Holding

Disciplinary action may be taken against an officer exercising quasi‑judicial functions where there is prima facie evidence of misconduct, recklessness, or an intention to unduly favour a party, and such immunity does not apply.

Summary

The respondent, an Income Tax Officer, was charged under Rule 14 of the Central Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1965 for completing nine tax assessments in an irregular, hasty manner allegedly to confer undue favour, thereby violating Rules 3(1)(i)-(iii) of the Central Civil Services (Conduct) Rules, 1964. He sought a stay of the disciplinary proceedings before the Central Administrative Tribunal (CAT) and argued that actions taken in his quasi‑judicial capacity were immune from disciplinary action. The CAT ordered the sealed‑cover procedure to be opened and later held that the officer’s quasi‑judicial actions could not form the basis of discipline, quashing the charge memorandum. The Union of India appealed, contending that disciplinary action is permissible where conduct reflects on the officer’s integrity, recklessness, or undue favour, even if the officer was exercising quasi‑judicial powers. The Supreme Court held that immunity does not attach to quasi‑judicial functions when the officer’s conduct shows misconduct, recklessness, or a desire to favour a party, and therefore disciplinary action is justified. Consequently, the Court allowed the appeals, setting aside the CAT orders.

Issues considered

Whether a government servant exercising quasi‑judicial functions enjoys immunity from disciplinary proceedings.
Whether the alleged irregular and hurried assessments, intended to confer undue favour, constitute misconduct under the Central Civil Services (Conduct) Rules, 1964.
Whether the sealed‑cover procedure could be employed while disciplinary proceedings were pending.

Legislation cited

Central Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1965s. Rule 14
Central Civil Services (Conduct) Rules, 1964s. Rule 3(1)(i), s. Rule 3(1)(ii), s. Rule 3(1)(iii)
Income Tax Acts. Section 29(4), s. Section 99

Subjects

disciplinary proceedingsquasi‑judicial immunitycivil services conduct rulesintegrityundue favoursealed cover procedureCentral Administrative Tribunalpromotiontax assessment

Judgment

•

A UNION OF INDIA AND ORS.
v.
K. K. DHAWAN

JANUARY 27, 1993

B [L.M. SHARMA, CJ., S. MOHAN AND S.P. BHARUCHA, JJ.]

Central Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules,
1965--Rule 14---Disciplinary proceedings against Income Tax Officer for y
violatio11 of Rule J(l)(i)(ii),(iii) of the Central Civil Services {Conduct)
Rules, 19(;4. while conducting assessments in irregular manner, in undue
c haste, conferring u11due favour upon the assessees-Legality of

The respondent while working as Income Tax Officer completed
certain as.sessments during the year 1982-83.

D A charge memorandum, was served on him, proposing to hold an
inquiry against him under Rule 14 of the Central Civil Services (Classifica-
tion, Central Appeal) Rules, 1965.

A statement of article of charge was framed against the respondent.
The substance of the charge was th"e completion of nine assessments in an
E irregular manner, hastily with a view to confer undue favour upon the
assessees, and by such act, he failed to maintain absolute integrity and
devotion to duty and exhibited a conduct unbecoming of government
sen-ant.

The details relating to misconduct or misbehaviour of the respon-
F dent were furnished and he was charged for violating the provisions of
Rules 3(l)(i), 3(1)(ii) and 3(l)(iii) of the Central Civil Services (Conduct)
Rules, 1964. In support of the allegations, he was also supplied with the
necessary documents.

G Against the memorandum, the ·respondent preferred an application
before the Central Administrative Tribunal, praying for a stay of the
disciplinary proceedings and to consider his case for promotion on merits
without resort to the sealed cover procedure.

On 8.2.1991, the Tribunal directed the appellant-Union of India to
H open the sealed cover and to implement the recommendations of the
296
•
U.0.1. v. K.K DHAWAN 297
Departmental Promotion Committee to promote the respondent to the A
post of Deputy Commissioner of Income Tax, if he was found ru for
promotion within two weeks from the date of order.

Later on 223.1991, the Trilmnal allowed the respondent's applica-
tion, holding that the action taken by the respondent-officer was quasi-
judicial and should not have formed the basis of disciplinary action. The B
Tribunal also made its earlier order dated 8.2.1991 absolute.

The Union of India preferred the present appeals by special leave
against the orders of the Tribunal, contending that in a case where
disciplinary proceedings were pending against the respondent, the proce- C
dure of opening the sealed cover should not have been resorted to. Other-
wise, it would amount to putting a premium on misconduct ; that the
Tribunal failed to appreciate the ratio of the order in C.A. Nos. 4986-87/90;
that as the respondent was charged for violation of Rules 3(l)(i), 3(l)(ii)
and 3(l)(iii) of the Central Civil Services (Conduct) Rules, 1964; immunity
from the disciplinary action could not be claimed. D
The respondent contended that the opening of the sealed cover was
correctly ordered because on the date when the Departmental Promotion
Committee met in March 1989, no charge-sheet was served on the respon-
dent; that as the respondent was exercising quasi-judicial functions, or-
ders made by him if were wrong, the remedy by way of an appeal or E
revision could be resorted to; that if in every case of wrong order, discipli-
nary action was resorted to, it would jeopardize the exercise of judicial
functions; and the immunity attached to the officer while exercising quasi-
judicial powers would be lost.

On the question, whether an authority enjoys immunity from dis- F
ciplinary proceedings with respect to matters decided by him in exercise
of quasi-judicial functions; allowing the appeals, this Court,

HELO : 1.01. The disciplinary action can be taken in the following
cases :

(i) Where the Officer had acted in a manner as would reflect on his G
reputation for integrity or good faith or devotion to duty ;

(ii) if there is prima facie material to show recklessness or miscon-
duct in the discharge of his duty;

(iii) if he has acted in a manner which is unbecoming of a govern- H
•
298 SUPREME CQURT REPORTS [1993] 1 S.C.R.
A ment servant; [311E-F]

(iv) if be bad acted negligently or that be omitted the prescribed
conditions which are essential for the exercise of the statutory powers;

(v) if be bad acted in order to unduly favour a party;
B
(vi) if be bad been actuated by corrupt motive however, small the
bribe may be. [311G-H]

The instances above catalogued are not exhaustive. For a mere
technical violation or merely because the order is wrong and the action not
c falling under the above enumerated instances, disciplinary action is not
warranted. Each case will depend upon the facts and no absolute rule can
be postulated. [312A-B]

1.02. There is a great reason and justice °for holding in such cases
that the' disciplinary action could be taken. It is one of the cardinal
D principles of administration of justice that it must be free from bias of any
kind. (3118]

1.03. The officer who exercises judicial or quasi-judicial powers acts
negligently or recklessly or in order to confer undue favour on a person is
E not acting as a judge. [311C]

1.04. In the present case, this Court is not concerned with the
correctness or legality of the decision of the respondent but the conduct of
the respondent in discharge of his duties as an officer. The legality of the
orders with reference lo the nine assessments may be questioned in appeal
F or revision under the Act. (3110]

UIS. In lite case on hand, article of charge dearly mentions that the nine
assessments covered by the article of charge_,, romp1eted:

(i) in an irregular manner,
G
(ii) in undue haste, and

(iii) apparently with a view to confer undue favour upon the assessees
concerned. [310A-B]

H Therefore, the allegation of conferring undue favour is very much
•
U.0.1. v. K.K. DHAWAN [MOHAN, J.] 299
there and certainly disciplinary action is warranted. [310C] A
Govinda Menon v. Union of India, AIR 1967 SC 1274; Thayre v. The
London, Brighton and South Coast Railway Company, 22 TLR 240 and
Thompson v. British Bema Motor Lorries Limited, 33 TLR 187 at page 188,
referred to.
B
Union of India & Ors. v. A.N. Saxena, [1992) 3 SCC 124, explained.

SLP (C) Nos. 2635-36/89 in C.A. No. 4986-87/90, distinguished

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal Nos. 266-267
~~ c
From the Judgment and Order dated 8.2.91 & 22.3.91.of the Central
Administrative Tribunal Principal Bench, New Delhi in O.A. No. 2540/89
& M.P. No. 219 of 1991.
- -~
K.T.S. Tuls~ Additional Solicitor General, B. Parthasartby, P. Par- D
meshwaran and C.V.S. Rao for the Appellants.

Indu Malhotra for the Respondent.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
' E
> MOHAN, J. Leave granted.

The respondent, while working as Income Tax Officer, Muktsar
during the year 1982-83 completed certain assessments. A charge
memorandum dated 2.5.1989 was served on him to the effect it was
proposed to hold an inquiry against him under Rule 14 of the Central Civil F
Services (Classification, Central & Appeal) Rules, 1965. A statement of
~-----f
article of charge framed against him was to the following effect :

STATEMENT OF ARTICLE OF CHARGE FRAMED
AGAINST, SHRI K.K. DHAWAN, A GROUP 'A'
G
NOW POSTED AS ASSISTANT COMMISSIONER
OF INCOME TAX, BOMBAY .

....:..i:l...k Anicle I

Shri K.K. Dhawan while functioning as I.T.O. •A' H
300 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1993] 1 S.C.R.
A Ward, Muktsar during 1982-1983 completed nine assess-
ments in the ease of :

( 1) M/s Chananna Automobiles,

(2) M/s Gupta Cotton Industries,
B
(3) Mis Ajay Cotton Industries,

( 4) Mis National Rice Mills,

(5) Mis Tek Chand Buchram,
c (6}.Mis Tilak Cotton Industries,

(7) Mis Chandi Ram Behari Lal,

(8) Mis Phuman Mal Chandi Ram and

D (9) Mis Modern Tractors

in an irregular manner, in undue haste and apparently with ~ view to
conferring undue favour upon the assessees concerned.

By his above acts Shri Dhawan failed to maintain absolute integrity and
E devotion to duty and exhibited a conduct unbecoming of a Govt. servant,
thereby violating provisions of Rules 3( l}(i}, 3(l)(ii) and 3( l)(iii) of the CCS
(Conduct) Rules, 1964.

This was accompanied by a statement of imputation of his misconduct or
misbehaviour in support of the article of charge framed against him.
F
In each of the nine cases of the assesses above referred to, the details
relating to misconduct or misbehaviour were furnished. Therefore, it was
charged that the respondent had violated the provisions of Rule 3(1)(i),
3(1)(ii) and 3(1)(iii) of the Central Civil Services (Conduct) Rules, 1964. The
G necessary documents in support of these allegations were also enclosed.

Against the said memorandum dt. 2.5.1989, the respondent preferred
an application 0.A. No. 2540i89 before the Central Administrative
Tribunal, New Delhi praying for a stay of the disciplinary proceedings and
to consider his case for promotion on merits without resort to the sealed
H cover procedure.
.. _

U.0.1. v. K.K. DHAWAN (MOHAN, J.] 301
By its order dt. 8.2.1991, Central Administrative Tribunal, Principal A
Bench, New Delhi directed the respondent Union of India to open the
sealed cover immediately and implement the recommendations of the
Departmental Promotion Committee in so far as it pertained to the
petitioner and to promote hill! to the post of Deputy Commissioner of
Income Tax if he was found fft for promotion within two weeks from the
B
date of said order.

Thereafter, by a detailed judgment dated 22.3.1991, the Tribunal
relying on S.L.P. (C) Nos. 2635-36/89 in Civil Appeal No. 4986-87/90, held
{bat the action taken by the officer was quasi-judicial and should not have
formed the basis of disciplinary action. Therefore, the application was C
allowed and the impugned memorandum dated 2.5.1989 was quashed. The
earlier order dated 8.2.1991 to open the sealed cover and implement the
recommendations of Departmental Promotion Committee was made ab-
. ~- solute .
D
A~rieved by these two orders, the present special leave petitions
have been preferred.

The learned counsel for the appellant Shri K T.S. Tulsi submits as
under:
E
(i) That in a case where disciplinary proceedings are
pending against the respondent, the procedure of opening
the sealed cover should not have been resorted to. Other-
wise, it would amount to putting a premium on miscon-
duct. F
--~ (ii) The Tribunal failed to appreciate the ratio of the order
in C.A. Nos. 4986-87/90. In that case, the enquiry report
showed that the charge framed against the officer had not
been proved. That is entirely different from holding that
in a case of quasi-judicial action taken by the Officer no G
disciplinary action could be taken. The true purport of
that observation is only to buttress the earlier finding that
the charge had not been proved. Therefore, rt;llance ought
not to have been placed on this ruling which turned on
the peculiar facts and circumstances of that case. H
. "

302 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1993] 1 S.C.R.
A (iii) Though nine cases were cited in the charge memoran-
dum, only one of the cases had been discussed.

(iv) Lastly, it is submitted that the respondent is charged
for violation of Rule 3(1)(i), 3(1)(ii) and 3(1)(iii) of
Central Civil Services (Conduct) Rules, 1964.
B
Therefore, if the conduct of the respondent could be
brought within the scope of the Rules, immunity from the
disciplinary action cannot be claimed.

c In support of these submissions, reliance is placed on Union of India
& Ors. v. A.N. Saxena, [1992] 3 SCC 124.

In Civil Appeal No. 560 of 1991, the peculiar facts are different; in
disregard to the instructions of the Central Board oi Direct Taxes, refund
of taxes was ordered. Further, there was no allegation of corrupt motive
D or to oblige any person on account of extraneous considerations. There-
fore, that ruling is distinguishable.

The respondent would try to support the impugned order contending
that the' opening of the sealed cover was correctly ordered because on the
date when the Departmental Promotion Committee met in March 1989, no
E
charge-sheet had been served on the respondent. The charge memorandum
dated 2.5.1989 came up to be served only on 5.5.1989. Therefore, following
the earlier procedure such a direction was given.

This is a case in which the respondent was exercising quasi-judicial
F functions. If the orders were wrong the remedy by way of an appeal or
revision could have been resorted to. Otherwise, if in every case of wrong
order, disciplinary action is resorted to, it would jeopardize the exercise of
judicial functions. The immunity attached to the officer while exercising
quasi-judicial powers will be lost. Rightly, therefore, the Tribunal relied on
Civil Appeal Nos. 4986-87/90 where this Court took the view that no
G
disciplinary action can be taken in respect of exercising quasi-judicial
functions. To the same effect in Civil Appeal No. 560/91 the decision relied
on by the appellant namely Union of India & Ors., (1992] 3 SCC 124 (supra)
has no application to the instant case.

H The charge memorandum dated 2.5.1989 states as follows :
..
U.0.1. v. K.K. DHAWAN [MOHAN, J.) 303
MEMORANDUM A
'The President proposes to hold an inquiry against Shri
K.K. Dhawan under Rule 14 of the Central Civil Services
(Classification, Central and Appeal) Rules, 1965. The
substance of the imputations of misconduct or mis-
behaviour in respect of )Vhich the inquiry js proposed to B
be held is set out in the enclosed statement of article of
charge."

At this stage, we will refer to Rule 3(1)(i) , 3(1)(ii) and 3(1)(iii) of
the Central Civil Services (Conduct) Rules, 1964 which are as under : C
Rule 3 (1) : Every government servant shall at all time-

(i) maintain absolute integrity;

(ii) maintain devotion to duty and
D
(ili) do nothing which is unbecoming of a government
servant.

The substance of the charge is the completion of nine assessments in
an irregular manner, hastily with a view to confer undue favour upon the E
various assessees. By such act, the respondent failed to maintain absolute
integrity and devotion to duty and exhibited a conduct unbecoming of
government servant. Certainly, it cannot be contended that concerning the
violation of these rules, no ilisciplinary action could be taken. However,
what is urged is that in so far as the respondent was exercising quasi-judi-
cial functions, he could not be subject to disciplinary action. The order may F
• -<t be wrong. In such a case, the remedy will be to take up the matter further
in appeal or revision.

The question, therefore, arises whether an authority enjoys immunity
from ilisciplinary proceedings with respect to matters decided by him in
exercise of quasi-judicial functions?
G

•• '.'. In Govinda Menon v. Union of India, AIR 1%7 SC 1274, it was
contended that no disciplinary proceedfilgs could be taken against appel-
lant for acts or omissions with regard to his work as Commissioner under
Madras Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments Act, 1951. Since the H
304 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1993] 1 S.C.R.
A orders made by bim were quasi-judicial in character, they should be
challenged only as provided for under the Act. It was further contended
that having regard to scope of Rule 4 of All India Services (Discipline and
Appeal} Rules, 1955, the act or omission of the Commissioner was such
that appellant was not subject to the administrative control of the Govern-
B ment and therefore, the disciplinary proceedings were void. Rejecting this
contention, it was held as under :

"It is not disputed that the appropriate Government has
power to take disciplinary proceedings against the appel-
lant and that he could be removed from service by an
c order of the Central Government, but it was contended
that I.A.S. Officers are governed by statutory rules, that
'any act or omission' referred to in Ruie 4(1} relates only
to an act or omission of an officer when serving under the
Government, and that 'serving under the Government'
D means subject to the administrative control of the Govern-
ment and that disciplinary proceedings should be, there-
fore, on the basis of the relationship of master and servant.
It was argued that in exercising statutory powers the
Commissioner was not subject to the administrative con-
trol of the Government and disciplinary proceedings can-
E not, therefore, be instituted against the appellant in
respect of an act or omission committed by him in the
course of his employment as Commissioner. We are un-
able to accept the proposition contended for by the ap-
pellant as correct. Rule 4(1} does not impose any
F limitation or qualification as to the nature of the act or
omission in respect of which disciplinary proceedings can
be instituted. Rule 4(1} (b} merely says that the ap-
propriate Government competent to institute disciplinary
proceedings against a member of the Service would be the
Government under whom such member was serving at the
G time of the commission of such act or omission. It does
not say.that the act or omission must have been committed
in the discharge of his duty or in the course of his employ-
ment as a Government servant. It is, therefore, open to
the Government to take disciplinary proceedings against
H the appellant in respect of bis acts or omissions which cast
•
U.0.1. v. K.K. DHAWAN [MOHAN, J.] 305
a reflection upon his reputation for integrity or good faith A
or devotion to duty as a member of the service. It is not
A disputed that the appellant was, at the time of the alleged
misconduct, employed as the First Member of the Board
of Revenue and he was at the same time performing the
duties of Commissioner under the Act in addition to his
B
duties as the First Member of the Board of Revenue. In
our opinion, it is not necessary that a member of the
Service should have committed the alleged act or omission
in the course of discharge of his duties as a servant of the
l'
Government in order that it may form the subject-matter
of disciplinary proceedings. In other words, if the act or c
omission is such as to reflect on the reputation of the
officer for his integrity or good faith or devotion to duty,
there is no reason why disciplinary proceedings should not
be taken against him for that act or omission even though
_......_ the act or omission relates to an activity in regard to which
D
there is no actual master and servant relationship. To put
it differently, the test is not whether the act or omission
was committed by the appellant in the course of the
discharge of his duties as servant of the Government. The
test is whether the act or omission has some reasonable
connection with nature and condition of his service or E
whether the act or omission has cast any reflection upon
the reputation of the member of the Service for integrity
or devotion to duty as a public servant. We are of the
opinion that even if the appellant was not subject to the
administrative control of the Government when he was F
functioning as Commissioner under the Act and was not
the servant of the Government subject to its orders at the
-~ relevant time, his act or omission as Commissioner could
form the subject-matter of disciplinary proceedings
provided the act or omission would reflect upon his
reputation for integrity or devotion to duty as a member G
of the service." In this context reference may be made to
the following observations of Lopes, LJ. in Pearce v.
v' Foster, (1866) 17 OBD 536, p.542.
- '<

"If a servant conducts himself in a way inconsistent with tlle H
•

306 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1993) 1 S.C.R.
A faitllf11l discllarge of Iris duty in the service, it is misconduct
wllicll justifies immediate dismissal. That misconduct, ac-
cording to my view, need not be misconduct in the carrying
on of the service of the business. It is sufficient if it is
cQ11duct which is prejudicial or is likely to be prejudicial
to the interests or to the reputation of the master, and the
B
master will be justified, not only if he discovers it at the
time, but also if he discovers it afterwards, in dismissing
that servant." (emphasis supplied)

Concerning, the exercise of quasi-judicial powers the contention
C urged was to the following effect :

"We next proceed to examine the contention of the appel-
lant that the Commissioner was exercising a quasi-judicial
function in sanctioning the leases under the Act and his
orders, therefore, could not be questioned except in ac-
D cordance with the provisions of the Act. The proposition
put forward was that quasi-judicial orders, unless vacated
under the provisions of the Act, are final and binding and
cannot be questioned by the executive Government
through disciplinary proceedings. It was argued that an
E appeal is provided under S.29{4) of the Act against the
order of the Commissioner granting sanction to a lease
and that it is open to any party aggrieved to file such an
appeal and question the legality or correctness of the
order of the Commissioner and that the Government also
may in revision under S.99 of the Act examine the cor-
F rectness or legality of the order. It was said that so long
as these methods were not adopted the Government could
not institute disciplinary proceedings and re-examining
the legality of the order of the Commissioner granting
sanction to the leases~
G
That was rejected as under :

"The charge is, therefore, one of misconduct and reckless-
ness disclosed by the utter disregard of the relevant
provisions of S.29 and the Rules thereunder in sanctioning
H the leases. On behalf of the respondents it was argued
U.0.1. v. K.K. DHAWAN [MOHAN, J.] 307
both by Mr. Sarjoo Prasad and Mr. Bindra that the Com- A
missioner was not discharging quasi-judicial functions in
~ sanctioning leases under S.29 of the Act, but we shall
proceed on the assumption that the Commissioner was
performing quasi-judicial functions in granting leases
under S.29 of the Act. Even upon that assumption we are
B
satisfied that the Government was entitled to institute
disciplinary proceedings if there was prima facie material
for showing recklessness or misconduct on the part of the
appellant in the discharge of his official duty. It is true if
the provisions of S.29 of the Act or the Rules are dis-
regarded the order of the Commissioner is illegal and such c
an order could be questioned in appeal under S.29 ( 4) or
in revision under S.99 of the Act. But in the present
proceedings what is sought to be challenged is not the
correctness or the legality of the decision of the Commis-
sioner but the conduct of the appellant in the discharge D
of his duties as Commissioner. The appellant was
proceeded against because in the discharge of his func-
tions, he acted in utter disregard of the provisions of the
Act and the Rules. It is the manner in which he discharged
his functions that is brought up in these proceedings. In
E
other words, the charge and the allegations are to the
effect that in exercising his powers as Commissioner the
appellant acted in abuse of his power and it was in regard
to such misconduct that he is being proceeded against. It
is manifest, therefore, that though the· propriety and
legality of the sanction to the leases may be questioned in F
appeal or revision under the Act, the Government is not
precluded from taking disciplinary action if there is proof
-~ that the Commissioner had acted in gross recklessness in
the discharge of his duties or that he failed to act honestly
or in good faith or that he omitted to observe the G
prescribed conditions which are essential for the exercise
of the statutory power. We see no reason why the Govern-
ment cannot do so for the purpose of showing that the
"""'""" .,,., Commissioner acted in utter disregard of the conditions
prescribed for the exercise of his power or that he was
H
308 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1993) 1 S.C.R.
A guilty of misconduct or gross negligence. We are accord-
ingly of the opinion that the appellant has been unable to
make good his argument on this aspect of the case."

The above case, therefore, is an authority for the proposition that
disciplinary proceedings could be initiated against the government servant
B even with regard to exercise of quasi-judicial powers provided :

(i) The act or omission is such as to reflect on the reputa-
tion of the government servant for his integrity or good
faith or devotion to duty, or
c (ii) there is prima facie material manifesting recklessness
or misconduct in the discharge of the official duty, or

(iii) the officer had failed to act honestly or in good faith
or had omitted to observe the prescribed conditions which
D arc essential for the exercise uf statutory power.

We may also usefully refer to two English decisions. 771ayre v. The
London, Brighton and South Coast Railway Company, 22 T.L.R. 240
states:
E
"'Dishonesty' included dishonesty outside the service of
the company as well as dishonesty towards the company."

In Thompson v. British Berna Motor Lorries Limited 33 T.L.R. 187 at
page 188, it has been held as under : ·-
F
"It was the duty of the servant to render proper, full and
clear accounts to his principals, and it was the duty of a
servant to render prompt obedience to the lawful orders
of his master. In this case the plaintiff had failed in both
respects. There was no question as to the plaintiffs hones-
G ty, but he had been negligent."

The Tribunal has chosen to rely on Civil Appeal Nos. 4986-87/90.
The order in that case clearly shows the ultimate conclusion was that the .,J-
charge framed against the delinquent officer had not been established. In
H support of that conclusion, it was observed as under :
U.0.1. v. K.K. DHAWAN [MOHAN, J.] 309
"We are also of the view that the action taken by the A
appellant was quasi-judicial and should not have formed
the basis of disciplinary action."

We do not think where to buttress the ultimate conclusion, this
observation was made, that could ever be construed as laying the law that
in no case disciplinary action could be taken if it pertains to exercise of
B
y quasi-judicial powers.

Then, we come to Civil Appeal No. 560/91 to which one of us
(Mohan, J.) was a party. The ruling in this case turned on the peculiar
facts. Nevertheless, what we have to carefully notice is the observation as C
under:

"On a reading of the charges and the allegations in detail
learned Additional Solicitor General has fairly stated that
they do not disclose any culpability nor is there any al-
legation of taking any bribe or to trying to favour any party D
in making the orders granting relief in respect of which
misconduct is alleged against the respondent."

A The above extract will clearly indicate that if there was any culpability
or any allegation of taking bribe or trying to favour any party in exercise
of quasi-judicial functions, then disciplinary action could be taken. We find
E
our conclusion is supported by a following observations found in the said
order at page 3:

"In our view, the allegations are merely to the effect that
the refunds were granted to unauthorized instructions of F
the Central Board of Direct Taxes. There is no allegation,
however, either express or implied that these actions were
taken by the respondent actuated by any corrupt motive or
to oblige any person 011 account of extraneous considera-
tions. In these circumstances, merely because such orders
of refunds were made, even assuming that they were G
erroneous or wrong, no ·disciplinary action could be taken
as the respondent was discharging quasi-judicial function.
If any erroneous order had ·been passed by him correct
remedy is by way of an appeal or revision to have such
orders set aside." H
310 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1993) 1 S.C.R.
A In the case on hand, article of charge clearly mentions that the nine ~
assessments covered by the article of charge were completed :

(i) in an irregular manner,

(ii) in undue haste, and
B
(iii) apparently with a view to confer undue favour upon
the assessees .concerned. {Emphasis supplied)

Therefore, the allegation of conferring undue favour is very much
there unlike Civil Appeal No. 560/91. If that be so, certainly disciplinary
c action is warranted. This Court had occasion to examine the position. In
Union of India & Ors. v. A.N. Saxena, [1992) 3 SCC 124 to which one of us
{Mohan, J.) was a party, it was held as under :

"It was urged before us by learned counsel for the respon-
D dent that as the respondents was performing judicial or
quasi-judicial functions in making the assessment orders
in question even if his actions were wrong they could be
corrected in an appeal or in revision and no disciplinary
proceedings could be taken regarding such actions.
E In our view, an argument that no disciplinary action
can be taken in regard to actions t~ken or purported to
be done in the course of judicial or quasi-judicial proceed-
ings is not correct. It is true that when an officer is
performing judicial or quasi-judicial functions disciplinary
F proceedings regarding any of his actions in the course of
such proceedings should be taken only after great caution
and a close scrutiny of his actions and only if the cir-
cumstances so warrant. The initiation of such proceedings,
it is true, is likely to shake the confidence of the public in
the officer concerned and also if lightly taken likely to
G undermine his independence. Hence, the need for ex-
treme care and caution before initiation of disciplinary
proceedings against an officer performing judicial or ,b---
quasi-judicial functions in respect of his actions in the
discharge or purported to discharge his functions. But it
H is not as if such action cannot be taken at all. Where the
U.Q.I. v. K.K. DHAWAN [MOHAN, J.] 311
actions of such an officer indicate culpability, namely a A
< ;,( desire to oblige himself or unduly favour one of the parties
or an improper motive there is no reason why disciplinary
action should not be taken.'

This dictum fully su11ports the stand of the appellant. There is a great
reason and justice for holding in such cases that the disciplinary action B
could be taken. It is one of the cardinal principles of administration of
y
justice that it must be free from bias of any kind.

Certainly, therefore, the officer who exercises judicial or quasi-judi-
cial powers acts negligently or recklessly or in order to confer undue favour
on a person is not acting as a Judge. Accordingly, the contention of the
c
respondent has to be rejected. It is important to bear in mind that in the
present case, we are not concerned with the correctness or legality of the
decision of the respondent but the conduct of the respondent in discharge of
his duties as an officer. The legality of the orders with reference to the nine
assessments may be questioned in appeal or revision under tht: Act. But D
we have no doubt in our mind that the Government is not precluded from
taking the disciplinary action for violation of the Conduct Rules. Thus, we
conclude tnat the disciplinary action can be taken in the following cases :

(i) Where the officer had acted in a manner as would
A reflect on his reputation for integrity or good faith or E
devotion to duty;

(ii) if there is prima facie material to show recklessness or
misconduct in the discharge of his duty;

(iii) if he has acted in a manner which is unbecoming of
F
a government servant;

(iv) if he had acted negligently or that he omitted the
prescribed conditions which are essential for the exercise
of the statutory powers; G
(v) if he had acted in order to unduly favour a party;
~
(vi) if he had been actuated by corrupt motive however,
small the bribe may be because Lord Coke said long ago
'though the bribe may be small, yet the fault is great.' H
312 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1993] 1 S.C.R.
A The instances above catalogued are not exhaustive. However, we may
add that for a mere technical violation or merely because the order is '
wrong and the action not falling under the above enumerated instances,
disciplinary action is not warranted. Here, we may utter a word of caution.
Each case will depend upon the facts and no absolute rule can be postu-
lated.
B
In view of the foregoing discussion, the appeals will stand allowed.
There will be no order as to costs.

We make it clear that it is open to the respondent to put forth all
defences open to him in the departmental inquiry which will be conside•ed
c on its merit.

V.P.R. Appeals allowed.