Holding

The sealed‑cover procedure may be employed only after a charge‑memo or charge‑sheet is served, and a fully exonerated employee is entitled to notional promotion and salary from the date he would have been promoted, while arrears of pay are to be decided by the authority on the facts of each case.

Summary

The Supreme Court examined the “sealed‑cover” procedure used when a government employee’s promotion is pending but disciplinary or criminal proceedings are underway. It held that the procedure can be invoked only after a charge‑memo or charge‑sheet has been served, and that preliminary investigations do not trigger it. An employee who is completely exonerated, i.e., not even censured, is entitled to a notional promotion and the salary of the higher post from the date he would have been promoted, but the payment of arrears of pay is left to the discretion of the authority after considering the facts. The Court rejected the application of the “no work‑no pay” rule (Fundamental Rule 17(1)) where the employee is prevented from work by the authority. It also affirmed that penalties imposed in disciplinary proceedings may be taken into account while considering promotion and that denial of promotion or salary does not violate Articles 14, 16 or the double‑jeopardy bar of Article 20(2). Accordingly, the Court modified the Central Government Memorandum, set aside certain Tribunal findings and allowed the appeals in part, while dismissing others.

Issues considered

When does pendency of disciplinary or criminal proceedings begin for the purpose of invoking the sealed‑cover procedure?
What effect does a penalty short of dismissal have on an employee’s promotion and on the operation of the sealed‑cover procedure?
What benefits, including salary and arrears, is an employee completely exonerated after such proceedings entitled to, and from which date?
Does the “no work‑no pay” rule (Fundamental Rule 17(1)) apply when the employee is prevented from work by the authority?
Do denial of promotion or salary arrears violate constitutional guarantees under Articles 14, 16 and the double‑jeopardy protection of Article 20(2)?

Legislation cited

Constitution of Indias. Article 14, s. Article 16, s. Article 20(2)
Fundamental Ruless. Rule 17(1)

Subjects

sealed cover proceduregovernment promotiondisciplinary proceedingscriminal proceedingsno work no payFundamental Rulesconstitutional lawArticles 14 16 20double jeopardyarrears of salarydepartmental promotion committee

Judgment

UNION OF INDIA ETC. ETC.
A
v.
K.V ..JANKIRAMAN ETC. ETC.

AUGUST 27, 1991

B [RANGANATH MISRA, CJ M.H. KANIA AND
P.B. SAWANT, JJ.)

Civil Services: Government of India (Deptt. of Personnel and
Training) Office Memorandum No. 22011/ 1/79 Estt. (A) dated
30.1.82-Promotion-Sealed cover procedure-When could be resor-
ted to--Exoneration from all charges-Notional promotion from the
c date the juniors were promoted-Arrears of salary from date of notional
promotion-Grant of-Proceedings deliiyed because of the employee's
acts or acquitted on benefit of doubt or owing to non-availability of
evidence due to employee's acts-Entitlement to back wages-To be
decided by the authority concerned-Employee visited with penalty in
D disciplinary proceedings or found guilty by court-Findings contained
in sealed cover-not to be acted upon-Consideration for promotion-
Whether authority could take into account past record including penalty
awarded earlier.

Constitution of India, 1950:Article 20(2)-Non-promotion of
E e.mployee till the date on which he was held guilty-Whether amounts to
double jeopardy. .
Fundamental Rules: Rule 17( 1)-No work no pay rule-Appli-
cability of-Where employee willing but not allowed to work.

F When an employeedee~due for promotion, ~crement etc. but disci- . l_
plinary/criminal proc mgs are pending agamst him at the relevant
time, the findings or his entitlement to such benefit are kept in a sealed
cover to be opened after the proceedings in question are over.

According to this procedure, while the findings are kept in the
G sealed cover, the vacancy which might have gone to the officer con-
cerned is filled only on an officiating· basis. If on the conclusion of the
departmental/court proceedings, the officer concerned is completely
exonerated, and where he is under suspension it is also held that the
suspension was wholly unjustified, the sealed cover is opened and the
recommendations or the DPC are acted upon. If the officer could have
H been promoted earlier, he is promoted to the post which is filled on an

7CJO
U.0.I. v. JANKIRAMAN 791

officiating basis, the officiating arrangement being terminated. On his
A
promotion, the officer gets the benefit of seniority and fixation of pa) on
a notional basis with reference to the date on which he would have been
+ - promoted in the normal course, but for the pending disciplinary /court
proceedings. However, no arrears of salary are paid in respect of the
period prior to the date of actual promotion.
B
Sometimes the cases in the courts or the departmental ·proceed-
ings take nndnly long time to come to a conclusion and the officers
undergo considerable hardship, even where it was not intended to
deprive them of promotion for such a long time. The Government in
consultation with the Union Public Service Commission examined hO\•
the hardship caused to the Government servant in such circumstanc<'
could be mitigated and laid down certain procedures by an Otlice c
:\lemorandum No. 22011/1/79-Estt. (A) dated January 30, 1982.

In interpreting the Memorandum as to what is the date from
which it can be said that disciplinary /criminai proceedings are pending
against an employee; as to what would be the course to be adopted when D
the employee is held guilty in such proceedings if the guilt merit>
punishment other than that of dismissal; and as to what benefits an
employee who is completely or partially exonerated is entitled to and
from which date, different Benches of the Central Administrative Tri·
bunal recorded their findings and while doing so, the Full Bench of the
Tribunal struck down two provisions of the said Memorandum dated E
January 30, 1982, which related to a prohibiton against acting upon the
findings contained in the sealed cover in case the officer was imposed
penalty ·as a result of disciplinary proceedings or found guilty in the
L ourt proceedings against him and regarding arrears of pay for the
period of notional promotion.
F
Aggrieved by the decisions of the various Benches of the Tribnnal,
the Union of India and other authorities preferred the present appeals
and special leave petitions.

Disposing of these matters, this Court,
G
,. HELD: I. The sealed cover procedure is to be resorted to only
after the charge-memo/charge-sheet is issued. The pendency of prelimi-
nary investigation prior to that stage will not he sufficient to enable the
authorities to adopt the sealed cover procedure. The preliminary
investigations take an inordinately IOng time and particularly when they
are initiated at the instance of the interested persons, they are kept H
792 SUPREME COURT RljPORTS [1991] 3 S.C.R.

A pending deliberately. Many times they never result in the issue of any
charge-memo/charge-sheet. If the allegations are serious and the
authuritie> are keen in investigating them ordinarily it should not take
much time to collect the relevant evidence and finalise the charges. If
the charges are that serious, the authorities ha~e- the power to suspend
the employees under the relevant rules, and the suspeqsion by itself
-·
B permits a resort to the sealed cover procedure. The authorities thus are
not without a remedy. [799F-H; SOOA-B]

2. When an employee is completely exonerated meaning thereby
that he is not found blameworthy in the least and is not visited with the
penalty e,·en of censure, he has to be given the benefit of the salary of
C the higher post along with the other benefits from the date on which he
would have normally been promoted but for the disciplinary /criminal
proceedings. Howe,·er, there may be eases. where the proceedings,
whether disciplinary or criminal, are delayed at the instance of the
employee or the clearance in the disciplinary proceedings or acquittal in
the criminal proceedings is with benefit uf doubt or on account of non-
D arnilability of evidence due to the acts attributable to the employee etc.
In such circumstances, the concerned authorities must be ,·ested with
the power to decide whether the employee at all deserves any salary for
the intervening period and if he does, the extent to which he deserves it .
Life being complex, it is not possible tu. anticipate and enumerate
....
exhaustively all the circumstances under which such consideration may
E become necessary .. To ignore, however. such circumstances when they
exist and lay down an inllexible rule that in every case when an
employee is exonerated in disciplinary /criminal proceedings he should
be entitled to all salary for the intervening period is to undermine
discipline in the administration and,ieopardise public interests. The
l"ribunal was not right in holding that to deny the salary to an employee
F would in all circumstances be illegal. [802G-H; 803A-D I

3. The normal rule of "no work no pay'' is not applicable to
ca;es where the employee although he is willing to work is kept away
from _work by the authorities for no fault of his. This is not a case where
the employee remains 1way from work for his own reasons, although
G, the work is offered to him. It is for this reason that F.R. 17(1) will
also be inapplicable to such cases. [802F-G I i

4. The Tribunal erred in holding_ that when an officer is found
guilty in the discharge of his duties, an imposition of penalty is all that is
necessary to improve his conduct and to enforce discipline and ensure
H purity in the administration. In the first instance, the penalty short of
U.0.l. v. JANKIRAMAN 793

dismissal will vary from reduction in rank to censure. The Tribunal
has not intended that the promotion should be given to the officer from A
tile original date even when the penalty imparted is of reduction in
rank. On principle, the officer cannot be rewarded by promotion as a
matter of course even if .the penalty is other than that of reduction
in rank. [804F-G]
B
5. An employee has no right to promotion. He has only a right to
be considered for promotion. The promotion to a post and more so, to a
selection post, depends upon several circumstances. To qualiff for
., P.romotion, the least that is expected of an employee is to have an
unblemished record. That is the minimum expected to ensure a clean
'-"\ and efficient administration and to protect the public interests. An
'
employee found guilty of misconduct cannot be placed on par with the c
other employees and his case has to be treated differently. There is.
therefore, no discrimination when in the matter of promotion, he is
treated differently. [804G-H; SOSA]

6. The least that is expected of any administration is that it does D
nut reward an employee with promotion retrospectively from a date
when for his conduct before that date he is penalised in presenti. When
an employee is held guilty and penalised and is, therefore, not promoted
at least till the date on which he is penalised, he cannot be said to have
been subjected to a further penalty on that account. A denial of promo-
tion in such circumstances is not a penalty but a necessary consequence E
of his conduct. [SOSB-C]

7. While considering an employee for promotion his whole record
has to he taken into consideration and if a promotion committee takes
the penalties imposed upon the employee into consideration and denies
him the promotion, such denial is not illegal and unjustified. If the F
promoting authority can take into consideration the penalty or penalties
awarded to an employee in the past while considering his promotion and
deny him promotion on that ground, it will be irrational to hold that it
cannot take the penalty into consideration when it is imposed at a later
date because of the pendency of the proceedings, although it is for
conduct prior to the date the authority considers the promotion. [805C-D] G

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeals Nos.
JU 18-21 of 1987.

From the Judgment and Orders dated 24.4.87, 2.3.87, & 1.4.87 of
the Central Administrative Tribunal, Hyderabad in Original Applita- H
794 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [ 1991] 3 S.C.R.
A
tion No. 121/86., T.A. Nos. 958 & 180 of 1986 and 0.A. No. 140 of
1986.
WITH
CA Nos. 3016/88 & 51-55/90 with CA Nos. 3083 & 4379 of 1990
B and S.L.P. (C) Nos. 1094, 2344/90, 11680 of 1991.
Altaf Ahmed, Additional Solicitor General, V.C. Mahajan, J.D.
Jain, C.V.S. Rao, Heman! Sharma, B. Parthasarthy, A. Subba Rao,
M.N. Krishnamani, Pravir Choudhary, Ms. Indu Malhotra, Ms. Shirin
Jain, T.V.S.N. Chari, Ms. Suruchi Aggarwal and Ms. Manjula Gupta
for the appearing parties.
c The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
SAWANT, J. Civil Appeals Nos. 3019/87, 3020/87 and 3016/88
arise out of the judgment dated March 2, 1987 delivered by the Full
Bench of the Central Administrative Tribun.al (hereinafter referred to
as the 'Tribunal').
0
Civil Appeals Nos. 3018/87 and 3021/87 arise out of the judg-
ments dated April 24, 1987 and April 1, 1987 respectively of the Tri-
bunal, Hyderabad Bench ..
Civil Appeals Nos. 3083/90 and 4379/90 arise out of the' judg-
E ments dated March 2, 1989 and September 15, 1989 of the Madras and
Hyderabad Bench of the Tribunal respectively and which are based on
the aforesaid decision of the Full Bench of the Tribunal.
Civil Appeals Nos. 51-55 of 1990 arise out of the decision dated
July 12, 1989 of the Tribunal, Chandigarh Bench.
F Special Leave Petition (C) No. 1094 of 19'!0 arises out of the l._ .
decision dated June 29, 1989 of the Tribunal, Bombay Bench.
Special Leave Petition (C) No. 2344 of 1990 arises out of the
decision dated 18th September, 1989 given by the Tribunal, Principal
Bench, New De.lhi.
Special Leave Petition (C) No. 11680 of 1991 arises out of the
G decision dated January 25, 199~ given by the Tribunal, Principal
Bench, New Delhi.
2, The common questions involved in all these matters relate to
what in service jurisprudence has come to be known as "sealed cover
procedure". Concisely stated, the questions are:-n) what is the date
H from which it can be said that disciplinary/criminal proceedings are
U.0.I. v. JANKIRAMAN [SAWANT, J.J 795

pending against an employee? (2) What is the course to be adopted A
when the employee is held guilty in such proceedings if the guilt merits

. punishment other than that of dismissal? (3) To what benefits an
employee who is completely or partially exonerated is entitled to ahd
from which date? The "sealed cover procedure" is adopted when an
•

employee is due for promotion, increment etc. but disciplinary/crimi-
nal proceedings are pending against him at the relevant time and B
hence, the findings of his entitlement to the benefit are kept in a sealed
cover to be opened after the proceedings in question are over. Hence.
the relevance and importance of the questions.

3. The Union of India and the other appellant-authorities have
by these appeals challenged the findings recorded by the different C
Benches of the Tribunal in reply to one or the other of or all the
aforesaid three questions, in the decisions impugned therein. While
recording its findings, the Full Bench of the Tribunal has also struck
down two provisions of the Central Government Memorandum of 30th
January, 1982 on the subject. We may, therefore, first refer to the said
memorandum. D

4. The Government of India (Dept!. of Personnel & Training)
)._ issued an Office Memorandum No. 22011/1/79. Estt. (A) dated
January 30, 1982 on the subject of promotion of officers in whose cases
"the sealed cover procedure" had been followed but against whom
disciplinary/court proceedings were pending for a long time. The E
Memorandum stated that according to the existing instructions, cases
of officers (a) who are under suspension or (b) against whom discipli-
nary proceedings are pending or a decision has been tak'en by the
competent disciplinary authority to initiate disciplinary proceedings
or, (c) against whom prosecution has been launched in a court of law
or sanction for prosecution has been issued, are considered for promo- F
tion by the Departmental Promotion Committee (hereinafter referred
to as the 'DPC') at the appropriate time but the findings of the Com-
mittee are kept in a sealed cover to be opened after the conclusion of
the disciplinary/court proceedings. While the findings are kept in the
sealed cover, the vacancy which might have gone to the officer con-
cerned is filled only on an officiating basis. If on the conclusion of the G
departmental/court proceedings, the officer concerned is completely
exonerated, and where he is under suspension it is also held that the
suspension was wholly unjustified, the sealed cover is opened and the
recommendations of the DPC are acted upon. If the officer could have
been promoted earlier, he is promoted to the post which is filled on an
officiating basis, the officiating arrangement being terminated. On his H
796 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [ 1991] 3 S.C.R.

A promotion, the officer gets the benefit of seniority and fixation of pay
on a notional basis with reference to the date on which he would have
been promoted in the normal course, but for the pending disciplinary/
court proceedings. However, no arrears of salary are paid in respect of
the period prior to the date of actual promotion. The Memorandum
...
goes on t.o state further that it was noticed that sometimes the cases in
B
the courts or the departmental proceedings take unduly long time to
come to a conclusion and the officers undergo considerable hardship,
even where it is not intended to deprive them ·of promotion for such a
long time. The Government, therefore, in consultation with the Union
Public Service Commission examined how the hardship caused to the
Government servant in such circumstances can be mitigated and has
c laid down the following procedure in such cases:
"3. (i)(a) It may be ascertained whether there is any
departmental disciplinary proceedings or any case in a
court of law pending against the individual under consi-
deration, or
D
(b) there is a prima-facie case on the basis of which a deci-
sion has been taken to proceed against the official either
departmentally or in a court of law. ....;(,

(ii) The facts may be brought to the notice of the Depart-
E mental Promotion Committee who may then assess the
suitability of the official(s) for promotion to the next
grade/post and for the purpose of this assessment, the
D.P.C. shall not take into consideration the fact of the
pending case(s) against the official. In case an official is
found "unfit for promotion" on the basis of his record,
F without taking into consideration, the case(s) pending
against him, the findings of the D.P.C. shall be recorded in
the proceedings. In respect of any other kind of assess-
ment, the grading awarded by the D.P.C. may be kept in a
sealed cover.
G (iii) After the findings are kept in a sealed cover by the
Departmental Promotion Committee subsequent D.P.Cs.,
if any, held after the first D.P.C. during the period the
disciplinary/court proceedings may be pendi.ng, will also
consider the officer's case and record their findings which
will again be kept in sealed cover in the above manner.
H
U.0.J. v. lANKIRAMAN [SAWANT, l.I 797

In the normal course, on the conclusion of the disci- A
plinary/court·proceedings, the sealed cover or covers may
be opened, and in case the officer is completely exonerated
i.e. no statutory penalty, including that of censure, is
imposed, the earliest possible date of his promotion but for
the pendency of the disciplinary /court proceedings against
him, may be determined with reference to the position(s) B
assigned to him in the findings in the sealed cover/covers
and with reference to the date of promotion of his next
junior on the basis of such position. The officer concerned
may then be promoted, if necessary by reverting the junior-
most officiating person, and he may be given a notional
promotion from the date he would have been promoted, as C
determined in the manner indicated above. But no arrears
of pay shall be payable to him for the period of notional
promotion proceeding the date of actu~l promotion. ·

If any penalty is imposed on the officer as a result of
the disciplinary proceedings or if he is found guilty in the D
court proceedings against him, the findings in the sealed
cover/covers shall not be acted upon. The officer's case for
promotion may be considered· in the usual manner by the
next D.P.C. which meets in the normal course after the
conclusion of the disciplinary/court proceedings. The exist-
ing instructions provide that in a case where departmental E
disciplinary proceedings have been held under the relevant
disciplinary rules, "warning" should not be issue,d as a
result of such proceedings. If it is found as a result of the
proceedings that some blame attaches to the officer, then
the penalty of censure at least should be imposed. This may
be kept in view so that no occasion arises for any doubt on p:
the point whether or not an officer has been completely
exonerated in disciplinary proceedings held against him."

Clause (iv) of Para 3 of the Memorandum then lays down the
procedure for ad hoc appointment of the concerned officer when the
disciplinary/court proceedings are not concluded even after the expiry G
of two years from the date of the DPC which first considered him for
promotion and whose findings are kept in the sealed cover, provided
· however that the officer is not under suspension. It is not necessary to
reproduce that clause in extenso here. Suffice it to say that the
Memorandum urges that in making the ad hoc promotion in such
cases, his case should be placed before the DPC which is held after the H
798 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1991] 3 S.C.R.

expiry of the said period of two years, and the ad !Joe promotion has to
A
be made on the basis of the totality of the record of service etc.

Para 4 of the Memorandum states that if the officer concerned is
acquitted in the court proceedings on the merits of the case or
exonerated in departmental disciplinary proceedings, the ad hoc
B promotion already made may be confirmed and the promotion treated
as a regular one from the date of the ad hoc promotion with all
attendant benefits. In such cases, the sealed cover may be opened and
the official may be assigned his place in the seniority list as he would have got
in accordance with the recommendation of the DPC.

Paras 5, 6 and 7 of the Memorandum then read as follows:- ~--·

c
"5. Where the acquittal in a court case is· not on
merits but purely on technical grounds, and the Govern-
ment either proposes to take the matter to a higher court or
to proceed agai.nst the officer departmentally, the appoint-
D ing authority may review whether the ad-hoc promotion
should be continued.

6. Where the acquittal by court is on technical
grounds, if the Government does not propose to go in
appeal to a higher court or to take further departmental
E action, action should be taken in the·same manner as if the
officer had been acquitted by the court on merits.

7. If the officer concerned is not acquitted/exonera-
ted in the court proceedings or the departmental proceed- '
..l..
ings, the ad-hoc promotion already granted should be
F brought to an end by the issue of the "further order" con-
templated in the order of ad-hoc promotion (Please see
para 3(vi) above) and the officer concerned reverted to the
post from which he was promoted on ad-hoc basis. After
such reversion, the officer may be considered for future
promotion in the usual course by the next D.P.C."
G
5. To bring the record uptodate_, it may be pointed out that in
view of the decision of this Court in Union of India & Anr. v. Tajinder
Singh, [1986] 2 Scale 860 decided on September 26, 1986, the Govern-
ment of India in the Dept!. of Personnel & Training issued another
Office Memorandum No. 22011/2/86. Estt. (A) dated January 12,
H 1988 in supersession of all the earlier instructions on the subject
U.0.I. v. JANKIRAMAN [SAWANT. J.) 799

including the Office Memorandum dated 30th January, 1982 referred
A
to above. ·There is no difference in the instructions contained in this
and the earlier aforesaid Memorandum of January 30, 1982, except
that this Memorandum provides in paragraph 4 for a six-monthly
review of the pending proceedings against the Government servant
where the proceedings are still at the stage of investigation and if as a
f
result of the review, the appointing authority comes to the conclusion B
on the basis of material and evidence collected in the investigation till
that time, that there is no prima facie case in initiating disciplinary
action or sanctioning prosecution, the sealed cover is directed to be
opened and the employee is directed to be given his due promotion
with reference to the position assigned to him by the the DPC. A
further guideline contained in this Memorandum is that the same
sealed cover procedure is to be applied where a Government sen;ant is c
recommended for promotion by the DPC, but before he is actually
promoted, he is either placed under suspension or disciplinary pro-
ceedings are taken against him or decisi_on has been taken to initiate
the proceedings or criminal prosecution is launched or sanction for
such' prosecution has been issued or decision to accord such sanction is D
taken.

These differences in the two Memoranda have no bearing on the
questions to be answered.

6. On the first question, viz., as to when for the purposes of the E
sealed cover procedure the disciplinary/criminal proceedings can be said.
to have commenced, the Full Bench of the Tribunal has held that it is
only when a charge-memo in a disciplinary proceedings or a charge-
sheet in a criminal prosecution is issued to the employee that 'it can be
said that the departmental· proceedings/criminal prosecution is initia-
ted against the employee. The sealed cover procedure is to be r~sorted F
to only after the charge-memo/charge-sheet is issued. The pendency of
preliminary investigation prior to that stage will not be sufficient to
enable the authorities to adopt the sealed cover procedure. We are in
agreement with the Tribunal on this point. The contention advanced by
the learned counsel for the appellant-authorities that when there are
serious allegations and it takes time to collect necessary evidence to G
prepare and issue charge-memo/charge-sheet, it would not be in the
interest of the purity of administration to reward the employee with a
promotion, increment etc. does not impress us. The acceptance of this
contention would result in injustice to the employees in many cases. As
has been the experience so far, the preliminary investigations take an
inordinately long time and particularly when they are initiated at the H
800 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [ 1991] 3 S.C.R.

A instance of the interested persons, they are kept pending deliberately.
Many limes they never result in the issue of any charge-memo/charge-
sl'leet. M the allegations are serious and the authorities are keen in
investigating them, ordinarily it should not take much time to collect
the relevant evidence and finalise the charges. What is further; if the .
charges are that serious, the authorities have the power to suspend the
8 empfoyee under the relevant rules,· and the suspension by itself
permits a resort to the sealed cover procedure. The authorities thus
a·re not without a remedy. It was then contended on behalf of the
authorities that conclusions nos. 1 and 4 of the Full Bench, of the
Tribunal are inconsistent with each other. Those conclusions are as
follm11s:
c "(l) consideration for promotion, selection grade. cross-
ing the efficiency .bar or higher scale of pay cannot be with-
held merely on the ground of pendency of a·disciplinary or
criminal proceedings against an official;

(2) ............................................... .
(3) ............................................... .
(4) the sealed cover procedure can be resorted only after a
charge memo is served on the concerned official or the
...:,
. charge sheet filed before the criminal court and not
before.'.'

There is no dou:bt that there is a seeming contradiction between
the two conclusionsc But read harmoniously, and that is what the Full
Bench has intended, the two conclusions can be reconciled with each
other. The conclusion no. 1 should be read to: mean that the promotion
etc. cannot be .vithheld merely because some disciplinary/criminal
F pro.:eedings are pending against the employee. To deny the said
benefit, they must be at the relevant time pending at the stage when
charge-memo/charge-sheet has alre.ady been issued to the· employee.
Thus re"ad, there is no inconsistency in the two conclusions.

We, therefore. repel the challenge of the appellant-authorities to
G the said finding of the Full Bench of the Tribunal. ·

7. The Full Bench of the Tribunal, while considering the earlier
Memorandum dated 30th January. 1982 has. among other things, held
that the portion of paragraph 2 of the memorandum which says "but
no arrears are allowed in respect of the period prior to the date of the
H
U.0.1. v. JANKIRAMAN ISAWANT, J.] 801

actual promotion·· is violative of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution
because withholding of salary of the ptomotional post for the perinu A
during which the promotion has been withheld while giving other
benefits, is discriminatory when compared with other employees who
are not at the verge of promotion when the disciplinary proceeding,
were intiated against them.
lil
The Tribunal has, therefore, directed that on exoneration, full
salary should be paid to such employee which he would have received
on promotion if he had not been subjected to disciplinary proceeding,.

We are afraid that the Tribunal"s reference to paragraph 2 of the
Memorandum is incorrect. Paragraph 2 only recites the slate of affairs
as existed on January 30, 1982 and the portion of the Memorandum C
which deals with the relevant point is the last sentence of the first
sub-paragraph after clause (iii) of paragraph 3 of the Memorandum
which is reproduced above. That sentenceTeads as follows:

"But no arrears of pav shall be payable to him for the D
period of notionafpromotion preceding the date of actual
prqmotio1! ., .

\... This sentence is preceded by the observation that when the"
employee is completely exonerated on the conclusi~n of the discipli-
nary/court proceedings, that is, when no statutory penalty, including E
that of censure, is imposed, he is to be given a notional promotion
from the date he would have been promoted as determined by the
Departmental Promotion Committee. This direction in the Memoran-
dum has also to be read along with the other direction which follows in
_>_ . the next sub-paragraph and which states that if it is found as a result of
the proceedings that some blame attaches to the officer then the F
penalty of censure at least, should be imposed. This direction is in
~upersession of the earlier instructions which provided that i~ a case
where departmental disciplinary proceedings have been held, "warn-
ing'" should not be issued as a result of such proceedings. \

There is no doubt that when an employee is completely G
exonerated and is not visited with the penalty even of censure indicat-
ing thereby that he was not bla.neworthy in the least, he should not be
deprived of any benefits including the salary of the promotional post.
It was· urged on behalf o_f the appellant-authorities in all these cases
that a person is no.t entitled to the salary of the post unless he assumes
charge of·the same. They relied on F.R. 17(1) of the Fundamental H
802 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [ 1991] 3 S.C.R.

Rules and Supplementary Rules which reads as follows:
A
"F.R. 17(1) Subject to any exceptions specifically
made in these rules and to the provision of sub-rule (2), an
officer shall begin to draw the pay and allowances attached
to his tenure of a post with effect from the.date when he
B assumes the duties of that post, and shall cease to draw
them as soon as he ceases to discharge those duties:

Provided that an officer who is absent from duty with-
out any authority shall not be entitled to any pay and allo-
wances during the period of such absence."
c .,. .
It was further contended on their behalf that the normal rule is
"no work no pay". Hence a person cannot be allowed to draw the
benefits of a post the duties of which he has not discharged. To allow
him to do so is against the elementary rule that a person is to be paid
only for the work he has done and not for the work he has not done.
D As against this, it was pointed out on behalf of the concerned
employees, that on many occasions even frivolous proceedings are
instituted at the instance of interested persons, sometimes with a
specific .object of denying the promotion due, and the employee
concerned is made to suffer both mental agony and privations which
are multiplied when he is also placed under suspension. When, there-
E fore, at the end of such sufferings, he comes out with a clean bill, he
has to be restored to all the benefits from which he was kept away
unjustly.

We are not much impressed by the contentions advanced on
behalf of the authorities. The normal rule of "no work no pay" is not ~
F applicable to cases such as the present one where the employee
although he is willing to work is kept away from work by the
authorities for no fault of his. This is not a case where the employee
remains away from work for his own reasons, although the work is
offered to l}im. It is for this reason that F.R. 17(1) will also be inapplic-
able to sue~ cases.
G
We are, therefore, broadly in agreement with the finding of the
Tribunal that when an employee is completely exonerated meaning
thereby that he is not found blameworthy in the least and is not visited
with the penalty even of censure, he has to be given the benefit of the
salary of the higher post along with the other benefits from the date on
H which he would have normally been promoted but for the disciplinary/
U.0.I. v. JANKIRAMAN [SAWANT. J.] 803

criminal proceedings, However, there may be cases where the pro-
A
ceedings, whether disciplinary or criminal, are, for example, delayed
at the instance of the employee or the clearance in the disciplinary
proceedings or acquittal in the criminal proceedings is with benefit of
doubt or on account of non-availability of evidence due to the acts
attributable to the employee etc. Jn such circumstances, the concerned
authorities must be vested with· the power to decide whether the B
employee at all deserves any salary for the intervening period and if he
does, the extent to which he deserves it. Life being complex, it is not
possible to anticipate and enumerate exhaustively all the circumst'.'"ces
under which such consideration may become necessary. To ignore.
however, such circumstances when they exist and lay down- an inflexi-
ble rule that in every case when an employee is exonerated in disciplinary/
criminal proceedings he should be entitled to all salary for the c
intervening period is to undermine· discipline in the administration and
jeopardise public interests. We are, therefore, unable to agree with
the. Tribunal that to ·deny the salary to an employee would in all
circumstances be illegal. While, therefore. we do not approve of the
said last sentence in the first sub-paragraph after clause (iii) of D
paragraph 3 of the said Memorandum, viz., "but no arrears of pay
shall be payable to him for the period of notional promotion preceding
the date of actual promotion", we direct that in place of the said
sentence the following sentence be read in the Memorandum:

"However, whether the officer concerned' will be entitled . E
to any arrears of pay for the period of notional promotion
preceding the date of actual promotion, and if so to what
extent, will be decided by the concerned authority by tak-
ing into consideration.all the facts and circumstances of the
disciplinary proceeding/criminal prosecution. Where the
authority denies arrears of salary or part of it, it will record F
its reasons for doing so." .

To this extent we set aside the conclusion of the Tribunal on the
said point.

8. Th_e Tribunal has also struck down the following portion in G
the second sub-paragraph after clause (iii) of paragraph 3 which reads
as follows: "If any penalty is imposed on the officer as a result of the
disciplinary proceedings or if he is found guilty in the court proceed-
ings against him, the findings in the sealed cover/covers shall not be
acted upon" and has directed "that if the proceedings result in a
penalty, the person concerned should be considered for promotion in a H
804 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [ 1991] 3 S.C.R.

Review DPC as on the original date in the li_ght of the results of th~
A
se.aled cover as also the imposition of penalty, and hi_s claim for promo-
tion cannot be deferred for the subsequent DPCs as provided in the
instructions. It may be pointed out that the said sub-paragraph directs r
that ""the officer's case for promotion may be considered in the usual
manner by the next DPC which meets in the normal course after the
B conclusion of the disciplinary/court proceedings". The Tribunal has
g1Ven the direction in question on the ground that such deferment o(
tile claiin for promotion to the subsequent DPCs amounts to a double
penalty. According to the Tribunal, "it not only violates Articles 14
and 16 of the Constitution compared with other employees who are
not at the verge of promotion when the disciplinary proceedings are
.'r
initiated against them but also offends the rule against double
c 1eopardy contained in Article 20(2) of the.Constitution". The Tribunal
has, therefore, held that when an employee is visited with a penalty as
a result of the disciplinary proceedings there should be a Review DPC
as on the date when the sealed cover procedure was followed and the
review DPC should consider the findings in the sealed cover as also the
0 penalty imposed. It is not clear to us as to why the Tribunal wants the
review DPC to consider the penalty imposed while considering the
findings in the sealed cover if, according to t_he Tribunal, not giving
effect to the findings in the sealed cover even when a penalty is
imposed, amounts to double jeopardy. However, as we read the find-
1:1gs of the Tribunal, it appears that the Tribunal in no case wants the
E promotion of the officer to be deferred once the officer is visited with a
penalty in the disciplinary proceedings and the Tribunal desires that
the officer should be given promotion as per the findings in the sealed
cover.

According to us, the Tribunal has erred in holding that when an
F officer is found guilty in the discharge of his duties, an imposition of
penalty is all that is necessary to' improve his conduct and to enforce
discipline and ensure purity in the administratfon. In the first instance,
the penalty short of dismissal will vary from reduction in rank to
censure. We are sure that the Tribu·nal has not intended that the pro-
motion should be given to the officer from the original date even when
G the penalty imparted is of reduction in rank. On principle, for the
same reasons, the officer cannot be rewarded by promotion as a matter
of course even if the penalty is other than that of the reduction in rank.
An employee has no right to promotion. He has only a right to be
considered for promotion. The promotion to a post and more so, to a
selection post, depends upon several circumstances. To qualify for
H promotion, the least that is expected of an employee is to have an
U.0.1. v. JANKIRAMAN ISAWANT, J.•l 805

unblemlslied record. That is the minimum expected ,to .cnsu.rc a cleaifl
.and efficient administration and to protect the public interests. A•n
employee found guilty of a misconduct cannot be placed on :par w.ith
the other employees and his case has to be treated differently. There ·
is, therefore, no discrimination V\ hen in the matter .of pr.omotion, he .is
1

treated differently. The least that is expected of any administrnt.ion ;s
that it does not reward an employee with promotion retrospectively B
from a date when for bis conduct before that ;fate he is peaaiised ·;n
presentii. When an employee is held guilty and. penalised and i•, there-
to re, not promoted at.least till the date on which he is pena'lise.d, he
cannot be said to hav~ been subjected to a further penal•ty on <hat
account. A denial of pro1notion in such circumstances is 11-01 .a penalty
but a necessary consequence of his conduct. In fact, while considering·
an employee for promotion his whole record has .to be taken into C
consideration and if a pron1otion committee takes tl:Je penaitics ii·m-
posed upon the employee into consideration and denies him the prom-
otion, such denial is not illegal and unjustified. If. further, the 1>1ome>t- ·
ing authority can take into consideration the penalty or pena~ties
awarded to an employee in the past while considering his ;prnmotic>n D
and deny. him promotion on that ground, it will be irrational lo hold
that it cannot take the penalty into consideration when it js ·imposed .at
\. a later dale because of the pendency of the proceedings, alrtiough it is
for conduct prior to the date the authority considers the pmmo'tlion.
For these reasons, we arc of the view that the Tribunal is not Tight in
striking down the said portion of the second sub-paragraph afte.r.clal!ISC IE
(1n) of paragraph 3 of the said Memorandum. We, therefore, set aside
the said findings of the Tribunal.

...L In the circumstances, the conclusions ar·rived at by the F<A'li
Bench of the Tribunal stand modified as above. !tis needless [O :lidd
that the modifications which we have made above will equal:ly apply to F
the Memorandum of January 12, 1988.

9. In the result, in Civil Appeals Nos. 3019/87, 3Q20/87 and
3016/88 which arise out of the decision of the Full Bench, the Division
Bench of the Tribunal to which the matters .are_remanded by the Full
Bench, will dispose of the cases of the employee/s involved in tile· G
appeals in the light of what we have held hereinabove.·

Civil Appeal No. 3018of1987

Jn this case, no charge-sheet was served on the respondent-
employee w!Jen the DPC met to consider the respondent'spromotion. H
806 'SUPREME COURT REPORTS I 1991] 3 S.C.R.

Yet, the sealed cover procedure was adopted. The Tribunal has rightly
A
directed the authorities to open the scaled cover and if the respondent
was found fit for promotion by the DPC, to give hiin the promotion
from the date his immediate junior Shri M. Raja Rao was promoted
pursuant to the order dated April 30, 1986. The Tribunal has also
directed the authorities to grant to the respondent all the consequen-
B tial benefits. The Tribunal has further stated in the impugned order
that its order would not mean that the disciplinary proceedings
instituted against the respondent-employee should not go on. We see
no reason to interfere with this order. The appeal, therefore, stands
dismissed. In the circumstances of the case, however, there will be no
. order as to costS.

c Civil Appeal No. 3021of1987

In this case, the DPC did not consider the case of the res-
pondent-employee for crossing efficiency bar w.e.f. 14th September,
1983 on the ground that disciplinary proceedings were contemplated
o against him. We arc, therefore,'of the view that the Tribunal's direc-
tion that the DPC should be convened ,to consider the case of the
respondent for crossing the efficiency bar w.e.f. 14th September, 1983
on the basis of his confidential record at the relevant date and without J,
reference· to the contemplated disciplinary proceedings is both proper
and valid. In this case also the Tribunal has given ·the said direction
E without prejudice to the right of the appellant-authorities to take any
disciplinary action as might have been contemplated. This order also
does not require any interference from this Court. Hence, the appeal
stands dismissed. In the circumstances of the case, however, there will
be no order as to costs. '

F Civil Appeal No. 3083 of 1990

In this case, the responden-t-en1ployee 's .case was considered for
promotion by the DPC'in August 1982. However, the result was kept in
a sealed cover in view of the pending disciplinary proceedings against
him. According to the employee, on October l l, 1985 the disciplinary
G proceedings ended in complete exoneration. Thereafter, a DPC was
again constituted in March 1986 which; after consideration of the emp- "'
loyee's case, recommended him for promotion w.e.f. July\26, 1986.
!'his was obviously contrary even to the instructions contained in the
Memorandum. He was entitled to promotion from the date his im-
mediate junior was promoted in or after August 1982 if he was in
H August 1982 found fit for promotio,n by the DPC. The Tribunal has,
U.0.1. v. JANKIRAMAN ISAWANT, J.) 807

therefore, rightly directed the appellant to open the sealed cover and if
A
the DPC in 1982 had found him fit for promotion, to give him the
promotion from the date on which his immediate junior was pro-
moted. However, wh_ile doing so, the Tribunal has also ~irected
arrears of salary to be paid for intervening period along with all conse-
quential benefits. Since we have held disagreeing with the decision of
the Full Bench of the Tribunal that the benefit of the arrears of salary B
will not flow automatically but will depend upon the circumstances in
each case, we modify the said order to the extent it directs the payment
of arrears of salary, and direct the appellant-authority to consider
whether the employee in the circumstances of the case was entitled to
any arrears of salary and to what extent. The authority will, of course,
give reasons for denial of .the whole or part of the arrears of salary.
The appeal is, therefore, allowed partly 'Ni th no order as to costs. C

Civil Appeal No. 4379 of 1990

In this case, the respondent-employee was not recommended for
promotion by the DPC in its meeting held on February 1, 1988. D
Instead, the DPC had kept the results in a sealed cover because of the
pending disciplinary proceedings. Admittedly, no charge-memo was
served on the employee till the date the DPC met on February 1, 1988.
').·· It was issued only in March 2, 1989. The Tribunal has, therefore.
nghtly directed the authorities to open the sealed cover. We are, how-
ever, unable to understand the direction of the Tribunal to convene a E
Review DPC for considering the employee's case as on February I,
1988. If the DPC had considered the case of the employee on February
1, 1988 and withheld the result because of the pending disciplinary
proceedings, the proper direction would have been to ask the
....L appellant-authority to open the sealed cover and if the employee was
tound fit for promotion, to direct the authority to promote him from F
the date on which his immediate junior was promoted as a result of the
recommendation of the DPC on February I, 1988. In case he is so
found fit, he would be entitled to the benefits of seniority etc. on a
notion.al basis. However, whether he would be entitled to the arrears
of salary for the intervening period and to what extent will have to be
decided. by the appellant-authority in the light of what we have stated G
above. In case the authority denies to the employee the salary in full or
in part, it will, of course, record its reasons for doing so. The appeal is,
therefore, allowed partly as above with no order as to costs.

Civil Appeals Nos. 51-55 of 1990
H
These appeals are filed against five respondent-employees. Dis'
808 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1991] 3 S.C.R.

c1pllnary proceedings as well as criminal prosecution \Vere launched
A
against each of them for lodging false Leave Travel Concession claims
and for using forged documents to support them. The employees· were
suspended from service on 15th July, 1983. They admitted guilt and
pleaded revocation of their suspension on depositing the amount of
Rs.1600. They were reinstated in service in November, 1983. Keeping
B in view .the deposit of the amount voluntarily in October 1983, a
lenient view was taken and ihe criminal prosecutions against them
were dropped by the Administration by .an order of January 14, 1985.
However, this was done without prejudice to the. departmental pro-
ceedings which were subsequently initiated and the formal charge-
sheet was issued to the employees on December 24, 1987.
c The Departmental Promotion Committee met in July 1986 to
consider the cases of the employees for promotion but resorted to
sealed cover procedure in view of the pendency of the disciplinary
proceedings against them. There is no dispute that the formal charge-
sheet was issued either on August or December 24, 1987: Conflicting
D months have been mentioned in the decision of the Tribunal.

However, we find that the Tribunal has taken a mechanical view·
and applied the decision of the Full Bench and directed the promotions
to be given to the employees on the basis of the recommendations, if
any, of the DPC of July 1986. We are of the view that in the present
E case when the DPC met in July 1986, the Committee had before it the
record of the refund of the amount by the respondent-employees and
the consequent withdrawal of the prosecutions without prejudice to
the authorities' right to institute departmental proceedings.

In view of the aforesaid peculiar facts of the present case, the
F DPC which met in July 1986 was justified in resorting to the sealed
cover procedure, notwithstanding the fact that the charge-sheet in the
departmental proceedings was issued in August/December, 1987. The
Tribunal was, therefore, not justified in mechanically applying the
decision of the Full Bench to the facts of the present case and also in
directing all benefits to be given to the employees including payment
G of arrears of salary. We are of the view (hat even if the results in the
sealed cover entitle the employeee to promotion from the date their
immediate juni0rs were promoted and they are, therefore, s.o pro-
moted and given notional benefits of seniority etc., the employees in
no case should be given any arrears of salary. The denial of the benefit
of salary will, of course, be in addition to the penalty, if any, imposed
H on the employees at the end of the disciplinary proceedings. We,
U.0.1. v. JANKIRAMAN [SAWANT, J.J 809

therefore, allow these appeals as above with no order as to costs.
A
S.L.P. (Civil) No. 1094 of 1990
. ....,.
Special leave granted.

The respondent-employee in this case was a Sepoy in the Depart- B
ment of Central Excise and Customs. He passed his Departmental
, examinat.ion for the post of Lower Division Clerk against 10% vacan-
cies and by letter of October 14, 1981, he was informed about his
selection for the said post against the said vacancies reserved for
educationally qualified Group-D staff. However, he was informed that
his appointment order as L.D.C. would be issued if he was exonerated
from the disciplinary proceedings which were then pending against c
him. In the Departmental Inquiry, he was exonerated of all the
charges and by an order of June 6, 1985 he was appointed to officiate
as Lower Division Clerk. By a subsequent order of July 3, 1985, the
earlier order of June 6, 1985 was made effective from September 25,
1981. By yet anotherorderof July 29, 1985, his pay was fixed by giving D
him increment from September 25, 1981 but he was denied arrears of
pay from that date till June 2, 1985. The employee did not challenge
the said orcter denying him arrears of pay till he made his representa-
tion on February 18, 1988. To his representation a reply was sent that
since he had not worked as LDC during the said. period he was not
entitled to the arrears of salary. By the impugned decision, the Tri- E
bunal has directed the authorities to grant to the respondent-employee
his pay and allowances from September 25, 1981 to June 2, 1985.

In view of what we have held above, the appeal is allowed, the
impugned order is hereby set aside and instead the appellant-authori-
ties are directed to examine the questibn whether the respondent- F
employee was entitled to any salary and if so to what extent in the light
of the view taken by us. The appellant-authorities will, of course, have
to record reasons if the arrears of salary in its entirety or in part are
denied to the employee. Jn the circumstances of the case, however,
there will be no order as to costs.
G
S.L.P. (Civil) No. 11680of 1991

Special leave granted.

The order impugned in this appeal is an interim one whereby the
Tribunal has directed the appellant-Union of India to open the sealed H
810 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [ 1991] 3 S.C.R.

cover and if the result shows that the DPC has found the respondent-
A
employee fit for promotion to the post of Commissioner of Income-
tax, to give effect to the said recommendations. The admitted facts are
that the QPC which met in 1988 had considered the respondent-
employee's case for promotion to the post of Commissioner of
Income-tax. However, since some departmental proceedings were
B pending against him, he was not given the said promotion. It was for
the first time in 1990, that the appellants served on him a memoran-
dum asking his explanation in respect of certain alleged acts of miscon-
duct to which he sent a reply on May 18, 1990. Till the date of the
impugned order of the Tribunal, i.e., January 1, 1991, no charge-sheet
was served upon the respondent-employee. However, 12 persons
junior to him were promoted by .an order dated April 16, 1990. The
c Tribunal has, as stated above, therefore, made the impugned order.
There is no direction in the order to pay him the arrears of salary for
the interregnum. In the circumstances of the case, we do not think it
necessary to interfere with the impugned order. The appeal, therefore,
stands dismissed. In the circumstances of the case, however, there will
D be no order as to costs.

S. L. P. (Civil) No. 2344 of 199~

Special leave granted.

E The peculiar facts in this case are that at the relevant time the \,,
respondent-employee was working as Superintending Engineer since
July 1986. When earlier he was working as Garrison Engineer in
Bikaner Division, there wa> a fire in the Stores in April 1984 and there
were also deficiencies in the Stores held by the Store-keeper during the
period between 1982 and 1985. Hence, disciplinary proceedings were
F commenced in February 1988 and the respondent was served with a
charge-sheet on February 22, 1988. By an order of August 19, 1988 a
penalty of withholding of increment for one year was imposed on the
respondent as a result of the said disciplinary proceedings.

On June 3, 1988, the .DPC met for considering the promotion to
G the Selection Grade. Pursuant to this meeting, by an order of July 28,
1988 some juniors were given the Selection Grade with retrospective
effect from July 30, 1986. The respondent-employee's name was kept
in a sealed cover and was, therefore, not included in the list of the
promotee officers.

H The Tribunal has found fault with the authorities on two
U.0.1. v. JANKIRAMAN (SAWANT, J.] 811

grounds. The Tribunal has observed that although when the DPC met
A
in June 1988, the employee was already served with a charge-sheet on
February 22, 1988 and, therefore, the sealed cover procedure could
not be faulted, since admittedly his juniors were given promotion with
retrospective effect from July 30, 1986, the DPC should not have
excluded the respondent's name from consideration when it met on
June 3, 1988. The second fault which the Tribunal has found is that B
since the penalty of stoppage of increment was imposed at the end of
the disciplinary proceedings, it was not open for the authorities to
deny the respondent his promotion to the Selection Grade as that
amounted to double penalty. Having taken this view, the Tribunal has
directed that a Review DPC should consider the respondent's case for
promotion w.e.f. July 1986 when his juniors were given promotion
taking into account his performance and confidential records up to c
1986. We are afraid the Tribunal has taken an erroneous view of the
matter. Admittedly, the DPC met in June 1988 when the employee
was already served with the charge-sheet on February 22, 1988. The
charge-sheet was for misconduct for the period between 1982 and 1985.
Admittedly further, the employee was punished by an order of August D
19, 1988 and his one increment was withheld. Although, therefore,
the promotions to his juniors were given with retrospective effect from
July 30, 1986, the denial of promotion to the employee was not
unjustified. The DPC had for the first time met on June 3, 1988 for
considering promotion to the Selection Grade. It is in this meeting that
his juniors were given Selection Grade with retrospective effect from . E
July 30, 1986, and the sealed cover procedure was adopted in his case.
If no disciplinary proceedings were pending against him and if he was
otherwise selected by the DPC he would have got the Selection Grade
w.e.f. July 30, 1986, but in that case the. disciplinary proceedings
against him for his misconduct for the earlier period; viz., between
1982 and 1985 would have been meaningless. If the Tribunal's finding F
is accepted it would mean that by giving him the Selection Grade
w.e.f. July 30, 1986 he would stand rewarded notwithstanding his mis-
conduct for the earlier period for which disciplinary proceedings were
pending at the time of the meeting of the DPC and for which again he
was visited with a penalty. We, therefore. allow the appeal and set
aside the finding of the Tribunal. There will, however, be no order as G
to costs.
Before we part with these appeals, we make it clear that if any of
the respondent-employee/s in any of the above appeals has/have been
given any benefits the same will not be disturbed.

G.N. Appeals disposed of.