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Supreme Court of India

UNION OF INDIA & ANR.versusPREMCO-DKSPL (JV) & ORS.

Citation
2016 INSC 555
Decided
25 July 2016
Disposal
Appeal(s) allowed

Holding

The application under Section 11(6) was premature; the Railways had not forfeited its right to appoint arbitrators, and the lower court’s order was set aside.

Summary

The dispute concerned a clause in a railway‑contractor agreement that required the contractor to give a written demand for arbitration, after which the Railways had 60 days to furnish a panel of more than three eligible railway officers. The contractor sent its demand on 12 June 2013 but filed an application under Section 11(6) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act on 23 July 2013, before the 60‑day period elapsed. The High Court held that the Railways had forfeited its right to appoint arbitrators and appointed a former judge as arbitrator. On appeal, the Supreme Court found that the contractor’s application was premature, the Railways had not defaulted, and the lower court had misread the contractual clause. Consequently, the appeal was allowed, the impugned order set aside, and the contractor was permitted to serve a fresh notice for arbitration.

Issues considered

  • Whether the contractor’s premature application under Section 11(6) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act results in forfeiture of the Railways’ right to appoint arbitrators under the agreement.
  • Whether the 60‑day period stipulated in clause 64(3)(a)(ii) must be respected before invoking Section 11(6).
  • Whether the lower court erred in applying the Datar Switchgears precedent to the present facts.

Legislation cited

Subjects

ArbitrationSection 11Appointment of arbitratorForfeiturePremature applicationRailway contractArbitration and Conciliation Act 1996

Judgment

                             [2016] 3 S.C.R. 484



A                       UNION OF INDIA & ANR.
                                     v.
                      PREMCO-DKSPL (JV) & ORS.
                       (Civil Appeal No. 6179 of2016)
B                              JULY25,2016
          [SHIVA KIRTI SINGH AND R. BANUMATHI, JJ.]
            Arbitration and Conciliation Act. 1996: s.11 -Appointment
    of arbitrator - Stipulation in the agreement that on the request of
    respondent-contractor for arbitration. Railways shall send them a
c   panel of more than 3 names of railway officers within 60 days
    whereafter the contractor would suggest at least two names out of
    that panel for appointment of contractors nominee - Such
    suggestion from contractor was required to be made within 30 days
    from the dispatch of request by Railway - Contractor sent a notice
D   demanding arbitration on 12.6.2013 which was served on Railways
    on J.I. 6.2013 - Instead of waiting for 60 days, the contractor
    preferred application u/s.11 on 23. 7.2013 - Railways sent a panel
    of 4 names to the contractor on 30. 7.2013, well within 60 days -
    Whether Railway had forfeited its right to appoint railway officers
    as arbitrators in terms of agreement - Held: Railway had not
E
    forfeited its right to appoint arbitrator - Rather the application ul
    s.11 (6) was premature - Notice of appointment was served on
    14. 06. 2013 - Contractor ought to have waited for a period of atleast
    60 days before s.11 application could be filed - Instead of waiting
    for 60 days, the contractor/respondent preferred such application
F   prematurely on 23.07.2013 - Thus, Railways had not committed
    default and had not forfeited their right to appoint arbitrators as
    per terms of the agreement.
          Allowing the appeal, the Court
          HELD: 1. In the facts and circumstances, it did not lie in
G   the mouth of the respondent contractor that the appellants had
    committed a default and had forfeited their right to appoint
    arbitrators as per terms of the agreement. The Judge failed to
    read the relevant clause of the agreement properly and
    therefore wrongly placed reliance upon judgment in the case of
H   Datar Switchgears. In that case this Court had extracted the
                                 484
 UNION OF INDIA & ANR. v. PREMCO-DKSPL (JV) & ORS.                           485


relevant terms of agreement which showed that there was no                    A
stipulation of any time limit like that of 60 days in the present
case. The terms of the Agreement bind the parties unless they
have chosen to repudiate the same. Relevant terms, if provided,
will be material for deciding when the right of a party to appoint
the arbitrator will suffer forfeiture and when the other party would
                                                                              B
be entitled to give notice and on failure, move application under
Section 11(6) of the Act. Such terms deserve respect of the parties
and attention of the Court. In case the respondent contractor is
still desirous of pursuing its claim through arbitration in terms
of the agreement, it is given the option to serve a fresh notice for
arbitration within a month and on receipt of the same the                     c
appellants/railways shall be at liberty to send a panel of requisite
number of names to the respondents within 60 days of receipt of
the notice so that Arbitral Tribunal is constituted in terms of
the Agreement. It goes without saying that ifthe Railways default
in sending the panel within the stipulated time; the contractor
                                                                              D
will be at liberty to pursue its further remedies as per provisions
of the Act and law. [Paras 6, 7) (488-B-G)
      Datar Switchgears Ltd. v. Tata Finance Ltd. & Anr.
      (2008) 8 sec 151 - referred to.
                        Case Law Reference                                    E
      (2008) 8 sec 151            referred to              Para3
     CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 6179
of2016.
     From the Judgment and Order dated 25.02.2014 of the High Court
                                                                              F
ofGauhati in Arbitration Petition No. 14 of2013.
      Ms. Kiran Suri, Sr. Adv., N. K. Kashail, Ms. Sadhna Sandhu,
Shreekant N. Terdal, Advs. for the Appellants.
      Anil Kumar Mishra, Advs. for the Respondents.
      The Judgment of the Court was delivered by                              G
       SHIVA KIRTI SINGH, J. I. The appellants have assailed the
legality and correctness of final order dated 25.02.2014 passed in
Arbitration Petition No.14 of2013 by an Hon'ble Judge ofGauhati High
Court designated by the Chief Justice of that Court to de9ide respondents'
applications under Section 11 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act,        H
486               SUPREME COURT REPORTS                           [2016] 3 S.C.R.


A     1996 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act'). By the impugned order the
      designated Judge allowed the application under Section 11 of the Act
      and appointed a former Judge of that Cow1 as the Arbitrator after holding
      that the appel Iants had forfeited their right to appoint railway officers as
      arbitrators in terms of clause 64(3)(a)(ii) of the agreement.
B            2. According to Ms. Kiran Suri, learned senior counsel for the
      appellants the impugned order suffers from apparent error of fact on
      account of misreading or non-reading of the relevant clause of the
      Agreement, i.e., clause 64(3)(a)(ii) which requires the contractor/
      respondent to make a written demand for arbitration and permits 60
      days' time to the Railways from the date of receipt of the demand, to
c     send a panel of more than three names of eligible gazetted railway officers
      so that the contractor may suggest to General Manager at least two
      names out of that panel for appointment of the contractor's nominee.
      Such suggestion from the contractor should come within 30 days from
      the dispatch of the request by Railways. According to learned senior
D     counsel, the relevant clause though indicated in paragraph 4 of the
      impugned order has been misread leading to an erroneous inference in
      the following words :
              · " .... This Clause permits the respondents to nominate a
                railway officer, provided of course, the nomination is made
E               within 30 days of receipt of the demand letter from the
                petitioner. But since there was no reaction from the rai Iways
                side within the permissible 30 days and since in the meantime
                the contractor has approached the High Court under Section
                I I (6) of the Arbitration Act, having regard to the decision
                in Datar Switchgears Ltd. (supra) it is apparent that the
F               respondents have forfeited their right to appoint a railway
                officer as the arbitrator."
             3. It has been further contended on behalf of the appellants that
      the law laid down in the case of Datar Switch~ears Ltd. v. Tata
      Finance Ltd. &Anr. 1 has not been correctly appreciated by the learned
G     Judge because in that case failure to meet the demand to appoint an
      arbitrator was apparent on account of expiry of the notice period of 30
      days indicated in the demand. Even then the Court held that since the
      application was under Section I I (6)(a) of the Act and since that Section
      does not prescribe any time limit rather gives an unfettered discretion to
H     1
          <2000) s sec 151
    UNION OF INDIA & ANR. v. PREMCO-DKSPL (JV) & ORS.                            487
                  [SHIVA KIRT! SINGH, J.]

appoint an arbitrator without any time limit, such power will stand forfeited    A
only after the party making the demand has moved the Court under
Section 11 and not on mere expiry of the notice period of30 days. It is
appellants' stand that in view of stipulations in the relevant clause
providing for arbitration, the respondent-contractor admittedly sent a notice
demanding arbitration on 12.06.2013 which was served on the appellants
                                                                                  B
on 14.06.2013 and hence it had to wait for 60 days for receipt of a panel
of more than three names. Thereafter the contractor had to suggest
two names for appointment of his nominee arbitrator within 30 days.
The cause of action for sending a notice of30 days or any reasonable
period, in view of clear terms in the Arbitration Agreement which has
not been repudiated, can arise only after 60 days. Hence according to             c
learned senior counsel for the appellants, the learned Judge erred in
holding that the appel Iants had forfeited their right to appoint arbitrators.
Instead, the finding should have been that the application under Section
11 ( 6) of the Act was premature.
       4. On behalf ofappellants reliance has been placed upon judgment           D
of this Court by a three Judges Bench in the case of Northern Railway
Administration, Ministry ofRaihvay v. Patel Engineering Company
Limited~ in support of the proposition that in the appointment of arbitrator
by court under Section 11 (6), the Chief Justice or the designated person
shall have "due regard to the two conditions in Section 11 (8)(a) and (b)
relating to qualifications required for the arbitrator by the agreement of        E
the parties; and other considerations relevant to secure the appointment
of an independent and impartial arbitrator''. Hence, in any event
appointment of a non-technical person, a former judge as arbitrator was
unwarranted.
       S. On behalf of respondent contractor the relevant facts have not          F
been disputed and hence on facts it is beyond any doubt that the learned
Judge has misread or omitted to read the relevant clause of the agreement
which allows 60 days' time to the Railways to respond to the demand of
the contractor by sending a panel containing more than three names out
of which the contractor has to suggest at least two names to the Railways         G
which has to appoint one out of them as the contractor's nominee. The
relevant dates are also not in dispute~ Since the notice for appointment
ofarbitrators dated 12.06.2013 was served on the railways on 14.06.2013,
the contractor had to respect the terms of the agreement which was
2
    (2008) 1osec 240                                                              H
488             SUPREME COURT REPORTS                           [2016) 3 S.C.R.



A     unrepudiated and to wait for a period of at least 60 days before Section
      11 application could have been filed. Instead of waiting for 60 days the
      contractor/respondent preferred such application prematurely on
      23.07.2013. The Railways sent a panel of 4 names to the respondent on
      30.07.2013, well within 60 days limit.
B            6. In the aforesaid facts and circumstances it did not lie in the
      mouth of the respondent contractor that the appellants had committed a
      default and had forfeited their right to appoint arbitrators as per terms of
      the agreement. The learned Judge failed to read the relevant clause of
      the agreement properly and therefore wrongly placed reliance upon
      judgment in the case of Datar Switchgears (supra). In that case this
c     Court had extracted the relevant terms of agreement in paragraph 9
      which showed that there was no stipulation of any time limit like that of
      60 days in the present case. The terms of the Agreement bind the
      parties unless they have chosen to repudiate the same. Relevant terms,
      if provided, will be material for deciding when the right of a party to
D     appoint the arbitrator wi II suffer forfeiture and when the other party
      would be entitled to give notice and on failure, move application under
      Section 11 (6) of the Act. Such terms deserve respect of the parties and
      attention of the Court.
             7. In view of aforesaid discussions we find no option but to set
E     aside the impugned order under appeal. We order accordingly. In case
      the respondent contractor is still desirous of pursuing its claim through
      arbitration in terms of the agreement, it is given the option to serve a
      fresh notice for arbitration within a month and on receipt of the same the
      appellants/railways shall be at liberty to send a panel of requisite number
      of names to the respondents within 60 days of receipt of the notice so
F     thatArbitral Tribunal is constituted in terms of the Agreement. It goes
      without saying that if the Railways default in sending the panel within
      the stipulated time, the contractor will be at liberty to pursue its further
      remedies as per provisions o(the Act and law. The appeal is al lowed in
      aforesaid terms but without any order as to costs.
G
      Devika Gujral                                                Appeal allowed.


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