UNION OF INDIA AND ORSversusDEEP CHAND PANDEY AND ANR.
- Citation
- 1992 INSC 224
- Decided
- 27 August 1992
- Disposal
- Appeal(s) allowed
- Bench
- L M SHARMA
Holding
The Central Administrative Tribunal has exclusive jurisdiction over the dispute, and the High Court lacked jurisdiction.
Summary
The respondents, casual typists employed on daily wages by the Indian Railways, had their services terminated and filed writ petitions in the Madhya Pradesh High Court, which allowed them. The Union of India appealed, contending that under Section 14 of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985 the dispute fell within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Central Administrative Tribunal (CAT) and that the High Court could not entertain the petition. The respondents argued that, being casual workers and not holding a civil post, they were outside the scope of the Act. The Supreme Court examined the wide language of Article 323A and the provisions of Sections 3(q) and 14, holding that the Act covers all matters relating to conditions of service of persons employed by the Union, including casual employees. Consequently, the Court held that the CAT, not the High Court, had jurisdiction, set aside the High Court judgment, dismissed the writ petitions and allowed the appeals without costs.
Issues considered
- Whether the Central Administrative Tribunal has jurisdiction to entertain claims of casual typists whose services were terminated under the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985.
- Whether the High Court had jurisdiction to entertain the writ petitions filed by the respondents.
Legislation cited
- Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985s. 14, s. 3(q)
Subjects
Judgment
UNION OF INDIA AND ORS. A
v.
DEEP CHAND PANDEY AND ANR.
i AUGUST 27,1992
[L.M. SHARMA, S. MOHAN AND N. VENKATACHALA, JJ.] B
Civil Services:
Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985:
Sections 3(q) and 14-Jurisdiction of Central Administrative Tribunal- C
Casual typists in Railways-Services tenninatetf-C/aim for continuing in
service-Whether could be entertained by the Tribunal.
The Respondents were working as Casual Typists on daily wages lo
the Railways. Their services were terminated and they tiled Writ Petitions D
before the High Court challenging the same. The High Court allowed the
Writ Petitions.
The Union of India preferred the present appeals contending that
the High Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the Writ Petition of the
Respondents in view of section 14(1) of the Administrative Tribunals Act, E
1985 and that the respondents ought to have approached the Central
Administrative Tribunal.
On behalf of the respondents, it was contended that they were not
holding any civil post under the Union of India and were engaged only on
casual basis, and that after the termination of their services, the relation- F
ship of master and servant ceased to exist, and so they were not covered
by the Administrative Tribunal Act, and were right in approaching the
High Court.
Allowing the appeals, this Court,
G
HELD : 1. The Scope of Article 323A of the Constitution of India
permitting the Parliament to legislate on the subject covered therein is,
having regard to the language, very wide, and by enacting Administrative
Tribunals Act, 1985 this power bas been exercised in almost full measure.
An examination of section 14 and section 3(q) of the Act clearly indicates H
49
50 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1992] SUPP. 1 S.C.R.
A that the Act covers a very wide field, and there is nothing to suggest that
the provisions dealing with the jurisdiction of the Tribunal should receive
a narrow interpretation. [52-B]
2. In p~rsuance of Article 323A of Constitution of India, the Ad·
ministrative Tribunals Act, 1985 was passed and the Central Administra-
B tive Tribunal, established under section 4(1) thereof was available to the
respondents in the present case. By clause (2)(d) of Article 323A the
Parliament was authorised to exclude the jurisdiction of all courts except
the jurisdictiop of this Court under Article 136 with respect to the disputes
and complaints referred to in clause (1) and accordingly by section 14 of
C the Act, all the jurisdiction, powers and authority exercisable by all courts
except the Supreme Court have been vested in the Central Administrative
Tribunal. [51 B·C]
3. The respondents claimed their right to continue in the employ·
ment of the Union of India as before, with additional claim of temporary
D status. Therefore, the remedy of the respondents was before the Central
Administrative Tribunal and not before the High Court. [52 D-E)
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeals Nos. 3488-89
of 1992.
E From the Judgment and Order dated 31.1.92 of the Madhya Pradesh
High Court in M.P. Nos. 1405 and 1425 of 1990.
D.N. Dwivedi, Additional Solicitor General, C. Ramesh and V.K.
Verma for the Appellants.
F Anil Suhrawardy for the Respondents.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
SHARMA, J. The question which falls for decision in these petitions
is whether the Central Administrative Tribunal is vested with the jurisdic-
G tion to entertain and decide the claim of the respondents as against the
petitioners Union of India and its officers in the Railway Department and
consequently the High Court has no jurisdiction to deal with the matter.
According to their case the respondents were engaged in the office of
Deputy Chief Engineer (Construction) Central Railway, Gwalior as casual
H typists on daily wages and their services were wrongly terminated. The
U.0.1. v. D.C. PANDEY [SHARMA,J.] 51
respondents challenged the order by writ petitions before the Madhya A
Pradesh High Court which have been allowed by the impugned judgment.
Heard the learned counsel for the parties. Special leave is granted.
2. In pursuance of Article 323A of C_onstitution of India, the Ad-
ministrative Tribunals Act, 1985 was passed and the Central Administrative
Tribunal, established under section 4(1) thereof was available to the B
respondents in the present case. By clause (2)(d) of Article 323A the
Parliament was authorised to exclude the jurisdiction of all courts except
the jurisdiction of this Court under Article 136 with respect to the dispute
and complaints referred to in clause (1) and accordingly by section 14 of
the Act, all the jurisdiction, powers and authority exercisable by all courts c
except the Supreme Court have been vested in the Central Administrative
Tribunal. The question, therefore, is whether the Central Administrative
, Tribunal could entertain the claim of the respondents who were, before,
termination of their employment, engaged as casual servants of the Union
of India.
D
3. The expression 'all courts' mentioned in section 14(1) is com-
prehensive enough to include the High Court. If the subject-matter if the
claim of the respondents is held to be covered by section 14, it must follow
that the High Court is not left with any jurisdiction to deal with the
same.The contention of the learned counsel for the respondents, however, E
is that since the respondents were not holding an;• civil post under the
Union of India and were engaged only on casual basis, the provisions of
the Central Administrative Act were not attracted. Alternatively, it was
suggested that after the termination of their service the relationship of
master and servant ceased to exist, and they, therefore, are not covered by F
the Act. The respondents, in the circumstances, rightly knocked the doors
of the High Court. We do not find any merit in this stand taken on behalf
of the respondents.
4. The respondents, on the one hand are relying upon their service
under the Union of India, of course casual in npe,
,, ... for a claim that they G
were entitled to continue as the servants of the Central Government and
on the other hand for the purpose of their argument that the High Court
and not the Central Administrative Tribunal is vested with the jurisdiction
to entertain their claim, they are disassociating themselves from the
relationship of master and servant under the Union of India. It is a strange H
52 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1992] SUPP. 1 S.C.R.
A stand taken on their behalf, involving self-contradiction and is not permis-
sible.
5. The scope of Article 323-A permitting the Parliament to legislate
on the subject covered therein is, having regard to the language, very wide,
and by enacting 1985 Act this power has been exercised in almost full
B measure. An examination of section 14 and section 3 (q) clearly indicates
that the Act covers a very wide field, and there is nothing to suggest thal
the provisions dealing with the jurisdiction of the Tribunal should receive
a narrow interpretation. This is also supported by the clarification offered
by the then Minister for Law, who was piloting the Bill, while replying to
C the demand for the further enumeration of the conditions of service in
sections 14 and 15. He stated that (as recorded in the proceedings for 9th
to 11th November, 1976 of the Rajya Sabha Debate) he believed the
'conditions of service' to be of such a wide expression that an attempt of
enumeration would be "really so dangerous from the point of view of the
employees themselves that by exclusion you say that the others are not".
D
6. The present respondents are claiming the right to continue in the
employment of the Union of India as before, with additional claim of
temporary status and it is, therefore, idle to suggest that such a claim is
not covered by the Act. The necessary conclusion, therefore, is, that the
E remedy of the respondents was before the Tribunal and not the High
Court. We, accordingly hold that the High Court did not have the jurisdic-
tion to entertain the claim of the respondents. Consequently the impugned
judgment is set aside, the writ petition before the High Court is dismissed
and these appeals are allowed, but without costs.
G.N. Appeals allowed.
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