 23(1-
    A) have been made applicable by virtue of Section 30(1}.    c
    If Section 23(1-A}, independently of Section 30(1 ), is
    applicable to all proceedings which were pending on the
    date of the commencement of the amending Act, clauses
    (a} and (b) of Section 30(1) would have been confined to
    proceedings which had commenced prior to the 0
    commencement of the amending Act and had concluded
    before such commencement because.by virtue of Section
    15 the provisions of Section 23(1-A) would have been
    applicable to proceedings pending before the Collector on
    the date of commencement of the amending Act. There
    was no need to so phrase Section 30(1) as to apply the E
    provisions of Section 23(1-A) to proceedings which were
    pending before the Collector on the date of the
    commencement of the amending Act. This only indicates
    that but for the provisions contained in Section 30(1)
    Section 23(1-A) would not have been applicable to F
    proceedings pending before the Collector on the date of
    commencement of the amending Act."

     7.A similar issue again came up for consideration before
this Court in Pralhad and Others v. State of Maharashtra and    G
another reported in (2010) 1O sec 458 wherein reference was
made and reliance was placed in the decision of K. S.
Paripooman (supra).

   1 8.   In the present case the acquisition proceeding        H
   984      SUPREME COURT REPORTS                [2011] 2 S.C.R.

A commenced with the notification under Section 4 issued on
  06.03.1965 and it culminated in passing of the award by the
  Collector on 09.07.1980, i.e., before 30.04.1982, the date from
  which the amending Act 68 of 1984 was made applicable to
  the pending and subsequent proceedings. Therefore, in terms
B of the law laid down by the Constitution Bench decision of this
  Court in the case of K.S. Paripooman (supra) the respondents
  are not entitled to the benefit of Section 23(1A).

       9. All the appeals, therefore, are partly allowed to the
C aforesaid extent and disposed of leaving the parties to bear
  their own costs.

   R.P.                                  Appeals partly allowed.