Holding

The High Court's order setting aside the dismissal was invalid for lack of reasons, and the case was remitted to reconsider the quantum of punishment.

Summary

Dwarka Prasad Tiwari, a constable in the Central Reserve Police Force, fired his service weapon without orders while on sentry duty, injuring himself. A departmental inquiry under Rule 27 of the CRPF Rules, 1955 found him guilty of misconduct and negligence and dismissed him. The High Court set aside the dismissal as "shockingly disproportionate" and ordered his reinstatement, but gave no reasons for its conclusion. The Supreme Court held that a court may interfere with a disciplinary punishment only if it shocks the conscience or is irrational, and that the High Court failed to provide any reasoning, thereby reflecting a non‑application of mind. Consequently, the High Court order was set aside and the matter remitted to it to reconsider the quantum of punishment. The appeal of the Union of India was allowed in part and the respondent's appeal dismissed.

Issues considered

The scope of judicial review of disciplinary punishments under Article 14 and whether the High Court could set aside dismissal without stating reasons.
Whether the punishment of dismissal was "shockingly disproportionate" to the misconduct.
Whether the Wednesbury test or proportionality principles apply to the quantum of punishment in service cases.

Legislation cited

Central Reserve Police Force Act, 1949s. 11(1)
Constitution of Indias. 14, s. 21, s. 226, s. 227
CRPF Rules, 1955s. Rule 27

Subjects

disciplinary actionmisconductnegligencedismissalproportionalityWednesbury testjudicial reviewCRPFservice lawpunishment

Judgment

UNION OF INDIA AND ORS. A

DWARKA PRASAD TlWARl

OCTOBER 12, 2006

[ARIJITPASAYAT AND LOKESHWAR SINGH PANTA, JJ.] B

Service Law:

Misconduct-Punishment-Judicial Review-Scope-CRPF personnel
dismissed for misconduct and negligence/remissness in discharge of duty- C
High Court set aside punishment of dismissal holding it to be too harsh and
shockingly disproportionate-On appeal, held, order of High Court reflects
non-application of mind since it did not indicate any reason to justify its
conclusion-Matter remitted to High Court to re-consider the question of
quantum of punishment-Central Reserve Police Force Rules, 1955-Rule D
27.

Respondent was posted as a constable with Central Reserve Police Force
(CRPF). While functioning as sentry on a platoon post, he committed an act
of misconduct and negligence/remissness in that he fired one round from
his service weapon without orders and without any sufficient reason. E
Departmental Inquiry in terms of Rule 27 of the CRPF Rules, 1955 was
ordered, consequent to which Respondent was dismissed. He filed writ petition
whereupon the High Court set aside the punishment of dismissal holding it
to be too harsh and shockingly disproportionate. Hence the present appeal.

Disposing of the appeals, the Court F

HELD: 1.1. Interference with quantum of punishment cannot be a routine
matter. The Court should not interfere with the administrator's decision
unless it was illogical or suffers from procedural impropriety or was shocking
to the conscience of the Court, in the sense that it was in defiance of logic or G
moral standards. The Court would not go into the correctness of the choice
made by the administrator open to him and the Court should not substitute
its decision to that of the administrator. The scope of judicial review is limited
to the deficiency in decision-making process and not the decision.
1221-E; 227-G, H; 228-AI
217 H
218 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2006] SUPP. 7 S.C.R.

A 1.2. To put differently unless the punishment imposed by the
Disciplinary Authority or the Appellate Authority shocks the conscience of
the Courtffribunal, there is no scope for interference. Further to shorten
litigations it may, in exceptional and rare cases, impose appropriate
punishment by recording cogent reasons in support thereof. In a normal
B course if the punishment imposed is shockingly disproportionate it would be
appropriate to direct the Disciplinary Authority or the Appellate Authority to
reconsider the penalty imposed.1228-B, Cl

B.C. Chaturvedi v. Union of India and Ors., (I995J 6 SCC 749; Om
Kumar and Ors. v. Union of India, (2001( 2 SCC 386; Union of India and
C Anr. v. G. Ganayutham, (1997( 7 SCC 463; Union ofIndia and Anr. v. KG.
Soni, (2006) 6 Supreme 389 and Damoh Panna Sagar Rural Regional Bank
. and Ors. v. Munna Lal Jain, 12005) to SCC 84, relied on•

. Wednesbury case, 1948 (I). KB 223 and Council for Civil Services Union
v. Minister of Civil Service, (1983) I AC 768, referred to."
D
2. The High Court has not indiCated any reason for coming to the
conclusion that the punishment was shockingly disproportionate. It only stated
t~at the defence of respondent was not duly consid.ered. If that was really so,
the High Court would have interfered on that ground but that has not been
done. The High Court's order therefore reflects non-application_ of miml. The
E impugned order of the High Court is set aside. The matter is remitted to the
High Court to re-hear the writ petition restricted to the qu.Stion of quantum
ofpunishmenL (228-EJ

.
. CIVIL APPELLATE
- .
JURISDICTION
'
: Civil Appeal No. 4454 of2006.

F From the final Judgment and Order dated 23.6.2005 of the High Court
of Madhya Pradesh at Jabalpur in Misc. Petition No: 2150 of 1992. ·

WITI-1

Civil Appeal No. 4455 of2006
G
Vikas Singh, Ashok K. Srivastava; Sushma Suri and Prakash Srivastava
for the Appellants. . -·

Mohan Singh and Prakash Shrivastava_ for the Respondent.

H .The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

--
U.0.1. v. DWARKAPRASADTIWARl[PASAYAT,J.)

, ARIJIT PASA YAT, J. Leave granted in bvth the Special Leave Petitions. A
'
These two appeals are directed against a common judgment of the
Madhya Pradesh High Court at Jabalpur allowing the writ petition filed by the
respondent-Dwarka Prasad' who is the appellant in the appeal relating to
SLP(C) No. 15725 of2006. The writ petition was partially allowed by a learned
Single Judge of the High Court holding that the punishment of dismissal from· B
service imposed on responde~t-Dwarka Pra5ad was too harsh and was required
to be substituted by an appropriate lesser punishment. Accordingly the order
of dismissal was set aside and reinstatement with continuity of service without
any back wages was directed and it was further directed that from the date
of judgment the respondent-Dwarka Prasad shall be entitled for full salary. C
The background facts in a nutshell are as follows:

Respondent-Dwarka ·Prasad was ·posted ·as a constable with Central
Reserve Police Force (in short the 'CRPF') in Fn4 Battalion, CRPF at Platoon
Post, Jayanti Pura which was accommodated in a building on Batala Amritsar D
'Road-a sensitive and terrorist infested area. He was on sentry duty from I 000
(hrs. to 1200 hrs. on 31.8.1989 on the roof of the building. He had been issued
a 7.62 mm SLR and 40 rounds of ammunition. At about 1115 hrs, he fired one
bullet without orders and without any sufficient reason. A Court of Inquiry
was conducted and it was established that he alone wa5 responsible for the
firing in which he had sustained bullet injury in his abdomen. Accordingly E
a departmental inquiry in terms of Rule 27 of the Central Reserve Police Force
Rules, 1955 (in short the 'Rules') was ordered alleging misconduct and
negligence/remissness in discharge of his duty in his capacity as a member
of the Force. The inquiry was conducted and the respondent-Dwarka Prasad
was given opportunity to defend himself, The inquiry officer found the F
respondent guilty of charges framed against him. After consideration of the
representation made by respondent-Dwruka Prasad, the Commandant dismissed
him from the services with effect from 20.01.19?0 under Rule 27{a)(i) of the
Rules.

Against the order of dismissal respondent preferred an appeal to the G
Deputy Inspector General of Police (in shorfthe 'DIGP'), CRPF. During
pendency of the appeal, a writ petition was filed under Articles 226 and 227
. of the Constitution of India, 1950 (in short the 'Constitution') which was
numbered as M.P. No. 2978 of 1990. The High Court by its order dated
26. I LI 990 dismissed the petition but direction was given for disposal of the
H
,./ '
-·
220 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2006] SUPP. 7 S.C.R.

A appeal pending before the DIGP, CRPF who dismissed the appeal. A revision
petition before Additional Director General (in short the •ADG'), CRPF did not
bring any relief.

. A review petition was filed before the Director General (in short the
'D.G'), CRPF who modified the punishment of dismissal to one of removal
B considering the respondent-Dwarka Prasad's young age and short length of
service. Against the said order a writ petition bearing number M.P. No. 2150
of 1992 was filed under ·Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution. The High
Court by the impugned judgment held that the defence of the respondent-
Dwarka Prasad was not properly considered by any departmental authority
C and the punishment awarded was shockingly disproportionate. Accordingly
as noted above the punishment was set aside and direction for reinstatement
with certain other benefits was given.

In support of the appeal, learned counsel for the Union of India and its
. functionaries submitted that the High Court has completely overlooked the
D fact that the respondent-Dwarka Prasad was a member of a disciplined Force.
'· He had committed a serious misconduct and after taking into account the
j relevant factors, the departmental authority initially passed the order of
· dismissal, which by taking a compassionate view the DG on review modified
to that of removal from service. The High Court did. not indicate even any
reason as to why_ it considered the punishment to be disproportionate or
E considered to be shockingly disproportionate. No reason was given to justify
this conclusion. Mere reference to the decision of this Court in B.C. Chaturvedi
v. Union of India and Ors., [1995] 6 SCC 749 without indicating as to how
the view expressed in paragraph 12 thereof had any application to the facts
of the case.
F
It was, therefore, submitted that the order of the High Court should be
set aside and the order passed by the DG should be restored. In the appeal
filed by Dwarka Prasad the primary stand is that there was no misconduct
involved and therefore, the High Court should have found him innocent and
should have held that no punishment was warranted.
G
The charges against respondent-Dwarka Prasad ·were as follows:

"ARTICLE-I

That the said No. 830762299 Ct. Dwarka Prasad Tiwari while
H functioning as sentry in F coy 76 Bn. CRPF at platoon post Jayantipura,
U.O.l. v. DWARKAPRASADTIWARl[PASAYAT,.I.] 221

on 31.0 l.1989 between 1000 hrs. to 1200 hrs he committed an act of A
misconduct in his capacity as member of the Force U/s. 11 (1) of CRPF
Act 1949 in that he fired one round from his service weapon (SLR)
at his own without any permission from the competent authority and
without any sufficient reason.

ARTICLE-II B
That during the aforesaid period and while functioning in the
aforesaid office the said No. 8230762299 Ct. Dwarka Prasad Tiwari
was guilty of neglect of duty and remissness in his capacity as
member of the Force U/s. 11 (I) of CRPF Act, 1949 in that he fired one
round from his weapon (SLR) and sustaining bullet injury in his c
abdomen."

Learned counsel for the Union of India and its functionary has referred
to the statement made by respondent-Dwarka Prasad admitting his guilt and
giving clean chit to one Hawaldar Mahavir Singh. Contrary to that statement,
presently his stand is that it was the said Hawaldar-Mahavir Singh who was D
responsible for the shooting incident.

The scope of interference with quantum of punishment has been the
subject-matter of various decisions of this Court. Such interference cannot
be a routine matter.
E
Lord Greene said in 1948 in the famous Wednesbury case (1948) I KB
223 that when a statute gave discretion to an administrator to take a decision,
the scope of judicial review would remain limited. He said that interference
was not permissible unless one or the other of the following conditions was
satisfied, namely the order was contrary to law, or relevant factors were not F
considered, or irrelevant factors were considered; or the decision was one
which no reasonable person could have taken. These principles were
consistently followed in the UK and in· India to judge the validity of
administrative action. It is equally well known that in 1983, Lord Diplock in
Council for Civil Services Union v. Minister of Civil Service, (1983) I AC
768 (called the CCSU case) summarized the principles of judicial review of G
administrative action as based upon one or other of the following viz.,
illegality, procedural irregularity and irrationality. He, however, opined that
"proportionality" was a "future possibility".

In Om Kumar and Ors. v. Union of India, [2001] 2 SCC 386, this Court H
222 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2006] SUPP. 7 S.C.R.

A observed, inter-alia, as follows:
"The prin:iple originated in Prussia in the nineteenth century and
has since been adopted in Germany, France and other European
countries. The European Court of Justice at Luxembourg and the
European Court of Human Rights at Strasbourg have applied the
B principle while judging the validity of administrative action. But even
long before that, the Indian Supreme Court has applied the principle
of"proportionality" to legislative action since 1950, as stated in detail
below.

By "proportionality", we mean the question whether, while
c regulating exercise of fundamental rights, the appropriate or least-
restrictive choice of measures has been made by the legislature or the
administrator so as to achieve the object of the legislation or the
purpose of the administrative order, as the case may be. Under the
principle, the court will see that the legislature and the administrative
authority "maintain a proper balance between the adverse effects
D
which the legislation or the administrative order may have on the
rights, liberties or interests of persons keeping in mind the purpose
which they were intended to serve". The legislature and the
administrative authority are, however, given an area of discretion or
a range of choices but as to whether the choice made infringes the
E rights excessively or not is for the court. That is what is meant by
proportionality.

xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx
The development of the principle of. "strict scrutiny" or
F "proportionality" in administrative law in 'England is, however, recent.
Administrative action was traditionally being tested on Wednesbury
grounds. But in the last few years, administrative action affecting the
freedom of expression or liberty has been declared invalid in several
cases applying the principle of "strict scrutiny". In the case of these
freedoms, Wednesbury principles are no longer applied. The courts in
G England could not expressly apply proportionality in the absence of
the convention but tried to safeguard the rights zealously by treating
the said rights as basic to the common law and the courts then applied
the strict scrutiny test. In the Spycatcher case Attorney General v.
Guardian Newspapers Ltd., (No.2) (1990) I AC 109 (at pp. 283-284),
H Lord Goff stated that there was no inconsistency between the
convention and the common law. In Derbyshire County Council v.
U.0.1. v. DWARKA PRASADTIWARI [PASAYA T, .I.] 223
.-
Times Newspapers ltd, (1993) AC 534, Lord Keith treated freedom of A
expression as part of common law. Recently, in R. v. Secy. ofState for
Home Deptt., exp. Simms (1999) 3 All ER 400 (HL), the right of a
prisoner to grant an interview to a journalist was upheld treating the
right as part of the common law. Lord Hobhouse held that the policy
of the administrator was disproportionate. The need for a more intense
and anxious judicial scrutiny in administrative decisions which engage B
fundamental human rights was re-emphasised in in R. v. lord Saville
exp. (1999] 4 All ER 860 (CA), at pp.870,872). In all these cases, the
English Courts applied the "strict scrutiny" test rather than describe
the test as one of "proportionality". But, in any event, in respect of
these rights "Wednesbury" rule has ceased to apply. c
However, the principle of "strict scrutiny" or "proportionality"
and primary review came to be explained in R. v. Secy. of State for the
Home Deptt. exp Brind, ( 1991) I AC 696. That case related to directions
given by the Home Secretary under the Broadcasting Act, 1981 requiring
BBC and IBA to refrain from broadcasting certain matters through D
persons who represented organizations which were proscribed under
legislation concerning the prevention of terrorism. The extent of
prohibition was linked with the direct statement made by the members
of the organizations. It did not however, for example, preclude the
broadcasting by such persons through the medium of a film, provided
there was a "voice-over" account, paraphrasing what they said. The E
applicant's claim was based directly on the European Convention of
Human Rights. Lord Bridge noticed that the Convention rights were
not still expressly engrafted into English law but stated that freedom
of expression was basic to the Common law and that, even in the
absence of the Convention, English Courts could go into the question F
(seep. 748-49).

" ..... whether the Secretary of State, in the exercise of his discretion,
could reasonably impose the restriction he has imposed on the
broadcasting organisations"
G
and that the courts were
"not perfectly entitled to start from the premise that any restriction
of the right to freedom of expression requires to be justified and
nothing less than an important public interest will be sufficient
-. to justify it".
H
224 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2006] SUPP. 7 S.C.R.

A Lord Templeman also said in the above case that the courts could go
into the question whether a reasonable minister could reasonably
have concluded that the interference with this freedom was justifiable.
He said that "in terms of the Convention" any such interference must
be both necessary and proportionate (ibid pp. 750-51 ).

B In the famous passage, the seeds of the principle of primary and
secondary review by courts were planted in the administrative law by
Lord Bridge in the Brind case (1991) I AC 696. Where Convention
rights were in question the courts could exercise a right of primary
review. However, the courts would exercise a right of secondary review
based only on Wednesbury principles in cases not affecting the rights
c under the Convention. Adverting to cases where fundamental freedoms

-
were not invoked and where administrative action was questioned, it
was said that the courts were then confined only to a secondary
review while the primary decision would be with the administrator.
Lord Bridge explained the primary and secondary review as follows:
D "The primary judgment as to whether the particular competing
public interest justifying the particular restriction imposed falls to
be made by the Secretary of State to whom Parliament has
entrusted the discretion. But, we are entitled to exercise a
secondary judgment by asking whether a reasonable Secretary of
E State, on the material before him, could reasonably make the
primary judgment."

But where an administrative action is challenged as "arbitrary"
under Article 14 on the basis of Royappa, [ 1974] 4 SCC 3 (as in cases
where punishments in disciplinary cases are challenged), the question
F will be whether the administrative order is "rational" or "reasonable"
and the test then is the Wednesbury test. The courts would then be
confined only to a secondary role and will only have to see whether
the administrator has done well in his primary role, whether he has
acted illegally or has omitted relevant factors from consideration or
has taken irrelevant factors into consideration or whether his view is
G one\vhich no reasonable person could have taken. If his action does
not satisfy these rules, it is to be treated as arbitrary. In G. B. Mahajan
v. Jalgaon Municipal Council, [ 1991] 3 SCC 91 at p. 111
Venkatachaliah, J. (as he then was) pointed out that "reasonableness"
of the administrator under Article 14 in the context of administrative
H law has to be judged from the stand point of Wednesbury rules. In
U.0.1. v. DWARKAPRASADTIWARl[PASAYAT..J.] 225

Tata Cellular v. Union of India, [1994] 6 SCC 651 (at pp. 679-80), A
Indian Express Newspapers Bombay (P) ltd. v. Union of India, [1985]
I SCC 641 at p.691, Supreme Court Employee's We/fare Assn. v. Union
of India, [1989] 4 SCC 187 at p. 241 and U.P. Financial Corpn. v. Gem
Cap. (India) (P) ltd, [1993] 2 SCC 299 at p. 307) while judging
whether the administrative action is "arbitrary" under Article 14 (i.e. B
otherwise then being discriminatory), this Court has confined itself to
a Wednesbury review always.

The principles explained in the last preceding paragraph in respect
of Article 14 are now to be applied here where the question of
"arbitrariness" of the order of punishment is questioned under Article C
14.

- xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx
Thus, from the above principles and decided cases, it must be
held that where an administrative decision relating to punishment in
disciplinary cases is questioned as "arbitrary" under Article 14, the D
court is confined to Wednesbury principles as a secondary reviewing
authority. The court will not apply proportionality as a primary
reviewing court because no issue of fundamental freedoms nor of
discrimination under Article 14 applies in such a context. The court
while reviewing punishment and if it is satisfied that Wednesbury E
principles are violated, it has normally to remit the matter to the
administrator for a fresh decision as to the quantum of punishment.
Only in rare cases where there has been long delay in the time taken
by the disciplinary proceedings and in the time taken in the courts,
and such extreme or rare cases can the court substitute its own view
as to the quantum of punishment." F
In B. C. Chaturvedi case (supra) it was observed:

"A review of the above legal position would establish that the
disciplinary authority, and on appeal the appellate authority, being
fact-finding authorities have exclusive power to consider the evidence G
with a view to maintain discipline. They are invested with the discretion
to impose appropriate puni~hment keeping in view the magnitude or
gravity of the misconduct. The High Court/Tribunal, while exercising
the power of judicial review, cannot normally substitute its own
conclusion on penalty and impose some other penalty. If the H
226 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2006] SUPP. 7 S.C.R.

A punishment imposed by the disciplinary authority or the appellate
authority shocks the conscience of the High Court/Tribunal, it would
appropriately mould the relief, either directing the disciplinary/appellate
authority to reconsider the penalty imposed, or to shorten the litigation,
it may itself, in exceptional and rare cases, impose appropriate
punishment with cogent reasons in support thereof."
B
In Union of India and Anr. v. G. Ganayutham, [ 1997] 7 SCC 463. this
Court summed up the position relating to proportionality in paragraphs 31 and
32, which read as follows:

"The current position of proportionality in administrative law in
c England and India can be summarized as follows:

(I) To judge the validity of any administrative order or statutory
discretion, normally the Wednesbury test is to be applied to find out
if the decision was illegal or suffered from procedural improprieties or
was one which no sensible decision-maker could, on the material
-
D before him and within the framework of the law, have arrived at. The
court would consider whether relevant matters had .not been taken
into account or whether irrelevant matters had been taken into account
or whether the action was not bona fide. The court would also
consider whether the decision was absurd or perverse. The court
E would not however go into the correctness of the choice made by the
administrator amongst the various alternatives open to him. Nor could
the court substitute its decision to that of the administrator. This is
the Wednesbury (1948 l KB 223) test.

(2) The court would not interfere with the administrator's decision
F unless it was illegal or suffered from procedural impropriety or was
irrational-in the sense that it was in outrageous defiance of logic or
moral standards. The possibility of other tests, including
proportionality being brought into English administrative law in future
is not ruled out. These are the CCSU (1985 AC 374) principles.

G (3)(a) As per Bugdaycay (1987) AC 514), Brind, (1991 (I) AC 696)
and Smith (1996 (I) All ER 257) as long as the Convention is not
incorporated into English law, the English courts merely exercise a
secondary judgment to find out if the decision-maker could have, on
the material before him, arrived at the primary judgment in the manner
he has done.
H
U.0.1. v. DWARKAPRASADTIWARI (PASAYAT..J.] 227

(3)(b) If the Convention is incorporated in England making available A
the principle of proportionality. then the English courts will render
primary judgment on the validity of the administrative action and find
out if the restriction is disproportionate or excessive or is not based
upon a fair balancing of the fundamental freedom and the need for the
restriction thereupon.
B
(4)(a) The position in our country, in administrative law, where no
fundamental freedoms as aforesaid are involved, is that the courts/
tribunals will only play a secondary role while the primary judgment
as to reasonableness will remain with the executive or administrative
authority. The secondary judgment of the court is to be based on C
Wednesbury and CCSU principles as stated by Lord Greene and Lord
Dip lock respectively to find if the executive or administrative authority

- has reasonably arrived at his decision as the primary authority.

(4 )(b) Whether in the case of administrative or executive action
affecting fundamental freedoms, the courts in our country will D
apply the principle of "proportionality" and assume a primary
role, is left open, to be decided in an appropriate case where such
action is alleged to offend fundamental freedoms. It will be then
necessary to decide whether the courts will have a primary role
only if the freedoms under Articles I9, 21 etc. are involved and
not for Article 14. E
Finally, we come to the present case. It is not contended before
us that any fundamental freedom is affected. We need not therefore
go into the question of "proportionality". There is no contention that
the punishment imposed is illegal or vitiated by procedural impropriety.
As to "irrationality", there is no finding by the Tribunal that the F
decision is one which no sensible person who weighed the pros and
cons could have arrived at nor is there a finding, based on material,
that the punishment is in "outrageous" defiance of logic. Neither
Wednesbury nor CCSU tests are satisfied. We have still to explain
Ranjit Thakur, [1987] 4 SCC 611".
G
.. The common thread running ·through in all these decisions is that the
Court should not interfere with the administrator's decision unless it was
illogical or suffers from procedural impropriety or was shocking to the
conscience of the Court, in the sense that it was in defiance of logic or moral
standards. In view of what has been stated in the Wednesbury's case (supra) H
228 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2006] SUPP. 7 S.C.R.

A the Court would not go into the correctness of the choice made by the
administrator open to him and the Court should not substitute its decision
to that of the administrator. The scope of judicial review is limited to the
deficiency in decision-making process and not the decision.

To put differently unless the punishment imposed by the Disciplinary
B Authority or the Appellate Authority shocks the conscience of the Court/
Tribunal, there is no scope for interference. Further to shorten litigations it
may, in exceptional and rare cases, impose appropriate punishment by recording
cogent reasons in support thereof. In a normal course if the punishment
imposed is shockingly disproportionate it would be appropriate to direct the
C Disciplinary Authority or the Appellate Authority to reconsider the penalty
imposed.

The above position was recently reiterated in Union of India and Anr.
v. K.G. Soni, (2006] 6 Supreme 389 following Damoh Panna Sagar Rural -
Regional Bank and Ors. v. Munna Lal Jain, (2005] IO SCC 84.
D
The High Court, as rightly submitted by learned counsel for Union of
India, has not indicated any reason for coming to the conclusion that the
punishment was shockingiy disproportionate. The High Court only stated
that the defence of respondent-Dwarka Prasad was not duly considered. !f
that was really so, the High Court would have interfered on that ground but
E that has not been done. The High Court's order therefore reflects non
application of mind. The impugned order of the High Court is set aside. The
matter is remitted to the High Court to re-hear the writ petition restricted to
the question of quantum of punishment. The appeal filed by respondent-
Dwarka Prasad is without merit in view of the fact that his statement at
F different stages during the departmental proceedings indicates that he has
accepted that he himself was responsible for the incident.

In ultimate result the appeal filed by Union of India is allowed to the
extent indicated, while the appeal filed by Dwarka Prasad is dismissed. No
costs.

B.B.B. Appeals disposed of.
..