Holding

The High Court's order quashing the detention order is set aside because the writ petition was not maintainable at the pre‑execution stage; courts may interfere only in the five limited exceptions, none of which are satisfied.

Summary

A detention order under Section 3(1) of the Conservation of Foreign Exchange and Prevention of Smuggling Activities Act, 1974 (COFEPOSA) was issued against Ratan Bagaria. Before the order could be served, his wife Vidya Bagaria filed a habeas corpus petition under Article 226 challenging the order. The Punjab and Haryana High Court quashed the detention order, but the Union of India appealed. The Supreme Court held that a writ petition is not maintainable at the pre‑execution stage unless one of the limited exceptions is satisfied, which were absent here. Consequently, the High Court’s order was set aside and the writ petition dismissed. The appeal was allowed, restoring the validity of the detention order pending proper service and surrender.

Issues considered

Whether a writ petition under Article 226 challenging a COFEPOSA detention order is maintainable when the order has not been served and the detenu not taken into custody.
Whether the High Court erred in quashing the detention order without considering the limited scope of pre‑execution jurisdiction.
What are the specific circumstances in which courts may interfere with a detention order at the pre‑execution stage.

Legislation cited

Conservation of Foreign Exchange and Prevention of Smuggling Activities Act, 1974s. 3(1)

Subjects

COFEPOSApreventive detentionpre‑execution jurisdictionhabeas corpusArticle 226maintainabilitydetention orderSupreme Court

Judgment

UNION OF INDIA AND ORS. A
v.
VIDYA BAGARIA

MAY 5, 2004

[DORAISWAMY RAJU AND ARIJIT PASAYAT, JJ.] B

Conservation of Foreign Exchange and Prevention of Smuggling
Activities Act, 1974:

Section 3(1)-Detention order-High Court quashed detention order C
before it was actually served and the detenu taken into custody-Correctness
of-Held: The question of delayed execution of detention order, delay in
consideration ofrepresentation etc. are really hypothetical in nature when the
order of detention was not executed at all and challenge was sought to be
made at pre-execution stage-Hence, High Court's order set aside. D
A detention order under Section 3(1) of the Conservation of Foreign
Exchange and Prevention of Smuggling Activities Act, 1974, was passed
in respect of the respondent's husband. Before the order of detention could
be served on the respondent's husband, the respondent filed a Habeas
Corpus petition before the High Court for quashing of the order of E
detention. The appellant raised a preliminary objection regarding the
maintainability of the writ petition before the order of detention was
actually served and the detenu taken into custody. However, the High
Court allowed the writ petition and quashed the order of detention. Hence
the appeal.
F
Allowing the appeal, the Court

HELD: 1. The questions regarding delayed execution of detention
order, delay in consideration of the representation and the like are really
hypothetical in nature when the order of detention has not been executed G
at all and the detenu has avoided service and incarceration and when
challenge is sought to be made at pre-execution stage. (954-E)

Additional Secretary to the Govt. of India v. Smt. Atka Subbash Gadia,
[1992) Supp. 1 sec 496, Sayed Taher Bawamiya v. Joint Secretary to the
949 I{
950 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2004) SUPP. 1 S.C.R.

A Govt. of India, [2000] 8 SCC 630, Union of India v. Parasmal Rampuria,
[1998) 8 SCC 402, Sunil Fulchand Shah v. Union of India, [2000) 3 SCC
409, Hara Ram Pandey v. State of Bihar, (2003) 10 JT 114 and Union of
India v. Amritlal Manchanda, [2004) 3 SCC 75, relied on.

2. The High Court_ does not appear to have considered the case in
B the background of whether any relief was available to the writ petitioner
even before the order of detention was executed. Consequently the order
is liable to be set aside. [955-E-F)

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTfON : Criminal Appeal No. 86
C of 1999.
From the Judgment and Order dated 20.2.98 of the Punjab and Haryana
High Court in Crl. W.P. No. 286 of 1997.

Anup G. Choudhary, C.V. Subba Rao, B.K. Prasad and V.K. Venna for
D the Appellant.
Mahabir Singh, Rakesh Dahiya, Nikhil Jain and M.A. Chinnasamy for
the Respondent.

The judgment of the Court was delivered by
E ARIJIT PASAYAT, J. The Union oflndia, Joint Secretary COFEPOSA,
Commission of Customs-II, Madras and State of Tamil Nadu question the
legality of the Judgment rendered by a learned Single- Judge of the Punjab
and Haryana High Court quashing order of detention dated 19.12.95 passed
in respect of one Ratan Bagaria under Section 3(1) of the Conservation of
F Foreign Exchange· and Prevention of Smuggling Activities Act, 1974
(hereinafter referred to as 'the COFEPOSA Act'). Before the order of detention
could be served on Shri Ratan Bagaria, his wife Smt. Vidya Bagaria, the
respondent herein, filed Habeas Corpus writ petition under Article 226 of the
Constitution of India, 1950 (in short '_the Constitution') praying for issuance
of writ or any other order quashing the·order of detention passed by appellant
G no.2 herein who was the respondent no.2 in the writ petition. Several grounds
touching legality of grounds on which the. order of detentfon was passed,
were raised in the writ petition. The present appellants filed a counter affidavit.
Primarily an objection was taken regarding the maintainability of the writ
application before the order of detention was actually served and the detenu
H taken into custody. The various stands regarding the legality of the grounds
U.0.1. v. VIDYA BAGARIA [PASAYAT, J.] 951
....... of detention as have been raised by the writ petitioner, were also refuted and A
it was submitted that grounds stated were germane and relevant for directing
detention. The High Court elaborately dealt with the legality of the grounds
on which the order of detention was founded. But as regards the preliminary
>
objection about the maintainability of the writ petition even before the order
of detention was actually served, the same was dealt with and disposed of in
a very casual and summary manner, observing without even properly adverting B
to the law laid down by this Court, brought specifically to its notice as
follows:

"Before I proceed further into the matter, I may say that the case law
which has been relied upon by Mr. Sharma is off the point."
c
... The writ petition was allowed holding that grounds indicated in the
order of detention were not legally sustainable and order of detention was
unsustainable.

Learned counsel for the appellants submitted that the High Court has
not dealt with the most vital aspect regarding the very maintainability of the
D
writ petition even before the order of detention was served and the detenu
incarcerated in prison in a very cryptic manner before rejecting the plea.

Per contra, learned counsel for the respondent submitted that the

- reasonings given by the High Court clearly indicate that the writ petition was
maintainable and the legality of grounds were also duly tested. No infirmity,
therefore, can be found with the Order of the High Court. In any event, it was
E

submitted that the order of detention was passed nearly nine years back and
the purported apprehensions and the alleged objectionable activities of Mr.
Bagaria have no relevance presently.
F
The question whether the detenu or any one on his behalf is entitled.to
challenge the detention order without the detenu submitting or surrendering
to it, has been examined by this Court on various occasions. One of the
leading judgments on the subject is Additional Secretary to the· Govt. of India
and Ors. v. Smt. Alka Subhash Gadia and Anr., case [1992] Suppl SCC 496.
In para 12 of the said Judgment, it was observed by this Court as under: G

"12. This is not to say that the jurisdiction of the High Court and
the Supreme Court under Articles 226 and 32 respectively has no role
·"' to play once the detention • punitive or preventive - is shown to have
been made under the law so made for the purpose. This is to point
H
952 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2004] SUPP. I S.C.R.

A out the limitations, which the High Court and the Supreme Court
have to observe while exercising their respective jurisdiction in such
cases. These limitations are normal and well known, and are self-
imposed as a matter of prudence, propriety, policy and practice and
are observed while dealing with cases under all laws. Though the
Constitution does not place any restriction on these powers, the judicial
B decisions have evolved them over a period of years taking into
consideration the nature of the legislation or of the order or decisfon
complained of, the need to balance the rights and interests of the
individual as against those of the society, the circumstances under
which and the persons by whom the jurisdiction is invoked, the nature
c of relief sought, etc. To illustrate these limitations, (i) in the exercise
of their discretionary jurisdiction the High Court and the Supreme
Court do not, as Courts of appeal or revision, correct mere errors of
law or of facts, (ii) the resort to the said jurisdiction is not permitte<t
as an alternative remedy for relief which may be obtained by suit or
other mode prescribed by statute. Where it is open to the aggrieved
D person to move another Tribunal or even itself in another jurisdiction
for obtaining redress in the manner provided in the statute, the Court
does not, by exercising the writ jurisdiction, permit the machinery
created by the statute to be by-passed; (iii) it does not generally enter
upon the determination of questions which demand an elaborate
E examination of evidence to establish the right to enforce which the
writ is claimed; (iv) it does .not interfere on the merits with the
determination of the issues made by the authority invested with
statutory power, particularly when they relate to matters calling for
expertise, unless there are exceptional circumstances calling for judicial
intervention, such as, where the determination is mala fide or is
F prompted by the extraneous considerations or is made in contravention
of the principles of natural justice of any constitutional provision; (v)
the Court may also intervene where (a) the authority acting under the
concerned law does not have the requisite authority or the order
which is purported to have been passed under the law, is not warranted
or is in breach of the provisions of the concerned law or the person
G
against whom the action is taken, is not the person against whom the
order is directed; or (b) when the authority has exceeded its power or
jurisdiction or has failed or refu~ed to exercise jurisdiction vested in
it;' or (c) where the authority has not applied its mind at all or has
exercised its power dishonestly or for an improper purpose; (vi) where
H the Court cannot grant a final relief, the Court does not entertain
U.0.1. v. VIDYA BAGARIA [PASAYAT, J.] 953
petition only for giving interim relief. If the Court is of opinion, that A
there is no other convenient or efficacious remedy open to the
petitioner, it will proceed to investigate the case on its merit and if

-
the Court finds that there is an infringement of the petitioner's Jega.l
rights, it will grant final relief but will not dispose of the petition only
by granting interim relief; (vii) where the satisfaction of the authority B
is subjective, the Court intervenes when the authority has acted under
the dictates of another body or when the conclusion is arrived at by
the application of a wrong test or misconstruction of a statute or it is
not based on material which is of a rationally probative value and
·. relevant to the subject matter in respect of which the authority is to
satisfy itself. If again the satisfaction is arrived at by taking into C
consideration material, which the authority properly could not, or by
omitting to consider matters, which it sought to have, the Court
interferes with the resultant order; and (viii) in proper cases the Court
also intervenes when some legal or fundamental right of the individual
is seriously threatened, though not actually invaded."
D
In Sayed Taher Bawamiya v. Joint Secretary to the Govt. of India and
Ors., (2000] 8 SCC 630, it was observed by this Court as follows:

"This Court in Alka Subhash 's case (supra) was also concerned
with a matter where the detention order had not been served, but the
...... High Court had entertained the petition under Article 226 of the E
Constitution. This Court held that equitable jurisdiction under Article
226 and Article 32 which is discretionary in nature would not be
exercised in a case where the proposed detenu successfully evades
the service of the order. The Court, however, noted that the Courts
have the necessary power in appropriate case to interfere with the F
detention order at the pre-execution stage but the scope for interference
is very limited. It was held that the Courts will interfere at the pre-
execution stage with the detention orders only after they are prima
facie satisfied:

(i) that the impugned order is not passed under the Act which G
it is purported to have been passed;

(ii) that it is sought to be executed against a wrong person;

(iii) that it is passed for a wrong purpose';

(iv) that it is passed on vague, extraneous and irrelevant grounds; H
954 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2004) SUPP. I S.C.R.

A or

(v) that the al!thority which passed it had no authority to do so.

As we see it, the present case does not fall under any of the aforesaid
five exceptions for the Court to interfere. It was contended that these
exceptions are not exhaustive. We are unable to agree with this
B
submission. Atka Subhash 's case (supra) shows that it is only in these
five types of instances that the Court may exercise its discretionary
jurisdiction under Article 226 or Article 32 at the pre-execution stage.
The appellant had sought to contend that the order which was passed
was vague, extraneous and on irrelevant grounds but there is no
c material for making such an averment for the simple reason that the
order of detention and the grounds on wh.ich the said order is passed; l
has not been placed on record inasmuch as 'the order has 11ot yet been
executed. The appellant does not have a copy on the same, and
therefore, it is not open to the appellant to contend that the non-
. existent order was passed on vague, extraneous or on irrelevant
D
grounds".

This Court's decision in Union of India and Ors. v. Parasmal Rampuria,
[I 998] 8 sec 402 throws considerable light as to what would be the proper
course fm: a person to adopt when he seeks to challenge an order of detention
E on the available grounds like delayed execution of detention order, delay in
consideration of the representation and the like. These questions are really
hypothetical in nature when the order of detention has not been executed at
all and the detenu has avoided service and incarceration and when challenge
is sought to be made at pre-execution stage. It was observed as under:

F "In our view, a very unusual order seems to have been passed in
a pending appeal by the Division Bench of the High Court. It is
challenged by the Union of India in these appeals. A detention order
under Section 3(1) of the COFEPOSA Act was passed by the
authorities on 13.9.1996 against the respondent. The respondent before
surrendering filed a writ petition in the High Court on 23.10.1996
G and obtained an interim stay of the proposed order, which had remained
us-served. The learned Single Judge after hearing the parties vacated
the ad interim relief. Thereafter, the respondent went in appeal before
the Division Bench and again obtained ad interim relief on 10.1.1997
which was extended from time to time. The writ appeal has not been
H still disposed of.
U.0.1. v. VIDYA BAGARIA [PASAYAT, J.] 955
When the 'Vrit petition was filed, the respondent had not A
surrendered. Under these circumstances, the proper order which was
required to be passed, was to call upon the respondent first to surrender
pursuant to the detention order and then to have all his grievances
examined on merits after he had an opportunity to study the grounds
of detention and to make his representation against the said grounds B
as required by Article 22(5) of the Constitution."

In Sunil Fulchand Shah v. Union of India and Ors. [2000] 3 SCC 409,
a Constitution Bench of this Court observed that a person may try to abscond
and thereafter take a stand that period for which detention was directed is
over and, therefore, order of detention is infructuous. It was clearly held that C
the same plea· even if raised, deserved to be rejected as without substance. It
should all the more be so when the detenu stalled the service of the order
and/or detention in custody by obtaining orders of Court. In fact, in Sayed
Taher's case (supra) the fact position shows that 16 years had elapsed yet this
Court rejected the plea that the order had become stale.
D
These aspects were once again highlighted recently in Hare Ram Pandey
v. State of Bihar and Ors., (2003) 10 JT 114 and Union of India v. Amrit/a/
Manchanda and Ors., [2004] 3 SCC 75 after an elaborate and exhaustive
consideration of the matter.

The High Court does not appear to have considered the case in the E
background of whether any relief was available to the writ petitioner even
before the order of detention was executed. The cryptic observation that the
decision" is off the point", seems to be not only evasive but lacks judicious
application of mind. Consequently, the order is liable to be set aside. It is
open to the respondent to surrender to custody as was observed in Parasmal F
Rampuria 's case (supra) and take such pleas as are available in law to the
person concerned. These aspects were once again sufficiently highlighted in·
Amrit Lal Manchanda 's case (supra).

The appeal is allowed. The order of the High Court is set aside and the
writ petition filed in the High Court shall stand dismissed. G
v.s.s. Appeals allowed.