Holding

A government servant acquitted on appeal must be reinstated, but back wages are payable only from the date of acquittal; the department is not liable for wages for the period of dismissal.

Summary

The respondent, a government servant, was convicted under IPC sections 302 and 34 and dismissed from service. He was later acquitted on appeal, after which the High Court ordered his reinstatement with full back wages. The Union appealed, arguing that the department should not be liable for wages for the period of dismissal. The Supreme Court held that while the employee must be reinstated, back wages are payable only from the date of acquittal, as the department was not responsible for the period when the employee was out of service due to the conviction. The Court relied on Ranchhodji Chaturji Thakore v. Superintendent Engineer (1996) 11 SCC 603 and clarified that a dismissed special leave petition does not create binding precedent. Consequently, the High Court's order granting back wages was set aside, and the respondent is to be reinstated with back wages from the acquittal date.

Issues considered

Whether a government servant acquitted on appeal is entitled to back wages for the period of dismissal following his conviction.
Whether the department is liable to pay back wages for the period during which the employee was out of service due to the criminal conviction.
Whether the High Court's order granting full back wages is sustainable in view of precedent.
Whether a summary dismissal of a special leave petition constitutes binding precedent.

Legislation cited

Indian Penal Code, 1860s. 302, s. 34

Subjects

service lawback wagesreinstatementcriminal convictionacquittalgovernment servantdepartmental liabilityIPC 302special leave petitionprecedent

Judgment

UNION OF (NOIA AND ORS. A
v.
JAIPAL SINGH

NOVEMBER 3, 2003

[DORAISWAMY RAJU AND ARIJIT PASAYAT, JJ.] B

Service Law :

Back wages-(]overnment servant convicted by trial court of an offence
uls 302134 /PC-Dismissal from service-On appeal, conviction set aside- C
Writ petition by employee seeking reinstatement and fall back wages-Allowed
by High Court-Held, though in the event of prosecution at the behest or by
the department itselfperhaps different considerations may arise, if an employee
or a public servant got involved in a criminal case and if after initial conviction
by trial court he gets acquittal on appeal subsequently, department cannot in D
any manner be found fault with for having kept him out of service, since the
law obliges a person convicted of an offence to be so kept out and not to be
retained in service-Although, the employee has to be reinstated in service for
the reason that the earlier discharge was on.account of criminal proceedings
and conviction only, yet department will be well within its rights to deny back
wages to the employee for the period he was not in service-Department E
cannot be made liable to pay for the period for which it could not avail of the
services of the employee..:.....Employee will be entitled to back wages from the
date of acquittal and except for the purpose of denying him actual payment
of back wages, that period also will be counted as period of service without
any break. F
Ranchhodji Chaturji Thakore v. Superintendent Engineer, Gujarat
Electricity Board, Himmatnagar (Gujarat) and Anr., (19961 11 SCC 603,
relied on.

Constitution of India, 1950 :
G
Articles 136 and 141-Held, an order rejecting a special leave petition
at the threshold without detailed reasons therefor does neither constitute any
declaration of law by Supreme Court nor a binding precedent-Precedent.

I 15 H
116 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2003] SUPP. 5 S.C.R.

A CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 8565 of2003.

From the Judgment and Order dated 30.10.200 I of the Punjab and
Haryana High Court in C.W.P. No. 12929 of 1999.

Raju Ramachandra, Additional Solicitor General, R.C. Verma, Mukesh
B Verma, Mrs. Sushnia Suri and B.V. Balaram Das for the Appellants.

Ranbir Singh Yadav for the Respondent.

The following Order of the Court was delivered :

C Leave granted.

The above appeal has been filed against the order of the Division
Bench of the High Court of Punjab and Haryana and Chandigarh dated
30.10.2001 in CWP No. 12929 of 1999 whereunder the Division Bench has
allowed the writ petition filed by the respondents and granted relief, as prayed
D for, directing re-instalment of the respondent with full back wages and
consequential benefits. The respondent was involved in a criminal case and
he was charge-sheeted for an offence under Section 302 read with Section 34
of the IPC along with his brother and though he was convicted by the learned
Additional Sessions Judge, Rewari for the same by a judgment dated
E 05.03.1997, on further appeal, before the High Court, the Division Bench of
the High Court returned a verdict of acquittal. As a consequence thereof,
since, he was not re-instated inspite of the order of acquittal, he moved the
High Court and obtained orders, as noticed supra. Aggrieved, the appellants
have come before this Court.

Heard Mr. Raju Ramachandran, learned Additional S_olicitor General
F
appearing for the appellants, who placed strong reliance upon the decision of
this Court in [1996] 11 SCC 603: Ranchhodji Chaturji Thakore v.
Superintendent Engineer, Gujarat Electricity Board, Himmatnagar (Gujarat)
and Anr. wherein this Court, in a case identical to the facts of the present
case, has chosen to order only re-instatement but denied back-wages on the
G ground that the department was in noway concerned with the criminal case
and, therefore, cannot be saddled with liability also for back wages for the
period when he was out of service during/after conviction suffered by the.
respondent in the criminal case. Per contra, Mr. Ranbir Singh Yadav, learned
counsel for the respondent sought to place reliance upon an order of this
H Court dismissing the special leave petition filed summarily against the
U.O.l. v. JAIPAL SINGH 1I7
..... judgment of the very same High Court dated 19 .07 .200 I in CWP No. I 020 I A
•
of 2000. Learned counsel for the respondent, by inviting our attention to the
judgment of the High Court in that case contended that on facts the case on
hand was also similar to the case considered therein but this Court dismissed
the special leave petition when the relief granted for re-instatement and back
wages was contested by the authorities before this Court.
B
On a careful consideration of the matter and the materials on record,
including the judgment and orders brought to our notice, we are of the view
that it is well accepted that an order rejecting a special leave petition at the
threshold without detailed reasons therefore does not constitute any declaration
of law by this Court or constitute a binding precedent. Per contra, the decision C
relied upon for the appellant is one on merits and for reasons specifically
recorded therefore and operates as a binding precedent as well. On going
through. the same, we are in respectful agreement with the view taken in
[1996] 11 SCC 603 (supra). If prosecution, which ultimately resulted in
acquittal of the person concerned was at the behest or by department itself,
perhaps different considerations may arise. On the other hand, if as a citizen D
the employee or a public servant got involved in a criminal case and it after
initial conviction by the trial court, he gets acquittal on appeal subsequently,
the department cannot in any manner be found fault with for having kept him
out of service, since the law obliges, a person convicted of an offence to be
so kept out and not to be retained in service. Consequently, the reasons given E
in the decision relied upon, for the appellants are not only convincing but are
in consonance with reasonableness as well. Though exception taken to that
part of the order directing re-instatement cannot be sustained and the
respondent has to be re-instated, in service, for the reason that the earlier
discharge was on account of those criminal proceedings and conviction only, F
the appellants are well within their rights to deny back wages to the respondent
for the period he was not in service. The appellants cannot be made liable to
pay for the period for which they could not avail of the services of the
respondent. The High Court, in our view, committed a grave error, in allowing
back wages also, without adverting to all such relevant aspects and
considerations. Consequently, the order of the High Court in so far as it G
directed payment of back wages are liable to be and is hereby set aside.

The respondent will be entitled to back wages from the date ofacquittal
and except for the purpose of denying the respondent actual payment of back
wages, that period also will be counted as period of service, without any
H
118 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2003] SUPP. S S.C.R.

A break. The re-instatement, if not already done, in terms of the order of the
High Court will be done within thirty days from today.

The appeal is allowed and disposed of on the above terms.

R.P. Appeal allowed and disposed.