UNION OF INDIA AND ORS.versusSHAH GOVERDHAN L. KABRA TEACHERS COLLEGE

A                    UNION OF INDIA AND ORS.
                                v.
            SHAH GOVERDHAN L. KABRA TEACHERS COLLEGE

                                OCTOBER 23, 2002                                       ,•

B                      [G.B. PATTANAIK AND RUMA PAL, JJ.]


          National Council of Teacher Education Act, 1993-Section 17(4)-
    Constitutional validity-Challenge of-High Court held it unconstitutional as
C   Parliament cannot make law pr~cribing qualification for entry into the service
    under State Government-O,r5ppeal, held: the provision is a law dealing with
    co-ordinated development of education system within entry 66 List I ofSeventh
    Schedule and it is not dealing with the service conditions of an employee
    under the State Government-Constitution of India, 1950-VII Schedule, list
    I, Entry 66.
D
          Doctrines:

           Doctrine of "pith and substance"-Meaning and applicability of -
    Held, has to be applied not only in cases of conflict between powers of two
    legislatures but in any case where the question. arises whether a legislation is
E   covered by particular legislative power in exercise of which it is purported to
    be made- If an enactment substantially falls within the powers expressly
    conferred by the Col]stitution upon the legislature which enacted it, it cannot
    be held to be invalid, merely because it incidentally encroaches on matters
    assigned to another legislature.

F        ,Interpretation of Statute:
          In order to examine the true character of the enactment, the entire Act,
    its object and scope and effect, is required to be gone into.

          A private educational institution conducting courses of B.Ed., filed
G application for recognition of B.Ed. (Vacation Course) whkh was rejected
    by Northern Regiona.l Committee of National Council for teachers
    education. The institution filed writ petition challenging the order of the
    Council and the constitutional validity of National Council for Teachers
    Education Act, 1993. High Court allowed the petition holding that order
H   de-recognising the vacation course was bad in law and it also struck down
                                          220
            U.O.l v.SHAH GOVERDHAN L KABRA TEACHERS COLLEGE             221
Section 17(4) of the Act holding that though, in view of Entry 66 of List I     A
of Seventh Schedule of the Constitution, Parliament had legislative
competence to enact the Act, but Section 17(4) is unconstitutional as
Parliament cannot make law prescribing qualification for entry into the
service under the State Government and such law could be made only
under Proviso to Article 309; and that if the Council cannot force a State      B
or State funded institution to employ teachers having a particular
qualification like B.Ed. or B.P.Ed., it does not have power to de-recognize
any such degree for the purpose of employment. It directed the Council
to issue certificate of recognition to B.Ed. (V.acation Course) since the
B.Ed; course, imparted by the same institution was recognized by the
Council.                                                                        C
      In appeal to this Court, the question for consideration was whether
the legislation in question could be held to be law dealing with co-ordinated
development of education system within Entry 66 of List I of Seventh
Schedule of the Constitution of India or it is a law dealing with service
conditions of an employee under the State Government.                           D
     Allowing the appeals, the Court

      HELD: I.I. High Court committed gross error in construing the
provisions of sub-section (4) of Section 17 of the Act to mean that it is a
legislation dealing with recruitment and conditions of service of persons       E
in the State service within the meaning of Proviso to Article 309 of the
Constitution. It committed the aforesaid error by examining the provisions
of sub-section (4) on its plain terms without trying to examine the true
character of the enactment which has to be done by examining the
enactment as a whole, its object and scope and effect of the provisions.        F
Even, the High Court does not appear to have applied the doctrine of "pith
and substance" and thus, committed the error in interpreting the
provisions of sub-section (4) of Section 17 to mean to be a provi~ion dealing
with conditions of service of an employee under the State Government.
                                                                   [229-A-CJ
                                                                                G
      1.2. If the provisions of the National Council of Teacher Education
Act, 1993 are examined and more particularly Section 17(4) thereof, the
statute is one squarely dealing with coordination and determination of
standards in institutions for higher education within the meaning of Entry
66 of List I of the Seventh Schedule. Both entries 65 and 66 of List I
empower the Central Legislature to secure the standards of research and         H
    222                      SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2002] SUPP. 3 S.C.R.

A the standards of higher education. The object behind being that the same,
    standards are not lowered at the hands of the particular State or States
    to the detriment of the national progress and the power of the State
    legislature must be so exercised as not to directly encroach uporu power
    of Union under Entry 66. The power to coordinate does not mean merely
    the power to evaluate but it means to harmonise or secure relationship
B   for concerted action. A legislation made for the purpose of coordination
    of standards of higher education is essentially a legislation by the Central
    legislature in exercise of its competence under Entry 66 of List I of the
    Seventh Schedule and sub-section (4) of Section 17 merely provides the
    consequences if an institution offers a course or training in teacher
C   education in contravention of the Act though the ultimate consequences
    under sub-section (4) of Section 17 may be that unqualified teacher will
    not be entitled to get an employment under the State or Central
    Government or in a University or in a College. By no stretch of
    imagination the said provision can be construed to mean a law dealing
D   with employment. 1228-D-H]

          2. When the vires of enactment is challenged, the Court primarily
    presumes the constitutionality of the statute by putting the most liberal
    construction upon the relevant legislative entry so that it may have the
    widest amplitude and the substance of the legislation will have to be looked
E   into. The Court sometimes is duty bound to guard against extending the
    meaning of the words beyond their reasonable connotation in anxiety to
    preserve the power of the legislature. [227-D-EJ

           3..Entries in the different lists should be read together without giving
    a narrow meaning to any of them. Power of the Parliament as well as the
p   State !egislature are expressed in precise and definite terms. Whih: an entry
    is to be given its widest meaning but it cannot be so interpreted as to over-
    ride another entry or make another entry meaningless and in case of an
    apparent conflict between different entries, it is the duty of the Court to
    reconcile them.. When it appears to the Court that there is apparent
             '                 .
                               -··~
    overlapping between. the two entries the doctrine of "pith and substance"
G   hii• t ., '·e applied to find out the true nature of a legislation and the entry
    wit.        ~hich it would fall. In case of conflict between entries in List I and
    List l~, the same has to be decided by application of the principle of "pith
    and substance". The doctrine of "pith and substance" means that if an
    enactment substantially falls within the powers expressly conferred by the
H   Constitution upon the legislature which enacted it, it cannot be held to be
            U.0.1 v.SHAH GOVERDHAN L. KABRA TEACHERS COLLEGE            223
invalid, merely because it incidentally encroaches on matters assigned to       A
another legislature. When a law is impugned as being u/tra-vires the
legislative competence, what is required to be ascertained is the true
character of the legislation. If on such an examination it is found that the
legislation is in substance one on a matter assigned to the legislature then
it must be held to be valid in its entirety even though it might incidentally   B
trench on matters which are beyond its competence. In order to examine
the true character of the enactment, the entire Act, its object and scope
and effect, is required to be gone into. The question of invasion into the
territory of another legislation is to be determined not by degree but by
substance. The doctrine of "pith and substance" has to be applied not only
in cases of conflict between the powers of two legislatures but in any case     C
where the question arises whether a legislation is covered by particular
legisla.tive power in exercise of which .it is purported to be made.
                                                         [227-F-H; 228-A-C]

       4. De-recognition of the B.Ed. (Vacation course) cannot be nullified
on the ground of failure to comply with the principle of natural justice,       D
as the Council is an expert body created under the provisions of the
National Council for Teacher Education Act, 1993 and the Parliament has
imposed upon such expert body the duty to maintain the standards of
education, particularly, in relation to the teachers education. Education
is the backbone of every democracy and any deterioration in the Standard        E
of teaching in the B.Ed. course would ultimately produce sub-standard
prospective teachers who would be teaching in schools and colleges
throughout the country and on whose efficiency the future of the country
depends. Inasmuch as the teacher himself has received a sub-standard
education it is difficult to expect from him a higher standard of teaching
to the students of the schools or other institutions. It is from this           F
perspective, conclusion of an expert body should not be lightly tinkered
with by Court of law without giving due weightage to the conclusion
arrived at by such expert body. High Court committed error in holding
that there was no reasonable justification for not recognizing the B.Ed.
(Vacation course) which was being imparted by the institution.                  G
                                                       [229-E-H; 230-A, Bl

        CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 7404 of
2000.

     From the Judgment and Order dated 9.8.2000 of the Rajasthan High
Court in D.B.C.W.P. No. 1644 of 1999.                                           H
    224                     SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2002] SUPP. 3 S.C.R.

A                                        WITH
         C.A. Nos. 6040, 6043, 6044, 6038, 6046, 6042, 6041, 6039, 6045,
    6049, 6047, 6048, 6050/2001 and 3225 of 2002.

          Barish N. Salve, Solicitor General, M.N. Krishnamani, G.L. Sanghi,
B   K.V. Mohan, Ranji Thomas, Mrs. Bharati Upadhyaya, Sushi! Tekriwal,
    for Javed M. Rao, Prateek Jalan, R.N. Podar, B.V. Balaram Das, Ms.
    Sandhya Goswami, Manu Mridul, U.N. Goyal, Surya Kant, Manish Singhvi,
    Ashok K. Mahajan and Naresh Kumar, for the appearing parties.

          The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
c          PATTANAIK, J. This Appeal by the Union oflndia is directed against
    the Judgment of Rajasthan High Court allowing the Writ Petition filed before
    it. A private educational institution conducting courses leading to the degree
    of Bachelor of Education filed a Writ petition challenging the order passed
    by the Northern Regional Committee of National Council for teachers
D   education rejecting the application of the institution for recognition of the
    B.Ed (Vacation Course). The institution was directed not to admit students in
    the vacation course from 1999-2000 onwards. In the Writ Petition, the
    constitutional validity of the National Council for Teachers Education Act,
    1993 (Act 73 of 1993, hereinafter refer.·ed to as 'the Act') was also challenged.
    The High Court by the impugned judgment came to hold that the order de-
E   recognising the vacation course is bad in law. The High Court also struck
    down Section 17(4) of the Act.

         The parliament enacted the Act and provided for the establishment of
   a council for teacher education with a view to achieving planned and
F coordinated d~velopment of the teacher education system throughout the
   country and for regulation of proper maintenance of norms and standards in
   the teacher education system. Section 17 of the Act, with which we are
  ··concerned in the present case, is extracted herein below:

            Section I 7. "Contravention ofprovisions of the Act and consequences
G           thereof - (I) Where the Regional Committee is, on its own motion
            or on any representation received from any person, satisfied that a
            recognised institution has contravened any of the provisions of this
            Act, or the rules, regulations orders made or issued thereunder, or
            any condition subject to which recognition under sub-section (3) of
            section 14 or permission under sub-section 15 was granted, it may
H           withdraw recognition of such recognised institution for reasons to be
U.0.1 v.SHAH GOVERDHAN L. KABRA TEACHERS COLLEGE [PATTANAIK, J.] 225

   recorded in writing:                                                       A
       Provided that no such order against the recognised institution
   shall be passed unless a reasonable opportunity of making
   representation against the proposed order has been given to such
   recognised institution:
                                                                              B
       Provided further that the order withdrawing or refusing recognition
   passed by the Regional Committee shall come into force only with
   effect from the end of the academic session next following the date
   of communication of such order.

   (2) A copy of every order passed by the Regional Committee under           C
   sub-section (I),-
  (a) shall be communicated to the recognised institution concerned
      and a copy thereof shall also be forwarded simultaneously to the
      university or the examining body to which such institution was
      affiliated for cancelling affiliation; and                              D
   (b) shall be published in the Official Gazette for general information.
        (3) Once the recognition of a recognised institution is withdrawn
   under sub-section (I), such institution shall discontinue the course or
   training in teacher education, and the concerned University or the
   examining body shall cancel affiliation of the institution in accordance   E
   with the order passed under sub-section (!), with effect from the end
   of the academic session next following the date of communication of
   the said order.

       (4) If an institution offers any course or training in teacher
   education after the coming into force of the order withdrawing F
   recognition under sub-section (I), or where an institution offering a
   course or training in teacher education immediately before the
   appointed day fails or neglects to obtain recognition or permission
   under this Act, the qualification in teacher education obtained pursuant
   to such course or training or after undertaking a course or training in G
   such institution, shall not be treated as a valid qualification for purposes
   of employment under the Central government, any State Government
   or University, or in any school, college or other educational body
   aided by the Central Government or any State Government."

 On and from the date of enforcement of the Act, every institution, H
    226                     SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2002] SUPP. 3 S.C.R.

A offering or intending to offer the course or training in teacher education, was
    required to make application to the Regional Committee in such form and
    manner as may be determined by the regulations as provided in Section 14
    of the Act. In accordance with the said provision the respondent institution
    made an application for grant of recognition to the Bachelor of Education
B   (vacation course). This application, having been rejected by the Northern
    Regional Committee of the Council, the respondent had approached the High
    Court.· Having regard to the Entry 66 of the List I of the Seventh Schedule
    of the Constitution, the High Court did record a conclusion that the Parliament
    has the legislative competence for enacting the Act with a view for achieving
    planned and coordinated development of the teacher education system. But
C   so far as Section 17(4) of the Act is concerned, the High Court held that the
    Parliament cannot make law prescribing qualification for entry into the service
    under the State Government and such law can be made only under the Proviso
    to Article 309 of the Constitution. In the opinion of the High Court, when
    NCTE cannot force a State or State funded institution to employ only teachers
    having a particular qualification like B.Ed or B.P.Ed. or it cannot force the
D   State Government for the employee to have B.Ed degree then it cannot have
    power under any law tu de-recognize any such degree for the purpose of
    employment and as such Sub-section (4) of Section 17 is unconstitutional
    and ultra-vires of the Constitution. Having struck down Section 17 (4) of the
    Act, the High Court further directed the NCTE to issue certificate of
E   recognition to the B.Ed (vacation course) of the institution since the regulation
    of B.Ed course imparted by the same institution was recognised by the council.

         It is contended, on behalf of the council, that sub-section (4) of Section
  17 is in fact a law dealing with coordinated development of the teacher
  education system to provide consequences if an institution, without obtaining
F recognition or after the recognition being withdrawn, offers any course or
  training in teacher education. According to the learned counsel, the legislation
  in pith and substance is a legislation dealing with the topic of coordination
  and determination of standards in institutions for higher education coming
  within the legislative Entry 66 of the List 1 of the Seventh Schedule and even
G if it is construed to be an encroachment relating to service under a State
  Government the same is merely consequential and, therefore, .the legislation
  cannot be declared to be ultra-vires.

         Mr. Sanghi, appearing for the respondent, on the other hand contended
  that though it would be within the competence of the Parliament to make law
H for coordinated development of education but ifthe law deals with the question
    U.0.1 v.SHAH GOVERDHAN L. KA BRA TEACHERS COLLEGE [PA TTANAIK, J] 227

of minimum qualification for the service under the State Government the            A
same would be a law referable to Article 309 of the Constitution and not
referable to a law dealing with coordinated development of the teacher
education system and therefore, sub-section (4) of Section 17 must be held
to be ultra-vires of the Constitution.

       In view of the rival submissions at the bar, the question that arises for   B
consideration is whether the impugned legislation can be held to be a law
dealing with coordinated development of education system within Entry 66
of the List I of the Seventh Schedule or it is a law dealing with the service
conditions of an employee under the State Government. The power to legislate
is engrafted under Article 246 of the Constitution and the various entries for     C
the three lists of the Seventh Schedule are the "fields of legislation". The
different entries being legislative heads are all of enabling character and are
designed to define and delimit the respective areas of legislative competence
of the Union and the State legislatures. They neither impose any restrictions
on the legislative powers nor prescribe any duty for exercise of the legislative
power in any particular manner. It has been a cardinal principle of construction   D
that the language of the entries should be given the widest scope of which
their meaning is fairly capable and while interpreting an entry of any List it
would not be reasonable to import any limitation therein. The rule of widest
construction, however, would not enable the legislature to make a law relating
to a matter which has no rational connection with the subject matter of an
                                                                                   E
entry. When the vires of enactment is challenged, the court primarily presumes
the constitutionality of the statute by putting the most liberal construction
upon the relevant legislative entry so that it may have the widest amplitude
and the substance of the legislation will have to be looked into. The Court
sometimes is duty bound to guard against extending the meaning of the
words beyond their reasonable connotation in anxiety to preserve the power         F
of the legislature.

        It is further a well-settled principle th~t entries in the different lists
should be read together without giving a narrow meaning to any of them.
Power of the Parliament as well as the State legislature are expressed in
precise and definite terms. While an entry is to be given its widest meaning G
but it cannot be so interpreted as to over-ride another entry or make another
entry meaningless and in case of an apparent conflict between different entries,
it is the duty of the court to reconcile them. When it appears to the Court that
there is apparent overlapping between the two entries the doctrine of "pith
and substance" has to be applied to find out the true nature of a legislation H
    228                     SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2002] SUPP. 3 S.C.R.

A and the entry within which it would fall. In case of conflict between entries
    in List land List II, the same has to be decided by application of the principle
    of "pith and substance". The doctrine of "pith and substance" means that if
    an enactment substantially falls within the powers expressly conferred by the
    Constitution upon the legislature which enacted it, it cannot be held to be
B   invalid, merely because it incidentally encroaches on matters assigned to
    another legislature. When a law is impugned as being ultra-vires of the
    legislative competence, what is required to be ascertained is the true character
    of the legislation. If on such an examination it is found that the legislation
    is in substance one on a matter assigned to the legislature then it must be held
    to be valid in its entirety even though it might incidentally trench on matters
C   which are beyond its competence. In order to examine the true character of
    the enactment, the entire Act, its object and scope and effect, is required to
    be gone into. The question of invasion into the territory of another legislation
    is to be determined not by degree but by substance. The doctrine of "pith and
    substance" has to be applied not only in cases of conflict between the powers
    of two legislatures but in any case where the question arises whether a
D   legislation is covered by particular legislative power in exercise of which it
    is purported to be made.

         Bearing in mind the atoresaid principles of rule of construction, if the
  provisions of the impugned statute, namely, the National Council of Teacher
E Education Act, 1993 are examined and more particularly Section 17(4) thereof
  which we have already extracted, the conclusion is irresistible that the statute
  is one squarely dealing with coordination and determination of standards in
  institutions for higher education within the meaning of Entry 66 of List I of
  the Seventh Schedule. Both Entries 65 and 66 of List I empower the Central
  Legislature to secure the standards of research and the standards of higher
F education. The object behind being that the same standards are not lowered
  at the hands of the particular State or States to the detriment of the national
  progress and the power of the State legislature must be so exercised as not
  to directly encroach upon power of Union under Entry 66. The power to
  coordinate does not mean merely the power to evaluate but it means to
G harmonise or secure relationship for concerted action. A legislation made for
  the purpose of coordination of standards of higher education is essentially a
  legislation by the Central legislature in exercise of its competence under
  Entry 66 of List I of the Se.venth Schedule and sub-section (4) of Section 17
  merely provides the consequences if an institution offers a course or training
  in teacher education in contravention of the Act though the ultimate
H consequences under sub-section (4) of Section 17 may be that unqualified
    U.0.1 v SHAHGOVERDHAN L. KABRA TEACHERS COLLEGE [PATTANAIK, J] 229

teacher will not be entitled to get an employment under the State or Central      A
Government or in a university or in a college. But by no stretch of imagination
the said provision can be construed to mean a law dealing with employment
as has been held by the High Court in the impugned Judgment.

       In our considered opinion, the High Court committed gross error in
construing the provisions of sub-section (4) of Section 17 of the Act to mean     B
that it is a legislation dealing with recruitment and conditions of services of
persons in the State service within the meaning of Proviso to Article 309 of
the Constitution The High Court committed the aforesaid error by examining
the provisions of sub-section (4) on its plain terms without trying to examine
the true character of the enactment which has to be done by examining the         C
enactment as a whole, its object and scope and effect of the provisions. Even,
the High Court does not appear to have applied the doctrine of "pith and
substance" and, thus, committed the error in interpreting the provisions of
sub-section (4) of Section 17 to mean to be a provision dealing with conditions
of service of an employee under the State Government.
                                                                                  D
       In the aforesaid premises, the conclusion of the High Court that Section
17(4) is ultra-vires being beyond the competence of the Uni.Jn legislature
cannot be sustained and the said conclusion is accordingly set aside. On
examining the statute as a whole and on scrutiny of the object and scope of
the statute, we have no manner of doubt that even sub-section (4) of Section
17 is very much a law dealing with the coordination and determination of          E
standards in institution for higher education coming within Entry 66 of the
List Ill of the Seventh Schedule and, thus, the Union legislature did have the
competence for enacting the said provision.

      We are also of the further opinion that the de-recognition of the B.Ed
(Vacation course) cannot be nullified on the ground of failure to comply with F
the principle of natural justice. In the judgment under challenge, the High
Court has held also that when the institution is imparting the B.Ed (Vacation
Course) then National Council for Teacher Education could not have refused
to recognise the said course. We are unable to accept this reasoning inasmuch
as the NCTE is an expert body created under the provisions of the National G
Council for Teacher Education Act, 1993 and the Parliament has imposed
upon such expert body the duty to maintain the standards of education,
particularly, in relation to the teachers education. Education is the backbone
of every democracy and any deterioration in the Standard of teaching in the
B.Ed course would ultimately produce sub-standard prospective teachers who
would be teaching in schools and colleges throughout the country and on H
    230                     SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2002) SUPP. 3 S.C.R.

A whose efficiency the future of the country depends. Inasmuch as the teacher
    himself has received a sub-standard education it is difficult to expect from
    him a higher standard of teaching to the students of the schools or other
    institutions. It is from this perspective, the conclusion of an expert body
    should not be lightly tinkered with by court of law without giving due
    weightage to the conclusion arrived at by such expert body. From this
B   standpoint, we are of the considered opinion that the High Court committed
    error in holding that there was no reasonable justification for not recognising
    the B.Ed (Vacation Course) which was being imparted by the institution of
    Shah Goverdhan Lai Kabra Teachers College. In the aforesaid premises, we
    set aside the impugned Judgment of the High Court and allow this appeal.
c          In other Civil Appeals which have been filed by the State of Rajasthan,
    the re.spondents having been denied employment to them, had approached
    the High Court for issuance of mandamus. The High Court allowed the same
    in view of its judgment in Shah Goverdhan Lai Kabra Teachers College case
    striking down Section 17 (4) of the Act. Since the appeal of the Union
D   Government against the said Judgment has been allowed, Section 17(4) of
    the Act has been held by us to be intra-vires; the impugned judgment cannot
    be sustained. The counsel appearing for the respondents, however, contended
    before us that there are several other grounds which are required to be
    examined and since the impugned judgment proceeded because of invalidity
E   of Section 17(4) of the Act, in Shah Goverdhan Lai Kabra Teachers College
    case and the said judgment of the High Court having been reversed by this
    Comt the matter should be remitted back to the High Court for reconsideration
    of other grounds. We are not in a position to appreciate as to what other
    grounds are to be urged. However, sincP, the impugned judgment proceeds
    because of Section 17(4) of the Act having been struck down, and the judgment
F   of the High Court in Shah Goverdhan Lal Kabra teachers college case having
    been reversed by us, we set aside the impugned judgment in each of the
    appeals and allow the Civil Appeals filed by the State of Rajasthan.

          We, however, remit the Writ Pt>titi0ns bac!: :o the High Court for being
    considered if any other point survives for consideration.
G
    K.K.T.                                                      Appeals allowed.