Supreme Court of India
UNION OF INDIA AND ORS.versusARUN KUMAR ROY
- Citation
- 1986 INSC 7
- Decided
- 23 January 1986
- Disposal
- Appeal(s) allowed
- Bench
- A P SEN
Holding
The amended Rule 5(1)(b) of the Central Civil Services (Temporary Service) Rules, 1965, governs the case and does not require payment of notice salary at the time of termination; the notification has no statutory force.
Summary
Arun Kumar Roy was appointed as a temporary Stores Officer in the Zoological Survey of India on 30 July 1975, with a two‑year probation that was later extended by one year. On 27 July 1978 he was terminated during the extended probation, the termination order stating that he was entitled to one month’s salary in lieu of notice, which was not paid at the time of termination. He challenged the order before the Calcutta High Court, where a Single Judge upheld the termination, but a Division Bench set it aside on the ground that the notice salary had to be paid simultaneously, relying on a 1967 notification. The Supreme Court held that the amended Rule 5(1)(b) of the Central Civil Services (Temporary Service) Rules, 1965, which was retrospective, governs the service conditions and does not require simultaneous payment of notice salary; a notification cannot override a statutory rule. Consequently, the termination was valid despite the non‑payment of notice salary at the time of termination. The Court allowed the appeal, setting aside the Division Bench judgment.
Issues considered
- Whether a temporary government servant on probation must be paid notice salary simultaneously with the termination notice under Rule 5(1)(b) of the Central Civil Services (Temporary Service) Rules, 1965.
- Whether the 26 August 1967 notification can override the statutory rule governing termination.
- Whether the terms of the appointment letter can prevail over the service rules for a temporary employee.
Legislation cited
- Central Civil Services (Temporary Service) Rules, 1965s. Rule 5(1)(b)
- Constitution of Indias. Article 309
Subjects
Service lawTermination of employmentProbationNotice salaryTemporary government servantStatutory rules vs notificationArticle 309
Judgment
136
A
UNION OF INDIA AND ORS.
v.
ARUN KUMAR ROY
JANUARY 23, 1986
B [A.P. SEN AND V. KHALID, JJ.]
Service Law - Termination of service during the period r
of probation - Whether it was incumbant upon the Authorities
to pay notice salary along with the termination notice- Effect
of the amended Rule 5(1 )(b) of the Central Civil ·services
c (Temporary Service) Rules, 1965 - Notification cannot over-
ride statutory rules made governing service conditions -
Whether the terms embodied in the order of appointment should
govern the service conditions of employees appointment should
govern the service conditions of employees in Government
service - Constitution of India, 1950, Article 309.
D The Respondent was appointed as a Stores Officer in the .C
Department of Zoological Survey of India on July 30, 1975. Ile
was placed on probation for two years. By a Memo dated July
25, 1977, his period of probation was extended by another
year. During this extended period of probation, by an order
dated July 27, 1978, his services were terminated with effect
E from 'the afternoon of July 29, 1978. The co111111111ication stated
that the respondent would be entitled to claim a sum equal to
the amount of his pay plus allowances in lieu of one month's
notice at the same rates at which he was drawing them immedia-
tely before the termination of his service.
The respondent challenged this order by filing writ,
F petition No. 385/1981 before the Calcutta High Court. The
learned Single Judge dismissed the petition holding that the
order of termination was valid, inasnuch as the respondent
was a temporary Government servant governed by the amended
Rule 5(l)(b) of the Central Civil Services (Temporary Service)
Rules, 1965. However, in appeal, the Division Bench of that
G Court addressed itself to the question whether the amended
provisions of the proviso to Rule 5(l)(b) applied to the case
of the respondent or not. It came to the conclusion that the
order of termination was bad relying upon the terms contained
in the order of appointment and the Notification dated '#
26.8.1967 which clarified the operation of Rule 5 of the Civil
H
u.o.r. v. ARUN KUMAR ROY 137
A
). Service Rules, The Di vision Bench held that the said Noti-
~ication excluded the operation of Rule 5(1) including the
proviso thereto and that the terms of appointment clearly
indicated that his services could be terminated only if the
salary and allowance for one month were either paid or tender- B
ed alongwith the order of termination. Hence the appeal by
special leave.
Allowing the appeal, the Court
HELD: 1. A Notification has no statutory force. It can-
~ not override rules statutorily made governing the conditions
of service of the employees. The Notification is dated
26,8.67, Rule 5(l)(b) of the Central Civil Service (Temporary c
Service) Rules, 1965 was amended in 1971 with retrospective
effect from May 1, 1965, The rule was necessarily to govern
the service conditions and not the notification. Therefore,
the reliance by the High Court on the Notification in
preference to the rules is misplaced. Even if strict adherence
to the notification is to be made, it has to be noted that it D
only states that "it would be desirable to terminate the
_.. services of probation •••.••. .•..•••• ". In other words this
notification does not make it obligatory for tender. or pay-
ment of salary alongwith the order of termination. [145 A-B;
144 G-H]
2. As per Rule 5(1 )(b) of the Central Civil Service E
(Temporary Service) Rules, 1965, the payment of notice salary
is not a pre-requisite for termination. The payment can be
made after the order of ·termination is served on the employee.
Since the Rule was amended in 1971 with. retrospective effect
from May 1, 1965 it is only the amended Rule 5(l)(b) which
applies in this case inasmuch as ·the respondent was appointed F
on July 30, 1975, [144 F-G]
•
Baj Kumr v. Union of India, [ 1975] 3 s.c.R. 963
referred to.
3.1 The terms and conditions of service of an employee G
under the Government who enters service on a conti;act, will
once he is appointed, be governed by the rules governing his
service conditions. It will not be permissible thereafter for
him to rely upon the termli of contract which are not in conso-
nance with the rules governing the service. It is well settled
~ that a Government servant whose appointment though originates
in a contract, acquires a status and that the powers of the
\
138 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1986] 1 S.C.R.
Government under Article 309 to make rules, to regulate the J..
service conditions of its employees are very wide and unfet-,_.
tered. These powers can be exercised unilaterally without the
consent of the employees concerned. Therefore, it cannot be
contended that in the case of employees under the Government,
the terms of the contract of appointment should prevail over
the rules governing their service conditions. [146 F-H; 147 A]
3.2 The origin of Government service often times is
contractual.· There is always an offer and acceptance thus
bringing it to being a completed contract between the Govern- r
ment and its employees. Public law governing service condi-
tions thereafter steps into regulate the relationship between
the employer and the employee. His emoluments and other ser-
vice conditions are thereafter regulated by the appropriate
statutory authority empowered to do so. Such regulation is.
permissible in law unilaterally without reciprocal consent.
[147 A-C]
3.3 In this case the mere fact that the respondent wss
put on probation does not ipso facto make the appointment any
the less temporary and for that reason his extended probation ~
also. Unless the respondent makes out a case based on some
rules which requires confirmation to a post on the expiry of
the period of probation, he cannot succeed on the mere ground
of his being put on probation.for a period of two years or by
the fact that his probation was extended. He cannot rely upon
the first clause in the order of appointment either which
states that though the post is temporary it is likely to
continue indefinitely. Jn any case the order of termination
was served on him before the expiry of the extended period of
probation. [144 C-E]
Roshan Lal Tandon v. Union of India, [1968] 1 S.C.R. 185'
and State of J - . & Kashmir v. Trilolti Nath Khosa & Ors. ,
[1974] 1 s.c.R. 771 relied on.
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Civil Appeal No. 1213 of
1982.
From the Judgment and Order dated 7.12.1981 of the
Calcutta High Court in Original Order No. 385 of 1981.
R. Tyagarajan, Gopal Subramaniam and Miss A. Subhashini
for the appellants. ~
Respondent in person.
U.O.I. v. ARUN KUMAR ROY [KHALID, J.] 139
I
A
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
KHALID, J. This appeal by Special Leave is directed
against the Judgment rendered by a Division Bench of the
Calcutta High Court on 7.12.1981, setting aside, in appeal,
the Judgment of a learned Single Judge. The Union of India and
B
its Officers are the appellants. The facts in brief, necessary
to underst811d the dispute involved in the case are as follows:
The respondent joined the post of Stores Offi.cer in the
Department of the Zoological Survey of India on July 30, 1975.
He was placed on probation for two years. Before the expiry of
the period of probation of two years he received 'a Memo dated
July 25, 1977, from the Senior Administrative Officer, Zoolo-
gical Survey of India, informing him that the Government had c
decided to extend his period of probation as Stores Officer by.
one year more from July 30, 1977. On July 27, 1978, the Dy.
Secretary of the Government of India co1m1nicated to him an
Order of the President of India by which he was inf onned that
the President had terminated his service as a Stores Officer
D
with effect from the afternoon of 29th July, lq78. This
_,. communication further stated that the respondent would be
entitled to claim a sum equal to the amount of his pay plus
allowances in lieu of one month's notice at the same rates at
which he was drawing them immediately before the termination
of his service. The appellant challenged this Order by filing
E
Writ Petition No. 385 of 1981, before the Calcutta High Court.
The main contention raised by him in ,the Writ Petition was
that the Order of termination was bad since a sum equivalent
to his pay plus allowances for the notice-period was not paid
to him alongwith the notice as required under the terms of his
appointment letter. The learned Single Judge who heard the
F
Writ Petition declined relief to the respondent and dismissed
the Writ Petition. Aggrieved by the said Judgment the respon-
dent filed an appeal. The Division Bench agreed with the
respondent's case that the termination order was bad inas111.1ch
as the full amount of salary and allowances for the notice
period was not paid to him at the time of termination of his
G
service and so holding set aside the Judgment of the Single
Judge and allowed the appeal and quashed the Order of termi-
nation and gave liberty to the Government to terminate his
service in accordance with the terms of his appOintment.
Hence the appeal. -
The main question debated at the Bar by the respective
H
140 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1986) l S.C.R.
A
counsel is whether in the case of the respondent it was
incumbent upon the Authorities to pay notice salary alongwith
the termination notice or whether it was sufficient if he was
informed that he was entitled to such salary on his termi-
nation. A resolution of this dispute depends upon considera-
B tion of the nature and terms of his appointment. To appreciate
this, it is necessary to look into the Order of appointment
and relevant ·points of law governing the terms of service.
The respondent's counsel strongly pleaded that he was
appointed to a substantive post since he was placed on proba-
tion. If his appointment was purely temporary it was not
c necessary to.place him on probation. The case of the appellant
on the other hand was that the Order of appointment its elf
indicated that the respondent was appointed as a temporary
hand and that he did not become a regular hand simply because
he was put on probation. The termination in this case took
place before the expiry of the extended period of probation
D which the authority concerned was entitled to do under the
relevant rules.
We may, in passing,· indicate as to what was the case of
the respondent before the High Court. According to him after
he took charge of the post of Stores Officer in the Department
of Zoological Survey of India he found certain irregularities
E in the Stores, specifically in the item of rectified spirit.
According to him he brought such irregularities to the notice
of his superior officer. He incurred, as consequences, the
displeasure of the Officer senior to him which resulted in the
order of termination of his service during the period of
probation. Even so we would like to make it clear that neither
F before the learned Single Judge nor before the Division Bench
did the petitioner plead any case of malafides. Nor did he do
so before us.
The respondent appeared in person before us. We find
.from the records that he argued his case before the High Court
also. ·we felt sympathetic towards him and therefore suggested
G
to the appellants' counsel to tell the appellants to accommo-
date him in some place lest he, a youngma.n, should waste his
life without any employment. The learned Counsel for the
appellants could not give ua any assurance but undertook to
convey our suggestions to the authorities concerned.
Now, . coming to the merits of the case the Order of
H
appointment of the respondent is produced as Annexure-A. This
u.o.I. v. ARUN KUMAR ROY [KHALID, J.] 141
A
shows that he was appointed on a temporary basis. It is made
clear therein that though the post is temporary, it is likely
to continue indefinitely, that the appointment wili be liable
to be terminated at any time on one month's not:ice given by
either side, thus he will be on probation for a period of two B
years which may be extended, if necessary, and that the other
conditions of service will be governed by the orders and rules
in force from time to time. Clause 2(ii) of, the Order of
·- appointment is important. It reads:
"The appointing authority, however, reserves the
right of terminat!ng services of the appointee
forthwith or befor the expiry of stipulated period c
of notice by making payment to him of a sum equi-
valent to the pay and allCMances for the period of
notice or the unexpired portion thereof."
The Order of termination dated 27th July, 1978, which is
produced as Annexure-B, reads as follows: D
_l "In pursuance of the provisions contained in para
2(ii) and (iii) of this Department's C.M. No.
F.1-19/71-Sur. 3 dated the 9th July, 1975 regarding
appointment to the post of Stores Officer in the
Zoological Survey of India, the President of India
hereby terminates with effect from the afternoon of E
29th July, 1978, before the expiry of extended
period of probation the services of Shri Arun Kumar
Roy, Stores Officer, Zoological Survey of India,
Calcutta 2"d directs that be shall be entitled to
claim a sum equivalent to the amount of his pay
plus allawances in lieu of one 111lllth of notice at F
, the same rates at which be was drawing them :Imme-
diately before the termination of his services.
By Order and in the name of the President."
The learned Single Judge who heard the Writ Petition,
held that the appellant was a temporary Government servant and G
that he was governed by Rule 5(1) of the Central Civil Service
(Temporary Service) rules, 1965. Rule 5(1 )(b) as amended,
provided in its proviso that on termination of, a temporary
Government servant, one month's notice has to be given and
that he shall be entitled to claim a sum equivalent to the pay
and allowances for the period of his notice at the same rate H
142 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1986] 1 s.c.R.
A
at which he was drawing them immediately. The learned Single
Judge held that the order of termination was valid. The
Division Bench, disagreeing with the learned Single Judge held
that the Order of termination was bad since one month's salary
and allowances was not paid or tendered to the appellant
alongwith the notice. This is the only question that falls to
B be .decided in this appeal.
It is not disputed that the salary and allowances for one
month in lieu of notice was not paid or tendered to the appel-
lant simultaneously with the termination of his service. What
is the. legal consequence? To answer this question it is neces-
sary to refer to rule 5(l)(b) of the Central Civil Service
c (Temporary Service) Rules, 1965. Rule 5(1) in its amended form
reads as follows:
"5(l)(a) The services of a temporary Govt. servant
who is not in quasi permanent service shall be
liable to termination at any time by a notice in
writing given either by the Government servant to
D the appointing authority to the Government servant;
(b) The period of such notice shall be one month,
provided that the services of any such Govt.
servant may be terminated forthwith and on such
termination, the Govt. servant shall be entitled to
E claim a sum equivalent to the amount of his pay
plus allowances for the period of the notice at the
same rates at which he was drawing them immediately
before the termination of his services, or as the
case may be, for period by which such notice falls
short. of one month."
F
The proviso to Rule 5(l)(b), before it was amended, pro-
vided for the simultaneous payment of pay and allowances
alongwith the order of termination. The amendment of the
proviso to Rule 5(l)(b) was made in 1971 with retrospective
effect from May 1, 1965. It is necessary to note that the
G appellant was appointed to the post of Stores Officer on July
30, 1975, that is after the amended rules came into force.
H
The learned Single Judge relied upon the amended proviso
to Rule 5(l)(b) of the rules and held that though the pay and
allowances was not paid or tendered simultaneously with the
service of the order of termination, the same did not vitiate ,
U.O.I. v. ARUN KUMAR ROY [KHALID, J.] 143
A
i the termination of the appellant's service. It was this find~
ing that was successfully challenged before the Division Bench
by the respondent.
The Division Bench addressed itself to the question
whether the amended provisions of the proviso to Rule S(l)(b)
B
applied to the case of the respondent or not. In coming to the
conclusion that the order of termination was bad, the Division
Bench relied upon the terms contained in the order of appoint-
--< ment in the Notification dated 26.8.1967 which clarified the
operation of Rule 5 of the rules.
The Notification reads as follows:
"Under rule 5 of the Central Civil Services (Tempo-
c
rary Service) Rules,1965, the services of a
temporary Government servant, who is not in quasi
permanent service can be terminated at any time by
a notice in writing given either by the Government
servant who is not quasi permanent service to the
appointing authority or by the appointing authority
-· to the Government servant. A question has arisen
whether this rule should be invoked also iti the
case of persons appointed on probation, wherein the
appointment letter specific condition regarding
termination of service without any notice during or
E
at the end of period of probation (including
extended period, if any) has been provided. The
position is that the OCS(TS) Rules do not specifi-
cally exclude probationers or persons on probation
_as such. However, in view of the specific condition
regarding termination of service without any notice
F
during or at the ·end of the period of probation
(including extended period, if any), it has been
decided in consultation with the Ministry of Law,
that in cases where such a provision has been
specifically made in the letter of appointment it
would be desirable to terminate the service of the
G
probationer person on pr:obation in terms of the
letter of appointment and not under rule 5(1) of
the Central Civil Services (Temporary Services)
Rules, 1965."
r The Division Bench relied upon this Notification and held
that the said Notification excluded the operation of Rule 5(1)
H
144 SUPREME COURT . REPORTS [1986] 1 s.c.R.
A
including the proviso thereto in the case of the petitioner,>.
whose service was terminated during the period of probation.
The Division Bench did not agree with the contention of the
Union of India that the Notification did not apply to the case
of the appellant since in its view the terms of appointment
clearly indicated that he could be terminated only if the
B
salary and allowances for one month were either paid or
tendered alongwith the order of termination.
We find that the approach made by the Division Bench is _
not correct. We would first dispose of the contention raised
by the respondent that he was not a temporary hand. The Order
of appointment itself makes it clear that he will be on proba-
c tion for a period of two years which may be extended, if
necessary. According to him, a temporary hand is not normally
put on probation nor is probation extended in the case of
temporary hands. The fact that he was originally put on proba-
tion for a period of two years which was extended by one year
itself indicates accoroing to him that he is not a temporary
D
hand. This contention need not detain us for long. The A.
appointment order makes it clear that the appointment will be
on a temporary basis. The mere fact that he was put on proba-
tion does not ipso facto make the appointment any the less
temporary and for that reason his extended probation also.
Unless the respondent makes out a case based on some rules
E
which requires confirmation to a post on the expiry of the
period of probation, he cannot succeed on the mere ground of
his being put on probation for a period of two years or by the
fact that his probation was extended. He cannot rely upon the
first clause in the order of appointment either which states
that though the post is temporary it is likely to continue
F
indefinitely. In any case, the order of termination was served;
on him before the expiry of the extended period of probation.
As already indicated Rule 5(l)(b) of the rules was amended in
1971 with retrospective effect from May 1, 1965, The respon-
dent was appointed on July 30, 1975. The amended rule, there-
fore, applied in his case. As per this Rule, the payment of
G
notice salary was not a pre-requisite for termination. The
payment can be made after the order of termination is served
on the employee. Reliance by the High Court on the Notl.fi-
cation in preference to the rules i.e also misplaced. Even if
strict adherence to the notification is to be made, it has to
be noted that it only states that ":!-~ would be desirable to ,
H
terminate the services of probation~ .•.••....•• n. Thac is, this
U.O.I. v. ARUN KUMAR ROY [KHALID, J.] 14'5
A
notification does not malt<! it obligatory for tender or payment
of salary alongwith the order of termination.
A notification has no statutory force. It cannot override
rules statutorily made governing the conditions of service of
the employees; The notification is dated 26.8.1967. Rule
B
5(l)(b) was amended in 1971 with retrospective effect from May
1, 1965. The rule has necessarily to govern the service
conditions and not the notification.
The effect of Rule 5 of the Rules fell· to be considered
by this Court in two decisions, viz. Senior Superintendent,
R.M.S. v. K.V. Gopinath, fl972] 3 s.c.R. 530 and Raj Kumar v.
Union of India, [1975) 3 S.C.R. 963. The respondent relied
strongly upon the following ·observations reported in 1972 (3)
c
S.C.R 530 at page 532'
" •••••• The proviso to sub-rule (b) however gives
the Cove.rnment dn additional right in that it gives
an option to the Government not to retain the ser-
vices of. the employee till the expiry of· the
D
,period of the notice: if it so chooses to terminate
the service at any time it can do so forthwith 'by
payment to him of a sum equivalent to the amount of
his pay plus allowances for the period of notice at
the same rate at which he was drawing them immedia-
tely before the termination of his service, or as
E
the case may be, for the period by which such
notice falls. short of one month.' At the risk of
repetition, we may note that the operative words of
the proviso are "the services of any ·such Govern-
ment servanc may be terminated forthwith by
payment." To put the matter in a nut shell, to be
F
.-{ effective the termination of service has to be
simultaneous with the payment to the employee of
whatever is due to him. We need not pause to
consider the question as to what would be the
effect if there was a bona fide mistake as to the
amount which is to be paid. The rule does not lend
G
'itself to the interpretation that the termination
of service becomes effective as soon as the order'
is served on the Government servant irrespective·of
the question as to when the payment due to him is
to be made. If that was the intention of the
framers of the rule, the proviso ~ould have been
H
differently worded. As has often been said that if
'the precise words used are plain and unambiguous,
.f' we are bound to construe them in their ordinary
'
146 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1986] 1 S.C.R.
A
sense.' 'and not to limit plain words in an Act of
Parliament by consideration of policy, if it be
policy, as to which minds may differ and as to
which decision may vary.'
This decision was rendered on February 18, 1972. It was the
validity of an Order dated September 25, 1968, terminating the
B respondent therein, that was in question in that case. We
would like to observe, with respect, that the amendment
brought into Rule 5(l)(b) with effect from May 1, 1965,
escaped the notice of the Bench that decided that case. The
error was subsequently corrected by another Bench of this
Court in ~he decision in Rajkumar v. Union of India (supra) by
c stating :
" ••• The effect of this amendment is that on 1st
May; 1965 as also on 15.6.1971, the date on which
the appellant's services were terminated forthwith
it was not obligatory to pay to him a sum equi-
valent to the amount of his pay and allowances for
D the period of the notice at the rate at which he
was drawing them immediately before the terminating
of the services or as the case may be for the
period by which such notice falls short. The
Government servant concerned is only entitled to
claim the sums hereinbefore mentioned. Its effect
E is that the decision of this Court in Gopinath's
case (supra) is no longer good law. There is no
doubt that this rule is a valid rule because it is
now well established that rules made under the
proviso to Article 309 of the Constitution are
legislative in character retrospectively ••••••• "
F The question whether the terms embodied in the Order of
appointment should govern the service conditions of employees
in Government service or the rules governing them is not an
ope!' question now. It is now well settled that a Government
servant whose appointment though originates in a contract,
acquires a status and thereafter is governed by his service
G rules and not by the terms of contract. 'Ille pow~rs of the
Government under Article 309 to make rules, to regulate the
service conditions of its employees are very wide and unfet-
tered. These powers can be exercised unilaterally without the
consent of the employees concerned. It will, therefore, be
idle to contend that in the case of employees under the
H
u.o.r. v. ARUN KUMAR ROY [KHALID, J. 1 147
A
.( Government, the terms of the contract of appointment should
prevail over the rules governing their service conditions. The
origin of Government service often times is contractual. There
is always an offer and acceptance, thus bringing it to being a
completed contract between the Government and its employees.
B
Once appointed, a Government servant acquires a status and
thereafter his position is not one governed by the contract of
appointment. Public law governing service conditions steps
into regulate the relationship between the employer and
employee. His emoluments and other service conditions are
thereafter regulated by the appropriate statutory authority
empowered to do so. Such regulation is permissible in law
unilaterally without reciprocal .consent. This Court made this
c
clear in two Judgments rendered by two Constitution Benches of
this Court in Roshan Lal Tandon v. Union of India, [1968] (1)
S.C.R. 185 and in State of Janmi & Kashmir v. Triloki Nath
Khosa & Ors., [1974] (I) s.c.R. 771.
Thus it is clear and not open to doubt that the terms and D
-" conditions of the service of an employee unde< the Government
who enters service on a contract, will once he is appointed,
be governed by the rules governing his service conditions. It
will not be permissible thereafter for him to rely upon the
terms of contract which are not in consonance with the rules
governing the service.
E
The powers of the Government under Art. 309 of the
Constitution to make rules regula~ing the service conditions
of the government employees cannot, in any manner, be fettered
by any agreement. The respondent cannot, therefore, succeed
either on the terms of the contract or on the notification on
which the High Court has relied upon. Nor can he press into
F
"'.service the rule of estoppel against the Government.
Now, we may usefully advert to clause ( v) of para 2 of
the Order of appointment. This clause reads as follows:
11
0ther conditiqns of service wi 11 be governed by
G
the relevant rules and orders in force from time to
time."
This clause was inserted by way of abundant caution
)
.... making it clear that the conditions of service will be
regulated by the rules obtaining from time to_ time regarding
H
the service in question.
148 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1986] 1 s.c.R.
A
The Division Bench of the High Court, in our considered )..
view, erred in relying upon the notification in preference to
Rule 5(1 )(b) and to hold that the Order of termination was
wrong and in setting aside the Judgment of the learned Single
Judge. The Judgment under appeal has, therefore, to be set
B aside and we do so. The appeal is allowed with no order as to
costs.
We repeat what we have stated above. The respondent has ~
been sent out for reasons which we cannot decide in the
absence of necessary materials. We suggested to the learned
c counsel for the appellants, Mr. fyagarajan, to provide the
respondent with some job. The Counsel, in fairness, agreed to
consult his clients. Though our Judgment was ready long ago,
we gave time to the appellants' Counsel here on three
occasions, to explore the possibility of providing some job to
the respondent. Nothing tangible has happened. We still hope
J) that this young man will be provided with some job in the
department. ;,_
S.R. Appeal allowed.
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