Holding

The departmental proceeding initiated after the respondent’s total exoneration was invalid due to bias and violation of natural justice, and the dismissal was set aside, mandating his reinstatement with benefits.

Issues considered

Can a departmental proceeding be initiated against an employee after his acquittal in criminal court?
Is the initiation of a departmental proceeding after a nine‑year lapse valid?
Did the inquiry officer act with bias, violating the principles of natural justice?
Was Rule 14 of the Central Civil Services (Conduct) Rules, 1965 correctly applied in the inquiry?
Are the charges in the departmental proceeding distinct enough from the criminal charges to justify a new proceeding?
Was the departmental proceeding bona fide, reasonable and fair?

Legislation cited

Arms Acts. Section 27
Customs Acts. Section 108, s. Section 110, s. Section 112
Indian Penal Code, 1860s. Section 120B, s. Section 409

Subjects

departmental proceedingsmisconductnatural justicebiasrule 14civil service rulesreinstatementacquittalintelligence bureausmugglingdisciplinary action

Judgment

[2008] 5 S.C.R. 137

·- ... UNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS A
v.
NAMAN SINGH SEKHAWAT
(Civil Appeal No. 140 of 2007)
MARCH 14, 2008
B
'~ (S.B. SINHA AND HARJIT SINGH BEDI, JJ.)

Service Law:
Misconduct - Sub-Inspector working in Intelligence
Bureau allegedly indulging in smuggling activities - Initiation c
of departmental proceedings - Criminal proceedings also
initiated against him for committing offences punishable u/
ss. 409, 120B I. P. C., s. 13(2) of the Foreigners Act and s. 27 of
the Arms Act, resulting in acquittal of accused/delinquent -
Departmental authorities dropping charges against him as not D
.... proved - Initiation of another departmental proceeding against
~
him on the same ground after lapse of 9 years - Dismissal
from service - Reversed by Tribunal - Appeal against,
dismissed by High Court - Correctness of'- Held: Correct -
Delinquent exonerated by the authorities and the Criminal E
Court - Initiation of departmental proceedings by the
authorities after lapse of nine years has not been explained -
Imputation of misconduct, after exoneration by authorities/
Criminal Court, is beyond anybody's comprehension - Bias
on the part of inquiry officer explicit from the record - I. 0. and F
I,
consequently the disciplinary authority misdirected
~ themselves in law as they posed themselves a wrong question
- Principles of natural justice not complied with in the
departmental proceedings - Disciplinary authority differed with
the findings of the authorities and criminal Court without
G
assigning any reasons - Though departmental proceeding
permissible after recording of the judgment of acquittal by a
criminal Court but it must be initiated bonafide - Evidence of
driver of jeep, an eyewitness, is totally against the department
137 H
138 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 5 S.C.R.

A - Neither he was cross-examined nor it was held that he
deposed falsely - Hence, there is no infirmity in the impugned
iudgment warranting any interference - Initiation of
departmental proceedings against delinquent after acquittal
in criminal proceedings - Permissibility of - Central Civil
B Service (CCA) Rules, 1965 - r. 14.
Disciplinary proceecfings - Renders to nullity - Held:
When Inquiry Officer is biased.
Respondent was working as Sub-Inspector in the
c Intelligence Bureau. His job was to collect information in
regard to anti-national activities. One day, while he was
carrying the seized smu!~gled goods for delivering them
to the customs authorities, he was intercepted by the
Police and arrested on the charge of carrying the
smuggled goods in colllusion with a smuggler in his
0
official jeep. Accordin~1ly, a criminal proceeding was
initiated against him for commission of offences
punishable u/ss. 409 and 1208 l.P.C. r/w s. 13(2) of the
Foreigners Act; s. 27 of the Arms Act and s.110 of the
Customs Act. In the departmental proceeding initiated
E against him, the authorities came to a finding that there
was no evidence on rec:ord to establish involvement of
respondent in the alleg1ed crime. It was directed by the
authorities to confiscate the goods so carried by the
respondent dropping charges levelled against him and
F others. In the criminal proceedings, charges were not
proved against him and a judgment of acquittal was
recorded against him and other officials accompanying
him In the jeep. No appecil was preferred by the authorities/
Union of India. However, later, a second disciplinary
G proceeding was initiated against him, which was allegedly
not conducted prop1arly, and as a result of the
proceedings, the Inquiry Officer found him guilty of the
charges of misconduc:t levelled against him. He was
dismissed from the service. Appeal filed thereagainst was
H dismissed by the appellate authorities. Aggrieved from the
UNION OF INDIAAND OTHERS v. NAMAN SINGH 139
SE KHAWAT

-\ order of the appellate authority, respondent filed an A
Original Application before the Central Administrative
Tribunal. The Tribunal directed the authorities to reinstate
him in service with all consequential benefits. A writ
petition filed thereagainst was dismissed by the High
Court. Hence the present appeal. B
~-
It was contended by the Union of India and Others
. that the Tribunal and the High Court committed a serious
error in passing the impugned judgments in so far as they
failed to take into consideration that it is permissible for
the disciplinary authority to initiate a departmental c
proceeding even after the judgment of acquittal is
recorded in a criminal case inasmuch as similar evidence
can be viewed differently by the criminal court and an
inquiry officer having regard to the standard of proof
involved in the respective proceedings; that the criminal D
.., court having acquitted the respondent only on benefit of
.., doubt, the departmental proceeding was maintainable;
that in any event, the charges levelled against the
respondent in the criminal case and the departmental
proceeding were different; that the High Court, although E
noticed the legal principles operating in the field correctly,
failed to apply the same to the facts of the present case;
and that the Tribunal committed a serious illegality in
opining that a preliminary inquiry was required to be
conducted after the judgment of acquittal was passed. F
Respondent-employee submitted that the Customs
_\.. Authorities as also the Judicial Magistrate having held that
he was not guilty of the charges, the impugned judgment
is unassailable; that he being the Officer lncharge of the
Unit, was entitled to take all such actions which were G
necessary to act as an Intelligence Officer; that the
witness who could have proved that the smugglers were
the target of the respondent, having not been examined,
the Principle of Natural Justice was violated; that as an
lncharge of the office, he indisputably was entitled to use H
140 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008) 5 S.C.R.

A the government vehicle as also the arms; and that the )-
finding recorded by the disciplinary authority was wholly
perverse.
Dismissing the appeal, the Court

B HELD: 1. Initiation of the departmental proceeding
must be viewed in the baclkground of total exoneration of '('
the respondent-employee by the Customs Authorities and
the Criminal Court. (Para -- 19) [154-B]
2.1 Trans-border smuggling is a subject of federal
c function. This Court failed to understand as to why no
deeper probe was made in regard to his involvement of
the delinquent, if any, vis-a-vis the role of the officers of
the concerned police station. Larger public interest
demanded such probe. If the contention of the appellant
D was correct, the comp1~tent authority of the Central
Government should have taken up the matter with the v
State Government. Such inaction on the part of the >-
appellant is a matter of deep pubic concern. (Para - 21)
[154-E-G]
E 2.2 If the charges levelled against the respondent in
the departmental proceeding only related to administrative
lapses on his part, it could have been initiated long back.
Why was it initiated after a period of nine years has not
been explained. (Para - 22) [154-G]
F
2.3 The identity and! the activity of the private person,
who was found in the company of the respondent, should -f
have been investigatE~d by the competent authority,
particularly when re~spondent was working in the
Intelligence Department. (Para - 22) [155-B]
G
2.4 The Department of Customs of the Union of India
having examined the entire question, they found the
respondent innocent. As trans-border smuggling was the
common theme both before the said authority as also in
H the criminal court, the department concerned was
UNION OF INDIAAND OTHERS v. NAMAN SINGH 141
SE KHAWAT

expected to keep a strict vigil thereover. The question of A
mis-utilisation of jeep etc., was not brought to the notice
of the Customs Authorities. Such a question was also not
raised in the criminal proceeding. It was necessary to do
so so as to prove the charges of conspiracy. The
prosecution, thus, utterly failed to prove such a charge. B
(Para - 23) [155-C-E]
2.5 In the departmental proceeding the appellant was
bound to comply with the principles of natural justice.
Copies of some documents were not supplied. Services
of a legal practitioner, may not be a matter of right, but the C
delinquent was atleast entitled to the effective assistance
of the departmental representative. The same was also
for all intent and purport denied. (Para - 24) [155-E, FJ
2.6 The appellate authority did not consider the legal
0
question that the Inquiry Officer was bound to take
recourse to Rule 14 of the CCS (CCA) Rules particularly
when, apart from the orders of the Customs Authorities
and the criminal case, no other evidence appears to have
been brought on record. No reason has been assigned
as to why the request of the respondent to call one 'J' as E
defence witness to prove the bonafide of the respondent
had been turned down. (Para - 26) [156-D, E]
2.7 The bias on the part of the Inquiry Officer is
explicit from the record. Why the Inquiry- Officer cross- F
examined the respondent is beyond anybody's
>
comprehension. He was not the prosecutor. A Presenting
Officer had been appointed. The Inquiry Officer could not
have taken over the job of the Presenting Officer,
particularly when he was a superior of~icer. Valid and G
sufficient reasons have not been assigned by the Inquiry
Officer in this behalf. His finding that the respondent
should have informed his superior who was available at
the close point, is contrary to the evidence of the driver of
the official jeep. (Para - 26) [156-E-G]
H
142 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 5 S.C.R.

A .3.1 In regard to the suggestion before this Court that
the charges against the respondent in the criminal case
and the departmental proceeding were different, this
Court failed to undE!rstand what sort of public duty the
respondent was expected to perform when he was
B intercepted by the police in a jeep which was driven by a
notorious smuggler who had been detained under MISA. '(
If the conduct of the respondent did not cause any
embarrassment to the department in the year 1983, how,
after exoneration by the Customs Authorities and acquittal
c by the criminal court, his acts embarrassed the
department, so as 1to form the basis of imputation of
misconduct, is beyond anybody's comprehension.
(Para - 27) [157 -A, B, CJ
3.2 The Inquiry Officer and consequently the
D disciplinary authorit~f misdirected themselves in law as
they posed unto themselves a wrong question. The ,.
appellate authority's findings had not been considered at
all. (Para - 27) [157-C)
3.3 The disciplinary authority for all intent and
E purport, differed with the findings of the Customs
Department as well as the criminal court, but no basis
therefor was disclos,ed. No such evidence was brought
on record. No witness was examined to prove the said
fact. Even no documentary evidence was produced. The
F entire basis of the said finding is the ipse dixit of the
Disciplinary Authority and the Appellate Authority.
(Para - 27) [157-D, E]
4.1 Initiation of departmental proceeding is
G permissible even a:fter the judgment of acquittal is
recorded by the criminal court. But the same would not
mean that a proceeding would be initiated only because
it is lawful to do so. A departmental proceeding could be
initiated if the department intended to adduce any
evidence which is in its power and possession to prove
H
UNION OF INDIAAND OTHERS v. NAMAN SINGH 143
SE KHAWAT
... ~
the charges against the delinquent officer. Such a A
proceeding must be initiated bona fide. The action of the
authority even in this behalf must be reasonable and fair.
(Para - 28) [157-G, H; 158-A]
TN. C. S. Corporation Ltd. and others vs. K. Meerabai
(2006) 2 sec 255 - relied on. B

r 4.2 An acquittal of a delinquent ipso facto may not
absolve him from undergoing disciplinary inquiry.
However, where the charges are absolutely identical,
. ordinarily the same would not be resorted to. (Para -30)
[158-G, H]
c
Ajit Kumar Nag vs. General Manager (PJ}, Indian Oil
Corporation Ltd., Haldia and others (2005) 7 SCC 764 - relied
on.
D
~.
5.1 If the Inquiry Officer is biased, no action could
have been be taken on the basis thereof. It renders the
proceeding a nullity. Such an inherent defect in the
disciplinary proceeding cannot be cured by an order of
the appellate authority. An order which is void cannot be
validated by the appellate authority as the materials which E
were not brought on record could not be taken into
consideration by it. (Para - 30) [159-A, B]
5.2 It is not a case where a mere benefit of doubt had
been given to the respondent in the criminal proceeding. F
)o The criminal court has given a positive finding that the
} prosecution has not been able to prove that the accused
had misappropriated the goods. His visit to the border
for discharging his duties did not tantamount to misuse
of the post or the authority. No evidence has been
G
presented that he did not have the authority to go to the
border side on official duties and even the department
had not forbidden him from going to that place.
I
(Para - 32) [160-D, E]
5.3 No evidence had been adduced to bring home H
144 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 5 S.C.R.

A the charge of criminal conspiracy, which is an independent
crime. (Para - 32) [160-G]
5.4 Evidence of driver of the official jeep is totally
against the departmemt. He was not cross-examined. It
was not held that h,e had deposed falsely. (Para - 36)
B [162-E]
5.5 Respondent was found to have been carrying the
official revolver for his safety. No evidence was also
adduced to establish that when confronted by the police
c party, he had tried to show or used the same or threatened
them with the same or used the official revolver with the
intention of doing illegal work. The respondent was
allotted a jeep and also allowed to carry with him the
official revolver, was accepted by the prosecution side in
D the criminal case, and thus, he was found not guilty under
Section 27 of the Arms Act. (Para - 33) [162-E]
Sawai Singh vs. State of Rajasthan (1986) 3 SCC 454;
Jasbir Singh vs. Punjab & Sind Bank and others (2006) 11
SCALE 204 and M. V Bijlani vs. Union of India and others
E (2006) 8 SCC 8 - relied on.
6. The respondent is directed to be reinstated
forthwith with all consequential benefits. The order of the
Tribunal must be complied with in its entirety forthwith.
(Para - 38) [162-G]
F
CIVILAPPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 140
'
of 2007.
From the final Judgment and Order dated 01.09.2005 of
the High Court of Rajasthan, Jaipur Bench in D.B. CWP No.
G 5928 of 2001.
Vikas Singh, ASG, A.K. Srivastava, Shiva Lakshmi, Adita
Singh, Sushma Suri and Ritu Bhardwaz for the Appellants.

Sushi! Kumar Jain, Mahendra Shah, Puneet Jain, H.D.
H Thanvi and O.P. Gaggar for the Respondent.

,
UNION OF INDIAAND OTHERS v. NAMAN SINGH 145
SEKHAWAT [S.B. SINHA, J.]
.... -i
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by A
S.B. SINHA, J. 1. Respondent at all material times was
working as a Sub-Inspector (AIC0-11). He was posted in the
Intelligence Bureau. His principal function was to identify and
collect sources of information from the locality in regard to anti
. )'
national activities . B

2. On or about 5th August, 1983, the respondent
accompanied by the driver of an official jeep bearing Registration
No. RSN - 939, went to a place known as 'Ramsar Gagaria
Road' in the District of Barmer. There, he allegedly found a large c
number of smuggled goods. While bringing the same in his jeep
for their delivery to the Customs Authorities it was intercepted
by a Jonga Jeep, which was being driven by one Bhoor Singh,
a known smuggler, accompanied by the Head Constable Bhori
Das and Constable Kirta Ram of the concerned Police Station.
D
..., They were brought to the Police Station and arrested inter alia
-1 on the charge that the respondent, in conspiracy with the
smugglers had been taking the smuggled goods in his official
jeep.
3. Proceedings under the Customs Act were initiated on E
the basis of the First Information Report lodged by the said Head
Constable. A Criminal proceeding was also initiated against
him for the alleged commission of offences under Sections 409,
120-B of the Indian Penal Code read with Section 13(2) of the
Foreigners Act and Section 27 of the Arms Act as also under F
Section 110 of the Customs Act.
"
k--
.4. In the proceeding under Section 112 of the Customs
Act, the defence of the respondent inter alia was that, finding
some smuggled goods stranded and abandoned while he was
on a tour from near Village Gagaria, he loaded the same in the G
said Jeep No. RSM-939 for necessary action in relation thereto
by the Customs Authorities. However, in the meantime, they were
-.' intercepted by the police authorities.
5. The driver of the vehicle Mool Singh supported the said
H
146 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 5 S.C.R.

A contention of the respondent. The Additional Collector, Customs >- -
and Central Excise, upon consideration of the materials on
record by the parties thereto held :-

"15 ...... In his statement dated 20.8.2083 recorded under
Section 108 ibid, Shri Moo I Singh has corroborated the
B facts outlined by Naman Singh in his statement dated '(
20.8.1983. No independent evidence has been brought
on record to show Shri Mool Singh's involvement in
smuggling activities separately. Both S/Shri Naman Singh
and Mool Singh in their statements recorded under Section
c 108 have stated that they were intercepted by the Police
Officers who were sitting in a Jonga Jeep, being driven by
one Bhoor Singh, a known smuggler on the lndo-Pak
Border. However, in the records of the case, there is no
mention about the particular Jeep in which the Police
D Offices were traveling and who was driving the jeep. This
aspect has not b1:ien clarified even in the show cause ,..
}-
notice. In view of this statement, the Jeep number in which
the Police officers were traveling should have been
obtained by the Investigating Officers particularly when an
E allegation has beBn made against the very officers who
had made the seizure that they were traveling in a Jonga
Jeep belonging to a well known smuggler of the area.

16. Thus there is no evidence on record to indicate that
the goods under seizure belong to either S/Shri Naman
F Singh or Mool Singh or Narain Singh, who were present
in the jeep when the goods were seized. There is no '
evidence also that they had acquired goods through
-+
unauthorized route. Further, there is no evidence against
Shri Latif S/o. Bheru Musalman that he was in anyway
G concerned with the goods under seizure. Thus, the theory
given by the Police that the l.B. Officers and Narain Singh
(a private person) were indulging in smuggling of goods
in a Govt. Jeep does not hold any water, particularly when 'r
in their statements S/Shri Naman Singh and Mool Singh
H have clearly indicated that the Police Officers were
UNION OF INDIAAND OTHERS v. NAMAN SINGH 147
SEKHAWAT [S.B. SINHA, J.]
-\ traveling in Jonga Jeep belonging to Bhoor Singh, a well A
known smuggler of the area and Investigations have not
been made either by the Police or the Customs authorities
either to deny or to confirm this serious allegation. In the
circumstances, on the contrary there is no reason to
disbelieve that the 1.8. Officers on tour found certain goods B
•-y of foreign origin which they loaded in their vehicle to be
taken to the nearest Customs Offices for necessary.action
and they were intercepted by the Police Officers, who
were sitting in a private Jonga Jeep being driven by a
notorious smugger of the area, a fact which has not been c
denied or disputed. I, therefore, hold that the ownership of
the goods under seizure cannot be attributed to S/Shri
Naman Singh, Mool Singh, Narain Singh and Latif to whom
the show cause notice has been issued. There is no
evidence on record to indicate their involvement in the
D
smuggling of foreign origin goods from Pakistan into India."
.....
... On the basis of the aforesaid findings, whereas the goods
of the foreign origin were directed to be confiscated, the charges
against the respondent, MooI Singh and one Latif were dropped.
6. In the criminal proceeding against the respondent, the E
prosecution examined a large number of witnesses including
the informant 8hori Das, PW-6 and Constable Kirta Ram, PW-
7. The charges were found to have not been proved. It was inter
alia held that no case under Section 409 of the Indian Penal
Code had been made out as the respondent was not entrusted F
,.
.._. with the said goods. In regard to the charge under Section 27 of
the Arms Act, no offence was found to have been committed by
the respondent, as he was in possession of an Arm to which he
was entitled to. So far as the charge under Section 120-8 of the
Indian Penal Code is concerned, a judgment of acquittal was G
recorded stating :-
"As elaborated earlier, when the basis of presenting
prosecution has not been considered reliable by
Department of Custom and the statement of the accused
H
148 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 5 S.C.R.

A is considered to be more reliable, under such
circumstances it cannot be considered the accused has
misappropriated in this matter as visit by the employees
of Intelligence Bureau on the border for discharging their
duties does not tantamount to misuse of the post or the
B property and no such evidence has been presented that
the accused Naman Singh did not have the authority to go
on border side for official work and even the department
had not forbidden him from going that place. Due to want
of above facts it can be presumed that he visited the place ·
c for official work. As the misappropriation of the property is
not proved, therefore, the question of criminal conspiracy
does not arise. Apart from this, the crime of criminal
conspiracy is an independent crime. No evidence from
the prosecution side for this has been submitted."

D 7. The State accepted the said judgment. No appeal was
prefe1-red thereagainst. Long thereafter, namely on 1st May,
1982, for reasons best known to the appellant, a disciplinary
proceeding was initiatE~d against the respondent on two articles
of charges which read as under:-
E
(a) During his posting at Barmer, Rajasthan in 1983, the
Respondent had mis-utilized a Government vehicle
and revolver for an unauthorized tour of the border
area falling under PS Ramser outside the
requirement of his official duties, without the
F knowledge or permission of his superior officers.

(b) Unauthorisedly collected and carried smuggled
articles in the Government jeep which was an act
unbecomin~g of an intelligence officer and constituted
gross profossional misconduct.
G
8. In the said departmental proceeding the police officers
concerned were not examined. The Customs Officers were also
not examined. No official on behalf of the department was
examined, except the aforesaid Mool Singh. Mool Singh, in his
H evidemce, fully supported the case of the respondent. He stated
. UNION OF INDIAAND OTHERS v. NAMAN SINGH 149
SEKHAWAT [S.B. SINHA, J.]
.. ~

~ that the predecessors of the respondent also used to carry on A
similar duties and functions. He also disclosed that another
officer, who had been requested to accompany them, refused
to do so. He also stated that in similar situations, recove~d
smuggled goods had been handed over to the Custorus
Authorities. He also referred to an instance in regard to a simHlr 8
incident which took place during the tenure of Shri D.L. Oza,
CDIO.

9, Admittedly, Bhoor Singh who was driving the Jonga
Jeep was in inebriated condition. He is also said to be the owner
of the vehicle. How responsible police officers were traveling in c
the jeep of a well known smuggler defies all logic.
10. Respondent intended to examine one witness in the
departmental proceedings, Jumma. He was not permitted to
do so. During the course of the disciplinary proceedings his
D
.... Defence Assistant was not available. A request was made to
-'< allow him to attend the enquiry proceedings. The said request
was not acceded to.
11. The Inquiry Officer, however, by his report dated 9th
December, 1982, found the respondent guilty of the charges of E
misconduct leveled against him.
12. The Disciplinary Authority passed an order of dismissal
on 2nd February, 1993. The only reason assigned in support
thereof reads as under:-
F
.. "Therefore, on due appreciation of the inquiry report
~ furnished by the Inquiry Officer and representation against
it made by the charged officer, I feel that the charges leveled
against the delinquent government servant have been duly
established. I being the Disciplinary Authority, dismiss Shri
G
N.S. Shekhawat, ACI0-11 (G) from the service with
immediate effect, under Rule 11 (ix) of CCS (CC&A) Rules,
1965."
.....
13. An appeal was preferred thereagainst. The appellate
authority dismissed the said appeal by a detailed judgment dated H
150 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 5 S.C.R.

....
A 17th April, 2000, statin!r- >-

"6. That I, JD, SIB, Jaipur being the Appellate Authority
after carefully examining the appeal preferred by Sh. N.S.
· Shekhawat, dismissed ACI0-11, the Inquiry Report
submitted by the Inquiry Officer (Shri Bhagirath Mina, the
B then Assistant Director, Jodhpur), the order of the
Disciplinary Authority (i.e. Shri Ram Das, Assistant
Director, SIB, Jaipur), and other relevant documents on
record have found :-

c (i) That Rule 14 (15) of the CCS (CCA) Rules , 1965
provides that the Inquiry Officer, in his discretion, can
call for new 'evidence in case he feels that there is an
inherent lacuna in the evidence produced before him
and that production of such evidence is necessary in
the interest of justice. Accordingly, the Inquiry Officer
D
was well within his rights to call Shri Mool Singh'; JIO-
.~

II (MT) for deposition.
'"
(ii) That the request of Shri N .S. Shekhawat for engaging
a legal practioner as his defence assistant was rightly
E turned down, as the Presenting Officer was not a
legal practitioner nor were there any special
circumstances under which the delinquent could be
allowed to engage a legal practitioner.

(iii) That it is also revealed from the records of the inquiry
F . that proper summons were issued to the defence
assistant viz., Shri Madhukar Sharma, Spd. (PREV),
-j
Customs and Central Excise, Ajmer and to his
Controlling Officer viz., the Collector, Central Excise
and Customs, Jaipur, requesting him to relieve Shri
G Sharma for attending the disciplinary proceedings,
but he did not turn up at the enquiry.
(iv) That the request of the delinquent officer to produce
one Jumma as his defence witness was rightly turned
down as there was no relevance in his deposition.
H
UNION OF INDIAAND OTHERS v. NAMAN SINGH 151
SEKHAWAT [S.B. SINHA, J.]
4~

~ (v) That the C.O. was given full opportunity to defend A
himself.

(vi) That from the records of the departmental
proceedings, it is conclusively proved that the visit of
Shri NS. Shekhawat top the border area near Village
... Ramsar (District Barmer) on the night of August 5, B
)'
1983 was unauthorized, during which he was
'1
detected and intercepted by the local police for
unauthorisedly carrying smuggled goods 530
electronic calculators, Made in Japan, 19 Sanyo tape-
cum-transistors, Made in Japan, 57 'thans' c
measuring 1767 mts. of synthetic fabric of 'Pak'
origin; which were valued at Rs. 1 lakh 30 thousand
at that time in the official governmental jeep of IB
beyond any conceivable call of his legitimate duties.
In his deposition dated Oct. 22, 1992 before the 1.0., D
• Shri Shekhawat has admitted having visited the area
-'" near Village Ramsar, District Barmer without the
knowledge/authority of his Senior Officers for
undertaking such a tour which certainly required the
permission of the controlling officers at Jodhpur/ E
Jaipur.
(vii) That there is nothing on record to indicate that the
proceedings were not conducted as per the
procedure laid down under CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965."
F
14. Respondent preferred an Original Application before
...
~ the Central Administrative Tribunal, Jaipur Bench questioning
the said order of the disciplinary authority. By a judgment and
order dated 23rd October, 2001, the Tribunal, upon considering
the material at some details, held :-
G
"In the instant case, there is no evidence to corroborate
the charge against the applicant. The case of applicant is
..... solely or mainly depend on the statement of Shri Mool
Chand, (sic) who does not support the charges at all.
Criminal Court has already acquitted the accused on the H
152 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 5 S.C.R.

A basis of no evidence. In support of the allegations against >-
...
the applicant, no preliminary enquiry was conducted in
this case. Therefore, we are of the considered opinion
that there is no evidence on record to sustain the charges
against the applicant and it is a case of no evidence.
B Therefore, the finding of the Inquiry Officer can be
characterized as perverse." '!
A

Respondent, on the basis of the said findings, was directed
to be reinstated in service with all consequential benefits.

c 15. A Writ Petiltion preferred thereagainst has been
dismissed by a Division Bench of the Rajasthan High Court by
reason of the impugned judgment.
16. Mr. Vikas Sinigh, learned Additional Solicitor General,
appearing on behalf of the appellant would submit that the
D Tribunal and the High Court committed a serious error in passing
the impugned judgmemts in so far as they failed to take into •
consideration :- 'f-

1) it is permissible for the disciplinary authority to initiate
a departmental proceeding even after the judgment
E of acquittal is recorded in a criminal case inasmuch
as similar evidence can be viewed differently by the
criminal court and an inquiry officer having regard to
the standard of proof involved in the respective
· proceedings ;
F
2) the criminal court having acquitted the respondent
only on benefit of doubt, the departmental proceeding --).

was maintainable;
3) in any evernt, the charges levelled against the
G respondent in the criminal case and the departmental
proceeding were different;

4) the High Court, although noticed the legal principles
operating in the field correctly, failed to apply the )--

same to thie facts of the present case;
H
UNION OF INDIAAND OTHERS v. NAMAN SINGH 153
SEKHAWAT [S.B. SINHA, J.]
.... .. 5) the Tribunal committed a serious illegality in opining A
that a preliminary inquiry was required to be
conducted after the judgment of acquittal was passed.

17. Mr. Sushi! Kumar Jain, learned counsel appearing on
behalf of the respondent:on the other hand, urged:-
B
' - 'f 1) That the Customs Authorities as also the learned
Munsif-cum-Judicial Magistrate having held that the
respondent was not guilty of the charges, the
impugned judgment is unassailable.

2) Respondent being the Officer lncharge of the Unit, c
was entitled to take all such actions which were
necessary to act as an Intelligence Officer. Jumma
who could have proved that the smugglers were the
target of the respondent, having not been examined,
the Principle of Natural Justice was violated. D

" 3) No Circular or Notification has been brought on
"' records to show that any permission from any higher
authority was required before the respondent could
take the official jeep for carrying out his official duties.
E
4) As an lncharge of the office, the respondent
indisputably was entitled to use the government
vehicle as also the arms.

5) In view of the fact that the respondent had not been
found guilty both by the Customs Authorities and the F
,. Criminal Court, any embarrassment on the part of
~
the department, on account of any action of the
respondent did not and could not arise.

6) The only material brought on record being the orders
G
of the Customs Authorities, the judgment of the
criminal court and the evidence of Moo! Singh, the
finding recorded by the disciplinary authority was
wholly perverse.
18. Respondent was a responsible officer. He was H
154 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008) 5 S.C.R.

A incharge of a unit. The charge against the respondent was that ~
..
he had been found at the International Border, 100 kms. away
from the place of posting, accompanied by a driver and a private
person, having not be!en authorized by his superiors to make
the said trip and the same was not in the course of his legitimate
B duties and that he had hatched a conspiracy with the smugglers.
He is also accused of conspiring with the foreigners. 'I'-

19. Initiation of the departmental proceeding must be
viewed in the backgrround of his total exoneration by the
Customs Authorities and the criminal court.
c
20. The alleged occurrence took place on 5th August, 1983.
As he was arrested in connection with the said matter, he must
have been placed under suspension. The proceeding under the
Customs Act came to an end on 17th March, 1986. He was
acquitted in the criminal case on 11th July, 1991. The Department
D
was aware of the said proceedings. They were aware of his
defence. It has not been denied or disputed that obtaining y-
•
intelligence reports as regard anti smuggling activities was one
of his functions. It is one thing to say that in discharge of the
said function he was over enthusiastic but it is another thing to
E say that he hatched a conspiracy to assist the smugglers in
carrying out smuggling activities.
21. Trans-border smuggling is a subject offederal function.
We fail to understand as to why no deeper probe was made in
F regard to his involvement, if any, vis-a-vis the role of the officers
of the concerned police station. Larger public interest demanded
such probe. If the contention of the appellant was correct, the '
;J
competent authority of the Central Government should have
taken up the matter with the State Government. Such inaction
on the part of the appellant is a matter of deep pubic concern.
G
22. If the charges levelled against the respondent in the
departmental proceeding only related to administrative lapses
on his part, it could have been initiated long back. Why was it
'T-·
initiated after a period nine years has not been explained. On a
'H query made by us, the learned Additional Solicitor General,
J'
UNION OF INDIAAND OTHERS v. NAMAN SINGH 155
SEKHAWAT [S.8. SINHA, J.]

.. -\
~
submitted that the department must have been waiting for the A
outcome of the criminal case. If that is so, it was expected that .
the evidence would have been adduced in the criminal
proceeding to establish that the misuse of the jeep and the official
revolver as also visiting the border area by the respondent
formed part of conspiracy. 8

,.. f The identity and the activity of the private person, who was
found in the company of the respondent, should have been
investigated by the competent authority, particularly when
respondent was working in the Intelligence Department.
c
23. Whether incidental or ancillary to the issue which arose
in the departmental proceeding, we must place on record that
the Department of Customs of the Union of India having
examined the entire question, they found the respondent
innocent. As trans-border smuggling was th~ common theme
D
both before the said authority as also in the criminal court, the
.. department concerned was expected to keep a strict v·igil
thereover. The question of mis-utilisation of jeep etc., was not
"' brought to the notice of the Customs Authorities. Such a question
was also not raised in the criminal proceeding. It was necessary
to do so so as to prove the charges of conspiracy. The E
prosecution, thus, utterly failed to prove such a charge.
24. In the departmental proceeding the appellant was bound
to comply with the principles of natural justice. Copies of some
documents were not supplied. Services of a legal practitioner, F
may not be a matter of right, but he was atleast entitled to the
> effective assistance of the departmental representative, Shri
}., Madhukar Sharma. The same was also for all intent and purport
denied.
The Tribunal in this behalf opined :- G
" It is undisputed fact that Shri Mool Singh was examined
although his name was not in the list of witnesses. The
applicant's request to call Shri Jumma as defence witness
was not allowed. Not only this but in the absence of the
H
156 SUPREME COUHT REPORTS [2008] 5 S.C.R.

A departmental represEmtative Shri Madhukar Sharma, the ~
...
applicant was compelled to cross-examine Shri Mool Singh
who was cited as main witness in this case. It is also not
disputed that the Inquiry Officer himself has cross-examined
the applicant which was the duty of the departmental
B representatives. It appears that the conduct of the Inquiry
Officer in this case has been throughout biased and it
1:' -
appears that he has acted with predetermined notions
which should have caused prejudice to the applicant."
We are in general agreement with the said observations.
c
25. Our attention has been drawn to the order passed by
the appellate authority daited 17th April, 2000. It is a long order,
a portion whereof we have noticed herein before.
26. We may at this juncture notice that the appellate authority
D did not consider the legal question that the Inquiry Officer was
bound to take recourse to Rule 14 of the CCS (CCA) Rules
~
particularly when, apart from the orders of the Customs 'I-
Authorities and the criminal case, no other evidence appears
to have been brought on record. No reason has been assigned
E as to why the request of the respondent to call 'Jumma' as
defence witness to prove the bonafide of the respondent had
been turned down.
The bias on the part of the Inquiry Officer is explicit from
the record. Why the Inquiry Officer cross-examined the
F respondent is beyond anybody's comprehension. He was not
the prosecutor. A Presenting Officer had been appointed. The
Inquiry Officer could not l1ave taken over the job of the Presenting -j_

Officer, particularly whem he was a superior officer. Valid and
sufficient reasons have not been assigned by the Inquiry Officer
G in this behalf. His finding that the respondent should have
informed his superior who was available at the close point, is
contrary to the evidence of Mool Singh. According to him, the
practice followed by the officers similarly situated was to take
the goods found abandoned to the Customs Department and
H to the police station.
UNION OF INDIAAND OTHERS v. NAMAN SINGH 157
SEKHAWAT [S.B. SINHA, J.]

- ~ 27. It has been suggested before us that the charges A
against the respondent in the criminal case and the departmental
proceeding were different. However, we fail to understand what
sort of public duty the respondent was expected to perform when
he was intercepted by the police in a jeep which was driven by
Bhoor Singh, a notorious smuggler who had been detained B
under MISA. If the conduct of the respondent did not cause any
- i
embarrassment to the department in the year 1983, how, after
exoneration by the Customs Authorities and acquittal by the
criminal court, his acts embarrassed the department, so as to
form the basis of imputation of misconduct, is again beyond
anybody's comprehension. The Inquiry Officer and consequently
c
the disciplinary authority misdirected themselves in law as they
posed unto themselves a wrong question. The appellate
authority's findings are noticed in paragraph 12 (supra) had not
been considered at all.
D
The disciplinary authority, therefore, for all intent and purport,
"'f
differed with the findings of the Customs Department as well as
the criminal court, but no basis therefore was disclosed. No such
evidence was brought on record. No witness was examined to
prove the said fact. Even no documentary evidence was
E
produced. The entire basis of the said finding is the ipse dixit of
the Disciplinary Authority and the Appellate Authority.

It again goes to show that despite the findings of the ·
Customs Authorities and the Criminal Court, what was
uppermost in the mind of the disciplinary authority and the F
appellate authority was his alleged involvement in the smuggling
.);
activity.
28. There cannot be any doubt whatsoever, as has been
submitted by the learned Additional Solicitor General, that
initiation of departmental proceeding is permissible even after G
the judgment of acquittal is recorded by the criminal court. But
the same would not mean that a proceeding would be initiated
only because it is lawful to do so. A departmental proceeding
could be initiated if the department intended to adduce any
evidence which is in its power and possession to prove the H
158 SUPREME COUHT REPORTS [2008) 5 S. C.R.

A charges against the delinquent officer. Such a proceeding must
f.
...
be initiated bona fide. The! action of the authority even in this
behalf must be reasonable! and fair.
29. Reliance has been placed on I.N.C.S. Corporation
Ltd. and others vs. K. Meerabai : (2006) 2 SCC 255 wherein
B this court opined :-
~--
"30. The scope of disciplinary proceedings and the scope
of criminal proceedings in a Court of Criminal law are
quite distinct, exclusive and independent of each other.
The prosecution proceedings launched against the
c respondent herein were in respect of offences punishable
under Sections 409 and 477-A l.P.C., whereas the
Departmental Proceedings as initiated against her were
in respect of the charges of misappropriation and other
fraudulent practices such as deliberate omission to bring
D into accounts the stock received showing bogus issues in
the records, falsification of accounts, submission of
defective accounts, tampering of records, manipulation of . .,,.
accounts and records etc. Thus, the respondent herein
was proceeded against for quite different charges and on
E different sets of facts before the Court of Chief Judicial
Magistrate, on the one hand, and before the Departmental
Enquiry on the other."
It was, thus, a case where the charges were different.

F 30. In Ajit Kumar Nag vs. General Manager (PJ), Indian
Oil Corporation Ltd., Haldia and others : (2005) 7 SCC 764
this court opined that acquittal of a delinquent by a criminal court •'.f
would not preclude an employer from taking action by the
disciplinary authority, if it is otherwise permissible. Such a
G departmental proceeding, however, cannot be initiated mala fide.
It mu,st be conducted in accordance with law.
An acquittal of a delinquent ipso facto may not absolve
him from undergoing disciplinary inquiry. However, where the
':
charges are absolutely identical, ordinarily the same would not
H be resorted to.
UNION OF INDIAAND OTHERS v. NAMAN SINGH 159
SEKHAWAT [S.B. SINHA, J.]
~
We may notice that in Ajit Kumar Nag (supra) the order of A
dismissal was found to have been legally proved despite the
fact that the delinquent was acquitted by the court of law.
If the Inquiry Officer is biased, no action could have been
be taken on the basis thereof. It renders the proceeding a nullity.
B
r
'
Such an inherent defect in the disciplinary proceeding cannot
be cured by an order of the appellate authority. An order which
is void cannot be validated by the appellate authority as the
materials which were not brought on record could not be taken
into consideration by it.
c
In Ajit Kumar Nag (supra) it was held :-
"44. We are aware of the normal rule that a person must
have a fair trial and a fair appeal and he cannot be asked
to be satisfied with an unfair trial and a fair appeal. We
are also conscious of the general principle that pre- D
decisional hearing is better and should always be preferred
to post- decisional hearing. We are further aware that it
has been stated that apart from Laws of Men, Laws of
God also observe the rule of audi alteram partem. It has
been stated that the first hearing in human history was E
given in the Garden of Eden. God did not pass sentence
upon Adam and Eve before giving an opportunity to show
cause as to why they had eaten forbidden fruit. [See R. v.
University of Cambridge]. But we are also aware that
principles of natural justice are not rigid or immutable and F
hence they cannot be imprisoned in a straight-jacket. They
i must yield to and change with exigencies of situations.
They must be confined within their limits and cannot be
allowed to run wild. It has been stated; "To do a great right
after all, it is permissible sometimes to do a little wrong".
G
31. Reliance has also been placed on Commissioner of
Police, New Delhi vs. Narender Singh : (2006) 4 SCC 265
wherein this Court was dealing with a case of a police
constable, who was accused of committing theft of arms. He
made a confession of his involvement. It was found to be H
160 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 5 S.C.R.

A inadmissible in the criminal proceeding. In that factual backdrop
)..
..
this Court held :-

"12. It is not in dispute that the standard of proof required
in recording a finding of conviction in a criminal case and
in a departmental proceeding are distinct and different.
B Whereas in a criminal case, it is essential to prove a
charge beyond all reasonable doubt, in a departmental
proceeding preponderance of probability would serve the
purpose. [See Kamaladevi Agarwal v. State of WB.].

c 13. It is now well-settled by reason of a catena of decisions
of this Court that if an employee has been acquitted of a
criminal charge, the same by itself would not be a ground
not to initiate a departmental proceeding against him or
to drop the same in the event an order of acquittal is
passed. "
D
32. It is not a casE~ where a mere benefit of doubt had
been given to the respondent in the criminal proceeding. The
criminal court has given a positive finding that the prosecution
has not been able to prove that the accused had
E misappropriated the 1~oods. His visit to the border for
discharging his duties did not tantamount to misuse of the post
or the authority. No evidence has been presented that he did
not have the authority to go to the border side on official duties
and even the department had not forbidden him from going to
F that place.
It was held that as misappropriation of the property has
not been proved, the question of any criminal conspiracy did
not arise.
G No evidence had been adduced to bring home the charge
of criminal conspiracy, which is an independent crime.
3~i. Respondent was found to have been carrying the
official revolver for his safety. No evidence was also adduced \ ....
to establish that when confronted by the police party, he had
H tried to show or used the same or threatened them with the same
,'
I -I
UNION OF INDIAAND OTHERS v. NAMAN SINGH
SEKHAWAT [S.B. SINHA, J.]

or used the official revolver with the intention of doing illegal
161

A
work.
That the respondent was allotted a jeep and also allowed
to carry with him the official revolver, was accepted by the
prosecution side in the criminal case, and thus, he was found
B
not guilty under Section 27 of the Arms Act.

34. In Sawai Singh vs. State of Rajasthan: (1986) 3 SCC
454 this Court opined :-

"16 .... But in a departmental enquiry entailing
consequences like loss of job which now-a-days means c
loss of livelihood, there must be fair play in action, in respect
of an order involving adverse or penal consequences
against an employee, there must be investigations to the
charges consistent with the requirement of the situation in
accordance with the principles of natural justice in so far D
as these are applicable in a particular situation.
17. The application of those principles of natural justice
must always be in conformity with the scheme of the Act
and the subject matter of the case. It is not possible to lay E
down any rigid rules as to which principle of natural justice
is to be applied. There is no such thing as technical natural
justice. The requirements of natural justice depend upon
the facts and circumstances of the case, the nature of the
enquiry, the rules under which the Tribunal is acting, the F
subject matter to be dealt with and so on. Concept of fair
i play in action which is the basis of natural justice must
depend upon the particular lis between the parties."
35. In Jasbir Singh vs. Punjab & Sind Bank and others :
2006 (11) SCALE 204 it was held :- G

"7 The learned counsel for the respondent contended that
the decision of this Court has no application. He may be
right. But, it is not necessary for us to delve deep into the
matter as we are of the opinion that the judgment in civil
H
162 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 5 S.C.R.

}-
...
A matter having attained finality, the same was binding on
Respondent-Bank."
36. In M. V Bijlani vs. Union of India and others : (2006) 8
SCC 8 this Court stated the law in the following terms :-

B "25 ..... Although the charges in a departmental
proceedings are not required to be proved like a criminal
trial, i.e., beyond all reasonable doubts, we cannot lose
sight of the fact that the Enquiry Officer performs a quasi-
judicial function, who upon analysing the documents must
c arrive at a conclusion that there had been a preponderance
of probability to prove the charges on the basis of materials
on record. While doing so, he cannot take into
consideration any irrelevant fact. He cannot refuse to
consider the relevant facts. He cannot shift the burden of
D proof. He cannot reject the relevant testimony of the
witnesses only on the basis of surmises and conjectures.
j-
He cannot enquire into the allegations with which the
delinquent officer had not been charged with."
In this case, evidence of Mool Singh is totally against the
E department. He was not cross-examined. It was not held that he
had deposed falsely.
37. For the abovesaid reasons, there is no infirmity in the
impugned judgment. The appeal fails and is accordingly
dismissed.
F
38. Before parting, we may, however, notice that the -j
'
respondent was reinstated in service. However, after the order
of stay was granted by this Court on 27th MarchJ 2006, his
services had again been terminated. He is, therefore, directed
G to be reinstated forthwith with all consequential benefits. The
order of the Tribunal must be complied with in its entirety forthwith.
Respondent is entitled to costs of the appeal which is assessed
at Rupees One Lakh.
S.K.S. Appeal dismissed.
H