Holding

The confirming authority’s revisional jurisdiction under Section 160 is not confined to ordering additional evidence; it may examine the record, highlight errors, and direct a fresh consideration without intending to interfere with the Court‑Martial’s discretion.

Summary

Capt. A.P. Bajpai, an army officer, was tried by a General Court‑Martial (GCM) for theft of government property and for absenting himself without leave. The GCM acquitted him on the theft charge but convicted him on the absent‑without‑leave charge, sentencing him to forfeit three years' service and a severe reprimand. The confirming authority, exercising power under Section 160 of the Army Act, 1950, revised the GCM's finding on the theft charge, directing the court to reconsider the entire evidence, give the accused a further opportunity to address the court, and pass a fresh sentence if found guilty. On reconsideration, the GCM found Bajpai guilty of both charges and sentenced him to dismissal, a decision later confirmed by the Chief of the Army Staff. Bajpai challenged the confirming authority's intervention, arguing that it exceeded its jurisdiction by analysing the evidence and influencing the GCM's discretion. The Supreme Court held that Section 160 and Army Rule 68 permit the confirming authority to examine the record, point out deficiencies, and direct a fresh consideration, provided it does not intend to dictate the finding or sentence. Consequently, the Court allowed the appeal, set aside the High Court's order, and upheld the conviction and sentence.

Issues considered

The scope of the revisional jurisdiction of the confirming authority under Section 160 of the Army Act, 1950 and Army Rule 68, Note 6.
Whether the confirming authority may analyse the evidence and direct the Court‑Martial to reconsider, or is limited to directing the recording of additional evidence.
Whether the confirming authority's observations interfered with the discretion of the General Court‑Martial.

Legislation cited

Army Act, 1950s. 153, s. 160, s. 164(2), s. 180, s. 39(b), s. 52(a)
Army Rules, 1954s. Rule 68

Subjects

Army ActSection 160confirming authoritycourt‑martialrevisional jurisdictionmilitary lawevidence appraisalRule 68theftabsent without leave

Judgment

UNION OF INDIA AND ORS. A
v.
CAPT. A.P. BAJPAI

FEBRUARY 20, 1998

[SUJATA V. MANOHAR AND D.P. WADHWA, JJ.] B

Service Law :

Army Act, 1950 : Sections 39(b), 52(a), 153, 180 and 164(2).

Confirming authority-Revisional jurisdiction under S. 160-Scope-
c
Confirming authority without intending to interfere with the discretion of the
court directed General Court-Martial (GClvf): (i} to reconsider the entire
evidence relating to the charge of which the GCM acquitted the accused, (ii)
to give a further opportunity to the accused to address the Court and (iii)
to pass a suitable fresh sentence in case the accused was found guilty- D
Accused contended that the mind of GCM was influenced by the observations
of the confirming authority, and that the confirming authority ought not to
have interfered with the proceedings of the GCM which had arrived at a
finding after considering the evidence-Held: Revisional jurisdiction of the
confirming authority under S. 160 is not confined only to giving of directions E
for recording additional evidence by GCM but extends to analysing the
evidence on record for indicating where the Court"Martial has failed to
properly appreciate the evidence-In the circumstance of the case, the
confirming authority did not exceed its jurisdiction-Contentions of accused
rejected-Army Rules, 1954, Rule 68 and Note 6 thereto.
F
The respondent, an Anny Officer, was tried by General Court-Martial
(GCM) under Section 52(a) and 39(b) of the Anny Act, 1950 (i) for committing
theft of Government property and (ii) absenting himself without leave. The
GCM held the respondent guilty of the second charge and sentenced him to
forfeit three years' service for the purpose of promotion and to be severely G
reprimanded. The confirming authority under Section 160 of the Act revised
the findings of the GCM on the first change and directed it to reconsider
the entire evidence relating to the first charge in the light of the observations
made by him in the order without in any way intending to interfere with the
discretion of the Court. The confirming authority further directed that a
further opportunity should be given to the respondent-accused to address the H
1041
1042 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1998] l S.C.R.

A Court and that in case the respondent-accused was found guilty a suitable I.
fresh sentence should be passed. In accordance with the said directions, the
GCM reconsidered the matter and held the respondent guilty on both the
charges. The respondent thereafter was sentenced to be dismissed from
sen'ice. The Chief of the Army Staff confirmed the conviction and sentence.

B The respondent's representation under Section 164(2) of the Act was
re.iected. The High Court set aside the conviction and sentence and also the
order of the confirming authority on the ground that the confirming authority
had analysed the evidence minutely almost returning the finding of guilt
against the rcs1iondent and leaving no discretion with the GCM to act otherwise.
C Hence this appeal.

On behalf of the respondent-accused it was contended that the
jurisdiction of the confirming authority was confined only to giving of direcions
for recording additional evidence; that the GCM concluded its proceedings
hurriedly without applying its mind independently of the observations of the
D confirming authority; that the mind of the GCM was influenced by the
observations of the confirming authority; and that there was no ground for
the confirming authority to interfere with the proceedings of the GCM which
had considered the evidence and arguments in depth and held the first
change not proved against the respondent.

E Allowing the ap11eal, this Court

HELD : 1. In view of Section 160 of the Army Act, 1950 and Rule 68
of the Army Rules, 1954 and Note 6 thereto the finding· or sentence of the
Court-Martial can be revised once by the confirming authority. If after
remand and Court-Martial returns the same finding or sentence, confirming
F authority would be bound by the same. As to why the confirming authority
would like the Court-Martial to reconsider the matter, it has per force to give
its views which it can do only after examining the evidence on record and
the proceedings of the Court-Martial. (1048-B)

Capt. Harish Uppal v. Union of India, (1979) 2 SCR 1025, relied on.
G
Gian Chand v. Union ofIndia, (1983) Crl. L.J. 1059 (Del), approved.

Naib Subedar Avtar Singh v. Union of India, (1983) Cr. L.J. 1986
(Del), referred to.

H 2. It is an indisputable fact that in the conduct of the Court-Martial
U.O.I. v. CAPT. A.P. BAJPAI 1043
proceedings before and at the stage of reconsideration, procedure as A
prescribed was followed. It is true that the confirming authority did analyse
the evidence on the record of the proceedings of the Cou~-Material but that
was so done in the context of indicating where the Court-Martial could have
gone wrong in appreciation of evidence and nevertheless caution had been
administered to the Court-Martial that what was said in the revision order B
was not intended in any way to interfere with the discretion of the Court-
Martial that what said in the revision order was not intended in any way to
interfere with the discretion of the Court-Martial to arrive at a particular
finding or sentence and regarding the value to be attached to the evidence
on record and the inference to be deduced therefrom. [1050-E)
c
3. The jurisdiction of the confirming authority is not confined only to
giving of directions for recording additional evidence by General Court-
Martial (GCM). The confirming authority cannot act merely as a rubber
stamp. The fact that the finding and sentence of the Court-Martial should be
valid only after it is confirmed by the competent authority would show that D
it has to examine the whole of the record of the proceedings of the Court-
Martial before confirming the finding or sentence. It is the requirement of
section 160 of the Act that when the confirming authority wishes that the
finding or sentence of a Court-Martial requires revision it should not send
back the case as a matter of course but should record reasons as to why the
confirming authority though as to where the Court-Martial has failed in its E
duty to properly examine the facts and in application of correct law. When
the matter is.remitted back to the Court-Martial under Section 160 of the
Act the Court-Martial may take additional evidences if so directed by the
confirming authority. In the present case no such direction was given by the
confirming authority and there was no occasion for the GCM to record F
additional evidence. Full opportunity was given to the respondent to make
submission before the GCM after it had reassembled and as the record would
show a copy of the revisional order was also supplied to the respondent and
he made his submission in writing. The Court thereafter closed for
reconsideration and it was thereafter that it revoked its earlier finding and
sentence and held the respondent guilty of the first and second charges. It G
cannot be said that the finding and sentence after reconsideration was arrived
at in a hurried fashion. It was the Chief of the Army Staff who confirmed
the finding and sentence and when he did so it could not be said that the
whole of the record was not before him. Therefore, it cannot be said that the
confirming authority exceeded its jurisdiction in analysing the evidence H
1044 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1998) l S.C.R.

A recorded during the Court-Martial proceedings. (1051-G-H; 1052-A-D] I.

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 9190 of
1995.

From the Judgm::nt and Order dated 22.12.92 of the Allahabad High
B Court in 0. A. No. 8113of1981.

P.P. Malhotra, N.N. Goswami, A.K. Srivastava, Hemant Shanna and Ms.
Anil Katiyar for tl1e Appellants.

J.S. Sinha, Rajiv Dutta and Randhir Singh for the Respondent.
c The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

D.P. WADHWA, J. The respondent, au officer in tlle anuy, was tried by
General Court Martial on the following two charges:

D "(i) Under Anny Act Section 52(a) for committing tlleft of property
belonging to the Government in that he, at Pitlloragarh on 08 Sep 77
committed tlleft of tlle following property belonging to tlle Govt :-

(aa) Jam td Kissan 4 tins (450 gms each) - 1.800 Kgs

(bb) Pine apple td 6 tins (850 gms each) - 5.100 Kgs.
E
(cc) Sausage td 9 tins (400 gms each) - 3.600 Kgs.

(dd) Coffee 1 tins (500 g111s) - 0.500 Kgs.

(ee) Milk td 54 tins (397 gms each) - 21. 438 Kgs.
F (ii) Under Army Act Section 39 {b) for absenting himselfwitllout leave
in tllat he, at Pitlloragarh, on 03 Jun 78, while attached to Station
Headquarters Pithoragarh, absented himself without leave until
voluntarily rejoined on 07 Jun 78."

G After tlle conclusion of tlle trial by order dated January 21, 1979 General
Court Martial held the respondent not guilty of tlle first charge of tlleft, but
found him guilty of tlle second charge and sentenced him to forfeit three
years' service for tlle purpose of promotion and to be severely reprimanded.
Under Section 153 of tlle Army Act, 1953 (for short 'tlle Act'), the finding or
sentence shall be valid except so far as it may be confirmed as provided by
H the' Act. Under Section 154 tlle finding and sentence of General Court Martial
U.0.1. v. CAPT. A.P. BAJPAI [D.P. WADHWA, J.) 1045
may be confirmed by the Central Government, or by any officer empowered A
in this behalf by warrant of the Central Government. When the matter was
placed before the General Officer Commanding U.P. Area, the competent
confirming authority, he in the exercise of his power under Section 160 of the
Act revised the findings of the General Court Martial on the first charge and
directed it to reconsider the entire evidence relating to the first charge in the B
light of the observations made by him in the order. He gave the following
directions for the General Court Martial to observe:

"If the Court, on revision, revokes its earlier finding on the first charge
and find the accused guilty of the first charge, it shall revoke its earlier
sentence and pass a suitable fresh sentence.
c
After this revision order is read in open Court; the accused shall be
given a further opportunity to address the Court. Therefore, if it
becomes necessary to clear any points raised by the accused, the
Judge Advocate may give a further Summing up.

The attention of the Court is invited to Army Act Section 160 and D
Army Rule 68 and the form of proceedings on revision on page 370
of the MIML 1961 reprint, which should be modified to conform to
Army Rule 62(10)."

In pursuance to the aforesaid order of the confirming authority, General E
Court Martial assembled on March I 0, 1979 and on the request of the
respondent was adjourned to the following day. The respondent made written
submissions which were taken on record. After reconsideration the court held
the respondent guilty of both first and the second charges. Respondent was
thereafter sentenced to be dismissed from service by order dated March 11,
1979. The conviction and sentence so passed on the respondent was confirmed F
by the Chiefofthe Army Staff by order dated September 14, 1979 which was
promulgated on September 24,. 1979.

The respondent under Section 164 (2) of the Act preferred a post
confirmation petition before the Central Government which was rejected. The G
respondent thereafter filed the writ petition in the High Court of Judicature
at Allahabad challenging his conviction and sentence. A Division Bench of
the High Court by impugned judgment dated December 22. 1992 set aside the
conviction and sentence passed on the respondent on the first charge and
held that punishment on the second charge was yet to be confirmed by the
confirming authority so as to make the same operative. On leave being H
1046 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1998] l S.C.R.

A granted, the appellants have filed this appeal.

The stage from which the High Court thought it necessary to interfere
in the proceedings was when the confirming authority passed order under
Section 160 of the Act revising the order of the General Court Martial holding
the respondent not guilty of the first charge. High Court was of the view that
B the confirming authority had analysed the evidence minutely almost returning
the finding of guilt against the respondent and leaving no discretion with the
General Court Martial to act otherwise. High Court termed the observations
of the confirming authority unwarranted and said that even the subsequent
confirming authority being the Chief of the Army Staff overlooked the abuse
C of the power committed by the first confirming authority under Section 160
of the Act in reappreciating the whole evidence on record in respect of the
quilt of the respondent and further that the authorities did not care to read
the revisional order of the confirming authority properly and rejected the
statutory representation of the respondent. High Court did notice the following
observations of the confirming authority in its order of revision but said it
D was a very ingenious method adopted by the confirming authority to influence
the Court Martial and said that the whole thing was a mere camouflage:

"While in no way wishing to interfere with the discretion of the court
to arrive at a particular finding or sentence, and regarding the value
to be attached to the evidence on record and the inference to be
E deducted therefrom, I, as the confirming officer, am of the view that
the finding of ·not guilty' on the first charge arrived at by the court
is perve~se being against the weight of overwhelming evidence .. "

High Court was thus of the view that the first confirming authority over-
stepped its jurisdiction and that. its order was invalid. High Court relied on
F a decision of the Delhi High Court in Naib Subedar Avtar v. Union of India,
(1989) Crl.L.J. 1986 rendered by a single Judge where that Court took the view
that the confirming authority could not appreciate evidence as its jurisdiction
was limited and that where the confirming authority had given directions to
the Court Martial to reverse the findings of "not guilty" into "guilty", the
G order of the confirming authority was held to be bad and liable to be quashed.

In our view, the High Court did not properly appreciate the scope and {
intent of Section 160 of the Act. Section 160 is as under:

"160. (!) Any finding or sentence of a court-martial which requires
H confirmation may be once revised by order of the confirming authority
U.O.I. v. CAPT.A.P. BAJPAI [D.P. WADHWA, J.] 1047

and on such revision, the court, if so directed by the confinning A
authority, may take additional evidence.

(2) The court, on revision, shall consist of the same officers as
were present when the original decision was passed, unless any of
those officers are unavoidably absent. B

(3) In case of such unavoidable absence the cause thereof shall
be duly certified in the proceedings, and the court shall proceed with
the revision provided that, if a general court-martial, it still consists
of five officers, or, if a summary general or district court-martial of
~~=" c
Rule 68 of Anny Rules, 1954 deals with confirmation and revision of
finding or sentence of a Court Martial. There are Notes under this Rule and
Note 6 is relevant. These are:

"68. Revision.- (I) Where the finding is sent back for revision under D
Section 160, the court shall reassemble in open court, the revision
order shall be read, and if the court is directed to take fresh evidence,
such evidence shall also be taken in open court. The court shall then
deliberate on its finding in closed court.

(2) Where the finding is sent back for revision and the court does E
not adhere to its fonner finding, it shall revoke the finding and sentence
and record the new finding, and if such new finding involves a
sentence, pass sentence afresh.

(3) Where the sentence alone is sent back for revision, the court F
shall not revise the finding.

(4) After the revision, the presiding officer shall date and sign the
decision of the court, and the proceedings, upon being signed by the
Judge-Advocate, if any, shall at once be transmitted for confinnation.
G
NOTES

I to 5 xxx xxx
6. If a court brings in a finding of "not guilty" against the weight of
evidence, the court may be re-assembled and the confinning officer H
1048 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1998] l S.C.R.

A may give his views on the evidence, directing the attention of the
court to any special points which it appears to have failed to
appreciate."

The finding sentence of the Court Martial can be revised once by the
confirming authority. If after remand the Court Martial returns the same
B finding or sentence confirming authority would be bounj by the same. As ,.._.
to why the confirming authority would like the Court Martial to reconsider the
matter, it has per force to give its views which it can do only after examining
the evidence on record and the proceedings of the Court Martial.

C In Capt. Harish Uppalv. Union ofIndia and Others, [1973) 2 SCR 1025
the petitioner, an officer in the Am1y, was tried before the Summary General
Court Martial on the charge of committing robbery on December 11, 1971 at
Hajiganj (in Bangladesh) of the properties of the Bank, its Manager as well
as of the Chowkidar. The court sentenced him to be cashiered. T11is sentence
D was subject to confirmation. The confirming authority passed an order
directing the revision of the sentence. Thereafter t11e petitioner was brought
before t11e same Court Martial and after considering the observations of the
confirming aut11ority revoked t11e earlier sentence and now sentenced him to
be cashiered and to suffer rigorous imprisonment for two years. This finding
E and sentence were subsequently confirmed. It was challenged in the Supreme
Court in a petition under Article 32 of the Constitution and one of the
arguments was that the authority to confirm t11e sentence passed by a Court
Martial did not confer on the confirming authority the power to enhance t11e
sentence and that authority could not achieve t11at object indirectly by directing
the revision of the sentence. It was contended that the Court Martial verdict
F should be unfettered. This Court examined the order of revision of the \
confirming authority. While sending the matter back to the Court Martial the
confirming authority gave a caution tliat "whilst in no way intending the
quantum of punishment to be awarded, the court should fully take into
consideration the following observations of t11e Confirming Officer" and also
G that the court should t11en carefully consider all the above and should tlley
decide to enhance the sentence, then fresh sentence should be announced
in open court as being subject to confirmation. This Court held that the order
of the confirming authority directing revision was in no way vitiated.

H In Gian Chand v. Union of India and others, (1983) Cr!. L.J. 1059, a
U.0.1. v. CAPT.A.P.BAJPAI [D.P. WADHWA, J.) 1049

division bench of the Delhi High Court said that a direction given by the A
confinning authority to the General Court Martial to reconsider the finding or
sentence could not be said to be a fetter on the exercise of powers of the
General Court Martial. High Court said that an order under Section 160 was
a sort of an application for review which was made by the confirming authority
and the statute, thereupon, casts a duty on the General Court Martial to B
reconsider its earlier finding or sentence but it was not obliged to change its
earlier view. It further said that the Court Martial when it was reconsidering
the matter in pursuance of a direction having been issued under Section 160
had to apply its mind to the case independently, uninfluenced by any
observations which might have been made in the direction given by the
confinning authority. These two decisions, it would appear, were not brought C
to the notice of the Judges of the Allahabad High Court while delivering the
impugned judgment as there is no reference to the aforesaid two decisions,
one of the Supreme Court and the other of the Division Ben ch of the Delhi
High Court.

In &. Lieut Jagdish Pal Singh v. Union of India and Ors., [Criminal D
Appeal NO. 104 of 1991 decided on May 7, 1997] the appellant was a
commissioned officer in the Army and faced trial before a Court Martial on
the accusation of taking away large number of bottles of Rum worth about
Rs. 5616/- from the military canteen. After trial the Court Martial held the
charge not proved against the appellant. When the matter was placed before E
the confirming authority as required under Section 153 of the Act, the confirming
authority remitted the matter to the Court Martial indicating various aspects
of the case which had not been considered properly. It was made clear by the
confirming authority at the outset that the observations made by the confirming
authority were not made to in any way interfere with the discretion of the
members of the Court Martial in basing its finding on reconsideration of the F
(
matter. Thereafter the Court Martial met again and on reconsideration came
to the finding that the appellant was held guilty of the offence and sentenced
him to be dismissed from service. TI1e finding and sentence were later
confinned by the confinning authority. The appellant filed a writ petition in
the Delhi High Court challenging his conviction and sentence but the same G
was dismissed. In appeal before this Court it was contended that the revisional
authority was empowered merely to direct for additional evidence and that no
such direction had been given and on the contrary observation on merits of
the case was made overstepping the limit of jurisdiction by tlie confirming
authority. This Court held that the confirming authority had not made any
finding which was likely to cause prejudice against the appellant and that it H
1050 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1998] l S.C.R

A had at the very outset made it clear that the Court Martial was free to decide
by adverting to certain basic features indicated hy the confirming authority. ;.
This Court therefore refused to interfere in the matter.

We are unable to subscribe to the submissions now advanced before
us that the jurisdiction of the confim1ing authority is confined only to giving
B of directions for recording additional evidence by General Court Martial or
that from the order of the confirming authority "inference cannot be escaped
that tltls is based not on any independent judgment but influenced by the
undisguised opinion expressed by the confirming authority on merits of the
case" or that the revisional order contained such unwarranted observations,
C which were tantamount to recording of finding, which was in no way the
function of the confirming authority or that there has been "unabashed
excess and misuse of jurisdiction" by confirming authority. It was asserted
that tl1e order in revision was liable to be quashed and rightly done so by
the High Court. All this, however, appears to us to be ntlstaken view entertained
by the High Court both in law and from the facts of the case.
D
There is no dispute that in the conduct of the Court Martial proceedings <
before and at the stage of reconsideration procedure as prescribed was
followed. It is true tl1at tlle confim1ing autllority did analyse the evidence on
tlle record of proceedings of the Court Martial but that was so done in tlle
context of indicating where tlle Court Martial could have gone wrong in
E appreciation of evidence and nevertheless caution had been administered to
the Court Martial that what was said in tlle revision order was not intended
in any way to interfere witll the discretion of ·tlle Court Martial to arrive at
a particular finding or sentence and regarding the value to be attached to the
evidence on record and tlle inference to be deducted tllerefrom. Confirming
F autllority said:
\
"Consequently, I am also of the view tllat the sentence awarded on
finding the accused quality of the second charge is not commensurate
with tlle gravity of tlle offence. At the very outset, I wish to impress
that where the Court ignores tlle broad features of the prosecution
G case, and restricts itself to a consideration of ntlnor discrepancies and
furtller meticulously ju>.1aposes the evidence of different witnesses on
disputed points and discards the evidence in its entirety when
discrepancies are found, the method can rightly be criticised as
fallacious. It has to consider whether there is any direct/reliable
H evidence on questions which have to be established by tlle
U.0.1. v. CAPT.A.P. BAJPAI [D.P. WADHWA, J.] 1051
prosecution. Undoubtedly, in considering whether evidence is reliable, A
it is justified in directing attention to other evidence which contradicts
or is inconsistent with the evidence relied upon by the prosecution.
But to discard all evidence because there are discrepancies without
any attempt at evaluation of the inherent quality of the evidence is
unwarranted. The court should make an effort to disengage the truth
from falsehood. It is an error to take and easy course by holding the B
evidence discrepant and the whole case untrue. Even when the
prosecution witnesses have not deposed the whole truth and although
it may not be possible to get an absolutely true picture of the events
from their evidence, it is not proper and justifiable to say that the
prosecution case is a complete fabrication. Bearing in mind these C
principles the Court should examine the evidence adduced before
them in respect of each charge."

It was contended by the respondent that the very use of the expression
"perverse" in the revision order would have influenced the mind of the
members of the General Court Martial as the officers constituting the General D
Court Martial were lower in rank than the confirming authority who was of
the rank of Major General and that the confirming authority of its own
appreciated whole of the evidence instead of saying as to what evidence was
to be considered by the General Court Martial which had the effect of
influencing the General Court Martial. An argument was also raised that when E
the Court Martial reassembled afte1 the revision order the whole proceeding
concluded within half an hour and the General Court Martial returned finding
of· guilt against the respondent. That according to the respondent would
show that the General Court Martial did not apply its mind independently and
was swayed by the opinion of the confirming authority. It was lastly submitted •
that there was no ground for the confirming authority to interfere in the F
proceeding of the General Court Martial which had considered the evidence
f
and argument in depth and held the first charge not proved against the
respondent. We are unable to agree to any of the submissions. Confirming
authority cannot act merely as a rubber stamp. The fact that the finding and
sentence of Court Martial should be valid only after it is confirmed by the G
competent authority would show that it has to examine the whole of the
record of the proceeding of the Court Martial before confirming the finding
or sentence. It is the requirement of Section 160 that when the confirming
authority wishes that the finding or sentence of a Court Martial required
revision it should not send back the case as a matter of course but record
reasons as to why the confirming authority thought so as to where the Court H
1052 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1998] 1 S.C.R.

A Martial has failed in its duty to properly examine the facts and in application
of correct law. When the matter is remitted back to the Court Martial under
Section 160 the Court Martial may take additional evidence if so directed by
the confirming authority. In the present case no such direction was given by
the confim1ing authority and there was no occasion for the General Court
B Martial to record additional evidence. Full opportunity was given to the
respondent to mal<:e submission before the General Court Martial after it had
reassembled and .as the record would show copy of the revisional order was
also supplied to respondent and he made his submission in writing. The Court
thereafter closed for reconsideration and it was thereafter that it revoked its
earlier finding and sentence and held the respondent guilty of the first and
C second charge. It cannot be said that the finding and sentence after
reconsideration was arrived at in a hurried fashion. We have noted above that
now it was the Chief of the Army Staff who confirmed the finding and
sentence and when he did so it could not be said that the wl10le of the record
was not before him. We do not think that the confirming authority exceeded
its jurisdiction in analysing the evidence recorded during Court Martial
D proceedings. The revision order was not intended in any way to interfere with
the discretion of the Court Martial and the Court Martial was also not bound
by any such observation.

We, therefore, allow the appeal, set aside the Judgment of the High
E Court and dismiss the writ petition filed by the respondent.
V.S.S. Appeal allowed.

\