Holding

The Supreme Court held that the respondent's claim was stale and unsupported, and the Tribunal's order altering his date of birth must be set aside.

Summary

Kantilal H. Pandya joined the Railway Service in 1955, stating his date of birth (DOB) as 6 September 1930, which was entered in his service record. Upon retirement in 1988, he claimed his correct DOB was 4 September 1934 and sought alteration of his service records to obtain benefits until 1992, filing applications in 1985 and 1987 supported only by school leaving certificates issued in 1988. The Central Administrative Tribunal quashed the retirement order and directed the Railway Administration to amend his DOB and grant consequential benefits. The Union of India appealed, arguing that the claim was stale, made after an inordinate delay, and lacked reliable documentary evidence, invoking the Supreme Court’s decision in Union of India v. Hamam Singh. The Supreme Court held that the Tribunal erred, applying the principle of laches and the Hamam Singh ratio, and set aside the Tribunal’s order, refusing relief to the respondent. The appeal was allowed.

Issues considered

The applicability of the principle of laches to a belated claim for correction of date of birth in service records.
Whether the Central Administrative Tribunal was justified in altering the respondent's date of birth despite the delay and insufficient evidence.
Whether the respondent is entitled to retirement benefits based on the corrected date of birth.

Subjects

date of birth correctionservice recordslachesstale claimRailway ServiceCentral Administrative Tribunalretirement benefitsSupreme Court

Judgment

UNION OF INDIA AND ORS. A
v.
KANTILAL HEMATRAM PANDYA

FEBRUARY 14, 1995

(AS. ANAND AND M.K. MUKHERJEE, JJ.) B

Seryice Law : Date of Birth-Co"ection of-Where request made after
unexplained and inordinate delUJTo be scrntinised carefully-Interference
could be made sparingly and with circumspection-Cautious approach
needed. c
-(
Constitution of India, 1950: Art, 141-Law laid down by Supreme
Court-Binding on all Courts and Tribunall-Trying to get over of)jectionable
unless distinguishing factors could be established.

The respondent entered Railway Service on 1.7.1955 giving his date D
of birth as 6.9.1930 which was entered in his service records. When the
Railway Administration issued order8 for his superannuation, the respon-
dent protested claiming that his correct date of birth was 4.9.1934 and not
6.9.1930 and he was liable to be retired only on 30th September 1992. He
challenged the order before the Central Administrative Tribunal. Quash-
log the order, the Tribunal directed that either the General Manager or
E
his delegate, the Chief Personnel Officer of the Railway Administration
should inform the respondent about the documents with copies thereof on
which reliance was placed by the Railway Administration to record his date
of birth and give an opportunity to him to produce documents in supp9rt
of his claim and thereafter to pass a speaking order within six months. F
Accordingly, the Chief Personnel Officer held an inquiry into the
claim of the Respondent. The Railway Administration relied upon various
-( documents including the option forms dated 16.9.1960 and 20.2.1980 as
also the Provident Fund Withdrawal Form wherein the· respondent had
given his date of birth as 6.9.1930. It was· noticed that the respondent did G
not avail of the opportunity given by the ·Railway Board in 1972 asking all
the literate emplo~ to submit their representations'in case they wanted
any correction Of'. alteration in their recorded date of birth, latest by
31.7.1973."The respondent had made a representation for the first time on
25.12.1985 and then on 12.3.1987 seeking alteration of his date of birth. H
71 .
)
72 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1995) 2 S.C.R.

A The respondent, However, producted copies of School Leaving Certificates
· issued in 1988 in support of his claim.

The Chief Personnel Officer after hearing the parties rejected the
claim of the respondent. Aggrieved by the said decision the Respondent
filed an application before the Tribunal. The Tribunal quashed the im-
B pugned order ar.id directed the Railway Administration to alter the date of
the birth of the respondent in his service records, from 6.9.1930 to 4.9.1934
and to treat the respondent as if he had continued in service till 30.9.1992
and on that basis, to give him all the consequential benefits including pay
and allowances. ·
c In this appeal by the Union of India against Judgment of the
Tribunal, it was claimed that the judgment of this Court in Union of India
v. Hamam Singh, [1993) 2 sec 162 was fully attracted to the facts and
circumstances of the case.

D Allowing the appeal and setting aside the order of the Tribunal, this
Court

HELD : 1. Stale claims and belated applications for alteration of the
date of birth recorded in the service book at the time of initial entry, made
after unexplained and inordinate delay, on the eve of retirement, need to
E be scrutinised carefully and interference made sparingly and with cir-
cumspection. The approach has to be cautious and not casual. [80-C]

Union of India v. Hamam Singh, [1993) 2 sec 162, relied on.

2.1. A perusal of the record shows that after joining the service in
F 1955, the respondent had himself in 1960 as well as in 1980 mentioned his
date of birth as 6.9.1930 on various documents including the Provident
Fund Withdrawal Form dated 20.2.1980. No explanation, much less a
satisfactory explanation, has been furnished by the respondent as to why
he mentioned the date of birth as late as on 20.2.1980 in the Provident
G Fund Withdrawal Form as 6.9.1930, if he was already in possession of such
evidence which showed his date of birth as 4.9.1934. [78-F-G]

2.2. On 25.12.1985, for the first time, there decades after the respon-
dent had entered into service, did the respondent make an application for
correction of his date of birth without adducing any reliable documentary
H evidence in support of its claim and without in any manner explaining as
U.0.1. v. K.H. PANDYA 73

to why the respondent had taken no action for all those thirty years. [78-H] A
2.3. A bare or cursory look at the School Leaving Certificate shows
that it was issued on 19.9.1988, just a few days prior to the date of
superaqnnuation of the respondent on the basis of his recorded date of
birth and appeared to be a. document brought into existence in 1988 for
the benefit of the pending proceedings. The C.P.O., therefore, rightly did B
not place reliance on said certificate. The Tribunal, as a matter of indul-
gence directed the respondent on 15.2.1993 to obtain an affidavit from the
Headmaster of the school disclosing the date on which the original certifi-
cate was issued as also why the copy was issued in 1988, but no such
affidavit was produced for reasons best known to the respondent. lnspite C
of this lacuna, the Tribunal relied upon the said certificate, the correctness
and genuineness of which was not free from doubt, to grant relief to the
respondent. The material on record established that after filing the option
forms declaring his date of birth as 6.9.1930, in 1960, and after the filing
of the Provident Fund Withdrawal Form on 20.2.1980, the respondent
made bis representation for correction of date of birth in 1985 and 1987 D
but failed to substantiate bis claim through any reliable and trust-worthy
documentary evidence. He allowed the matter to rest till he neared the age
of superannuation. The respondent slept over his rights to get the date of
birth altered for more than thirty years and woke up from his deep
slumber on the eve of his retirement only. (79-F-H, 80-A-B] E
3. The approach of the Tribunal is patently objectionable as it is
attempted to circumvent the law laid down by this Court on untenable
reasons by stating that it required to consider the case on merits without
in fact so considering. The law laid down by this Court is binding on all
courts and tribunals. Ind~d, the law as declared by this Court bas to be F
applied to the facts of a given case and not applied mechanically, but in
the present case the facts were so eloquent that no scope was available with
the Tribunal to get over the opinion expressed by this Court in Ham.am
Singh 's case. On ~e facts as established on the record, the Tribunal had
no option but to refuse relief to the respondent. (78-D-EJ G
Union of India v. Ham.am Singh, [1993) 2 sec, 162, relied OD and
applied.

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 1733 of
1995. H
/
I

74 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1995] 2 S.C.R.

A · From the J\Idgment and Order dated 30.9.93/6.10.93 of the Central
Administrative Tribunal, Ahmedabad in O.A. No. 71of1990.

K.T.S. Tulsi, Additional Soli<;:itor Genral, Ms. Indu Goswami, Arvind
K. Sharma and C.V. Subba Rao for the Appellants.

B R.P. Bhatt, Ms. Reema Bhandari and M.N. Shroff for the Respon-
dent.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

DR. ANANDr J. Leave granted.
c
The respondent entered Railway service on 1.7.1955 giving his date
of birth as 6.9.1930 at the time of entry into the service. That date of birth
was entered in his service record. On the basis of the said date of birth,
the Railway Administration issued orders on 5.2.1988/8.3.1988 for the
D retirement of the respondent w.e.f. 30th September, 1988, on attaining the
age of 58 years. The respondent protested. According to him, his correct
date of birth was 4.9.1934 and not 6.9.1930 and he was liable to be retired
from service only on 30th September, 1992. The order of the Railway
Administration directing retirement of the respondent with effect from ·
30th September, 1988 was challenged by him through· OA No. '1i53lffl
E before the Central Administrative Trib\Jnal, Ahemadabad. By its order
dated 26.8.1988 the Tnbunal partly allowed the application directing as
under:

"The decision dated 5th February, 1988 of the Competent authority '"f
F communicated to the j,etitioner under letter dated 8.3.1988 is
· hereby quashed and set aside. It is directed that either the general
Manager or his delegate C.P.O. of the respondent Railway Ad-
ministration shall inform the petitioner at the earliest about the
documents with a copy thereof, on which reliance is sought by the "")--- ·
Railway Administration for arriving at a correct decision for his
G D.O.B. and permit the petitioner to produce relevant documents
in support of his claim and decide the same within 6 ~onths from
the date of this order by a speaking order after giving the petitioacr
a personal hearing in the light of the observations made herein
above and in accordance with law. ' have no doubt that the·
H competent authority will decide the matter· afresh, without being .
\

U.0.1. v. K.H. PANDYA (DR. ANAND, J.] 75

influenced by the orders passed earlier. It is further ordered that A
in case the petitioner's claim for correction of birth date is estab-
lished the competent authority will give effect to such corrected
birth date by giving all consequential benefits on the basis thereof."

In obedience to the aforesaid directions, the C.P.O. of Railway B
Administration held an enquiry into the claim of the respondent regarding
his date of birth. Parties were directed to produce their evidence and were
also heard. The Railway Administration in the course of the enquiry by the
C.P.O. relied upon various documents including the option forms dated
16th Septmber, 1960 and 20th February, 1980, wherein the respondent had
given his date of birth as 6.9.1930 as well as the Provident Fund withdrawal C
form filed on 20.2.1980 in which again the date of birth had been shown
by the respondent as 6.9.1930. It was also noticed that the respondent had
not availed of the opportunity given by the Railway Board in 1972 asking
all the literate employees serving with the Railway to submit their repre-
sentations if any, in case, they wanted any correction or alteration in their D
recorded date of birth, latest upto 31.7.1973. It was found that the respon-
dent had made a representation for the first time on 25.12.1985 and then
on 12.3.1987 seeking an alteration of his date of birth and claiming his date
of birth to be 4.9.1934. The respondent produced copies of school leaving
certificates, issued in 1988, in support of his claim that his date of birth was
4.9.1934. The C.P.O. after analysing the evidence and the material on the E
record and hearing the parties rejected the claim of the respondent for the
alteration of his date of birth from 6.9.1930 to 4.9.1934 vide order dated
24.1.1989. Aggrieved by the aforesaid decision, the respondent once again
moved an application before the Tnlmnal challenging the order dated
24.1.1989. By its impugned order dated 30th September, 1993, the Tnl>unal p
allowed the application and quashed the order dated 24.1.1989. and
directed the Railway Administration to alter the date of birth of the
respondent in his service records from 6.9.1930 to 4.9.1934 and since, the
respondent had already retired from service on 30.9.1988, the Tribunal
directed that the respondent be treated as if he had continued in service
from 1.10.1988 till 30.9.1992 and on that basis be given all the consequential G
benefits including the pay and allowances. The Tribunal took the view that
even though vide its earlier order of 26:8.1988 the C.P.O. had been directed
to pass a speaking order after giving an opportunity to the respondent to
produce his evidence and considering the same, the C.P.O. had not com-
plied with the ordci: ~.its. CQttec:& perspective. The Tnl>unal found fault H
}
'

76 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1995) 2 S.C.R.

A with the opinion of the C.P.O. that since the respondent had not availed
of the final opportunity, provided by the Board asking all the literate
employees to submit their representations if any, for correction of their
recorded date of birth latest by 3l.7.1993, therefore his belated claim for
correction of his date of birth suffered from the vice of laches. The
B Tribunal relied upon a Full Bench judgment of the Tribunal in T.A. No.
1104/86 and 1089/86, wherein it had been held that the Railway Board's
letter No. E(NG) ii-70-BR/l dated 4.8.1972, prescribing 31.7.1973 as the
last date for making representation, for effecting the change of date of
birth, did not have the force of law and that an application by a railway -~
employee for correction of his date of birth, could not be rejected on the
C ground that it had not been made before the last date prescribed in the
Railway Board's letter dated 4.8.1972.
")--
Learned counsel for the appellant while assailing the impugned order \
of the Tribunal submitted that it had laboured unnecessarily to get out of
the binding judgment of this Court in Union of India v. Hamam Singh,
D (1993) 2,SCC, 162 which was fully attracted to the facts and circumstances
of the case. Learned counsel submitted that the date of birth which had
been recorded in the service record of the respondent was 6.9.1930 and
that till almost the eve of his retirement, the respondent took no steps to
have the recorded date of birth altered, even though opportunity had been
E granted to all literate employees of the Railways to have their date of birth
altered, in case the same had been recorded wrongly, till 31.7.1993 and as
such, the Tribunal should have refused the alteration of the date of birth
of the appellant, which had been claimed after an inordinate and unex-
plained long delay of more than quarter of a century. ,
F
In Union of India v. Hamam Singh (supra) this Court opined that:

"A Government servant, after entering into service acquires the
right to continue in service till the age of retirement, as fixed by
the State in exercise of its powers regulating conditions of service,
G unless the' services are dispensed with on other grounds contained
in the relevant service rules after following the procedure
prescribed therein. The date of birth entered in the service records
of a civil servant is, thus of utmost importance for the reason that
the right to continue in service stands decided by its entry in the
H .-··-· ......... ·,--::··-.,
..
service record. A Government servant who has declared his age
U.0.1.v. K.H. PANDYA[DR.ANAND,J.) 77

at the initial stage of the employment is, of course, not precluded A
.from making a request later on for correcting his age. It is open
to a civil servant to claim correction of his date of birth, if he is in
possession of irrefutable proof relating to his date of birth as
different from the one earlier recorded and even if there is no
period of limitation prescribed for seeking correction of date of B
birth, the Government servant must do so without any un-
reasonable delay. In the absence of any provision in the rules for
correction of date of birth, the general principle of refusing relief
on grounds of laches or stale claims, is generally applied by the
courts and tribunals. It is nonetheless competent for the Govern-
. ment to fix a time-limit, in the service rules, after which no C
application for correction of date of birth of a Government servant
can be entertained. A Government servant who makes an applica-
tion for correction of date of birth beyond the time, so fixed,
therefore, cannot claim, as a matter of right, the correction of his
date of birth even if he has good evidence to establish that the D
recorded date of birth is clearly erroneous. The law of limitation
may operate harshly but it has to be applied with all its rigour and
the courts or tribunals cannot· come to the aid of those who sleep
over their rights and allow the period of limitation to expire. Unless
altered, his date of birth as recorded would determine his date of
superannuation even if it amounts to abridging his right to continue E
in service on the basis of his actual age."

The Tribunal noticed th~ judgment rendered by this Court in Har-
nam Singh's ease (supra) but curiously failed to follow it o~serving:
F
"Although the respondents neither quoted in the reply nor took
the opportunity of bringing the case to our notice. We are bound
to respect the ratio of the latest Supreme Court judgment in Union
of India and Ors. v. Hamam Singh, (1992) SC (L & S) 375, in the
matter ·of date of birth and which over rules CAT Full bench
decision in Darshansingh's case. That case which related to inter- G
pretation of Note No. 5 to FR-56(M) which was incorporated only
in 1979 provided for request to be made for correction of date of
birth within five years from the date of entry in to service. The
Hon'ble Supreme Coilrt held that in case of Government servants
who entered service prior to 1979, it will be appropriate and in H
}

.SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1995) 2 S.C.R .

A tune with harmonious construction to be held that they may seek
t~e correction of date of birth after 1979, but in any event not later
then 5 years after coming into force of the amendment in 1979.
The Supreme Court also observed that Darshansingh 's case was
distinghished by the fact that Shri Dharshansingh had not been
shown the service book even once during his entire service. The
B Supreme Court also referred to the General rule that in the
absence of date of birth the general principle of refusing relief on
the ground of laches and stale claim is generally applied by the
Courts and Tribunals.

c We are bound by Supreme Court's decision in Hamamsingh's
case but in view of the special features of the instant case, we hold
that we are required to consider the case on merits."

The approach of the Tribunal is patently objectionale and does not com-
mend to us. It attempted to circumvent the law laid down by this Court on
D untenable reasons by stating that "we are required to consider the case on
merits" without in fact so considering! The law laid down by this Court is
binding on all courts and tribunals. Indeed, the law as declared by this .
Court has to be applied to the facts of a given case and not applied
mechanically but we find that in the present case the facts were so eloquent
E that no scope was available with the Tribunal to get over the opinion
expressed by this Court in Hamam Singh's case (supra) and on the facts
as established on the. record the Tribunal had no option but to refuse relief
to the respondent.

From a perusal of the record we find that after joining the service in
F 1955, the respondent had himself in 1960 as well as in 1980 mentioned his
date of birth as 6.9.1930 (as had been recorded on the first sheet of his
service record) on various documents including the Provident Fund
withdrawal form dated 20.2.1980. No explanation, muchle'ss a satisfactory
explanation, has been furnished by the respondent as to why he mentioned
the date of birth as late as 20.2.1980 in the Provident Fund withdrawal
G
form, as 6.9.1930 if he was already in possession of such evidence which
showed his date of birth as 4.9.1934. ·

On 25.12.1985, for the first time, three decades after the respondent
·had entered into service, did the respondent inake an appiication for
H correction of his date of birth without adducing any reliable document~ry
. 'U.0.1. v. K.H. PANDYA [DR. ANAND, J.] 79

evidence in support of its claim and without in any manner explaining as A
to why the respondent had taken no action for all those thirty years. In the
enquiry held by the C.P.O., consequent upon the remand of the case, the
respondent relied upon three school leaving certificates procured belatedly
and containing contradictory assertions. In this connection, it may be
noticed that one of the school leaving certificates produced by the respon- B
dent shows that he was admitted to the school on 23.4.1949 and had left
the school on 12.1.1950, without even completing one academic year of
study. The respondent, on the basis of the above certificate, would appear
to have joined the school in mid-session and left the school again in
mid-session. Before the C.P.O., the respondent contended that he had to
withdraw from the school on account of the death of his father but curiously C
the Certificate records that he was leaving the school to study in some other
school. That apart, the basis on which the entry of date of birth was made
4 ·- in that certificate has not been disclosed. This certificate was produced
before the Tribunal also. The copy of the other School Leaving Certificate
which was produced by the respondent during the enquiry by the C.P.O. D
and was also produced before the Tribunal, issued by the Principal of the
V.C. Techn. High Schoo~ a private school, reads as follows :

This is to certify that Shri Kantilal Hemantram Pandya's Date
of Birth in figures - 4.9.34 (In words) Four September Thirty Four.
This Certificate is given as per this School Register No. J.R. E
NA-3716 dated 19.9.1988 on charging of Re. 1 as per rules.

A bare or cursory look at the above document shows that the
certificate was issued on 19.9.1988, just a few days prior to the date of
superannuation of the respondent on the basis of his recorded date of birth F
and appeared to be a document brought into existence for the benefit of
the pending proceedings. The C.P.O., therefore, rightly did not place
reliance on the said certificate. The copy of the certificate, as already
noticed had been issued in 1988. The Tribunal, as a matter of indulgence
directed the respondent on 15.2.1993 to obtain an affidavit from the
--(
Headmaster of the school disclosing the date on which the original certifi- G
cate was issued as also why the copy was issued in 1988, but no such
affidavit was produced for reasons best known to the respondent. In spite
of this lacuna, the Tribunal erroneously relied upon the said certificate, the
correctness and genuiness of which was not free from doubt to grant relief
· to the. respondent. The material on the record established that after filing H
)
80 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1995) 2 S.C.R.

A the option forms declaring his date of birth as 6.9.1930, in 1960, and after
the filing of the Provident Fund withdrawal form on 20.2.1980, the respon-
dent made his representation for correction of date of birth in 1985 and
1987 but failed to substantiate his claim through any reliable and trustwor-
thy documentary evidence. He allowed the matter to rest till he neared the
B age of superannuation. The respondent slept over his rights to get the date
of birth altered for more than thirty years and woke up from his deep
slumber on the eve of his retirement only. The law laid down by this. Court
in Hamam Singh's case (supra) was, thus, fully applicable to the facts and
circumstances of the case of the respondent and the Tribunal failed to
follow the same without even pointing out any distinguishing features on
C facts. Stale claims and belated applications for alteration of the date of
birth recorded in the service book at the time of initial entry, made after
unexplained and inordinate delay, on the eve of retirement, need to be
scrutinised carefully and interference made sparingly and with circumspec-
tion. The approach has to be cautious and not casual. On facts, the
D respondent was not entitled to the relief which the Tribunal granted to him.
The order of the Tribunal is erroneous and the directions issued by it
cannot be sustained. We, accordingly, set aside the order of the Tribunal
and allow this appeal. No costs.

G.N. Appeal allowed.