Holding

The High Court's judgments were in total non‑compliance with Order XLI Rule 31 CPC and are set aside, with the appeals remitted for fresh determination.

Summary

The Government of India acquired land for firing ranges and awarded compensation to landholders, who then sought a reference under Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. The Reference Court enhanced the compensation, but both the landholders and the Union of India appealed to the High Court. The High Court dismissed the appeals by a short, cryptic order without referring to any evidence, thereby violating the mandatory requirements of Order XLI Rule 31 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. The Supreme Court held that such non‑compliance vitiates the judgment, set aside the High Court’s orders and decrees, and remitted the matters for fresh consideration in accordance with law. The Court reiterated that appeals under Section 54 of the Land Acquisition Act are subject to the procedural provisions of the CPC.

Issues considered

Whether the High Court complied with the mandatory provisions of Order XLI Rule 31 CPC in hearing appeals from the award of the Reference Court under the Land Acquisition Act.
Whether a short, non‑reasoned order that does not consider the evidence satisfies the requirements of an appellate judgment.
Whether non‑compliance with Order XLI Rule 31 CPC renders the High Court's judgment void or vitiated.

Legislation cited

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908s. Order XLI Rule 31
Land Acquisition Act, 1894s. 18, s. 4(1), s. 54, s. 6(1), s. 9

Subjects

Land acquisitionCompensationAppealOrder XLI Rule 31Civil ProcedureSection 54Short orderJudicial discretion

Judgment

I
(

UNION OF INDIA & ANR. A
v.
RANCHOD & ORS.

DECEMBER 4, 2007
B
(G.P. MATHUR AND G.S. SINGHVI, JJ.]

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908-0rder XL! Rule 31-Appeals
from original decree-Land acquisition-Award ofcompensation by
Reference Court-Appeal against-Disposed ofby High Court without C
considering the evidence on record and by a short and cryptic order-
Held: There was non compliance ofthe mandatory provisions ofOrder
XL! Rule 31-Hence, Judgment of High Court set aside-Matter
-4 remanded back ot High Court for fresh decision-Land Acquisition
Act, 1894-s 54. D
Government of India acquired large area of the land for
establishing firing ranges. The Collector awarded compensation to
· the land holders. The land holders sought reference to be made
under section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, for enhancement E
of compensation .. The Reference Court awarded compensation for
unirrigated and uncultivable land and for irrigated land separately.
Both the land holders and the Union oflndia filed appeals. The High
Court dismissed the appeals by a short order.
In the other batch of appeals the State Government acquired F
land for a public purpose. The landholders were awarded
compensation. The Reference Court enhanced the compensation.
The landholders filed appeals against the award of Reference Court.
The High Court disposed of the same by short and cryptic order.
The appellant-State filed a review petition. High Court dismissed G
the same by a short order. Hence the present appeals.
Allowing the appeals and remitting the matter to the High Court,
the Court.
873 H
J

874 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2007] 12 S.C.R.

A HELD: 1.1. Section 54 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 states
the subject to the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908,
applicable to appeals from original decrees, and notwithstanding
anything to the contrary in any enactment for the time being in force,
an appeal shall only lie in any proceedings under this Act to the High
B Court from the award, or from any part of the award of the Court.
[Para 5) [877-E, F)

1.2. Order XLI CPC deals with appeals from original decrees.
Order XLI Rule 31 Iays down that the judgment of the appellate
court shall be in writing and shall state (a) points for determination,
C (b) the decision thereon, (c) the reasons for the decision, and (d)
where the decree appealed from is reversed or varied, the relief to
which the appellant is entitled. [Para 6) [877-G)
2.1. In the instant case, there were large number oflandholders
D whose lands were acquired and they filed separate objections under
section 9 of the Act and separately sought references under section
18 of the Act. They separately lead evidence in support of their cases
before the Reference Court. It is not a case where a single case
may have large number of parties and the evidence adduced is
E common for all of them. In the matter of determination of
compensation large number of factors have to be seen, namely,
nature and quality ofland, whether irrigated or unirrigated, facilities
for irrigation like existence of well etc., presence of fruit bearing
trees, the location of the land, closeness to any road or highway, the
F evenness of the land, namely, whether its level is even or there are
pits etc., its position in rainy season, namely, whether water gets
accumulated in rains, existence of any building or structure and a
host of factors having bearing on valuation of the land
[Para 8) (880-C, D, E)
G 2.2. The High Court did not refer to even an iota of evidence
which was adduced by the parties and there was absolutely no
indication in the judgment as to how it came to the conclusion that
the findings recorded by the reference court required to be affirmed.
There being total noncompliance of the mandatory provisions of
H Order XLI Rule 31 CPC, the judgments and decrees of the High
UNION OF INDIA v. RANCHOD 875

Court are set aside and the appeals both by the landholders and also A
by the Union of India are remitted to the High Court for fresh
decision in accordance with law.
[Paras 8, 9, 10, 11, 15and16) (880-F, G; 881-A)
G. Amalorpavam and Ors. v. R. C. Diocese ofMadurai, (2006) 3
B
SCC 224; Girja Nandini Devi v. Bijendra Narain Choudhury, AIR
(1967) SC 1124 andSantoshHazariv. Purushottam Tiwari, (2001) 3
sec 179, referred to.
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal Nos. 2108-
2194 of2003. c
From the Judgment and Order dated 01.09.1999 in FA 297/97,
FA 338/97, FA 339/97, FA 351/97, FA 402/97, FA 217/98, FA 372/
98, FA 454/98, FA 481/98, FA 539/98, FA 542/98, FA 548/98, FA
132/99, FA 311/97, FA 312/97, FA 328/97, FA 340/97, 340/98, FA
441197, FA 79/98, FA 143/98, FA 187/98, FA 194/98, FA 200/98, D
FA 201/98, FA 277/98, FA 338/98, FA 345/98, FA 346/98, FA 354/
98, FA362/98, FA 392/98, FA 439/98, FA 440/98, FA 445/98, FA 471/
98, FA 502/98, FA 145/99, FA 323/97, FA 335/97, FA 141/98, FA
383/98, FA 450/98, FA 550/98, FA 44/99, FA 164/99, FA 424/97,
FA 87/98, FA 257/98, FA 389/98, FA 30/99, FA 121/99, FA254/99, E
FA276/98, FA 468/98, FA 17/99, FA20/99, FA 257/99, FA 377/98,
FA 363/98, FA 373/98, FA 403/98, FA 453/98, FA 545/98, FA 181/
99, FA 378/98, FA 381/98, FA 472/98, FA 46/99, FA 290/99, FA 186/
99, FA 250/99, FA249/99, FA 441/98, FA 353/98, FA 188/98 of the
High Court ofM.P. at Indore. F
WITH
C.A. Nos.2266, 2269-2282, 2099-2107, 2283-2294, 2195-2254,
2267, 2268, 2255-2265 & 9511-9522 of2003 and 5609-5618 of2007.
Shipra Ghose, Sadhana Sandhu, Sunil Roy, R.C. Kathuria, Shail G
Kumar Dwivedi, B.K Prasad, Anita Sahani, Anil Katiyar, Niraj Sharma,
B.S. Banthia, B.V. Balaram Das, Siddhartha Dave, Vibha Datta Makhija,
M.M. Kashyap, Meera Mathur, Aishwarya Bhati and C.D. Singh for the
appearing parites.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by H
)

876 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2007] 12 S.C.R.

A G.P. MATHUR, J. 1. Leave granted in special leave petitions.
2. These appeals, by special leave, have been preferred against the
judgment and decree dated 1.9 .1999 of Madhya Pradesh High Court by
which the appeals filed by the landholders and also by the Union of India
were dismissed.
B
3. The Government of India issued notifications under Sections 4(1)
and 6( 1) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (hereinafter referred to as
the 'Act') for acquisition oflarge area ofland (4827.63 hectares) situate
in various villages in Tehsil Mhow, District Indore for establishing two firing
C ranges, namely, Bercha and Hema for the artillery wing of the army. An
area of 2917 .160 hectares was acquired for Bercha Firing Range and
I9 I0.464 hectares for Hema Firing Range. After receipt of notice under
Section 9 of the Act, the landholders submitted objections. The Collector,
Indore, after considering the objections of the landholders and making
D relevant inquiry, gave an Award regarding the compensation which was
to be paid to the landholders. The landholders being dissatisfied with the
Award of the Collector asked for a reference to be made to the court in
accordance with Section 18 of the Act. The reference court after taking
into consideration the evidence adduced by the parties gave an Award.
E It awarded compensation @Rs.58,000 per hectare for unirrigated and
uncultivable land and Rs.88,000 per hectare for irrigated land in Bercha
Firing Range. With regard to Hema Firing Range compensation was
awarded @ Rs.40,000 per hectare for uncultivable land, Rs.58,000 per
hectare for unirrigated land and Rs.88,000 per hectare for irrigated land.
F The landholders and also the Union oflndia preferred appeals against
the Award of the reference court before the High Court. The High Court
decided all the appeals by a common order, which is the subject-matter
of challenge in the present appeals. The High Court passed a short order
and the relevant part of the judgment dealing with the controversy is
G reproduced below: -
"5. We would have very much liked to examine the merit of rival
r
contentions, but it would serve the interests of none. It could only
prolong the agony of petty land-holders without resulting in the gain
to union coffers. Assuming appeals filed by the Union were to be
H allowed, it could prove futile because compensation amount
(

UNION OF INDIA v. RANCHOD[G.P.MATHUR,J.] 877

awarded by reference court stood paid or was in the process of A
being paid to land holders under the orders of this court with little
or no prospects ofits recovery. Similarly ifland-holders' plea was
to be entertained, it could entail remand to the reference court and
protract the proceedings for years on to their disadvantage and
detriment. Therefore taking all this into consideration and given B
regard to the interest of both parties we deem it appropriate to
end this litigation in "let be gones be gones" spirit, because
adverting to the issues raised by the parties would have opened
Pandora's Box resulting in unending litigation causing avoidable
hardship and inconvenience more particularly to poor land-holders C
who have reportedly gone through considerable sufferings during
the last 11 years for the sake ofNational Defence. This is not to
shy away from taking the adjudication to logical end but to
terminate the litigation to the mutual advantage and benefit of both
sides." D
4. Learned counsel for both the sides have submitted that the High
Court has not at all considered the evidence on record and has decided
the appeals by a short and cryptic order which shows a total non
application of mind. It has been submitted by learned counsel for the
parties that the matter requires fresh consideration in the light of evidence E
which has been adduced by the parties.
5. Section 54 of the Act, insofar as relevant for the purposes of the
present appeals, says that subject to the provisions of the Code of Civil
Procedure, 1908, applicable to appeals from original decrees, and F
notwithstanding anything to the contrary in any enactment for the time
being in force, an appeal shall only lie in any proceedings under this Act
to the High Court from the award, or from any part of the award of the
Court.
6. Order XLI CPC deals with appeals from original decrees. Order G
XU Rule 31 lays down that the judgment of the appellate court shall be
in writing and shall state (a) the points for determination, (b) the decision
thereon, (c) the reasons for the decision, and (d) where the decree
appealed from is reversed or varied, the relief to which the appellant is
H
I
I
878 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2007] 12 S.C.R.

A entitled. This provision has come up for consideration in innumerable
occasions and its meaning and scope has been explained. It is not
necessary for us to refer to various decisions but we will refer to one of
the recent judgments given in G. Amalorpavam and Ors. v. R. C. Diocese
ofMadurai, [2006] 3 SCC 224, wherein this Court observed as under:-
B 'The question whether in a particular case there has been
substantial compliance with the provisions of Order 41 Rule 31
CPC has to be determined on the nature of the judgment delivered
in each case. Non-compliance with the provisions may not vitiate
the judgment and make it wholly void, and may be ignored if there
c has been substantial compliance with it and the higher appellate
court is in a position to ascertain the findings of the lower appellate
court. It is no doubt desirable that the appellate court should
comply with all the requirements of Order 41 Rule 31 CPC. But
if it is possible to make out from the judgment that there is
D substantial compliance with the said requirements and that justice
has not thereby suffered, that would be sufficient. Where the
appellate court having considered the entire evidence on record
and discussed the same in detail, come to any conclusion and its
findings are supported by reasons even though the point has not
E been framed by the appellate court there is substantial compliance
with the provisions of Order 41 Rule 31 CPC and the judgment
is not in any manner vitiated by the absence of a point of
determination. ·Where there is an honest endeavour on the part of
the lower appellate court to consider the controversy between the
F parties and there is proper appraisement of the respective cases
and weighing and balancing of the evidence, facts and the other
considerations appearing on both sides is clearly manifest by the
perusal of the judgment of the lower appellate court, it would be
a valid judgment even though it does not contain the points for
G determination. The object of the rule in making it incumbent upon
the appellate court to frame points for determination and to cite
r
reasons for the decision is to focus attention of the court on the
rival contentions which arise for determination and also to provide
litigant parties opportunity in understanding the ground upon which
H the decision is founded with a view to enable them to know the
(
UNION OF INDIA v. RANCHOD[G.P.MATHUR,J.] 879

basis of the decision and, if so considered appropriate and so A
advised, to avail the remedy of second appeal conferred by Section
100 CPC."
In Girja Nandini Devi v. Bijendra Narain Choudhury, AIR (1967)
SC 1124, an observation was made that it is not the duty of the appellate B
court when it agrees with the view of the trial court on the evidence either
to restate the effect of the evidence or to reiterate the reasons given by
the trial court. Expression of general agreement with reasons given by
the Court decision of which is under appeal would ordinarily suffice.
7. The aforesaid observation in Girja Nandini Devi (supra) is often C
misunderstood and sometimes the courts while delivering a judgment of
affumance have adopted a shortcut method of not considering the evidence
but merely expressing a general agreement with the reasons given by the
trial court. This case was considered in Santosh Hazari v. Purushottam
Tiwari, [2001 J 3 SCC 179, wherein it was observed as below : - D
"The appellate court has jurisdiction to reverse or affirm the
findings of the trial court. First appeal is a valuable right of the
parties and unless restricted by law, the whole case is ther~in open
for rehearing both on questions of fact and law. The judgment of
the appellate court must, therefore, reflect its conscious application E
of mind and record findings supported by reasons, on all the issr es
arising along with the contentions put forth, and pressed by the
parties for decision of the appellate court. The task of an appellate
court affirming the findings of the trial court is an easier one. The
appellate court agreeing with the view of the trial court need not F
restate the effect of the evidence or reiterate the reasons given by
the trial court; expression of general agreement with reasons given
by the court, decision of which is under appeal, would ordinarily
suffice (see Girja Nandini Devi v. Bijendra Narain Choudhury).
We would, however, like to sound a note of caution. Expression G
of general agreement with the findings recorded in the judgment
under appeal should not be a device or camouflage adopted by
the appellate court for shirking the duty cast on it. While writing a
judgment of reversal the appellate court must remain conscious of
two principles. Firstly, the findings of fact based on conflicting H
880 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2007] 12 S.C.R.

A evidence arrived at by the trial court must weigh with the appellate
court, more so when the findings are based on oral evidence
recorded by the same Presiding Judge who authors the judgment.
This certainly does not mean that when an appeal lies on facts,
the appellate court is not competent to reverse a finding of fact
B arrived at by the trial Judge. As a matter of law if the appraisal of
the evidence by the trial court suffers from a material irregularity
or is based on inadmissible evidence or on conjectures and
surmises, the appellate court is entitled to interfere with the finding
of fact."
c 8. In the case in hand the High Court has not referred to even an
iota of evidence which was adduced by the parties. There were large
number of landholders whose land was acquired and they had filed
separate objections under Section 9 of the Act and had separately sought
references under Section 18 of the Act. They had separately lead evidence
D in support of their cases before the reference court. It is not a case where
a single case may have large number of parties and the evidence adduced
is common for all of them. In the matter of determination of compensation
large number of factors have to be seen, namely, nature and quality of
land, whether irrigated or unirrigated, facilities for irrigation like existence
E of well etc., presence of fruit bearing trees, the location of the land,
closeness to any road or highway, the evenness of the land, namely,
whether its level is even or there are pits etc., its position in rainy season,
namely, whether water gets accumulated in rains, existence ofany building
or structure and a host of factors having bearing on valuation of the land.
F
9. The High Court has not at all adverted to even a single piece of
evidence and there is absolutely no indication in the judgment as to how
it has come to a conclusion that the findings recorded by the reference
court require to be affirmed.
G 10. There being total non-compliance of the mandatory provisions
of Order XLI Rule 31 CPC we have no option but to set aside the
judgment of the High Court and remand the matter to the High Court for
fresh consideration of the appeals.
11. In the result, the appeals are allowed and the judgment and
H
I

(
UNIONOFINDIA v.RANCHOD[G.P.MATHUR,J.] 881

decree dated 1.9 .1999 of the High Court is set aside. The appeals (both A
· by the landholders and also by the Union oflndia) are remitted to the
High Court for fresh decision in accordance with law. Parties to bear their
own,costs.
CIVIL APPEAL NOS. of 2007
B
(@ S.L.P. (C) Nos. 740-41 OF 2004
12. These appeals, by special leave, have been preferred against
the judgment and decree dated 27.6.2000 of Madhya Pradesh High
Court.
c
13. The State Government issued notifications under Sections 4(1)
and 6(1) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (hereinafter referred to as
the 'Act') for acquiring large area of land for a public purpose. After
receipt of the notice under Section 9 of the Act the landholders filed
objections. The Collector, after consideration of the objections, made an D
Award awarding compensation @Rs.12,000 per hectare for dry land
and Rs.18, 000 per hectare for irrigated land. Feeling aggrieved by the
Award the landholders asked for a reference under Section 18 of the Act.
The reference court enhanced the compensation and awarded Rs.22,000
per hectare for dry land and Rs.33,000 per hectare for irrigated land. E
Against the Award of reference court the landholders preferred appeals
before the High Court under Section 54 of the Act. The High Court
decided the appeals by extremely short and cryptic order and the entire
judgment passed by the Division Bench of the High Court, comprising
Justice RD. Vyas and Justice Shambhoo Singh, is reproduced below: -
~ F
"These appeals arise out of the similar acquisition proceedings
as in the case of First Appeal No. 254/97 and the group decided
by this Court in the Division Bench consisting of Justice B.A. Khan
and Justice Shambhoo Singh on 01.09.99 are taken together. First
appeal No. 134/95 and First Appeal No. 223/96 are taken up G
for hearing today itself at the request of the parties and disposed
of along with the group.
The compensation will be governed by the principle and amount
decided in the aforesaid judgment of this Court meaning thereby
H
)
882 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2007] 12 S.C.R.

A that the unirrigated lands will be paid Rs.58,000/- per hectare and
the irrigated land Rs.88,000/- per hectare as confirmed in the said
judgment. The appeals are accordingly disposed off. The Court-
fees deposited in the appeal filed by the claimants/land holde~ shall
be returned to them as per the directions in the aforesaid judgment
B A copy of this judgment be placed in the connected appeal."
14. The appellant State of Madhya Pradesh preferred a review
petition against the aforesaid judgment and decree dated 27 .6.2000. In
the review petition the High Court took the view that the case did not fall
within the purview of Order 47 Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure
C and accordingly dismissed the same by a short order of eight lines.
15. Since in the present case the High Court has followed the
judgment and decree dated 1. 9.1999, which has been quoted above and
since we have set aside the said judgment and have remanded the matter
D to the High Court for fresh consideration, the judgments and decrees
under challenge in the present appeals have also to be set aside.
16. The appeals are accordingly allowed and the judgment and
decree dated 27.6.2000 and also the order passed in the review petition
dated 22.3.2002 are set aside and the appeals are remitted to the High
E Court for a fresh consideration in accordance with law. Parties to bear
their own costs.
NJ. Appeals allowed.