Holding

A court must not interfere with the quantum of punishment once guilt is proved, and dismissal was commensurate with the serious misconduct.

Summary

Narain Singh, a former driver and later constable in the Border Security Force, was charged with disobeying a lawful command and assaulting his superior after failing to report for sentry duty. He pleaded guilty and appealed his dismissal, arguing that his poverty and admission of guilt warranted leniency. The disciplinary authority dismissed him, the appellate authority upheld the dismissal, and the Rajasthan High Court initially dismissed his petition. A Division Bench of the High Court set aside the dismissal, citing his poor background and service record, and ordered reinstatement with limited grade increments. The Supreme Court held that once guilt is proved, courts should not interfere with the quantum of punishment, especially in paramilitary services, and that dismissal was commensurate with the serious misconduct. Consequently, the Supreme Court allowed the appeal and set aside the Division Bench order, upholding the dismissal.

Issues considered

Whether the dismissal from service is a proportionate punishment for the proven misconduct of disobeying a lawful command and assaulting a superior.
Whether a court can set aside a dismissal on grounds of the employee's poverty, plea of guilt, or personal circumstances.

Legislation cited

Constitution of Indias. Article 226

Subjects

service lawmisconductcourt martialdismissal from servicedisciplinary actionjudicial reviewArticle 226paramilitary disciplineproportionalitymitigation

Judgment

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A UNION OF INDIA AND ORS.
.v. ;.__
NARAIN SINGH

MAY 9, 2002

B [SYED SHAH MOHAMMED QUAD RI AND S.N. VARIA VA, JJ.]

Service law-Misconduct-Court Martial-Dismissal from service on A,
admitted facts-Order ofdismissal confirmed by appellate authority and Single
Judge of High Court-Division Bench setting aside the order-Whether
c justified-Held, charges being serious in nature the penalty was commensurate
with the charges-When charges proved courts should not interfere with the
quantum of punishment-Constitution of India, 1950, Article 226.

Respondent committed misconduct for the third time. He was
D charge-sheeted. During ,Court Martial, respondent pleaded guilty and also
stated that he was a poor man and may be pardoned. Disciplinary
Authority, on admitted facts, held him guilty of the charges and dismissed
him from service. Aggrieved, respondent filed appeal which was dismissed.
Single Judge of the High Court also dismissed the petition. Division Bench
concluded that the charges against the respondent are proved and are of
E serious nature and also that he was punished for the third time. However,
•.
holding that when a poor person pleads guilty to the misconduct committed
by him then the extreme penalty of dismissal from service was un-called
for, it set aside the dismissal order. Hence the present appeal.

Allowing the appeal, the Court
F
J
HELD : A Court must not lightly interfere with sentences passed
after a properly conducted enquiry where the guilt is proved. Reduction
of sentence, particularly in military, para-military or police services can
have a demoralising effect and would be a retrograde step so far as
G discipline of these services is concerned. It is not for the Court to determine
the quantum of punishment once charges are proved. Also it is not for
the Court to interfere on misplaced grounds of sympatl1y and/or mercy.
In the instant case the charges being of a serious nature th!! penalty of
~,.,,

dismissal from service was commensurate with the charges. Thus Division
Bench erred in setting aside the dismissal order and also holding that if a
H 924
U.0.1. v. >4ARAIN SINGH J.S.N. VARIAVA. J.J 925

poor person pleads guilty to the misconduct, then extreme penalty of A
dismissal is uncalled for. 1927-F-G; 928-A, Bl

Union of India v. Sardar Bahadur, 119721 4 SCC 618 and Apparel
Export Promotion Council v. A.K. Chopra, 119991 1 SCC 759, referred to.

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 3414 of B
2002.

From the Judgment and Order dated 26.2.2001 of the Rajasthan High
Court in D.B.C.S.A. No. 1051 of 1998.

Ranjit Kumar, Ms. Binu Tamta and Ms. Sushma Suri for the Appellants. C
Dhruv Mehta, Ms. Shobha and Anu Mehta for K.L. Mehta & Co. for
the Respondents.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
D
S.N. VARIAVA, J. (!)Leave granted.

(2) Heard parties.

(3) This Appeal is against an Order dated 26th February, 2001. Brieny
stated the facts are as follows: E
The Respondent was appointed as a Driver in the Border Security Force
in 1990. In 1992 he met with an accident which was found to be due to his
negligence. He was punished with 28 days qua1ter guard and a sum of Rs.
2,405 was recovered from him. He was then changed from the cadre of
Driver to that of a Constable. Thereafter he was punished a second time for F
n1isconduct.

(4) On 3rd February, 1997 the Head Constable, who was in-charge of
assigning duties to the Constables working under him, directed the Respondent
to go for Sentry Duty at Sector Headquarters, BSF, Silliguri. The Respondent G
did not report for Sentry duty. When the Head Constable learnt about this he
went to the barrack and found the Respondent sleeping. The Head Constable
woke up the Respondent. Some altercation took place and the Respondent
gave a fist blow on the mouth of the Head Constable as a result of which the
front tooth of the Head Constable was broken.
H
926 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2002] 3 S.C.R.

A (5) On 4th February, 1997 the Respondent was charge-sheeted for two
charges, viz. (i) disobeying the lawful command given by the superior officer
and (ii) assaulting the superior officer. On 2nd March, 1997, during Court
Martial, the Respondent admitted that he had disobeyed the lawful command
and that he had assaulted his superior officer. He stated that, "I am a poor
man, I have committed a mistake. I may be pardoned." The Disciplinary
B Authority, on admitted facts, found the Respondent guilty of the charges and
~ dismissed him from service. The Appellate Authority dismissed the Appeal
filed by the Respondent.

(6) The Respondent filed Writ Petition No. 669 of 1998. This was
C dismissed by a learned single Judge of the High Court of Rajasthan on 3rd
September, 1998. The Respondent then filed an Appeal. The Division Bench
in the impugned Order, inter alia, held as follows: ,...

"It is true that the charges levelled against the appellant and found to
be proved on his pleading guilty are really of serious nature and such
D a person cannot be allowed to go scot free without any punishment.
More particularly, when he was punished in all thrice in his entire
service of about seven years. However, we are of the considered
opinion that. while passing the extreme penalty of dismissal from
service the authorities were also required to keep in mind other factors,
namely; (i) the person is coming from which place, (ii) his family
E back ground, and (iii) his service record of seven years, etc.

xxx xxx xxx

F When a poor person pleads guilty to the misconduct committed by
him then in our considered opinion the extreme penalty from service
was un-called for."

On this reasoning, the Division Bench set aside the Order of dismissal asid
directed reinstatement of the Respond~nt. The Division Bench imposed an
G order of stoppage of three grade increments without cumulative effect. The
Division Bench directed the Appellants to reinstate the Respondent latest by
1st May, 200 I without back wages.

(7) This Court has, in the case of Union of India v. Sardar Bahadur +-
reported in [1972] 4 sec 618, held that there are limits to the powers which
H can be exercised by a Single Judge under Article 226 of the Constitution and,
U.0.1. v. NARAIN SINGH [S.N. VARIAYA, .I.] 927

-"" similarly, there are limits to the powers of a Division Bench while sitting in
appeal over the judgment of a Single Judge. This Court has held that where
A
there are relevant materials which support the conclusion that the officer is
guilty, it is not the function of the High Court to arrive at an independent
finding. It has been held that if an enquiry has been properly held the question
of adequacy or reliability of evidence cannot' be canvassed before the High
Court.
B

• (8) In the case of Apparel Exporl Promotion Council v. A.K. Chopra
reported in [1999] I SCC 759, it has been held by this Court that it is within
the jurisdiction of the competent authority to decide what punishment is to
be imposed and the question of punishment is outside the purview of High c
Court's interference unless ·it is so disproportionate to the proved misconduct
as to shock the conscious of the Court. It has been held that reduction of
sentence by the High Court would have a demoralising effect and would be
a retrograde step. It has been held that repentance/unqualified apology at the
last appellate stage does not call for any sympathy or mercy.
D
~ (9) As seen above, the Division Bench notes that the charges against
the Respondent are proved and that the charges are of serious nature. Once
the Court came to the conclusion that the charges were proved and that the
charges were of the serious nature, it was not the function of the Court to
interfere with the quantum of punishment. The Division Bench was wrong in
E
holding that factors viz. a) the person is coming from which place, b) his
family background and (c) his service record etc. were to be kept in mind.
In our view the Division Bench was also wrong in holding that if a poor
person pleads guilty to the misconduct, then extreme penalty of dismissal is
uncalled for. In our view a Court must not lightly interfere with sentences

' passed after a properly conducted enquiry where the guilt is proved. Reduction
of sentence, particularly in military, para-military or police services can have
F

a demoralising effect and would be a retrograde step so far as discipline of
these services is concerned. In this case the charges being of a serious nature
the penalty was commensurate with the charges. Further the Division Bench
has itself noted that this was the third time the Respondent was punished.
G
(I 0) Mr. Mehta tried to support the impugned Order on the ground that
the Division Bench had taken a just and kind view considering the fact that
-+ the Respondent had served for a long time and came from a poor family. He
submitted that the impugned Order was a just order and should not be interfered
with. We are unable to accept this submission. As stated above, the law is H
928 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2002] 3 S.C.R.

A clear. It is not for the Court to determine the quantum of punishment once
charges are proved. In this case it cannot be said that the punishment of
dismissal is not commensurate with the charges. It is not for the Court to
interfere on misplaced grounds of sympathy and/or mercy.

(11) In the result, the Appeal is allowed. The impugned Order dated
B 26th February, 2001 is set aside. There will be no order as to costs. .,-

N.J. Appeal allowed.

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