UNION OF INDIA AND ORS.versusKARNAIL SINGH AND ORS.

A                         UNION OF INDIA AND ORS.
                                         v;
                          KARNAIL SINGH AND ORS.

                              NOVEMBER 17, 1994

B              [K. RAMASWAMY AND N. VEKATACHALA, JJ.]

       Land Acquisition Act, I 894 as amended by Land Acquisition
    (Amendment) Act 68of1984:

        Section 28-A-Prospective in operation-Does not furnish any right to
C   claimants to make application after the coming into force of the Amending
    Act-Latter award does not furnish fresh right or cause of action-
    Awarding of additional statutory benefits-Neither the Collector nor the
    High Court has jurisdictii:Jn.

        Constitution of India, I 950 :
D
         Articles I 36, 142-Settling law in exercise of discretion-Such law so
    settled should be clear and operational instead of being kept vague so that
    it could become a binding precede·~t in all similar cases to arise in future.

         Certain lands in Bhatinda district were acquired, and the Collector
E   made an award determining the market value, based on the
    classification of the land, between Rs. 4500 and 16,000 per acre. The
    respondents had accepted the compensation without protest and did
    not seek any reference. Some other claimants secured reference. The
    Additional District Judge determined the compensation enhancing the
    market value ranging from Rs. 5,625 to Rs. 20,000 per acre. On appeal,
F   the High Court determined the market value at Rs. 15 to Rs. 17 per sq.
    yd.

        The respondents made an application under section 28-A of the
    Land Acquisition Act. The Land Acquisition Collector redetermined
    the market value, but did not award solatium and interest as also the
G   additional compensation under Section 23(1-A) of the Act. The
    respondents made another application enclosing another award made
    by the District Court in another reference, and sought statutory
    benefits. Since it was denied, respondents filed a writ petition which
    was allowed by a Single Judge, who directed the award of additional
    benefits. The Division Bench dismissed the appeal, and the Union of
H   India has preferred the present appeal.
                                         584
                      U. 0. I. v. KARNAIL SINGH                  585

    Appellants contended that though the award made by the Collector A
under Section 28-A was not separately challenged, the appellants had
in fact impugned its validity before the Division Bench; that since the
Amendment Act came into force on September 24, 1984, the earliest
reference made on July 31, 1979 should be the relevant and any
subsequent ctward could not furnish any cause of action to file an B
application under Section 28-A; and therefore the award made under
Section 28-A was without jurisdiction and a nullity:

   . Respondents contended that as held in Babua Ram v. State of U.P.
(1994) Supp 4 SCR 148 the Amendment Act 68of1984 was prospective
in operation and any award made by the reference court after the said C
Amendment Act came into force would furnish the cause of action to
the claimants for making an application within three months
thereafter; that the award was made in another reference and within
three months thereafter, the respondents were entitled to file an
application under Section 28-A; that even otherwise, when all the D
claimants had been awarded enhanced compensation, in equity the
respondents were also entitled to party in payment of compensation;
and that the award made under Section 28-A(2) having been allowed to
become final, it was not open to the appellants to claim that the said
award was illegal or without jurisdiction.
                                                                       E
    Allowing the appeal, this Court

     HELD : 1. It would be clear that cause of action for making an
application under Section 28-A of the Land Acquisition Act would arise
when an award has been made by the Civil Court, on a reference under
section 18, enhancing the compensation over and above the amount F
awarded by the Collector in his award under section 11 and the earliest
of the successive awards would furnish the starting period of the
limitation of three months as provided in the proviso to section 28-A(l).
It is seen that the earliest award was made on July 31, 1979 by which
date the Amendment Act had not come into force. The Land G
Acquisition (Amendment) Act 68 of 1984 has given prospective
operation to section 28-A from September 24, 1984. Therefore, it does
not furnish any right to the claimants to make any application after the
Act has come into force. The latter award dated March IS, 1990 does
not give any fresh right or cause of action to file an application under
section 2,8-A (1). Therefore, the judgment and order of this Court H
    586                   SUPREME COURT REPORTS           [1994) SUPP. 5 S.C.R

A   enhancing the compensation on August 24, 1987 does not furnish any
    cause of action to make the application under section 28-A.
                                                                (590 E-F, H)

        Babua Ram v. State of U.P., [1994) Supp. 4 SCR 148 .....Scheduled
    Castes Co-operative Land Owning Society; Bhatinda v. Union of India,
B   [1991) 2sec174, relied on.

         2. It is true that in another reference, the civil court had enhanced
    the compensation after the Amendment Act has come into force. Since
    the earliest award on reference under section 18 was made on July 3I,
    1979, by which date section 28-A was not in force or the period of three
c   months had already expired, the subsequent award made on March IS,
    I990 does not furnish any cause of action to the claimants to make the
    application under section 28-A(l). Therefore, the claimants also are not
    entitled to take aid from the award dated March IS, 1990. (591 A, B)

         3. It is clear from the facts that the award made by the Collector is
D   clearly without jurisdiction. There is no independent right or power
    vested in the Collector or the Court to award statutory benefits. Its
    application arises when the court determined the compensation in
    excess of the award of the Collector made under section 11. Equally
    section 28 also empowers award of interest on enhanced compensation;
    equally by section 23(1A). Thus, the award of the statutory benefits is
E   not independent of the award or in its substitution. Therefore, when the
    claimants sought for additional statutory benefits in the Writ Petition,
    and when they were awarded, it is only in modification of the award
    made by the Collector under section 28-A(2) of the Act. (591 C, E, F)

        4. The High Court committed grievous error of law in awarding
F  the ad<Jitional statutory benefits when the Collector himself has no
   jurisdiction to grant the enhanced compensation under section 28-A(2), .
   based on the judgment and order of this Court dated August 24, 1987
   or of the civil court in another awarded dated March 15, 1990. The
   High Court equally has no pow~r to award statutory benefits and have
G them substituted in the award of the Collector made under section
 . 28-A (1). (591 G, H)

        S. It is true that this Court when exercises its discretionary power
    urider Article 136 or passes any order under Article 142, it does so with
    great care and due circumspection. But, when settling the law in
H   exercise of this court's discretion, such law, so settled, should be clear
                       U. 0. I. v. KARNAIL SINGH                     587

and become operational instead of being kept vague, so that it could A
become a binding precedent in all similar cases to arise in future.
Considered from this perspective, it is a case warranting interference.
                                                                  (592 B)

    CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 9630of1994

    Appeal by spedal leave granted by this Court by its Order dated the B
17th November 1994 in petition for special leave to Appeal (C) No.
8306/93 form the Order dated the 11th December, 1992 of the High Court
of Punjab and Haryana at Chandigarh in L.P.A. No. 1211/92.

   V.R. Reddy, A.S.G., Y.P. Mahajan and Ms. Sushma Suri (NP.) for
Appellant.                                                                 C
    R.K. Jain, A.K. Goel, Ms. Sheela Goel, N.K. Jain and Ms. Abha R.
Sharma for the Respondents.

    The following Order of the Court was delivered:
    Leave granted                                                          D
     Notification under section 4( 1) of the Land Acquisition Act 1 of 1894,
for short 'the Act', acquiring 80 bighas 18 biswas of land situated in
revenue estate, Bhatinda, Tehsil and Distt. Bhatinda alongwith other lands
was published on October 9, 1974. The Collector made an award under
section 11 on June 11, 1975 determining the market value, based on the E
classification of the land, between Rs. 4,500 to Rs. 16,000 per acre. The
respondents had accepted the compensation without protest and did not
seek any reference under section 18. Some other claimants sought and
secured reference under section 18 of the Act. The Addi. Distt. Judge by his
award dated July 13, 1979 determined the compensation enhancing the
market value to Rs. 5,625 to Rs. 20,000 per acre. On appeal, the High Court F
had modified the award: Ultimately on appeal, this Court determined the
market value at Rs. 15 to Rs. 17 per sq. yd. by judgment dated August 24,
1987. The respondents made a written application under section 28-A on
November 24, 1987. The Land Acquisition Collector had redetermined the
market value under section 28-A(2) by his award dated February 28, I 989
but did not award solatium an~ interest and the additional compensation G
under section 23(1-A) of the Act. The respondents made another
application - C.M. No. 4978/90 - enclosing another award dated March 15,
 1990 made by the Distt. Court in yet another reference and sought the
statutory benefits. Since it was denied, in the respondents' writ petition, a
learned Single Judge, by his order dated December 21, 1990, allowed the
                                                                0


W.P. and directed the award of the additional benefits. In LPA No. 1211/92 H
     588                     SUPREME COURT REPORTS             [1994) SUPP. S S.C.R

A    filed by the appellants by judgment and order dated December 21, 1992, the
     Division Bench dismissed the appeal. Thus this appeal by special leave.

        It is contended by Sri V.R. Reddy, the learned Addi. Solicitor General
   for the appellants that though the award made by the Collector under
   section 28-A dated February 2&, 1989 was not separately challenged, the
   appellants have in fact impugned its validity in the LPA before the Division
B. Bench and grounds also have been raised in this appeal. It is also contended
   that the Amendment Act had since come into force on September 24, 1984,
   the earliest award, on the reference court made on July 31, 1979, should be
   the relevant one and any subsequent award made by the reference court or
   the judgment of this Court dated August 24, 1987 do not furnish any cause
   of action to file the application under section 28-A. The award made under
c section    28-A, therefore, is without jurisdiction and a nullity. 'u is also
   contended that the High Court committed illegality in making the award
   and failed to correct the manifest error of law committed by the Collector in
   his award made under section 28-A. Shri R.K. Jain, learned Senior counsel
   for the respondents, contends that in Babua Ram v. State of U.P., [1994]
   Supp 4 SCR 148, this Court has held that the Amendment Act 68 of 1984 is
D prospective in operation and that, therefore, any award made by the
   reference court after the Amendment Act has come into force would furnish
   the cause of action to th~ claimants to make an application within three
   months thereafter. The award was made in another reference on March 15,
    1990 and within three months thereafter, the respondents are entitled to file
   an application under section 28-A. Therefore, the application filed on
E November 24, 1987 could be treated to be one filed pursuant to that award.
   Even otherwise, when all other claimants have been awarded enhanced
   compensation, in equity the respondents also are entitled to parity in
   payment of the compensation. This court had granted compensation at the
   rate of Rs. 15 to Rs. 16 per sq. yd. So the respondents too are entitled to the
   same. It is further contended that the order passed by the Single Judge as
F affirmed by the Division Bench is not a substitution to the Collector's
   award but only an additional benefit. The award made under section 28·
   A(2) having been allowed to become final, it is not open to the appellants to
   contend that the award passed by the Collector under section 28-A(2) is
   illegal or without jurisdiction. Even otherwise, it is not a fit case ·warranting
   interference by this Court under Articles 136 or 142 of the Constitution.
G
         Having given our anxio1,1s and deep consideration, we think that it is a
     case warranting interference. In Babua Ram's case, considering the entire
     controversy, this Court held that:

                     "The legislature ·prescribed three months' limitation to
                     quicken diligence like caveat emptor and provided to a non-
H
         U. 0. I. v. KARNAIL SINGH                       589

 protester right to redetermination provided the application A
 in writing is made to the Collector within three months from
 the date of the award of the Civil Court of original
jurisdiction, excluding the requisite time taken to obtain a
 copy of the award. In other words, the right and remedy
 provided by section 28-A(l) stands extinguished with the
expiry of three months from the date of the award under B
 section 26. It is true that in a given set of facts, there could
 be more than one reference under section 18 at the behest of
different claimants of the lands covered by section 4( 1)
Notification and the court may make successive awards at
various times. Compensation given in the respective awards C
may vary and may be higher than the one given in an
earliest award. In the teeth of the express language in sub-
section ( 1) of section 28-A, limitation of three months once
expires in respect of earliest award by efflux of time, none
of the later awards could provide any assistance to revive
the lapsed time under section 28-A(l) nor provide fresh D
cause of action or successive causes of action when multiple
awards are made at different times or dates. Application
under section 28-A(l) may be made at the instance of the
self-same person or different persons. Any other
interpretation would amount to re-writing the proviso to
sub-section (1) of section 28-A. The judgment and decree E
of the Court of Appeal either under section 54 or under
section 96 of CPC or under Article 132, 133 or 136 of the
Constitution do~s not furnish fresh cause of action nor
provide fresh limitation to make application under section
28-A(l) of the Act. As has already been held in that they F
are not covered under Part III of the Act. May be that they
are continuation of original decree made in section 26(2)
and in law the executable decree is that of the Supreme
Court or the High Courts. But the legislature has conferred
right of reopening the award under sec.tion 11 only when
the civil court under section 26 awarded high compensation G
in Part III to a person having an interest in the land covered
by the same Notification under section 4( I) and an
application in writing if made within limitation."

"It is, therefore, clear that section 28-A does not apply to an
award under section 26 made prior to September 24, 1984." H
    590                    SUPREME COURT REPORTS           [1994] SUPP. 5 S.C.R

A                  "If an owner of the land or person interested in
                   compensation of the land acquired by the same Notification
                   under section 4(1) had not sought reference under section
                   18 in respect to an award made under Section 11 by the
                   Collector/LAO, but if on a reference made under section 18
                   prior to September 24, 1984 in respect of land covered by
B                  the same notification any award made under section 26,
                   prior or the Amendment Act had come into force, the award
                   under section 11 is not liable to be reopened for
                   redetermination of compensation even though three
                   months'. period has not expired by September 24, 1984 for
                   to hold otherwise would amount to giving retrospective
c                  operation to section 28-A. Any other non-protester claimant
                   will not be entitled to get an award reopened under section
                    11 though on reference at the instance of one or other
                   owner or interested person ha~ the benefit of determination
                   of higher compensation by an award made under section 26
                   before September 24, 1984 on his reference under section
D                   18 made prior to September 24, 1984."

         Thus, it would be clear that cause of action for making an application
    under section 28-A would arise when an award has been made by the Civil
    Court, on a reference under section 18, enhancing the compensation over
    and above the amount awarded by the Collector in his awarj under section
E   11 and the earliest of the successive awards would furnish the starting
    period of the limitation of three months as .provided in the proviso to
    section 28-A(l). It is seen that the earliest award was made on July 31,
     1979 by which date the Amendment Act had-not come into force. The Land
    Acquisition (Amendment) Act 68 of 1984 has given prospective operation
    to section 28-A from September 24, 1984. Therefore, it does not furnish
F   any right to the claimants to make· any application after the Act has come


                                                                                   ..
    into force. The latter award dated March 15, 1990 does not give any fresh
    right or cause of action to file an application under section 28A(l). The
    question then is whether the claimants are entitled to make an application
    after the appeal was allowed by this Court from appeals arising from one of
    the references. This question also was considered in the same judgment and
G
    it was held that it does not furnish any cause of action. This was also the
    view of another three Judges Bench of this Court in Scheduled Castes Co-
    operative Land Owning Society, Bhatinda v. Union of India, (1991) 2 SCC
     174. Therefore, we are of the firm view that the judgment and order of this
    Court enhancing the compensation on August 24, 1987 does not furnish any
H    cause of action to make the application under section 28-A.      · ·
                         U. 0. I. v. KARNAIL SINGH                       591

     It is true that in another reference, the civil court had enhanced the A
compensation on March 15, 1990 after the Amendment Act has come into
force. Since the earliest award on reference under section 18 was made on
July 31, 1979, by which date section 28-A was not in force or the period of
three months had already expired, the subsequent award made on March
15, 1990 does not furnish any cause of action to the claimants to make the
application under section 28-A(l ). Therefore, the claimants also are not B
entitled to take aid from the award dated March 15, 1990. The argument of
parity and denial of equality in payment of compensation as violative of
Article 14 was also considered in Babua Ram's case but was rejected. For
the same reasons, the plea of parity cannot be given any countenance.

      The question, therefore, is whether the. award of the Collector under     C
section 28-A(2) is valid in law. It is clear from the facts that the award
made by the Collector is clearly without jurisdiction. Section 28-A(3)
provides that the provisions of sections 18 to 28 shall apply, as far as it
may, for the reference under section 28-A. Section 23(1) gives power to the
Court to determine the compensation and sub-section (2) thereof provides
that "in addition to the market value of the land, as above provided, the       D
Court shall in every case award a sum of thirty per centum on such market
val!Je, in consideration of the compulsory nature of the acquisition." In
other words, there is no independent right or power vested in the Collector
or the Court to award statutory benefits. Its application arises when lhe
court determined the compensation in excess of the award of the Collector
made under section 11. Equally section 28 also empowers award of interest       E
on enhanced compensation. Equally by section 23(1A). In other words, the
statutory benefits would be granted when compensation was enhanced by
the Court over and above the compensation determined by the Collector.
Thereby, the award of the statutory benefits is not independent of the award
or· in its substitution. Therefore, when. the claimants sought for additional   F
statutory benefits in the Writ Petition, and when they were awarded it is
only in modification of the award made by the Collector under section 28-
A(2) of the Act. When that be the legal position, the question emerges
whether the ~igh Court was right in granting the additional statutory
benefits as well. We are clearly of the opinion that the High Court
committed grievous error of law in awarding the additional statutory            G
benefits when the Collector himself has no jurisdiction to grant the
enhanced compensation under section 28-A (2) based on the judgment and
order of this Court dated August 24, 1987 or of the civil court in another
award dated March 15, 1990. The High Court equally has no power to
award statutory benefits and have them substituted in the award of the
Collector made under section 28-A (I). Thereby, the order of the Single         H
    592                     SUPREME COURT REPORTS           (1994) SUPP. S S.C.R

A   Judge as affinned by the Division Bench is clearly illegal. Thus we hold
    that the entire order gets vitiated by manifest errors of law.

         It is true that this Court when exercises its discretionary power under
    Article 136 or passes any order under Article 142, it does so with great cure
    and due circumspection. But, when we are settling the law in exercise of
B   this court's discretion, such law, so settled, should be clear and become
    operational instead of being kept vague, so that it could become a binding
    precedent in all similar cases to arise in future. Considering from this
    perspective, we are of the considered view that it is a case warranting
    interference. The orders of the High Court in the W.P. and in the LPA are
    set aside. The W.P. stands dismissed. The award made by the Collector
C   under section 28A (2) is declared as that made_.without jurisdiction and a
    nullity. Accordingly, the appeal is allowed but the parties are directed to
    bear their own costs throughout.

    G.N.                                                        Appeal allowed.