Supreme Court of India
UNION OF INDIA ETC. ETC.versusHARI KRISHAN KHOSLA (DEAD) BY LRS. ETC. ETC.
- Citation
- 1992 INSC 249
- Decided
- 16 September 1992
- Disposal
- Appeal(s) allowed
- Bench
- L M SHARMA
Holding
Section 8(3)(a) of the Requisitioning and Acquisition of Immovable Property Act, 1952 does not violate Article 14, and the Act’s inclusion in the Ninth Schedule shields it from challenge under Article 31B provided it does not destroy the basic structure.
Summary
The case concerned a large tract of land requisitioned in 1967 under the Defence of India Act and later acquired by the Central Government under Section 7 of the Requisitioning and Acquisition of Immovable Property Act, 1952. The compensation determined by the Competent Authority was refused to be paid, leading the owner (Hari Krishan Khosla) to file a writ petition. The Punjab and Haryana High Court held that Section 8(3)(a) of the Act, which denied solatium and interest, violated Article 14 of the Constitution. The Union of India appealed. The Supreme Court held that Section 8(3)(a) is not violative of Article 14 because the Act provides a just equivalent valuation and the omission of solatium and interest is a legislative choice, not discrimination. The Court also clarified that the Act’s inclusion in the Ninth Schedule confers protection under Article 31B, but only to the extent that it does not damage the basic structure of the Constitution. Consequently, the Union’s appeal was allowed, the High Court’s decision set aside, and the matter remitted to the arbitrator for fresh determination of compensation.
Issues considered
- The constitutionality of Section 8(3)(a) of the Requisitioning and Acquisition of Immovable Property Act, 1952 under Article 14 of the Constitution of India.
- The effect of the Act’s inclusion in the Ninth Schedule and the protection afforded by Article 31B.
Legislation cited
- Constitution of Indias. Article 14, s. Article 31, s. Article 311, s. Article 31B
- Defence of India Act, 1962s. 29(1)
- Land Acquisition Act, 1894s. 23, s. 25, s. 34
- Requisitioning and Acquisition of Immovable Property Act, 1952s. 25, s. 28, s. 7, s. 8(1), s. 8(2), s. 8(3), s. 8(3)(a)
Subjects
Article 14Requisitioning and Acquisition of Immovable Property ActCompensationNinth ScheduleArticle 31BEminent domainSolatiumInterestLand acquisitionConstitutional validity
Judgment
A UNION OF INDIA ETC. ETC.
v.
HARi KRISHAN KHOSLA (DEAD) BY LRS. ETC. ETC.
SEPTEMBER 16, 1992·
B [LALIT MOHAN SHARMA, S. MOHAN AND
N. VENKATACHALA, JJ.]
Requisitioning and Acquisition of Immovable Propeny Act, 1952 :
C Section 8(3)(a)-Whether violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of
India-Determination of compensation---f'rinciple to be followed.
Constitution of India, 1950:
Article 14 and Ninth Schedule Item No.89-Constitutional validity of
D section 8(3)(a) Requisitioning and Acquisition of Immoveable Propeny Act,
1952.
A large extent of land of the 1st respondent in C.A. No.1129-31175
was requisitioned by the District Magistrate by an order dated 17th
March, 1967 under Section 29(1) of the Defence of India Act, 1962. Later
E on, these lands were acquired by the Central Government under Section
7(1) of the Act. The Competent Authority, determined the compensation
at Rs.1,62, Rs.1,61,109.37 Iakhs, an offer of payment was made to the 1st
respondent who was also called upon to communicate his acceptance. By
a written reply dated 22nd July, 1971 it was requested that the payment be
made to him under protest, and at the same time the inadequacy of the
F amount awarded was indicated, and that an arbitrator be appointed.
Interest at the rate of 6 per cent per annum was also claimed.
The Competent Authority refused to pay even the amount of com-
pensation determined, and being aggrieved, the respondent filed a Writ
G Petition in the High Court.
The matter came up before a Single Judge, who directed that it be
heard by a Division Bench, but later on the matter came up for adjudica-
tion before the Full Bench, which relying upon the decision of this Court
in Nagpur Improvement Trust and antoher v. Vithal Rao and others, (1973]
H 1 sec 500 upheld the contention that Section 8(3) (a) of the Requisi-
620
U.0.1. v. H.K. KHOSLA 621
tioning and Acquisition of Immovable Property Act, 1952 was violative of A
Article 14 for the following reasons:- (i) The fact that the owner of the
requisitioned property has been receiving conpensation even if it be
equivalent to the market rent, does not make any difference as the owner
of a non-requisitioned property may indeed be getting even a higher rate
of rent from a primte tenant before his property was acquired. (ii) There B
is nothing in the Act to suggest that the requisitioned property cannot be
acquired under the Land Acquisition Act. 1894 since there is no prohibi-
tion to do so. The result is that the Act leaves it to the arbitrary and
unguided discretion of the Government to acquire the requisitioned land
of one owner by resort to Section 7(1) of the Act, while the requisitioned
land of another exactly similarly stitnated could be acqnired nnder the C
Land Acquisition Act. (iii) The case arising out of the Bombay Town
Planning Act viz. Prakash Amichand Shah v. State of Gujarat, [1986) 1 SCC
581 stands on a different footing since there is no option to the local
authority to resort to one or other of the alternative methods which
resulted in acquisition. (iv) The classification between requisitioned and D
non-requisitioned land for the purpose of paying less compensation to one
and more to the other is not founded on any intelligible differentia, nor is
there any rational nexus to the obje.-t of acquisition of property for a
public purpose. (v) The liability to pay interest is totally absent under the
Act while there is a specific provision concerning the same under the land
Acquisition Act. E
The Union of India aggrieved by the aforesaid judgment appealed to
this Court by special leave, and contended that: Section 8(1) of the Act
lays down the principles and methods for determining compensation. and
under Clause (e) of sub-section (ii of the said section the Arbitrator is F
enjoined to determine the compensation which appears to him to be just,
therefore, what is required to be paid under the Act is the just compeDsa·
tion, and Section 8(3)(a) provides for just equivalent, that the High Court
was not correct in holding that the owner of the requisitioned property
was receiving compensation during the period of requisition, is of no
significance, and was wrong when it held that the deprivation of solatium G
and interest cannot be justified on the basis of the terms of Section 7(3)
of the Act. It was further submitted that the Act having been included in
the Ninth Schedule of the Constitution with effect from 10th August, 1975
as Item No.89, the protection under Article 311) of the Constitution would
be available. The respondents relied upon the Judgment in Abhay Singh H
622 SUPREME COURT REPORTS[1992) SUPP. 1 S.C.R.
A Surana .v. Secretary Ministry of Communication and othr.rs, [1987] 4 SCC
273 and submitted that the persons whose premises are requisitioned are
entitled to interest on the principal amount of compensation, and there-
fore, the award was not in any way bad.
On the question: whether section 8(3) (a) of the Reqnisitioning and
B Acquisition of Immovable Property Act, 1952 is violative of Article 14 of
the Constitution of India.
Allowing the appeals CA Nos.1129-31 of 1975, and disposing of the
connected matters, this Court,
C HELD: 1. Section 8(3)(a) of the Requisition Act is not, in any way,
violative of Article 14. (627-F]
2. The failure to provide solatium at 15% or interest at 6% under
Section 8(3)(a) of the Act does not make it discriminatory.
D Narain Das Jain (since deceased) by Lrs. v. Agr3 Nagar Mahapalika,
Agra, [1991] 4 SCC 212; P.C. Goswami v. Collector of Darrang, (1982] 1
sec 439 =AIR 1982 SC 144 and Hari Narain and Others v. Union of India
and Ors., AIR 1972 S.C. 2464 at 2465, referred to.
E 3. The power of the Sovereign to take private properties for public
nse Is based upon the doctrine of Eminent Domain. Consequently, right
of the owner to compensation for the deprivation of such a property Is
also well-recognised. [634-C]
4. When the properties are acquired under the Act there is a dis-
placement of private ownership by the ownership of the State. However,
F the sine qua non for such an acquisition is public purpose. In the absence
of such a public purpose the power of the acquisition will be rendered
void. What is important to be noted with reference to an immovable
property is the ownership, the compendium of all rights, that comes to be
acquired. (634-EJ
G
5. Under the Land Acquisition Act, the power of Eminent Doinain
could be exercised without any embargo so long as there is an underlying
public purpose. [635-F]
6. Cases. of acquisition of land stand on a different footing than
H those where such property is subject to a prior requisition before acquisition.
[641 F]
U.0.1. v. H.K. KHOSLA 623
Vajrevalu Mudaliar v. Special Deputy Collector, (1965] 1SCR614; Bal A
Amual v. State of Madras, 1968 SC 1425; Nagpur Improvement Trust and
a..ather v. Vithal Rao and others, [1973] 1 SCC 500 and State of Kera/a and
others v. T.M. Peter and others, [1980] 3 SCC 554, distinguished. [641-F)
7. Wltere, a property which was subject to prior requisition comes to
be acquired the compensation should be awarded on the basis of the B
principles adumberated in this Act. [644-B)
8. Under the Requisition Act, and the Land Acquisition Act, the
similarity is that unless and until there is a public purpose, acquisition
cannot be resorted to, while the dissimilarity is that in the case of requisi· C
tion, one of the important rights in the bundle of rights emanating from
ownership; viz._ the right of possession and enjoyment has been deprived of,
when the property was requistioned, and it is for that right that compensa·
tion is provided under section 8(2). Again, under the Requisition Act, the
acquisition even though it is for a public purpose is restricted to the two
clauses of section 7(3), which constitute a statutory embargo. [635-F] D
9. The amount of compensation can be fixed by agreement under
section 8(1)(b). In the absence of such an agreement it Is left to the
discretion of the Arbitrator. The Arbitrator under section 8(l)(e) is to
hear the dispute. Thereafter he is to determine the compensation which E
appears to him to be just. He must have regard to the circumstances of each
case while applying the provisions of sub-section (3)(a) of section 8. The
significant omission of solatium in indicative of the legislative intent
necessitating stress on the expressions "just circumstances of each case"
occurring in sub-section (l)(a) thereof. Yet another distinguishing feature
is the expression "open market". The reason why solatium bas not been F
provided is that "open market" contemplates a bargain between a free
buyer and a free seller unfettered by the consideration of requisition and
consequent acquisition. [642-H, 643 A-D-E]
10. All Acts and Regulations included in the Ninth Schedule prior to
April 24, 1973, will receive the full protection of Article 318 and will not G
be open to challenge on the ground that they are inconsistent with or take
away or abridge any of the rights conferred by any of the provisions of
Part Ill of the Constitution. The various constitutional amendments, by
which additions were made to the Ninth Schedule on or after April 24,
1973 will be valid only if they do not damage or destroy the basic structure H
624 SUPREME COURT REPORTS[l992] SUPP. 1 S.C.R.
A of the Constitution. There is no doubt that Article 31& should be inter·
preted strictly. But even interpreting it strictly the only requirement which
is laid down by Article 31B is that the Act should be specified in the Ninth
Schedule. (648 G·H, 647-C]
Waman Rao and Ors. etc. v. Union of India and Ors., (1981] 2 SCC
B 362, referred to.
The effect of the inclusion of the Requisitioning and Acquisition of
Immovable Property Act, 1952 in the Ninth Schedule as Item No.89 by the
Constitution 39th Amendment Act, 1975 with effect from August 10, 1975
is that it will not be open to challenge on the ground that it is inconsistent
C with or takes away or a bridges any of the rights conferred by any of the
provisions of Part III of the Constitution. (645 f·G]
Jagannath, etc. etc. v. The Authorised Officer, Land Refonns and Ors.
etc., (1971] 2 sec 893, relied on.
D State of West Bengal v. Paritosh Kr. and Ors., (1984 Calcutta Weekly
notes 532), approved.
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal Nos.1129-31
of 1975 etc. etc.
E From the Orders dated 30.5.1974 of the Punjab and Haryana High
Court in Civil Writ Nos. 608, 1572 and 1574 of 1972.
Altaf Ahmed, Addi. Solicitor General, N.N. Goswamy, D.V. Sehgal,
V.C. Mahajan, Barish N. Salve, O.P. Sharma, S.K. Bagga, R.K. Jain, M.N.
Krishnamani, Harbans Lal, A.K. Srivastava, Ms. Sushma Suri, Ms. A
F Subhashini, Sanjay Sarin S.C. Patel, H.K. Puri, Sunil Gupta, S.M. Sarin,
P.N. Puri, M.K. Dua, R.C. Gubrele, K.R. Gupta, Vivek Sharma, Kamal Jeet
Singh, Ms. Nanita Sharma, Mrs. Bagga, Mohan Pandey, P. Parmeswaran,
Ashok Mathur, P.K. Jain, C.V.S. Rao, S.N. Terdol, R.N. Keshwani, Ms.
lndu Malhotra, Ms. S. Janan~ Ravinder Bana, Ashish Kumar Verma, Ms.
G Abba R. Sharma, T.C. Sharma and Ms. V. Mohana for the appearing parties.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
MOHAN, J. Leave granted.
H These app~als which are dealt with under a common judgment raise
U.0.1. v. H.K. KHOSLA [MOHAN, J.] 625
the only question of law as to whether Section 8(3)(a) of the Reqnisitioning A
and Acqnisition of Immovable Property Act, 1952 (Act 30 of 1952)
(hereinafter referred to as the Act), is violative of Article 14 of the
Constitution of India.
It is enough if the facts in Civil Appeal No.1129 of 1975 are noted.
It is preferred against the judgment of a Full Bench of the Punjab and B
Haryana High Court in Writ Application No.608 of 1972 dated 30th of
May, 1974 (the judgment bas since been reported in AIR 1975 Punjab 74.
A large extent of land in the Village of Malo Majra Tehsil, District
Patiala was requsitioned by an order of the District Magistrate, Patiala, C
dated 17th March, 1967. The order of reqnisition was made under Section
29( 1) of the Defence of India Act, 1962. The reqnisitioned land included
157 Bighas and 6 biswas belonging to Diwan Harl Krishan Khosla who died
during the pendency of the proceedings in the High Court. His sons Avtar
Krishan Khosla and Chand Khosla were impleaded .as his legal repre-
sentives by an order dated 6th May, 1974. Later on, these lands were D
acqnired by the Central Govenment under Section 7(1) of the Act. The
Competent Authority, Jullundur, determined the compensation at Rs.
1,62,109.37. An offer of payment was made to Hari Krishan Khosla who
was called upon to communicate his acceptance. By his written reply dated
22nd July, 1971 he requested that the payment be made to him under E
protest. At the same time, he objected t.o the inadequacy of the amount
awarded to him. He wanted an arbitrator to be appointed and claimed
interest at the rate of 6 per cent per annum. The Competent Authority
refused to pay even the amount of compensation determined. Aggrieved
by the said refusal, Harl Krishan Khosla filed a writ petition.
F
When the matter came up before the learned Single Judge he
directed that it should be heard by a Division Bench. The Division Bench,
however, directed that the case be placed before the Chief Justice to be
heard by a larger Bench. This was bow the writ petition came up for
adjudication before the Full Bench. G
The only point agitated before the Full Bench was as follows:
"No porvision had been made in Section 8 of the Act for
payment of solatium at the rate of 15 per cent of the
compensation amount to the land owner as is available H
626 SUPREME COURT REPORTS[1992] SUPP. 1 S.C.R.
A under the provisions of Section 23 of the Land Acquisition
Act, 1894. There is no provision under the Act for payment
of interest at the rate of 6 per cent per annum as is provided
under Section 34 of the Land Acquisition Act. There is no
justification in depriving the land owner of the amount of
solatium and interest simply because the land has been
B acquired under the provisions of Section 7 of the Requisi-
tioning and Acquisition of Immovable Property Act, 1952.
The provisions of Section 8(3) of the Act are discriminatory
in, so far as, they deny the land owner of the amount of
solatium and interest and thus these provisions of the Act
c offend against the provisions of Article 14 of the Constitu-
tion of India."
The Full Bench, after referring to the case law, relied mainly on the
decision of this Court in Nagpur Improvement Trnst and another v. Vithal
Rao and others, (1973] 1 SCC 500 and upheld the contention that the said
D pfOvision was violative of Article 14 of the Constitution for the following
reasons:-
(i) The fact that the owner of the requisitioned property
has been receiving compensation even if it be equivalent
E to the market rent, does not make any difference as the
owner of a non-requisitioned property may indeed be
getting even a higher rate of rent from a private tenant
before his property is acquired.
(ii) There is nothing in the Act to suggest that the requisi-
F tioned property cannot be acquired under the Land Ac-
quisition Act, 1894 since there is no prohibition to do so.
The result is that the Act leaves it to the arbitrary and
unguided discussion of the Government to acquire the
requisitioned land of one owner by resort to Section 7(1)
of the Act while the requisitioned land of another exactly
G
similarly situated could be acquired under the Land Ac-
quisition Act.
(iii) The case arising out of the Bombay Town Planning
Act stands on a different footing since there is no option
H to the local authority to resort to one or other of the
U.0.1. v. H.K. KHOSLA [MOHAN, J.] 627
alternative meihods which resulted in acquisition. There- A
fore, the cases cited in this behalf are clearly distinguish-
able.
(iv) The classification between requisitioned and non- req-
uisitioned land for the purpose of paying less compensation
to one and more to the other is not founded on any B
intelligible differentia. Nor is there any rational nexus to
the object of acquisition of property for a public purpose.
(v) The liability to pay interest is totally absent under the
Act while there is a specific provision concerning the same c
under the Land Acquisition Act. Thus, Civil Appeal
Nos.1130-31of1975 are directed against the judgment and
order dated 30th May, 1974 of the Punjab and Haryana
High Court in Civil Writ Nos.1572 and 1574 of 1972,
questioning its correctness.
D
Mr. N.N. Goswamy, learned counsel, appearing for the Union of
India submits that Section 8(1) of the Act lays down the principles and the
method of determining compensation and under clause (e) of sub-section
(1) of the said section the Arbitrator is enjoined to determine tho compe.i-
sation which appears to him to be just. Therefore, what is required to be E
paid under the Act is the just compensation. Section 8(3)(a) provides for
just equivalent. As a matter of fact, this Court had the occasion to deal
with the validity of Section 8(3)(b) of the Act. While striking down that
provision in the case in Union of India v. Kam/abhai Haljiwandas Parekh
and others, (1968] 1 SCR 463 it was observed that Section 8(3)(a) provides F
for the .payment of just equivalent. If this be so, there is no scope for
awarding solatium and interest. The absence of such a provision under the
Act would not, in any way, make it violative of Article 14 of the Constitu-
tion.
In his submission, the High Court is not correct in holding the fact G
that the owner of the requisitioned property was receiving compensation
during the period of requisition, is of no significance. Equally, the High
Court is again wrong when it held that the deprivation of solatium and
interest cannot be justified on the basis of the terms of Section 7(3) of the
Act. H
628 SUPREME COURT REPORTS(1992] SUPP. 1 S.C.R.
A The finding that there is nothing in the language of the Act which
prohibits or makes illegal acquisition under the Land Acquisition Act,
overlooks the scope of Section 7(3) of the Act. Beside, what is more
important is in the case of an acquisition under the Land Acquisition Act,
the ownership which is compendium of all rights, inclusive of the right to
possession and enjoyment, comes to be acquired. On the contrary, in the
B case of the acquisition of the property which has been under requisition,
the right of possession and enjoyment is already there. with the Govern-
ment. Such a rjght to possession and enjoyment is a very valuable right.
Therefore, minus that right for which compensation is paid to the owner
during the period of requisition, as per Section 8(2) of the Act, the
C remainder comes to be acquired. This important distinguished feature had
escaped the attention of the High Court.
On the same line of reasoning, the decision in Nagpur Improvement
Trust (supra),, would be inapplicable to an acquisition under the Act.
Reliance placed by the High Court on that decision is incorrect. That was
D a case of acquisition of ownership.
In the case in Prakash Amichand Shah v. State of Gujarat, [1986] 1
SCC 581 arising under the Bombay Town Planning Act, while repelling a
similar argument, it was held that the said Act was not discriminatory in
E juxtaposition to Land Acquisition Act. In this ruling, the scope of Nagpur
Improvement Trust (supra) was explained. It is the ratio of this Judgment
which squarely applies to this case.
Without prejudice to the above submissions, learned counsel for the
appellant argues that in any event the Act had come to be included in the
F 9th Schedule of the Constitution with effect from 10th August, 1975 as Item
89. The effect of such inclusion will be; the protection under Article 31B
of the Constitution will be available. The said Article forbids an attack on
aoy one of the legislations included in the 9th Schedule as violative of
Articles 14 and 19 of the Constitution. This will be so, notwithstanding the
G impugned judgments of the High Court as though the said provision was
valid from the beginning. That exactly is the ratio in Jagannath, etc. etc. v.
The Authorised Officer, Land Refo1111s and others, etc., (1971] 2 SCC 893.
There is one other case to which reference has to be made where
this Court upheld the grant of solatium under the Assam Requisitioning
H Act. That turned on the language of Section 4(3) of the Act. Therefore,
U.0.1. v. H.K. KHOSLA [MOHAN, J.) 629
that cannot be the ground to award solatium in a case falling under the A
Act, more sB, in the absence of any specific provisions in this regard.
Hence, it is submitted that the Judgment of the High Court calls for
inteference.
Mr. D.V. Sehgal, learned counsel appearing for the respondents in
Civil Appeal Nos.1129-31of1975 cites the case inAbhay Singh Surana and B
others v. Secretary, Ministry of Communication and others, (1987] 4 SCC 273
and submits that the persons whose premises are requisitioned are entitled
to interest on the principal amount of compensation. Therefore, the award
of compensation, according to him, is not, in any way, bad.
Mr. R.K. Jain, learned counsel appearing for the petitioners in
c
SLP(C) 6912 of 1990, addressing the main arguments, would submit that
merely because the Act had come to be included in the 9th Schedule of
the Constitution it does not mean that it gets complete protection or is
immune from attack on the ground of violation of Article 14 of the
Constitution. It would be so only if the Act does not damage or destroy D
the basic structure of the Constitution. It cannot be gainsaid that Article
14 enshrining the principle of equality is a basic structure of the Constitu-
tion. If the impugned provision, namely, Section 8(3)(a) is violative of
Article 14 of the Constitution, it will still be open to challenge. In support
of this submission, learned counsel strongly relies on the decision in E
Waman Rao and others etc. v. Union of India and others etc., (1981] 2 SCC.
362.
Where the property has been under requisition for a long time, it
would deprive the owner of the use of the property and ultimately acquiring
the same would amount to fraud on power as laid down in H.D. Vora v. F
State of Maharashtra and others, (1984) 2 SCC 337.
Where different compensation came to be paid under the Kerala
Town Planning Act in contradistinction to the Land Acquisition Act, this
Court in State of K£ra/a and others v. T.M. Peter and others, (1980) 3 SCC
554 held that it would be unjust. The same ratio was laid down earlier in G
P. Vajravelu Muda/iar v. Special Deputy Collector, Madras and another,
(1%5] 1 SCR 614. In a recent case Narain Das Jain (since deceased) by Lrs.
v. Agra Nagar Mahapalika, Agra, (1991] 4 SCC 212 this Court has taken the
view that the award of solatium is a must in all cases of acquisition. Even
in a case arising under the Defence of India Act, 1962 where the Act H
630 SUPREME COURT REPORTS[1992] SUPP. 1 S.C.R.
A provided no solatium this Court has upheld the award of solatium in Civil
Appeal No.3058 of 1983 on 31st January, 1983. These authorities fully
support the stand of learned counsel for the respondent. From this point
of view the judgment of the High Court should be upheld.
Mr. Harish N. Salve, learned counsel appearing on behalf of respon-
B dents in SLP(C) No.1780 of 1991 submits that the Arbitrator in November
1977 awarded 15 per cent solatium and 6 per cent interest on the enhanced
compensation. It is that which is questioned. Therefore, should the Court
agree that the appellant's only this part of the award will go while the rest
would remain.
c In Civil Appeal Nos.4688-94 of 1989 for 16 years no Arbitrator was
appointed. Under exactly similar situation this Court in Civil Appeal
Nos.470 and 471 of 1985 dated 11th February, 1985 took the view that the
award does not call for any interference.
D In Civil Appeal No.995 of 1992, Mr. O.P. Sharma, learned counsel
for the respondents urged that should the arguments of the appellants
prevail, it is only the enhanced compensation that conld be interferred with.
E Mr. D.V. Sehgal, learned.counsel for the respondents in Civil Appeal
No.1981of1991 supports Mr. R.K. Jain, learned counsel for the petitioners
in SLP (C) No.6912 of 1990. However, in Civil Appeal Nos.2674-2685 of
1989, Mr. Sanjay Sarin, learneo counsel for the respondent argued that
there is a delay of 16 years in the appointment of Arbitrator and, therefore,
the same principle as .laid down in Civil Appeal Nos.470 and 471 of 1985
F dated 11th February, 1985 should be applied.
In Civil Appeal No.2073 of 1990, Mr. V.C. Mahajan submits, where
the Government is a tenant and if the land under tenancy is acquired under
the Land Acquisition Act, it is in no way different from the acquisition
G under this Act. Therefore, differential treatment cannot be. accorded,
based on the statute employed for the purposes of acquisition.
Prior to the enhancement of the compensation under the impugned
judgment the State had preferred SLP No.4298 of 1984 and that was
dismissed. That would constitute res judicata and the same cannot be
H interferred with, If, at all, it is only the enhanced compenstation that would
U.0.1. v. H.K. KHOSLA (MOHAN, J.] 631
be affected. Mr. Sehgal, learned counsel for the respondents appearing in A
C.A. Nos.1320-22 of 1990 would argue that in these cases the impugned
judgment has been upheld with reference to others in SLP Nos.4291-4348
of 1984. Therefore, that having become final cannot be reopened now.
In Civil Appeal Nos.1742-1756 of 1986 the State of Haryana is the
appellant. The acquisition is under Section 7 of the Punjab Requisitioning B
and Acquisition Act of 1953. That Act is not in the 9th Schedule. The
award come to be made under Section 8(4)(a) of the State Act. Even in
that award solatium at 15 per cent and interest at 6 per cent have been
given. That part of the award is liable to be set aside as there is no provision
for giving them. C
In opposition to this, the learned counsel for the respondent would
urge that when this award had been made in the year 1%1, the Court may
consider whether after long lapse of time the award should be interfered
with and unsettle it which has stood the test of time.
D
Having regard to the above submissions two questions arise for our
determination. (i) Whether Section 8(3)(a) of the Act is violative of Article
14 of the Constitution? (ii) What is the effect of the inclusion of the Act
in the 9th Schedule of the Constitution?
Before we proceed to determine the questions, it is necessary to set E
out the circumstances in which the Act came to be enacted. During the
World War, lands a.rid buildings were requisitioned under the Defence of
India Act, 1939 and the rules made thereunder. Those properties con-
tinued to be subject to requisition under the Requisitioned Land (Con-
tinuance of Powers) Act, 1947 (XVII of 1947). However, this Act was to F
expire on 31st of March, 1952. With regard to the property outside the
Delhi area Government of India had no power to requisition. In some
cases, the States were asked to requisition the properiy for the purpose of
Union. A Ju_dicial decision held that the exercise of the State power for
the pupose of Union would not be proper. Finding that a large number of
houses in the various cities of India had been requisitioned for Central G
Government purposes it was considered necessary to have an Act em-
powering the Central Government to requisition and acquisition. For this
purpose, Requisitioning and Acquisition of Immovable Property Or-
dinance, 1952 (III of 1952) was promulgated. This Ordinance was replaced
by the Act. H
632 SUPREME COURT REPORTS(1992] SUPP. 1 S.C.R.
A In the above background, we will proceed to consider the salient
features of the Act and as to how they stand in comparison to the Land
Acquisition Act (Central Act 1 of 1894). Section 3 empowers a competent
authority to requisition a property for a public purpose, being a purpose
of the Union. However, before the exercise of the power the competent
authority must form an opinion that the property is needed or likely to be
B needed for a public purpose.
Under Section 7, the requisitioned property conld be acquired, if the
Central Government is of the opinion that it be so acquired for a public
purpose. Sub-section (3) of Section 7 lays down certain embargo on the
C exercise of the power. This sub-section contains two clauses. Under clause
(a) where works have been constructed during the period of requisition,
which works require to be secured or preserved for the purpose of Govern-
ment; while under clause (b) it is provided that the cost of restoration of
the property would be excessive.
D Thus, it is not in every case the acquisition is or can be resorted to.
As regards compensation during the period of requisitioning, sub-
section (2) of Section 8 takes care, subject to the provisions of Section 2(a)
and 2(b).
E The principles and the methods of determining compensation are set
out in clauses (a) to (g) of sub-section (1) of Section 8.
Now, we come to Section 8(3) which is as below:-
"8(3). The compensation payable for the acquisition of any
F property under Section 7 shall be:-
(a) The price which the requisitioned property would have
fetched in the open market, if it had remained in the same
condition as. it was at the time of requisitioning and been
G sold on the date of acquisition, or
(b) twice the price which the requisitioned property would
have fetched in the open market, if it had been sold on the
date of requisition, which ever is less."
H The above clause (b) was struck down by this court in Union of India
U.0.1. v. H.K. KHOSLA [MOHAN, J.] 633
v. Kamlabhai Harjiwandas Parekh and others, [1968] 1 SCR 463. In this A
case, at page 472 it is observed:
"In Bela Baneljee's case, [1954] SCR 558 as also in the other
cases mentioned, viz., State of Madras v. D. Namasivaya
Mudaliar, [1964] 6 SCR 936; Vajrevalu Mudaliar v. Special
Deputy Collector, [1965] 1 SCR 614 and Jeejeebhoy v. As- B
sistant Collector, [1965] 1 SCR 636 the date for the Assess-
ment of compensation was mentioned in the Act itself. In
this case it is not so mentioned but such date is dependent
on the original requisition. In any case it does not give the
person to be compensated a just equivalent of the proerty c
he was losing at the date of acquisition."
Again, at page 474 it is observed:
"The argument on behalf of the appellant that the basis did
not provide for the payment of just equivalent could not be D
accepted by this Court because of the fact that the appel-
lant had produced no material on which its plea could be
sustained. It this case, however, there is no such difficulty.
Clause (a) of s.8(3) lays down a principle aimed at giving
the owner of the land something which approximates its
just equivalent on the date of acquisition. Clause (b) how-
E
ever directs the arbitrator to measure the price arrived at
in terms of cl. (a) with twice the amount of mjoney which
the requisitioned property would have fetched if it had
been sold on the date of requisition and to ignore the excess
of the price computed in terms of cl. (a) over that in terms F
of cl. (b). The position bears a close similarity with the facts
in Bela Baneljee's case, where the legislature directed that
the excess of the value as on the 31st December, 1946 was
to be ignored. The basis provided by cl. (b) has nothing to
do with the just equivalent of the land on the date of
G
acquisition nor is there any principle for such a basis. We
cann Jt therefore accept the proposition that the impugned
clause satisfies the requirements of Art. 31(2) of the Con-
stitution."
(Emphasis supplied) H
634 SUPREME COURT REPORTS[1992] SUPP. 1 S.C.R.
A From the above, it is clear that what the Court required was payment
of just equivalent on the date of acquisition. According to this· ruling that
was not so in cases falling under clause (b). Hence, it came to be struck
down. The underlined portion which deals with Section 8(3)(a) thus makes
a pointed reference that this provision aims at giving the owner just
equivalent on the date of acquisition.
B
We now go on to Land Acquisition Act of 1894.
The power of Sovereign to take private properties for public use is
based upon the doctrine of Eminent Domain. Consequently, right to the
C owner to compensation for the depr;vation of such a property is also
well-recognised. A justification of this exercise of the power is based on
two Latin maxims; (i) Salus populi suprena est (regard for the public
welfare is the highest law) and (ii) necessitis puh/ica major est quam private
(public necessity is greater than private necessity).
D The entire Land Acquisition Act is based on the above principles.
When the properties are acquired under the Act there is a displacement
of private ownership by the ownership of the State. However, the sine qua
non for such an acquisition is public purpose. In the absence of such a
public purpose the power of the acquisition will be rendered void. What is
important to be noted is with reference to an immovable property, the
E ownership, the compendium of all rights, comes to be acquired.
The points of similarities and dissimilarties between the Act and the
Land Acquisition Act are as under:-
In both the cases unless and until there is a public purpose, acquisi-
F tion cannot be resorted to.
Coming to dissimilarities, in the case of requisition, one of the
important rights in the bundle of rights emanating from ownership, namely,
the right to possession and enjoyment has been deprived of, when the
G property was requisitioned. It is minus that right for which, as stated above,
the compensation is provided under Section 8(2), the remaining rights
come to be acquired.
In contra-distinction under the Land Acquisition Act, as stated
above, the sum total of the rights, namely, the ownership itself comes to be
H acquired. We may usefully quote from Salmond on Jurisprudence 1966
U.0.l v. H.K. KHOSLA [MOHAN, J.] 635
Twelfth Edition Chapter 8 @ page 246-247: A
11
0wnership denotes the relation between a person an
object forming the subject-matter of his ownerhip. It con-
sits in a complex of rights, all of which are rights in rem,
being good against all the world and not merely against
specific persons (a). Though in certain situations some of B
these rights may be absent, the normal case of ownership
can be expected to exhibit the following incidents (b).
First, the owner will have a right to possess the thing which
he owns. c
Secondly, the owner normally has the right to use and enjoy
the thing owned: the right to manage it, i.e., the right to
decide how it shall be used; and the right to the income
from it. ...
D
... Fifthly, ownership has a residuary character. If, for
example, a landowner gives a lease of his property to A, an
easement to B. and some other right such as a profit to C,
his ownership now consists of the residual rights, i.e., the
rights remaining when all these lesser rights have been
E
given away."
Then again, under the Act, the acquisition even though it is for a
public pl!rpose is restricted to the two clauses of Section 7(3) of the Act
to which we have already made a reference. Thus two clauses of Section
7(3) constitute statutory embargo. F
Under the Land Acquisition Act, the power of Eminent Domain
could be exercised without any embargo so long as there is an underlying
public purpose. In our considered view, these vital distinctions will have to
be kept in mind while dealing with the question of violation of Article 14 G
of the Constitution. We may, at once, state, when examined in this light,
the reasonings of the High Court to make out a case of discrimination,
seem to be incorrect.
Question No.l: Whether Section 8(3)(a) of the Act is violative of Article
14 of the Constitution? H
636 SUPREME COURT REPORTS[l992] SUPP. 1 S.C.R.
A We have already referred to Kamlabhai Harjiwandas Parekh's case
(supra). Though the case did not directly deal with the vires of Section
8(3)(a) yet the observations which we have extracted above are apposite.
The cases which hold the award of compensation, if different from Land
Acquisition Act, would constitute discrimination, may now be examined.
B Vajreva/u Mudaliar (supra) is a case of Acquisition under the provisions of
Land Acquisition Madras (Amendment) Act of 1961. That amending Act
itself laid down principles for fllring compensation different from those
prescribed in the Principal Act. Therefore, it was held to be bad. Bal
Amual v. State of Madras, 1968 SC 1425 was a case of acquisition under
Madras City Improvement Act (37 of 1950) where the owners were
C deprived of the right to solatium. Under those circumstances it was held
to be a clear case of discrimination infringing the guarantee of equal
protection of laws.
Strong reliance was placed by the High Court on the decision in
D Nagpur Improvement Trust case (supra). This again is a case of acquisition
of property. While holding it to be discriminatory this Court observed in
paragraphs 29 and 30 as follows:
'Can classification be made on the basis of the public
purpose for the purpose of compensation for which land
E is acquired? In other words can the Legislature lay down
different principles of compensation for lands acquired say
for a hospital or a school or a Government building? Can
the Legislature say that for a hospital land will be acquried
at 50% of the market value, for a school at 60% of the value
F and for a Government building at 70% of the market value?
All three objects are public purposes and as far as the
owner is concerned it does not matter to him whether it is
one public purpor.e or the other. Article 14 cenfers an
individual right and in order to justify a classification there
should be something which justifies a different treatment
G to this individual right. It seems to us that ordinarily a
classification based on the public purpose is not pennis-
sible under Article 14 for the purpose of determining
compensation. The position is different when the owner of
the land himself is the recipient of benefits from an im-
H provement scheme, and the benefit to him is taken into
U.0.1. v. H.K. KHOSLA [MOHAN, J.] 637
consideration in fixing compensation. Can classification be A
made on the basis of the authority acquiring the land? In
other words can different principles of compensation be
laid if the land is acquired for or by an Improvement Trust
or Municipal Corporation or the Government? It seems to
us that the answer is in the negative because as far as the
owner is concerned it does not matter to him whether the
B
land is acquired by one authority or the other.
It is equally immaterial whether it is one Acquisition
Act or another Acquisition Act under which the land is
acquired. If the existence of two Acts could enable the
State to give one owner different treatment agians~ can
c
claim the protection of Article 14."
We will now refer to Prakash Amichand Shah's case (supra). This
case considered the rulings in Vajrave/u Mudaliar's case (Supra) as well as
Nagpur Improvement Trust case (supra). A contention was raised that the D
denial of solatium of 15% of the market value of the land in additon to
compensation would render the provisions of Bombay Town Plannig Act,
1954 discriminatory. In this regard reliance was place on Nagpur Improve-
ment case (supra).
After analysing the provisions of the Bombay Town Planning A~
E
1954 it was observed at page 609-610:
"The development and planning carried out under the Act
is primarily for the benefit of public. The local authority is
under an obligation to function according to the Act. The F
local authority has to bear a part of the expenses of
development. It is in one sense a package deal. The
proceedings relating to the scheme are not like acquisition
proceedings under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. Nor
are the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 made
applicable either without or with modifications as in the G
case of the Nagpur Improvement Trust Act, 1936. We do
not understand the decision in Nagpur Improvement Trust
case as laying down generally that wherever land is taken
away by the Govermnent under a separate statute compen-
sation should be paid under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 H
638 SUPREME COURT REPORTSf1992] SUPP. 1 S.C.R.
A only and if there is any difference between the compensa-
tion payable under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 and the
compensation payable under the statute concerned the
acquisition under the statute would be discriminatory. That
case is distinguishable from the present case. In State of
Kera/a v. T.M. Peter, [1980] 3 SCR 290 : [1980] 3 SCC 554
B
also Section 34 of the Cochin Town Planning Act which
came up for consideration was of the same pattern as the
provision in the Nagpur Improvement Turst Act, 1936 and
for that reason the court followed the decision in the
Nagpur Improvement Tmst case. But in that decision itself
c the court observed at pages 302 and 303 thus (SCC p.564,
para 21):
"We are not to be understood to mean that the rate of
compensation may not vary or must be uniform in all
cases. We need not investigate this question further as it
D does not arise here although we are clear in our kind that
under given circumstances differentiation even in the scale
of compensation may comfortably comport with Article
14. No such circumstances are present here nor pressed."
E The decision in P.C. Goswami v. Collector of DaTTang
[1982] 1 sec 439 both of which are again distinguishable
from the present one.
It cannot also be said as a rule that the State which
F has got a supply .;,d maintain large public services at great
cost should always pay in addition to a reasonable com-
pensation some amount by way of solatium. The interest
of the public is equally important. In any event it is not
shown that the compensation payable in this case is il-
lusory and unreal."
G
This ruling is an authority for the proposition that solatium is not a
must in every case disregardful of the circumstances. Mr. Goswami, learned
counsel for the Union of India is justified in placing reliance on this ruling
to advance his contention that the provision in question is not dis-
H criminatory.
U.O.l. v. H.K. KHOSLA [MOHAN, J.] 639
The next case that could be usefully referred to is T.M. Peter's case A
(supra). This case arose under Town Planning Act, 1932 (Travancore Act
4 of 1108). This was a case of acquisition. The contention was raised in
paragraph 16 to the following effect:
"The more serious submission pressed tersely but
B
clearly, backed by a catena of cases, by Shri Viswanathan
merits our consideration. The argument is shortly this. As
between two owners of property, the presence of public
purpose empowers the State to take the lands of either or
both. But the differential nature of the public purpose
does not furnish a rational ground to pay more compen- c
sation for one owner and less for another and that imper-
tinence vitiates the present measure. The purpose may be
slum clearance, flood control or housing for workers, but
how does the diversity of purposes warrant payment of
differential scales of quantum of compensation where no
D
constitutional immunity as in Article 31-A, Bur C applies?
Public purpose sanctions compulsory acquisition, not dis-
criminatory compensation whether you take A's land for
improvement scheme or irrigation scheme, how can you
pay more or less, guided by an irrelevance viz. the par-
ticular public· purpsoe? The State must act equally when E
it takes property unless there is an intelligent and intel-
ligible differentia between two categories of owners having
a nexus with the object, namely the scale of compensation.
It is inteliectual confusion of constitutional principle to
regard classification good for one purpose as obliteration F
of differences for unrelated aspects. This logic is neatly
applied in a series of cases of this Court."
Relying on Nagpur Improvement Trust it was held that the basis of
'equality' jurisprudence is, that classification is not permissible for compen-
sation purposes, so long as the differentia relied on has on rational relation G
to the object in view viz. reduction in recompense. Ultimately, it was held
as under:
"We hold that the exclusion of Section 25 of the Land
AcquiSition Act from Section 34 of the Act is unconstitu- H
640 SUPREME COURT REPORTS[l992] SUPP. 1 S.C.R.
A tional but is severable and we sever it. The necessary
consequence is that Section 34(1) will be read omitting the
words 'and Section 25'. What follows then? Section 32
obligates the State to act under the Land Acquisition Act
but we have struck down that part which excludes Section
25. It continues to apply to the acquisition of property
B under the Town Planning Act. Section 34(2) provides for
compensation exactly like Section 25(1) of the Land Ac-
quisition Act and in the light of what we have just decided
Section 25(2) will also apply and "in addition to the market •;;:
value of the land as above provided, the court shall in every
c case award a sum of fifteen per centum on such market
value in consideration of the compulsory nature of the
acquisition."
•
In Narain Das Jain (since deceased) by Lrs. v.Agra Nagar Mahapalika,
Agra, [1991] 4 SCC 212 where the property was acquired by the Agra Town
D Improvement Trust under the provisions of U.P. Town Improvement (Ap-
peals) Act, 1920 (3 of 1920), the question arose whether the award of
solatium should be made. In paragraph 7 at page 215 it was stated thus:
'The importance of the award of solatium caDl'ot be w1-
dermined by any procedural blockades. It follows automat-
E
ically the market value of the land acquired, as a shadow
leaves no discretion with the court in not awarding it in
some cases and awarding in others. Since the award of
solatium is in consideration of the compulsory nature of
acquisition, it is a hanging mandate for the court to award
F and supply the omission at any stage where the court gets
occa~ion to amend or rectify. This is the spirit of the
provision, wherever made. n
However, it is to be noted that the denial of solatium by the High
G Court was in the following circumstances set out in paragraph 9:
'The denial of the solatium to the appellant on the sum
awarded by the Tribunal is based on the reasoning that
firstly the Collector had not awarded solatium and the
appellant while taking the matter to the Tribunal had not
H raised such claim. Secondly after the order of the Tribunal
U.0.1. v. H.K. KHOSLA [MOHAN, J.] 641
the appellant when taking the matter to the High Court in A
appeal, had not made a grouse and laid claim to it in his
grounds of appeal. The High Court, it appears was even
then prepared to grant solatium to the appellant and of-
fered the appellant to seek amendment of the grounds of
appeal but the appellant declined to do so asserting that
B
his claim to solatium was not based on any demand at his
instance but was rather a statutory duty of the court to grant
it, as otherwise, the mandate of Section 23(2) would fail.
The High Court negatived such contention.'
In Civil Appeal No.3058 of 1983, allowed on 31.1.83, where the C
property was acquired under the Defence of India Act, 1962, while dealing
with the question whether the High Court should have awarded solatium,
a Division Bench of this Court observed:
"We are satisfied that the appellants are entitted to relief
on both counts. The payment of solatium at 15% is an D
obligatory duty under the Land Acquisition Act and for
the same reason it should be regarded as obligatory under
the Defence of India Act. The circumstance that the ap-
pellants did not specifically pray for solatium in their
petiton does not disentitle them to an order directing E
payment of solatium. As regards the appellants for the
entire period up to the date .of payment, the rate of interest
being that at which interest has already been awarded by
the High Court for the period ending May 18, 1967.'
These are the rulings cited by Mr. R.K. Jain, learned counsel for the F
appellants.
We are of the firm view that cases of acquisition of land stand on a
different footing than those where such property is subject to a prior
requisition before acquisition. G
Therefore, the cases relating to acquisition like Vajrave/u Mudaliar's
case (supra), Ba/ammal's case (supra), Nagpur Improvement Trust case
(supra) and Peter's case (supra) are not helpful in deciding the point in issue
here. Goverdhan & Ors. v. Union of India & Anr. (Civil Appeal No3058 of
1983, allowed by this Court on 31.1.83) no doubt was case of acquisition H
642 SUPREME COURT REPORTS(l992] SUPP. 1 S.C.R.
A under the Defence of India Act, 1962 but it contains no discussion. It has
already been noticed that the award of solatium is not a must in every case as
laid down in Prakash Amichand Shah's case (supra). One more authority
1equires to be referred to. In P.C. Goswami v. Collector of Darrang, [1982] 1
SCC 439 ~ AIR 1982 SC 144 at paragraph 7 it has been held as under:
B "There is, however, one contention advanced by Mr. Nandy
which, in our opinion, deserves to be accepted. He con-
tendS'that in the matter of payment of solatium, no dis-
crimination can be made between acquisitions under the
Assam Act and those made under the Land Acquisition
c Act. Section 4(3) of the Assam Act itself says that if a land
is acquired under that Act, the State Government shall be
empowered to apply to such land any of the provisions of
the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. In a judgment State of
Kera/a v. T.M. Peter, [1980] 3 SEC 554 given by this Court
very recently, to which Mr. Nandy has drawn our attention,
D it was held that there is no justification for discriminating
between an acquisition under one Act and acquisition
under another Act in so far as payment of solatium is
concerned. This should be more so in respect of an acquisi-
tion to which the State Government is empowered to
E extend the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act. Mr.
Naunit Lal has not been able to controvert this position in
view of the judgment to which he have referred above. We
accordingly direct that the State Government shall pay to
the appellant solatium at the rate of 15 per cent on the
compensation awarded to him by the High Court. Except
F
for this modification, the decree passed by the High Court
is confirmed. The order of remand passed by the High
Court will stand."
It should be noted clearly that these reasonings were based on the
G language of Section 4(3) of Assam Act which empowered the application of
the provisions of Land Acquisition Act, 1894. But here the position is not so.
We are of the opinion that the amount of compensation can be fixed
by agreement under Section 8(1)(b). Ir the absence of such an agreement
H it is left to the discretion of the Arbitrator. The Arbitrator under Section
U.0.1. v. H.K. KHOSLA [MOHAN, J.) 643
8(1)(e) is to hear the dispute. Thereafter he is to determine the compen- A
sation which appears to him to be just. He must have regard to the
circumstances of each case while applying the provisions of sub-section
(3)(a) of Section 8 which reads as under:
"8(3): The compensation payable for the acquisition of any
property under Section 7 shall be- B
(a) the price which the requisitioned property would have
fetched in the open market, if it had remained in the same
condition as it was at the time of requisitioning and been
sold on the date of acquisition, or c
(b) ...
(Emphasis supplied)
In our view, the significant omission of solatium is indicative of the D
legislative intent necessitating stress on the expressions "just and cir-
cumstances of each case" occurring in sub-section (l)(a) thereof.
Yet another distinguished feature is the expression "open market".
The reason why solatium has not been provided is that "open market" E
contemplates a bargain between a free buyer and a free seller nnfettered
by the consideration of requisition and consequent acquisition.
Now we will deal with the reasons which prompted the High Court to
hold that this provision is discriminatory. To say that the owner of requisi-
tioned ·property was getting compensation does not make any difference, is F
not correct. Equally, to hold, as the High Court does, that the property
requisitioned under the Act can be acquired under the Land Acquisition
Act, does not seem to be correct. We have already pointed out how the power
of Eminent Domain comes to be exercised under the Land Acquisition Act
and how an acquisition under this Act is subject to the statutory embargo G
unless there is a derequisitioning of the immovable property and separate
proceedings are taken under the Land Acquisition Act, there is no possibility
of acquiring the property under the Land Acquisition Act.
Reference should also be made to Section 8(1)(e) of the Act. That
refers to three things: H
644 SUPREME COURT REPORTS[1992] SUPP. 1 S.C.R.
A (i) The amount of compensation which appears to be just;
(ii) the circumstances of each case; and
(iii) the provisions of sub-sections (2) and (3).
B The effect of this classification, in our opinion, is that the Arbitrator
must determined the amount of compensation which appears to him to be
just but he must have regard to sub-sections (2) and (3) of Section 8.
Therefore, where, a property which was subject to prior requisition comes
to be acquired the compensation should be awarded on the basis of the
principles adumberated in this Act.
c
The comparison of acquisition under this Act to an acquisition under
the land Acquisition Acf seems to be odious in view of the dissimilarities
between the two Acts which we have clearly indicated above. It is true that
originally the reuisition was under the Defence of India Act, 1962 in some
D cases. Even then the property could be acquired in view of Sec. 25(1) of
this Act which reads as under:
"25(1) Notwithstanding anything contained ill this Act, any
immovable property requisitioned by the Central Govern-
ment or by any officer or authority to whom powers in this
E behalf have been delegated by that Government, under the
Defence of India Act, 1962, and the rules made thereunder
(including any immovable property deemed to have been
requisitioned under the said Act) which has not been
released from such requisition before the 10th January,
1968, shall, as from that date, be deemed to have been
F requisitioned by the competent authority under the
provisions of this Act for the purpose for which such
property was held immediately before the said date and all
the provisons of this Act shall apply accordingly:
Provided that-
G
(a) all determination, agreement and awards for the pay-
ment of compensation in respect of any such property for
any period of requisition b<.fore the said date and in. force
immediately before the said date, shall continue to be in
H force and shall apply to the payment of compensation in
U.0.1. v. HK KHOSLA [MOHAN, J.] 645
respect of that property for any period .of requisition as A
from the said date:
(b) anything done or· any action taken (including any or-
ders, notification or rules made or issued) by the Central
Government or by any officer or authority_ to whom powers
in this behalf have been delegated by that Government, in B
exercise of the powers conferred by or under Chapter VI
of the Defence of India Act, 1962, shall, in so far as it is
not inconsistent with the provisions of this Act, be deemed
to have been done or taken in the exercise of the powers
conferred by or under this Act as if this section was in force c
on the date on which such thing was done or action was taken."
As a matter of fact in Hari Narain and others v. Union of India and
ors., AlR 1972 S.C. 2464 at 2465 the similar acquisition was held to be valid.
In the result, we hold that the failure to provide solatium at 15% or D
interest at 6% under Section 8(3)(a) of the Act does not make it dis-
criminatory.
Thus we answer Question No.1 that Section 8(3)(a) is not, in any way,
violative of Article 14.
E
Question No.2: What is the effect of the inclusion of the Act
in the 9th Schedule of the Constitution of India?
This Act came to be included in the 9th Schedule as Item No.89 with
effect from 10.8.75. The effect of such inclusion of the Madras Land
Reforms (Fixation of Ceiling on Land) Act, 1961 which was declared void F
by this Court came up for consideration in Jagannath etc. etc. v. The
Authorised Officer, Land Refonns and Ors. etc., (1971) 2 SCC 893. Para-
graphs 15 and 16 are extracted as below:
"On behalf of some of the respondents and the intervener,
the Attorney-General of India, it was argued that no re- G
enactment of the Act was necessary. Our attention was
drawn to the wide scope of Article 31-B which sought to
cure the defect, if any, in the Acts specified in the Ninth
Schedule on the ground that any such Act or any provision
thereof was inconsistent with or took away or abridged any H
646 SUPREME COURT REPORTS[1992] SUPP. 1 S.C.R.
A of the rights conferred by any provisions of Part III of the
Constitution. The words of Article 31-B, it was argued,
made it amply clear that this was sought to be done not
only prospectively but retrospectively by the use of the
words "None of the Acts ...... shall be deemed to be void or
ever to have become void on the ground of the inconsistency
B mentioned." The removal of the defect was to have effect.
"Notwithstanding any judgment, decree or order of any
court or tribunal to the contrary."
c In other words, this meant that if the defect in any such
Act had been the subject-matter of any decision of a court
of law and any provision of the Act had been held to be
void as being inconsistent with Part III of the Constitution
such judgment, decree or order was not to be operative on
the provisions of the Act. In effect, it was contended that
D
the inclusion of an Act in the Ninth Schedule to the Con-
stitution read with Article 31-B overrode and rectified all
defects in the Act because of inconsistency of any provision
therein with any of the fundamental rights conferred by
Part III of the Constitution, as from the date of the com-
E mencement of the Constitution, no matter whether the
defect had been pointed out in any judgment of a court of
law and the Act held t~ be void on that ground.
Counsel for tbi: respondent and the interveners drew
F our attention to the dicta of learned Judges of this Court
in several decisions which according to them fortified their
contention. The first doctrine referred to by the learned
Attorney-General was that State of Maharasthra v. Patil-
chand, [1968] 3 SCR 712 : AIR 1968 SC 1395 where the
judgment of a Bench of Seven Judges of this Court was
G delivered by our present Chief Justice. The Act impugned
there was the Maharashtra State Agricultural Lands (Ceil-
ing on Holdings) Act,1961, as amended by Act 13 of 1962.
The preamble to that Act is parctically idential with thal
of the Madras Act which is under consideration in this
H case. It was contended on behalf of the appellants there
U.0.1. v. H.K. KHOSLA [MOHAN, J.] 647
that Article 31-B did not protect from challenge on the A
ground of violation of fundamental rights the provisions
of the Acts amending Agricultural Lands (Ceiling on
Holidings) Act, 1%1, as orginally enacted and that the
Seventeenth Amendment Act in spite of the decision in
Go/a/math's case (supra) was invalid. Nagativing these
B
.contentions it was said (see at p.719):
"......the High Court was right in holding that Article 31-B
does protect the impugned Act from challenge on the
ground of violation of fundamental rights. There is no
doubt that Article 31-B should be interpreted strictly. But c
even interpreting it strictly, the only requirement which is
laid down by Article 31-B is that the Act should be specified
in the Ninth Schedule."
Section 28 of the Act which was the main target of attack and which the
High Court had originally found as violating Article 14 of the Constitution D
was held to be protected under Article 31-B from the ground of attack
based on infringment of Article.
Upholding these contentions it was observed in paragraph 23:
E
"Apart from the question as to whether fundamental rights
originally enshrined in the Constitution were subject to the
amendatory process of Article 368 it must now be held that
Article 31-B and the Ninth Schedule have cured the defect,
if any, in the various Acts mentioned in the said Schedule
as regards any unconstitutionality alleged on the ground of F
infringment of fundamental righis, and by the express
words of Article 31-B such curing of the defect took place
with retrospective operation from the dates on which the
Acts were put on the statute book. These Acts even if void
or inoperative at the time when they were enacted by
reason of infringment of Article 13(2) of the Constitution,
G
assumed full force and vigour from the respective dates of
their enactment after their inclusion in the Ninth Schedule,
read with Article 31-B of the Constitution. The States could
not, at any time, cure any defect arising from the violation
of the provisions of Part III of the Constitution and there- H
-'
648 SUPREME COURT REPORTS[l992] SUPP. 1 S.C.R.
A fore, the objection that the Madras Ceilings Act should
have been reenacted by the Madras Legislature after the
Seventeenth Constitutional Amendment came into force
cannot be accepted".
An identical question arose before the Calcutta High Court as seen
B in State of West Bengal v. Paritosh Kr. and Ors., 1984 Calcutta Weekly Notes
532, is enough if we extract the Head Note :
"The Requisitioning and Acquisition of Immovable
Property Act, 1952 having been included in the Ninth
c Schedule by the Constitution 39th Amendment Act, 1975,
under Article 31-B of the Constitution, Section 8(3) (b)
thereof is a valid provision in spite of the decision of the
Supreme Court in Union of India v. Kam/abai, A.LR. 1968
S.C. 377. Article 31B protects with restrospective effect an
Act which is included in the Ninth Schedule by subsequent
D amendment of the Constitution. After such inclusion, such
an Act becomes valid with retrospective effect even though
held unconstitutional and void by a previous judicial and
no re-enactment by a competent legislature is necessary.
The method of valuation adopted by the arbitrator in the
instant case was quite legal.
E
There is no provision in the Requisitioning and Ac-
quisition of Immovable Property Act, 1952 for payment of
additional compensation and Section 23(2) of the Land
Acquisition Act, 1894 for payment of solatium cannot be
F attracted to acquisition of land under the former Act."
As against this, learned counsel for the reapondent would draw our
attention to the case in Waman R® and Ors. etc. v. Union of India and
Ors., [1981) 2 SCC 362. Paragraph 51 is extracted as below:
G "Thus, insofar as the validity of Article 31-B read with the
Ninth Schedule is concerned, we hold that all acts and
Regulations included in the Ninth Schedule prior to April
24, 1973 will receive the full protection of Article 31-B.
Those laws and regulations will not be open to challenge
H on the ground that they are inconsistent with or take away
U.0.1. v. H.K. KHOSLA [MOHAN, J.] 649
or abridge any of the rights conferred by any of the A
provisions of Part III of the Constitution. Act and Regula-
tions, which are or will be included in the Ninth Schedule
on or after April, 1973 will not receive the protection of
Article 31-B for the plain reason that in the face of the
judgment in Kesavananda Bharati, there was no justifica-
tion for making additions to the Ninth Schedule with a view
B
to conferring a blanket protection on the laws included
therein. The various constitutional amendments, by which
additions were made to the Ninth Schedule on or after
April 24, 1973 will be valid only if they do not damage or
destroy the basic structure of the Constitution". c
On this basis, it is contended that Article 14 is the basic structure
and since Section 8(3}(a) offends that Article it damages or destroys the
basic structure of the Constitution. We have already held in answer to
Question No. 1 that there is no violation of Article 14. If this be so, the
ratio of Jagannath's case (supra) would squarely apply. D
In the resul~ these appeals will stand allowed with costs. The judg-
ments of the High Court and the award are set aside and the matter is
remitted to the Arbitrator to determine the award in accordance with the
provisions of this Act.
E
SLP (C) No. 1780 of 1991 :
Leave granted.
In this case, we set aside the award of 15% solatium and 6% interest
F
on enhanced compensation since permissibl~ under this Act. The appeal
is allowed only to that extent.
Civil Appeal Nos. 4688-94/89 & 2674-85/89:
This is a case in which for 16 years no Arbitrator was appointed. We think G
it is just and proper to apply the principle laid down in Harbans Singh Shanni
Devi and Ors. v. Union of India and Ors., (Civil Appeal Nos. 470 & 471of1985,
disposed of by this Court on 11th February, 1985}. The Court held as under:
"Having regard to the peculiar facts and circumstances of
the present case and particularly in view of the fact that H
650 SUPREME COURT REPORTS(1992) SUPP. 1 S.C.R.
A the appointment of the Arbitrator was not made by the
Union of India for period of 16 years, we think this is a fit
case in which solatium at the rate of 30% of the amount of
compensation and interest at the rate of 9% per annum
should be awarded to the appellants. We are making this
order having regard to the fact that the law has in the
B
meanwhile been amended with a view to providing solatium
at the rate of 30% and interest at the rate of 9% pe; annum,"
These appeals will stand dismissed accordingly.
Civil Appeal No. 995 of 1992 :
c
We set aside the enhanced compensation which is impermissible in
law. The appeal is allowed only to that extent.
Civil Appeal No. 2073 of 1990:
D As rightly contended by Mr. V.C. Mahajan, learned counsel for the
respondents that the peior award before enhancement was unsuccessfully
questioned in SLP(C) 4298 of 1984 by the Union; that having been dis-
missed, it would constitute res judicate as far as the original award is
concerned. However, the enhanced award is illegal and that alone is set
E aside. The appeal is allowed only to that extent.
Civil Appeal Nos. 1320-1322 of 1990:
The impugned judgment has been upheld with reference to the decision
in SLP(C) Nos. 4291-4348of1984. Therefore, that having become conclusive,
F it cannot be reopened. The appeals will stand dismissed accordingly.
Civil Appeal No. 1742-56 of 1986:
The award was made in the year 1%1. Since we have settled the
G question of law and taking into consideration the peculiar circumstances
of the case at this distance of time of 31 years, we are not inclined to disturb
the award. Hence, the appeals will stand dismissed.
There shall be no order as to costs in any one of these appeals.
N.V.K. Appeals allowed.
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