UNION OF INDIA AND ORS.versusROBERT ZOMAWIA STREET

                         [2014) 4 S.C.R. 156


A                   UNION OF INDIAAND ORS.
                                   v.
                   ROBERT ZOMAWIA STREET
                  (Civil Appeal No. 4041 of 2014)
                          MARCH 27, 2014
B
         [CHANDRAMAULI KR. PRASAD AND PINAKI
                 CHANDRA GHOSE,JJ]

        CANTONMENTS:
c       Old grant -- Suit land comprising bungalow situated in
  cantonment area -- Plaintiff in possession of suit property
  through a will - General Land Register(GLR) entries showing
  suit land being managed as Class 8-3 land - Held: Entries
  made in GLR are conclusive evidence of title - In the instant
D c3se, entries made in GLR show that suit land is an old grant
  and is managed by plaintiff as 83 land - Class 83 is such
  land which is held by any private person subject to the
  conditions that Central Government has proprietary rights over
  it -- Plaintiff has not been able to establish his title over suit
E land - He held the land, but being an old grant, Central
  Government has the right of its resumption and, therefore, it
  cannot be said that plaintiff possesses the land as owner -
  Trial court rightly dismissed plaintiff's suit - Military Land
  Manual - Chapter JI- r.3 - Maxim, 'nemo dat quid non habet'.
F
        LAND LAWS:

       'Old Grant' -- Connotation of -- Held: The tenures under
  which permission is given to civilians to occupy Government
  land in the cantonment for construction of bungalows on the
G condition of a right of resumption, if required, are known as
  old grant tenures.


                                  156
H
 UNION OF INDIA AND ORS. v. ROBERT ZOMAWIA             157
                   STREET
    WORDS AND PHRASES:                                        A

    Word 'held'- Connotation of.

      In a suit for permanent injunction restraining the
defendants i.e. Union of India and Military Authorities,
from interfering with plaintiffs possession and title over    8
suit property i.e. land admeasuring 4.261 acres
comprising a bungalow within the cantonment area, the
plaintiff claimed ownership of the suit property through
a will. The stand of the defendants was that the
Government of India was the owner of the suit land and        C
had granted it free of rent to predecessors-in-interest of
the plaintiff in the year 1880 as old grant; that the land
was classified as B-3 land in GLR entries as "held by a
private person". The trial court dismissed the suit. The
first appeal of the plaintiff was also dismissed. However,    D
the High Court, in the second appeal filed by the plaintiff
set aside the findings recorded by both the courts below
and decreed the suit

    Allowing the appeal, the court                            E
      HELD: 1.1 It is settled legal position that the entries
made in the General Land Register maintained under the
Cantonment Land Manual are conclusive evidence of
title. Chapter II of the Military Land Manual, inter alia,
provides for classification and transfer of land, standard F
table of rent and management. Rule 3 of Chapter II of the
Military Land Manual, casts duty on the Military Estate
Officer to prepare in prescribed form a General Land
Register of all lands in the Cantonment. In the Instant
case, the entries with regard to suit land made in the GLR" G
show that it is an old grant and that it is managed by the
plaintiff as 83 land. Class 83 is such land which is held
by any private person subject to the conditions that the
Central Government has proprietary rights over it.
Evidently, the plaintiff held the land, but the word "held" H
    158     SUPREME COURT REPORTS              [2014) 4 S.C.R.


A does not necessarily mean to own with legal title. Being
  an old grant, Central Government has the right of its
  resumption and, therefore, it cannot be said that plaintiff
  possesses the land as owner. [para 10,11 and 13) [166-
  G; 167-D-E; 168-E-H]
B
      Union of India v. Ibrahim Uddin, 2012 (8) SCR 35        =
  (2012) 8 SCC 148; Chief Executive Officer v. Surendra
  Kumar Vakil 1999 (2) SCR 118 = (1999) 3 SCC 555; and
  Union of India v. Kam/a Verma (2010) 13 SCC 511 -- relied
C on.
        1.2 The tenures under which permission is given to
  civilians to occupy Government land in the cantonment
  for construction of bungalows on the condition of a right
  of resumption, if required, are known as old grant
D tenures. It is governed by regulation contained in Order
  No. 179 of 1836 which is self contained and provides for
  the manner of grant and resumption of land in
  cantonment area. In respect of old grant tenure, the
  Government retains the right of resumption. The GLR in
E unequivocal terms describes the nature of holder's right
  as "old grant". Thus, the plaintiff has not been able to
  establish his title over the suit land and, therefore, the
  plaintiff deserves to be non-suited on this gro~nd alone.
  [para 14) [169-A-D]
F     1.3 It cannot be accepted that since actual grant was
  not produced, the case pleaded by the defendants that
  the plaintiff held the land as old grant was not proved. The
  GLR maintained under the Cantonment Land
  Administration Rules supports the defendants' case that
G the plaintiff held the land on old grant basis. The plaintiff,
  on the other hand, has not produced any document fo
  show the title of his predecessor-in-interest. The maxim,
  'nemo dat quid non habet', which means no one gives
  what he does not possess, aptly applies in the case.
H Thus, the successor will not have better title than what
 UNION OF INDIA AND ORS. v. ROBERT ZOMAWIA             159
                   STREET
his predecessor had. Besides relying on the admission         A
made by the plaintiff's predecessor-in-interest, the
defendants have produced the GLR, which clearly shows
that the land in dispute is covered under old grant. The
classification of the land as 83 land also points towards
the same conclusion. Thus, the High Court committed           8
grave error in decreeing the plaintiffs suit. The judgment
and decree of the High Court is set aside and the
plaintiffs suit dismissed. (para 14, 15 and 17) (169-E-G;
170-C, E]

     Bhudan Singh v. Nabi Bux, 1970 (2 ) SCR 10 = (1969)      C
2 SCC 481; State of U.P. v. Sarjoo Devi, 1978 ( 1 ) SCR 181
= (1977) 4 SCC 2; State of A.P. v. Mohd. Ashrafuddin, 1982
                =
( 3 ) SCR 482 (1982) 2 SCC 1; Hari Ram v. Babu Gokuf
Prasad, 1991 Supp (2) SCC 608 and A.G. Varadarajulu v.
State of T.N., 1998 (2) SCR 390 = (1998) 4 sec 231 - cited.   D
                    Case Law Reference:
    2012 (8) SCR 35             relied on        para 7
    1970 (2) SCR 10             cited            para 9       E
    1978 (1) SCR 181            cited            para 9
    1982 (3) SCR 482            cited            para 9
    1991 Supp (2) sec 608       cited            para 9
    1998 (2) SCR 390            cited            para 9       F
    1999 (2) SCR 118            relied on        para 10
    CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No.
4041 of 2014.
                                                              G
    From the Judgment and Order dated 16.12.2011 of the
High Court of Gauhati at Assam in SA No. 1 of 2010.

    Mohan Parasaran, SG, Balasubramanian R., Ritu
Bhardwaj (for B.V. Balaram Das) for the Appellants.
                                                              H
    160       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                    [2014] 4 S.C.R.


A       K.K. Venugopal, V.K. Jindal, Raghenth Basant, Rohit
    Bhati, Hardeep Singh, Liz Mathew, Sandeep Jindal for the
    Respondents.

          The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

B       CHANDRAMAULI KR. PRASAD 1. Defendants are the
  petitioners before us and they are aggrieved by the judgment
  and decree dated 16th of December, 2011 of the High Court
  of Guwahati in Second Appeal No. 1 of 2010, reversing the
  judgment and decree of affirmance and granting permanent
C injunction restraining the Defendants-petitioners from interfering
  with the possession and title of the Plaintiff-Respondent over
  Bungalow No. 18, hereinafter referred to as "the suit land".

          2. According to the Plaintiff, the suit land comprises
    Bungalow No. 18, lying on a plot measuring 4.261 acres within
D   the Shillong Military Cantonment area. Plaintiff claims to be the
    absolute owner thereof on the basis of a Will dated 6th of
    December, 1980 executed by Late St. John Perry. The probate
    of the Will was granted by the District Judge, Shillong by an
    order dated 26th of June, 1987 and, according to the plaintiff,
E   it had become final as no appeal was preferred against the
    said order. On the basis of the aforesaid order, the Plaintiff
    approached Defendant No. 2, D.E.O., Guwahati Circle for
    mutation of the suit land in his name in the General Land
    Register (for short "GLR"). Plaintiff was asked to fill up a pro-
F   forma declaration form, inter alia, admitting the proprietary
    rights of the Government of India over the property and their right
    to resume the same as a condition for mutation. This was
    refused by the plaintiff. It is further case of the Plaintiff that soon
    thereafter, on 12th of December, 1986, a notice was served
G   on him by the Ministry of Defence, intimating him of their
    decision to resume the suit land and asking him to deliver the
    possession to Defendant No. 2 within a month. The Plaintiff was
    thereafter served with a show cause notice dated 23rd of
    March, 1993 by Defendant No. 3, the Station Commander,
H   Eastern Headquarter, Shillong, informing him that a Committee
 UNION OF INDIAAND ORS. v. ROBERT ZOMAWIA                       161
   STREET [CHANDRAMAULI KR. PRASAD, J.]
of Officers had determined the compensation payable to him              A
at Rs. 1, 72,094/- on account of resumption of the suit land and
to file reply by 19th of April, 1993, failing which it would be
assumed that he had no objection to the order of resumption.
This determination of compensation payable, according to the
Plaintiff, was dorre without giving him an opportunity of hearing.      B
It is in these circumstances that Plaintiff instituted Title suit No.
5(H) of 1993 before the learned Assistant District Judge,
Shillong for a declaration that the order of resumption dated
23rd of March, 1993 is illegal, invalid, without jurisdiction and
not binding on him and for permanent injunction, prohibiting the        c
Defendants from interfering with the possession of the Plaintiff
in any manner.

      3. On the other hand, the case of the Defendants is that
the suit land was settled with the British Government in 1863
under the Bengal Army Regulation, upon which the Cantonment             D
was established. The suit land was originally granted free of
rent to Mr. G.H. James in the year 1880 as "old grants". Mr.
James transferred the suit land to Mr. L.H. Musgrave in 1932,
who further transferred it by way of a Will to Mrs. G.M. De La
Nonger in 1939. On the death of Mrs. G.M. De La Nonger, the             E
suit land was transferred to St. John Perry vide Will dated 29th
of May, 1980. The Plaintiff came to occupy the suit land
pursuant to a Will executed by Late St. John Perry, bequeathing
the said land to the Plaintiff. It is the case of the Defendants
that since the land held under old grants is resumable,\ the            F
occupancy holder is required to admit the title of the
Government at the time of mutation. It is in these circumstances
that St.John Perry had executed an admission deed dated 13th
of May, 1982, duly stamped and registered in the office of Sub-
registrar, Shillong, bearing Serial No. 3046, admitting the title       G
of the Government over the suit land and their right of
resumption. Similar admission deeds had been executed by
the predecessors-in-interest of St.John Perry and hence the
holder of the suit land only had occupancy rights in the property
as a grantee. The Defendants disputed the title of the Plaintiff        H
    162        SUPREME COURT REPORTS                 [2014] 4 S.C.R.


A over the suit land, barring the authorized structures, which
  vested in him by virtue of the probate granted to the Will of Late
  St.John Perry. It is further case of the Defendants that the suit
  land was required for bona fide defence use and, hence, a
  resumption order dated 23rd of March, 1993 was served on
B the Plaintiff. The amount of compensation for the authorised
  structures was re-examined at the prevalent market rate and
  computed at Rs. 1,72,094/-. The Plaintiff was also offered an
  alternative site for accommodation.

       4. The trial Court on the basis of the pleadings of the
C parties framed several issues including the issue as to whether
  the suit land is covered by an old grant and can it be legally
  resumed by the defendants. The trial court on appreciation of
  the evidence and pleading came to the conclusion that the suit
  land forms part of an old grant and can be legally resumed and
D the plaintiff has no right over that; except for the value of the
  authorised structure. The appeal preferred by the plaintiff
  against the aforesaid judgment and decree had failed and the
  lower appellate court while dismissing the appeal has affirmed
  the aforesaid finding. However, the High Court in the second
E appeal preferred by the plaintiff set aside those findings and
  decreed the plaintiffs suit and while doing so observed as
  follows:

          "19 ...... In my opinion, the law relating to cantonment area
F         cannot obviate the requirement of registering a deed of
          conveyance. No other evidence is produced by the
          respondent authorities to prove that the suit land is under
          the old grant term with the right of resumption at their
          pleasure. There can be no presumption of ownership in
          favour of the respondent authorities. The appellant has
G
          created a high degree of probability that he is the owner
          of the suit land and the onus to prove that he is not the
          owner has now shifted to the respondent authorities. Apart
          from relying on such admissions, they have not been able
          to show any entry in the GLR or any other document/order
H
 UNION OF INDIAAND ORS. v. ROBERT ZOMAWIA                     163
   STREET [CHANDRAMAULI KR. PRASAD, J.)
    to indicate that the suit land is under the old grant with the   A
    right to resumption. Having miserably failed to discharge
    such onus, I am constrained to hold that the appellant is
    able to prove his title to the suit land. The courts below put
    the onus of proving title to the suit land wrongly upon the
    appellant, which has raised substantial question of law. The     B
    concurrent findings of the courts below are consequently
    perverse, cannot be sustained in law and are liable to be
    interfered with in this second appeal."

     5. Aggrieved by the same, the Defendants have preferred         C
the present special leave petition.

    6. Leave granted.

     7. Mr. Mohan Parasaran, learned Solicitor General
appearing on behalf of the Defendants-appellants submits that        D
entries made in the GLR maintained under Cantonment Land
Administration Rules is conclusive evidence of title. In support
of his contention, Mr. Parasaran places reliance on a judgment
of this court in Union of India v. Ibrahim Uddin, (2012) 8 SCC
148 and our attention has been drawn to the following                E
paragraph:

    "83. The General Land Register and other documents
    maintained by the Cantonment Board under the
    Cantonment Act, 1924 and the Rules made thereunder are
    public documents and the certified copies of the same are        F
    admissible in evidence in view of the provisions of Section
    65 read with Section 74 of the Evidence Act. It is settled
    legal position that the entries made in the General Land
    Register maintained under the Cantonment Land
    Administration Rules is conclusive evidence of title."           G

                                              (underlining ours)

    8. Yet another decision to which our attention has been
drawn is Union of India v. Kam/a Verma (2010) 13 SCC 511.
                                                                     H
    164        SUPREME COURT REPORTS                  [2014] 4 S.C.R.


A   In the said case, it has been held as follows:

          "15. Even in the instant case, the land in question, was
          originally permitted to be used by a civilian on "old grant"
          basis and the said fact is reflected in the lease deed
          executed by late Shri Roop Krishan Seth. Moreover, even
B
          in the sale deed executed in favour of the respondent, it
          has been stated that the vendor was an "occupancy-holder
          of the land and trees of the aforesaid premises and owner
          of superstructure of the bungalow ... ". It is also pertinent to
          note that even in the land register the Government of India
c         has been shown as a "landlord" and Shri Mohan Krishan
          Seth has been shown to be having occupancy right and
          his nature of right is shown to be of "old grant". These facts
          had been duly incorporated in the counter-affidavit filed by
          the present appellants before the High Court."
D
        9. Mr. K.K. Venugopal, learned Senior Counsel appearing
  on behalf of the Plaintiff-respondent, however, points out that
  the suit land has been classified as 83 land in the GLR.
  According to him, Rule 6 of the Cantonment Land
E Administration Rules, classifies 83 land as "held by any private
  person". It is his contention that the word "held" means "to own
  with legal title" and, hence, the plaintiff cannot be said to be a
  tenant of the suit land. In support thereof our attention has been
  drawn to the meaning of the expression "hold" in Black's Law
F Dictionary (Eighth Edition). According to this dictionary the term
  "hold" means "to possess by a lawful title". To drive home his
  point, he has also referred to a large number of dictionaries
  and decisions of this Court, viz. Bhudan Singh v. Nabi Bux,
  (1969) 2 SCC 481, State of U.P. v. Sarjoo Devi, (1977) 4 SCC
G 2, State of A.P. v. Mohd. Ashrafuddin, (1982) 2 SCC 1 and
  Hari Ram v. Babu Goku/ Prasad, 1991 Supp (2) SCC 608.
  All these cases and dictionaries have been referred to by this
  Court in A.G. Varadaraju/u v. State ofT.N., (1998) 4 SCC 231
  and, therefore, we are not inclined to burden this judgment by
  all those authorities. However, we consider it appropriate to
H
 UNION OF INDIA AND ORS. v. ROBERT ZOMAWIA                      165
   STREET [CHANDRAMAULI KR. PRASAD, J.)
reproduce the following paragraphs from-A. G. Varadarajulu             A
(supra):

    "26. The word "hold" or "held" in the context of land has
    come up for consideration in several cases before this
    Court. In State of U.P. v. Sarjoo Devi, (1977) 4 SCC 2,            B
    while dealing with the said word in Section 3(14) of the
    U. P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1950, as
    follows: (SCC p. 8, paras 8 and 10)

           "The word 'held' occurring in the above definition
           which is a past participle of the word 'hold' is of wide    C
           import. In the Unabridged Edition of The Random
           House Dictionary of the English Language, the word
           'hold' has been inter alia stated to mean 'to have
           the ownership or use of; keep as one's own'.
                                                                       D
           *     *             *
    In Webster's New Twentieth Century Dictionary (Second
    Edition), it is stated that in legal parlance the word 'held'
    means to possess by 'legal title'. Relying upon this
    connotation, this Court in Bhudan Singh v. Nabi Bux,               E
    (1969) 2 SCC 481, interpreted the word 'held' in Section
    9 of U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1950
    as meaning possession by legal title."

                                            (emphasis supplied)        F
    Again in State of A.P. v. Mohd. Ashrafuddin, (1982) 2
    SCC 1. it was held as follows: (SCC p. 4, para 8}

           "According to Oxford Dictionary 'held' means: to
           possess; to be the owner or holder or tenant of;            G
           keep possession of; occupy. Thus, 'held' connotes
           both ownership as well as possession. And in the
           context of the definition it is not possible to interpret
           the term 'held' only in the sense of possession."
                                                                       H
    166        SUPREME COURT REPORTS              [2014] 4 S.C.R.


A         The word "holds" was again interpreted in Hari Ram v.
          Babu Gokul Prasad, (1991) Supp.2 SCC 608, where it
          occurs in Section 185(1) of the Madhya Pradesh Land
          Revenue Code, 1959. It was observed: (SCC p. 611, para
          5)
B
                 "The word 'holds' is not a word of art. It has not
                 been defined in the Act. It has to be understood in
                 its ordinary normal meaning. According to Oxford
                 English Dictionary, it means, to .possess, to be
                 owner or holder or tenant of. The meaning indicates
c                that possession must be backed with some right or
                 title."

          27. We are, therefore, of the view that the word "held" in
          Section 3(42) is used in the sense that the female must
D         be in possession of the land as owner or with some
          element of title on 15-2-1970, the date of commencement
          of the Act."

        10. We have given our thoughtful consideration to the rival
E submissions and plea of Mr. Parasaran that entries made in
  the GLR are the conclusive proof of title commend us and the
  decisions relied on clearly support his contention. In the case
  of Ibrahim Uddin (supra), relying on the decision of Kam/a
  Verma (supra) and Chief Executive Officer v. Surendra Kumar
  Vakil, (1999) 3 SCC 555, this Court has observed that "it is
F settled legal position that the entries made in the General Land
  Register maintained under the Cantonment Land Manual Rules
  are conclusive evidence of title". We respectfully concur with
  this view. In this background, it is apt to reproduce the relevant
  details mentioned in the GLR in respect of the property in
G question:




H
 UNION OF INDIA AND ORS. v. ROBERT ZOMAWIA                   167
   STREET [CHANDRAMAULI KR. PRASAD, J.]

     1.      Survey No.                    65                       A

    5.       Area                          4.261 Ac.

    6.       Description                   Bungalow No. 18

    7.       Class                         B3                       B

    8.       By whom managed               MEO

    9.       Land Lord                     Govt of India

    10.      Holder of Occupancy           Lawrence Hugh
                                                                    c
             Right                         Musgrove
     11.     Nature of Holder              Old Grant
             Rights with description
     11. Chapter II of the Military Land Manual inter alia,         D
provides for classification and transfer of land, standard table
of rent and management. Rule 3 of Chapter II of the Military
Land Manual, hereinafter referred to as 'the Manual', casts duty
on the Military Estate Officer to prepare in prescribed form a
General Land Register of all lands in the Cantonment. Rule 4
                                                                    E
provides for classification of land, including Class Bland, which
reads as follows:

    "(c) Class "B" land, that is land which, though not actively
    occupied by the Army nor reserved against building, yet
    must be retained in the cantonment by the Government of         F
    India, because the cantonment is primarily a place of
    residence for troops and it is the duty of the Government
    of India, in the interest of troops and of civil population
    which is essential to the welfare of the troops, both to
    provide them with amenities such as postal, telegraphic         G
    and railway communications, rest houses, bungalows,
    shops, places of amusement, open spaces, agricultural
    produce and so forth; and also to keep in their hands a
    sufficient area to meet all possible future requirements that
    may arise in the course of the efficient discharge of their     H
    168            SUPREME COURT REPORTS              [2014] 4 S.C.R.


A         duties in respect of Army administration."

         12. Another rule which is relevant is Rule 6 which provides
    for division of Class 8 land in sub-classes. The same reads
    as follows:

8         "6.Class "8" Land - Class "8" land shall be divided by the
          Central Government, or such other authority as they may
          empower in this behalf, into the following sub-classes,
          namely:-

c         xxx:      )(}()(               )()()(


          (iii) Qass "83" Land, which is held by any private person
          under the provisions of these rules, or which is held or may
          be presumed to be held under the provisions of the
          Cantonment Code of 1899or1912, or under any executive
D         orders previously in force, subject to conditions under
          which the Central Government reserve, or have reserved,
          to themselves the proprietary rights in the soil; and

          )()()(    )(}()(              xxx''
E
       13. The entries made in the GLR show that it is an old grant
  and that it is managed by the plaintiff as 83 land. Class 83 is
  such land which is held by any private person subject to the
  conditions that the Central Government has proprietary rights
F over it. True it is that the plaintiff held the land but the word "held"
  does not necessarily mean to own with legal title. It is not a word
  of art and its meaning has to be understood in the context it
  has been used. In a given context the word "held" may connote
  both ownership as also possession, but it will not carry the
  same meaning in all context and circumstances. In the case in
G hand, the plaintiff held the land but being an old grant the Central
  Government has the right of its resumption and, therefore, it
  cannot be said that the plaintiff possesses the land as owner.
  In view of what we have observed above, the meaning of the
  word "held" in various dictionaries and explanation of said word
H in the several decisions of this Court referred to above in no
  UNION OF INDIA AND ORS. v. ROBERT ZOMAWIA                   169
    STREET [CHANDRAMAULI KR. PRASAD, J.]

way advance the case of the plaintiff.                               A
      14. The tenures under which permission is given to
civilians to occupy Government land in the cantonment for
construction' of bungalows on the condition of a right of
 resumption, if required, is known as old grant tenures. It is       B
governed by regulation contained in Order No. 179 of 1836
which is self contained and provides for the manner of grant
and resumption of land in cantonment area. In respect of old
grant tenu~. the Government retains: the right of resumption.
               1
The GLR in 'u,nequivocal terms deseribes the nature of holder's      C
right as "old ,~rant". Thus, the plaintiff has not been able to
establish his title over the suit land in question and, therefore,
the plaintiff de~fVeS to be non-suited on this ground alone.
However, in deference to Mr. Venugopal, we must answer an
ancillary submission projected before us. He points out that,
according to the defendants themselves, the land was given as        D
old grant to the predecessor-in-interest of the plaintiff but the
said grant has not been produced and in the absence of any
explanation by the defendants for its non-production, adverse
inference has to be drawn. According to him, once such
inference is drawn, the plaintiffs suit deserves to be decreed       E
and was, therefore, rightly decreed by the High Court. This
submission of Mr. Venugopal does not appeal to us. It is not
possible to accept the contention that since actual grant was
not produced, the case pleaded by the defendants that the
plaintiff held the land as old grant was not proved. The GLR         F
maintained under the Cantonment Land Administration Rules
supports the defendants' contention that the plaintiff held the
land on old grant basis. The plaintiff, on the other hand, has not
produced any document to show the title of his predecessor-
in-interest. Nemo dat quid non habet is the maxim which means        G
no one gives what he does not possess, aptly applies in the
case. It needs no emphasis that the successor will not have
better title than what his predecessor had. Hence, we reject this
submission of Mr. Venugopal.
                                                                     H
    170       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                  (2014] 4 S.C.R.


A      15. The High Court while decreeing the suit has observed
  that plaintiff has created a high degree of probability that he is
  the owner of the land and in such circumstanc~. the onus to
  prove that he is not the owner shifted on the defendants. It went
  on to observe that apart from relying on the admission made
B by the plaintiff's predecessor-in-interest, defendants have not
  been able to show any entry in the GLR to indicate that suit land
  is under the old grant. In our opinion, the whole approach of the
  High court in this regard is absolutely erroneous. Besides relying
  on the admission, the defendants have produced the GLR,
c which clearly shows that the land in dispute is covered under
  old grant. The classification of the land as 83 land also points
  towards the same conclusion. Thus, the High Court committed
  grave error in decreeing the plaintiff's suit.

       16. To put the record straight, the learned Solicitor General
D has raised various other points to assail the impugned judgment
  and decree, but as this appeal is to succeed in the light of the
  view, which we have taken above, we are not inclined to either
  incorporate or answer the same in this judgment.

E        17. In the result, we allow this appeal, set aside the
    judgment and decree of the High Court and dismiss the
    plaintiff's suit but without any order as to cost in present appeal.

    R.P.                                             Appeal allowed.