Holding

Section 3(2) confers an unrestricted power on the Central Government to fix tariff values, provided the method has a nexus to the value of the goods, and such fixation is not violative of Article 14; therefore the notifications fixing tariff values for sulphuric acid and chlorine are valid.

Summary

The Union of India issued notifications fixing tariff values for sulphuric acid and liquid chlorine under Section 3(2) of the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944, using a weighted‑average price methodology. Century Manufacturing Co. challenged these notifications, arguing that excise duty should be based only on manufacturing cost plus profit and that the government's discretion was arbitrary and violative of Article 14. The Bombay High Court agreed with the assessee and set aside the notifications. On appeal, the Supreme Court held that Section 3(2) gives the Central Government a broad, unrestricted power to fix tariff values, provided the method bears a nexus to the value of the goods and is not exercised arbitrarily. The Court clarified that the valuation under Section 4 is only one of several permissible modes and does not limit the government's power under Section 3(2). Consequently, the notifications fixing the tariff values were declared valid and constitutional, and the High Court's decision was set aside. The appeals were allowed and each party was ordered to bear its own costs.

Issues considered

The constitutional validity of Section 3(2) of the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944, in view of Article 14 of the Constitution.
Whether the Central Government may fix tariff values based on a weighted‑average price rather than manufacturing cost plus profit.
Whether the discretion under Section 3(2) is subject to the guidelines or limitations of Section 4.
The correctness of the High Court's finding that the notifications were arbitrary, perverse, and violative of Article 14.

Legislation cited

Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944s. 3(1), s. 3(2), s. 3(3), s. 4
Constitution of Indias. Article 14

Subjects

central excisetariff valuationSection 3(2)Article 14arbitrarinessweighted average priceexcise dutyconstitutional validity

Judgment

·""

A UNION OF INDIA AND ANR.
v. +--'-
CENTURY MANUFACTURING COMPANY LTD.

f\1A y 14, 1992

B (S. RANGANATHAN, V. RAMASWAMI AND YOGESHWAR
DAYAL, JJ.)

Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944:
~

c Sections 3(2), 4 and First Schedule-Fixation of ad valorem rate of
tariff by Central Government-Adoption of mode of fu:ation havi'!g nexus
with manufacture or production-Detemiination of value as provided under
section 4 not the only basis-Power conferred on Government Fixation at
average price-Whether unrestricted and arbitrary-Whether violative of Ar-
ticle 14 of the Constitution of India. +
D
Constitution of India, 1950:

Article 14-l'ower conferred on Central Government under section 3(2)
of the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944-Fixation of ad valorem rate of
duty-With reference to average prices-Whether c¢1itrary, unrestricted and
E ~~
violative of.

In exercise of its power conferred under section 3(2) of the Central
Excises and Salt Act, 1944, the Central Government issued notifications
dated 28.11.1970 and 26.7 .1971 fixing the tariff value on the basis of which
F excise duty was to be levied on sulphuric acid and liq!lid chlorine respec-
. tively. ~
IC. .~I

The Respondent-assessee challenged the fixation of the tariff values
for the abovesaid two items, by filing Writ Petitions before the High Court.
The main contentions of the assessee were that excise duty being a duty on
G manufacture or production, its levy could be based on the cost of produc-
tion or manufacture together with any margin of profit the manufacturer
may be able to make when he sells the goods in a whole-sale market at or )c::-
near the factory gate; that the tariff value fixed under section 3(2) of the
Act could also be only on the basis mentioned above and could not be based
H on the sale price of the goods much less on a weighted average sale price;
282
U.0.1. v. CENTURY MFG. CO. 283

and that section 3(2) gave a wide and unfettered discretion to the Central A
>-f- Government to fax the value at any figure it chose and so section 3(2) of
the Act was violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India, as no
guidelines have been indicated in the statute.

The High Court allowed the Writ Petitions and gave certain direc- ,
tions to the Central Government. Being aggrieved· against the said judg- B
ment of the High Court, the Revenue has preferred the present appeals.

Allowing the appeals, this Court,
~
HELD: 1. The tariff values of sulphuric acid and chlorine were
c
- validly f1Xed under the respective notifications issued by the Central
Government. Section 3(2) of the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944 and
the notifications dated 28.11.1970 and 26.7 .1971 are valid and constitution-
al. [299 D, E]
-+- 2.1. The High Court's reasoning restricts the freedom of rate faxation D
under section 3(1) to the mode of determination of value set out in section
4 and to the manufacturing cost and profit of an individual manufacturer-
assessee before the authorities. It overlooks that, reading ss.3(1), 3(2) and
4 together, in the light of Bombay ~yres, it is clear that the rate of excise
duty need not necessarily be ad valorem; that, even when it is ad valorem,
the mode of determination of value outlined in section 4 is only one of the E
-'r modes available to the Central Government which comes into operation
only where the value of any item of goods is not otherwise specified in
notifications issued under section 3(2); and that even where the value is to
be determined under section 4, it can have any nexus with the wholesale

_. price and is not limited to manufacturing cost and profit. The High Court F
has erred in reading ss.3(1) and (2) as being subject to the parameters of
section 4. It is clear that section 3(1) read with the schedule is very wide
and unrestricted in its language and permits the levy of duty on any basis
that has nexus with manu~acture or production. Section 3(1) comes into
operation only in cases of goods where an ad va/orem duty is set forth in
G
the schedule but, subject only to this restriction, this sub-section too does
not carry any limitation as to the manner in which the value is to be fixed,
much less any limitation that the value should be determined in the same
~-
manner as under section 4. [294 C-G]

·2.z. Even section 4 does not restrict the levy to manufacturing cost H
)

284 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1992] 3 S.C.R.

A and profit. This section read with the relevant rules only sets out the
procedure by which the assessing officer bas to determine the value in
individual cases that come up before him. Naturally, in such cases, the
statute proceeds on the basis of the position in the individual case before
the officer. Whether it be the manufacturing cost plus profit basis or the
price basis, the officer determines the value on the facts of the individual
B case without taking into account similar considerations in the case of other
manufacturers. But it would not be correct to read this limitation into
section 3(2) as well. Section 3(2) is a general provision which gives full
liberty to Central Government to determine the value in cases where the
first schedule prescribes an ad valorem levy. Section 4 does not control or
c limit the power of the Central Government to fix rates under section 3(2).
Section 4 is subject to section 3(2) and is not attracted to cases where the
value is notified under section 3(2) and not vice versa. The High Court was,
therefore, not correct in finding fault with the Central Government for
-
D
having faxed the tariff value at a figure related to an average of the prices
at which the goods are sold to various manufacturers. There is nothing in +
the statute which precludes the Government from faxing the tariff value in
this manner. [294 G, H; 295 A·C]

Union of India v. Bombay Tyres International Ltd., [1984) 1 SCR 347,
relied on.
E
3.1. While section 3(2) confers a power on the Central Government
to fax tariff values for goods at its pleasure, unrestricted to the terms of
section 4, this cannot be done at the whim and caprice of the Government.
This discretion bas to be exercised by the Government in accordance with
F the crucial guideline that is inbuilt into the statute and also illustrated by
the manner in which the determination is provided for in section 4. The
statute· leaves one in no doubt that the rate of duty is to be faxed ad valorem
i.e. on the basis of the value of the goods. It cannot be disputed that the
normal indication of the value of the goods will be its price and, that the
statute intends price to be the relevant factor is clear from the language
G of section 4 under which the statute itself faxes the value for the majority
of cases. The value may be derived with reference to the wholesale price,
the retail price or the average price at which the goods are sold by the
inanufacturer concerned or even by the price at which the goods are sold
by any particular person or place or the average price which the goods
H command in the whole country or any part thereof. It can be fixed at the
'
{,

U.0.1. v. CENTIJRY MFG. CO. 285

lowest of such prices, at the highest of such prices or at some average A
(mean, media, mode etc.) of such prices as the Government may consider
appropriate in the case of any particular commodity. [295 E-H; 296 A, BJ

3.2. That the weighted average so faxed exceeds the manufacturing
cost and profit of a particular manufacturer, can be no reason for doubt-
ing its validity. Equally, there is no acceptable logic in the High Court's B
suggestion that it should be faxed at the lowest of the prices at which th,e
manufacturer is able to sell his goods in the wholesale market. To apply
+-- such a measure will restrict the faxation of the value at figures even less
than those that can be arrived at under section 4. The whole purpose of
section 3(2) is to enable the Revenue to free itself from the shackles of c

- section 4, inter alia, in cases where the Government feels that the applica•
tion of that section would lead to difficulties and harassments. It cannot
be said that the tariff value has been manipulated to enhance the rate of
duty. The Central Government has the undoubted power to enhance the
rates and the validity of a notification having such an effect is not open to
challenge even if it is done under the "guise" of faxing a tariff. value. But D
there is no such guise or facade in this case and the tariff value has been ·
fixed on the basis of relevant criteria having a nexus to the value of the
goods. [298 D-GJ

Veeran v. Union of India, (1981) 8 ELT 515, Kerala and Gwalior E
-)r-- Rayon Silk Mfg. (Weaving) Co. Ltd. v. Union of India, (1988) 34 ELT 562
M.P., approved.

Century Spinning& Mfg. Co. v. Union, (1979) 4 ELT (J) 199, reversed.

.... Subbarayan v. Union of India, (1979) 4 ELT (J) 473 Mad. and Gwalior
Rayon Silk Mfg. (Weaving) Co. Ltd. v. Union of India, (1981) 5 ELT 52 M.P.,
overruled.

Union of India v. Vazir Sultan Tobacco Co. Ltd., 1978 Tax LR 1824,
F.

distinguished.
G
Roy v. Voltas Ltd., [19731 2 SCR 1089 and Atic Industries v. Asst.
Collector, [1975) 3 SCR 563, referred to.
--r;.(

4. The generality of section 3(2) is unrestricted and section 3(3) only
explains a few possible ways in which that power can be, and could always H
286 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1992) 3 S.C.R.

A have been, exercised. Likewise, the scheme of ss.3 and 4 leave no doubt
that section 4 is without prejudice to the provisions of section 3 and the
newly inserted section 4(3) only makes this abundantly clear. (299 A]

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal Nos. 1432 and
33of1984. ·
B
From the Judgment and Order dated 15/27.11.1978 of the Bombay
High Court in Special Civil Application Nos. 1066/72 and 1276 of 1972.

A.K. Ganguli, P. Parmeshwaran, Dilip Tandon and Ms. A Subhashini
C for the Appellants.

C.M. Lodha, S.S. Shroff, Rajiv Shakdhar and S.A. Shroff for the
Respondent.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by +
D
S. RANGANATHAN, J. These two appeals under Central Excises &
Salt Act, 1944 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') raise an interesting
question as to the vires and interpretation of s.3(2) of the Act. Under that
provision, the Central Government issued notifications dated 28.11.1970
E and 26.7.1971 fixing the tariff value on the basis of which excise duty was
to be levied on sulphuric acid and liquid cholrine respectively. In respect
of the former, the tariff value fixed was Rs. 260 per metric tonne where the
strength of the acid was 93% to 99% and a proportionately lower figure
where· the strength of the acid was less. The tariff value for chlorine was
fixed at Rs.500 per metric tonne:
F
-~
It is necessary to set out the provisions of sections 3 and 4 of the Act,
as they stood at the relevant time, to enable a proper understanding of the
iss~e raised. They read thus: ··

3. Duties specified in the First Schedule to be levied
G
(1) There shall be levied and collected in such manner as may
be prescribed duties of excise on all excisable goods other than
salt which are produced or manufactured in India and a duty
on salt manufactured in, or imported by land into, any patt of
H India as, and at the rates, set forth in the First Schedule.
U.0.1. v. CENTURY MFG. CO. [RANGANATHAN, J.] 21!,7

(lA) x x x A
(2) The Central Government may, by notification in the Official
Gazette, fix, for the purpose of levying the said duties, tariff
values of any articles enumerated, either specifically or under
general headings in the First Schedule as chargeable with duty
ad valorem and may alter any tariff values the time being in B
force.

4. Detennination of value for the purpose of duty:

Where, under this Act, any article is chargeable with duty at a

- rate dependent on the value of the article, such value shall be
deemed to be -

(a) the wholesale cash price, for which an article of the like
C

+ kind and quality is sold or is capable of being sold at the time
of the removal of the article chargeable with duty from the D
factory, or any other premises of manufacture or production
for delivery at the place of manufacture or production, or if a
wholesale market does not exist for such article at such place,
at the nearest place where such market exists, or

(b) where such price is not ascertainable, the price at which an E
article of the like kind and quality is sold or is capable of being
sold by the manufacturer or producer or his agent, at the time
of the removal of the article chargeable with duty from such
factory or other premises for delivery at the place of manufac-
ture or production, or if such article is not sold or is not capable
of being sold at such place, at any other place nearest thereto. F

Explanation - In determining the price of any article under this
section, no abatement or deduction shall be allowed except in
respect of trade· discount and the amount of duty payable at
the time of the removal of the article chargeable with duty from G
the factory or other premises aforesaid."

The effect of these two sections read with the definition in s.2(d) of,
and the First Schedule to, the Act may be· summarised thus : Excise duty
is charged on all goods specified in the First Schedule to the Act. It is a
duty on such goods produced or manufactured in India. It is levied at the H
288 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1992] 3 S.C.R.

A rates speicified in the First Schedule. These rates are charged in some
cases on the basis of length, area, volume and weight but, in most cases,
the rate is ad 'valorem i.e. dependent on the value of the goods. We are
concerned here with the last of these modes of rate fixation where the rate
is applied to the value. Naturally, in such cases, the crucial question is :
what is the value of the goods to which the rate is to be applied? This
B question is answered in two ways. S.3(2) empowers the Central Govern-
ment, in such cases, to fix the tariff value by Gazette notifications issued
from time to time. S.4 empowers the assessing authority to determine the
value of the excisable goods in individual cases on the basis of the
wholesale cash price for which the goods are sold at the factory gate.
c
The Century Spinning and Manufacturing Co. Ltd. (the respondent,
hereinafter referred to as 'the assessee') challenged the fixation of the tariff
values of sulphuric acid and liquid chlorine at the amounts referred to
earlier. Its contention, developed in three steps, was this: (a) that an excise
D duty being a duty on manufacture or production, its levy can be based on
the cost of production or manufacture together with any margin of profit
the manufacturer may be able to make when he sells the goods in a
wholesale market at or near the factory gate; (b) the tariff value fixed under
S.3(2) can also be only on this basis and cannot be based on the sale price
of the goods, much less on a weighted average sale ptice as in the present
E case; (c) .if S.3(2) were to be interpreted differently in a wide manner, as
empowering the Central Government to fix tariff values wholly at its
discretion - unfetttered by the formula indicated in (a) above - at any figure
it chooses, the sub-section should be struck down as violative of article 14
as there are no guidelines indicated in the statute for fixation of such tariff
value.
F
The Bombay High Court, in its judgment [reported as Century Spin- ,,,,-. .___ -

ning & Mfg. Co. v. Union, (1979) 4 ELT (J) 199] accepted the first two steps
in the assessee's line of reasoning. It, therefore, allowed the writ petitions
G filed by the assessee and gave certain directions. We are informed that a
similar view as to the scope of Section 3(2) of the Act has also been taken
in Subbarayan v. Union of India, [(1979) 4 ELT (J) 473 (Mad) and Gwalior
Rayon Silk Mfg. (Weaving) Co. Ltd. v. Union of India, (1981) 5 ELT 52
(M.P.)]. Veeran v. Union of India, [(1981) 8 ELT 515 (Ker) and Gwalior
Rayon Silk Mfg. (Weaving) Co. Ltd. v. Union of India, (1988) 34 ELT 562
H ·(M.P.)] take a contrary view but these decisions were rendered after an
i

U.0.1. v. CENTURY MFG. CO. [RANGANATIIAN, J.) 289

amendment of 1973 (effective from October 1975) and are, according to A
the assessee, distinguishable on that ground. The issue, being one of some
importance and constant recurrence, the Union of India has preferred
these appeals. .

The High Court, in the judgment under appeal has been greatly
influenced by certain observations of this Court in Roy v. Voltas Ltd., [1973l B
2 S.C.R. 1089 and Atic Industries v. Asst. Collector, [1975] 3 S.C.R. 563
explaining the concept and nature of an excise duty. In the former of these,
cases, this Court was concerned with an attempt of the Revenue to ignore
what was clearly a wholesale transaction because it represented only 10%
of the total sales and to levy excise duty on the basis of retail sales which C

- covered .the major percentage of the total production. Pointing out the
error of this and, after analysing the language of s.4 of the Act the Court ·
observed:

"Excise is a tax on the production and manufacture of goods D
(see Union of India v. Delhi Cloth and General Mills, [1963]
Supp 1 SCR 586 = AIR 1963 SC 791. Sec. 4 of the Act therefore
provides that the real value should be found after deducting the
selling cost and selling profits and that the real value can include
only the manufacturing cost and the manufacturing profit. The
section makes it clear that excise is levied only on the amount , E
representing the manufacturing cost plus the manufacturing profit
and the excludes post-manufacturing cost and the profit arising

---
from post-manufacturing operation, namely selling profit. The
section postulates that the wholesale price should be taken on
the basis of cash payment thus eliminating the interest involved F
in wholesale price which gives credit to the wholesale buyer for
a period of time and that the price has to be fixed for delivery
at the factory gate hereby eliminating freight, octroi and other
charges involved in the transport of the articles. As already
stated it is not necessary for attracting the operation of section
4{a) that there should be a large number of wholesale sales: G
The quantum of goods sold by a manufacture on whole-sale
basis is entirely irrelevant. The mere fact that such sales may
be few or scanty does not alter the true position,"

(Emphasis added) H
j

290 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1992) 3 S.C.R.

A This Court adopted the above passage and further elucidated it in
the latter case. There, the court was concerned with an attempt of the
Revenue to levy duty, not on the basis of the wholesale sale price, but on
the basis of the price at which the wholesale purchaser. sold the goods to
distributors and large consumers. In this context the court observed that if
excise were levied on the basis of second or subsequent wholesale price, it
B would load the price with a post manufacturing element, namely, the selling
cost and selling profit of the wholesale dealer. That would be plainly
contrary to the true nature of excise as explained in voltas case and it would
also violate the concept of the factory gate sale which is the basis of
determination of the value of the goods for the purpose of excise.
c Unfortunately, the observations of this Court in the above cases came
to be understood as laying down a general proposition that excise duty can
be levied only with reference to a hypothetical value of the manufactured
goods comprising of its manufacturing cost and manufacturing profit and
nothing more. This COf:lceptual error was rectified and the correct legal ·~-
D position expounded in Union of India v. Bombay Tyres International Ltd.,
[1984) 1 S.C.R. 347. It is true that, by the time this decision was rendered,
s.4 had undergone certain amendments. But this makes no difference to
the point at issue before us and it will be useful to extract certain relevant
passage from this judgment:
E
(a) The central issue between the parties is.that case was

"whether the value of an article for the purposes of the excise

F
levy must be determined by reference exclusively to the
manufacturing cost and the manufacturing profit of the
manufacturer or should be represented by the entire wholesale
-
price charged by the manufacturer. The wholesale price actual-
ly charged by the manufacturer consists of not merely his
manufacturing cost and his manufacturing profit but includes,
in addition, a whole range of expenses and an element of profit
a. (conveniently referred to as "post manufacturing expenses" and
"post manufacturing profit") arising between the completion of
the manufacturing process and the point of sale by the
manufacturer.

On this issue, the contention urged on behalf of the Union of India
H which was accepted by the court ran on the following lines:
U.O.I. v. CENTURY MFG. CO. [RANGANATHAN, J.) 291

"Shri K. Parasaran, the learned Solicitor General of India (when A
~
these cases were heard, and now the Attorney General of India)
has strongly contended that the value of an excisable article for
the purposes of the levy must be taken at the price charged by
the manufacturer on a wholesale transaction, the computation
being made strictly in terms of the express provisions of the
B
statute and, he: says, there is no warrant for confining the value
to the assessee's manufacturing cost plus manufacturing profit.
-t- According to him, although excise is a levy on the manufacture
of goods, it is open to Parliament to adopt any basis for
determining the value of an excisable article, that the measure
for assessing the levy need not correspond completely to the c
nature of the levy, and no fault can be found with the measure
so long as it bears a nexus with the charge.

---.+ and the court expressed its conclusion in the following words:

"It is apparent, therefore, that when enacting a measure to serve D
as a standard for assessing the levy the Legislature need not
contour it along lines which spell out the character of the levy
itself. Viewed from this standpoint, it is not possible to accept
the contenti~n that because the levy of excise is a levy on goods
-),- manufactured or produced the value of an excisable article E
must be limited to the manufacturing cost plus the manufac-
turing profit. We are of opinion that a broader based standard

- of reference may be adopted for the purpose of determining
the measure of the levy. Any standard which maintains a nexus
with the essential character of the levy can be regarded as a
valid basis for assessing the measure of the levy. In our opinion F
____ ...,....
the original s.4 and the new s.4 of the Central Excises and Salt
Act satisfy this test."

(b) Dealing with the old and new section 4, the Court had this to say:

"As we have said, it was open to the Legislature to specify G
the measure for assessing the levy. The Legislature has done
~ so. In both the old s.4 and the new s.4, the price charged by
the manufacturer on a sale by him represents the measure.
Pri~ and sale are related concepts, and price has a definite
connotation. The "value" of the excisable article has to be H
292 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1992) 3 S.C.R.

A computed with reference to the price charged by the manufac-
turer, the computation being made in accordance with the
terms of s.4.

A contention was raised for some of the assessees, that the
measure was to be found by reading s.3 with s.4, thus drawing
B the ingredients of s.3 into the exercise. We are enable to agree.
We are concerned withs. 3(1), and we find nothing there which
clothes the provision with a dual character, a charging provision
as well_ as a provision defining the measure of the charge."
-+
C (c) Touching upon A.K Roy & Anr. v. Voltas Ltd., [1973) 2 S.C.R.
1089 and the passage from it which we have quoted earlier, the Court
observed:

"Those observations were made when the Court was examining
the meaning of the expression "wholesale cash price". What the
D
Court intended to say was that the entire cost of the article to
the manufacturer (which wou:ld include various items of ex-
pense composing the value of the article) plus his profit on the
manufactured article (which wou:ld have to take into account
the deduction of 22% allowed as discount) wou:ld constitute
E the real valu~ had to be arrived at after. off-loading the discount
of 22%, which in fact represented the wholesale dealer's profit.
A careful reading of the judgment will show that there was no
issue inviting the court's decision on the point now raised in
these cases by the assessees."
F
(d) As to Atic Industries Ltd. v. H.H. Dove, Asstt. Collector of Central
Excise and Ors., [1975] 3 S.C.R. 563, the Court, after quoting extensively
from the decision, pointed out:

"Thj.s case also does not support the case of the assessees. When
G it refers to post-manufacturing expenses and post-manufactur-
ing profit arising from post - manufacturing operations, it
clearly intends to refer not to the expenses and profi~s pertain-
ing to the sale transactions effected by the manufacturer but to
those pertaining to the subsequent sale transactions effected by
H the wholesale buyers in favour of other dealers."
U.0.1. v. CENTURY MFG. CO. [RANGANATHAN, J.] 293-

If we look now at the judgment under appeal in the light of the above A
clarifications, it becomes clear that it does not state the correct law. Its
basic premise is based on wrong interpretation of s.3(1) and s.4. It obser-
ves:

"Section 3(1) of the Central Excise and Salt Act, 1944, provides
that there shall be levied and collected duties of excise on all B
excisable goods which are produced or manufactured in India
at the rates set forth in the First Schedule. The charging section,
therefore, enables levy of excise duty on production and
manufacture of goods. It is, therefore, clear that the levy of

- excise must have relation to the production or the manufactur-
ing cost of the goods produced by a manufacturer. Any levy of
excise which takes into account the factors which are not
connected with the production cost and profit on goods by the
C

manufacturer would not be legal."

It is true that the sub-section (1) of section 3 makes a reference to D
the First Schedule. But, as already pointed out, the first schedule specifies
rates based on length, area, volume and weight in a number of cases which
may not and need not have any relation to manufacturing cost and profit.
· -Even where the Schedule fixes a rate ad valorem and the value is governed
by s.4, there is no restriction of the value to manufacturing cost and profit. E
The High Court observes:

"Under S.4, it is the wholesale cash price which is the assessable
value. It is well seUted that the "wholesale cash price" means
the manufacturing cost and the manufacturing profit, and the
post-manufacturing cost and the post-manufacturing profit has . F
got to be ignored for finding out the assessable value for levying
the excise duty at the rates laid down in the Schedule."

Proceeding further, the Court ties up the value not only to the
manufacturing cost and profit but also ties it up to the manufacturing cost G
and profit of the particular producer who is the assessee. It observes:

"The valuation for the purpose of levying excise duty thus solely
depends on the production and the manufacturing cost and
manufacturing profit of the product. This necessarily would
exclude the inflation of cost and profit by the weighted average H
294 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1992] 3 S.C.R.

A method or otherwise. One producer or a manufacturer has no
control whatsoever over the production or manufacture by
another manufacturer or producer. It appears to us clear that
the value for the purposes of the excise duty on a particular
product produced or manufactured by a purchaser or a
manufacturer must be arrived at on the basis of manufacturing
B cost and manufacturing profit of that particular purchaser or
manufacturer. The weighted average basis necessarily intro-
duces irrelevant considerations, viz., the production or
manufacturing cost or manufacturing profit of another
manufacturer or producer altogether. This in our view would
c be foreign to the concept of excise as envisaged by the charging
section 3(1)."

In short, the High Court's reasoning restricts the freedom of rate
fixation under s.3(1) to the mode of determination of value set out in s.4
D and to the manufacturing cost and profit of an individual manufacturer-as-
+
sessee before the authorities. It overlooks that, reading ss.3(1), 3(2) and 4
together, in the light of Bombay Tyres, it is clear that the rate· of excise duty
need not necessarily be ad valorem; that, even when it is ad valorem, the
mode of determination of value outlined in s.4 is only one of the modes
available to the Central Government which comes into operation only
E where the value of any item of goods is not otherwise specified in notifica-
tions issued under s.3(2); and that even where the value is to be determined
under s.4, it can have any nexus with the wholesale price and is not limited
to the manufacturing cost and profit. In our opinion, the High Court has
erred in reading ss.3(1) and (2) as being subject to the parameteres of s.4.
F It is clear that s.3(1) read with the schedule is very wide and unrestricted
in its language and permits the levy of duty on any basis that has a nexus
with manufacture or production as explained in Bombay Tyres. Section 3(2}
comes into operation only in cases of goods where an ad valorem duty is
set forth in the schedule but, subject only to this restriction, this sub-section
too does not carry any limitations as to the manner in which the value is
G to be fixed, much less any limitation that the value should be determined
in the same manner as under s.4. Even s.4 does not restrict the levy to
manufacturing cost and profit but, this apart, this section, read with the
relevant rules only sets out the procedure by which the assessing officer is
to determine the value in individual cases ·that come up before him.
H Naturally, in such cases, the statute proceeds on the basis of the position
U.0.1. v. CENTURY MFG. CO. [RANGANATIIAN, J.) 295

~
. in. the individual case before the officer. Whether it be the manufacturing A
cost plus profit basis (as erroneously thought by the High Court) or the
price basis (as explained in Bombay Tyres) the officer determines the value
on the facts of the individual case without taking into account similar
considerations in the case of other manufacturers. But it would not be
correct to read this limitation into s.3(2) as well. s.3(2) is a general
B
provision which gives full liberty to Central Government to determine the
value in cases where the first schedule prescribes an ad va/orem levy.
Section 4 does not control or limit the power of the Central Government
1-- to fix rates under s.3(2). Section 4 is subject to s.3(2) and is not attracted
to cases where the value is notified under s.3(2) and not vice versa. The
High Court was, therefore, not correct in finding fault with the Central c
Government for having fixed the tariff value at a figure related to an
average of the prices at which the goods are sold by various manufacturers.
There is notlting in the statute which precludes the Government from fixing
~ the tariff value in this manner.
D
But, then, says learned counsel, to read s.3(2) in the manner indi-
cated above, would make the provision vulnerable to challenge on the basis
of violation of Article 14 of the Constitution. Such an interpretation, it is
said, would leave it open to the Central Government to fix tariff values at
its whim and caprice without any statutory guidelines laying down the
-?--- parametres of such fixation. We think that the contention proceeds on a E
misconception. While we undoubtedly say that s.3(2) confers a power on
the Central Government to fix tariff values for goods at its pleasure,
unrestricted to the terms of s.4, we do not say that this can be done at the
whim and caprice of the Government. The discretion has to be exercised
by the Government in accordance with the crucial guideline that is inbuilt F
ll. into the statute and also illustrated by. the manner in which the determina-
tion iS_provided for in s.4. The statute leves one in no doubt that the rate
of duty is to be fixed ad valorem i.e. on the basis of the value of the goods.
It cannot be disputed that the normal indication of the value of the goods
will be its price and, that the statute intends price to be the relevant factor
is clear form the language of s.4 under which the statute itself fixes the G
value for the majority of cases. But where one had got bogged down,
-~ possibly due to certain earlier observations of this Court in a different
context, ,was in thinking that the value of goods can only comprise of
manufact0ring cost and profit. Actually it has been made to depend on the
wholesale, frice of the manufacturer conce.med under s.4 (old and new). H
296 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1992) 3 S.C.R.

A But this need not be the sole criterion. The value may be derived with
reference to the wholesale price, ·the retail price or the average price at
which the goods are sold by the manufacturer concerned or even by the
price at which the goods are sold by any particular person or place or the
average price which the goods command in the whole country or any part
thereof. If can be fixed at the lowest of such prices, at the highest of such
B prices or at some average (mean, media, mode etc.) of such prices as the
Government may consider appropriate in the case of the particular com-
modity.

In the case of the goods with which we are concerned, the basis on

-
C which tariff value was fixed by the Government was explained before the
High Court, we may extract the relevant passage:

"On rule being issued, affidavits in reply were filed on behalf
of the respondents in Special Civil Application No.1066 of 1972.
D The affidavit of Shri S.R. Narayan, Under Secretary to the
Government of India, Central Board of Excise and Customs,
New Delhi, shows that notifications fixing the tariff values in
respect of sulphuric acid were being issued from time to time
since the year 1962. These tariff values were fixed from time to
time on the basis of weighted average value of sulphuric acid
E based on statistics collected. This weighted average value was
based on the data collected on all-India basis. It is also con-
tended in this affidavit that it would be a practicable method
to fix tariff values on the basis of weighted average on all- India
basis by 'taking into consideration the assessable values of the
F different manufacturers and then taking a weighted average
thereof which would be a uniform rate of tariff for all the
manufacturers. It has been also pointed out that in some of the
sales in view ·of the tariff value so fixed the petitioners have
benefited as they were required to pay excise duty at a rate less
than wqat would have been payable under section 4. It was also
G pointed out that there is a difference betwef'1. the method of
determining the value under section 4 and under sub-section
(2) of section 3, and once the tariff value is fixed, the deter-
mination of value under section 4 would be irrelevant. In the
affidavit, the fixation of tariff value in respect of these items
H has been .justified on the ground that it is a useful method to
U.0.1. v. CENTURY MFG. CO. [RANGANATHAN, J.J 297

fix tariff value where the price fluctuation is violent and it has A
~ been pointed out that the tariff values have been fixed after a
close study of price fluctuations, and it cannot, therefore, be
said that the Central Government has absolute and unfettered
discretion which is being used in an arbitarary manner. A
similar approach is found in the affidavit of Shri S.R. Narayan
B
is Special Civil Application No.1276 of 1972 in respect of
cholorine, and the fixation of the tariff values on weighted
average basis is justified on the ground that it is the only
"'t workable method for determining the assessable value which
would be fair and acceptable to all the manufacturing units
throughout the country. It has been contended that by its very c

- nature, such an average value ·is bound to be higher or lower
or even at par with the selling prices of the various manufac-
turers, but this cannot be helped if a uniform tariff rate is to
be fixed. It is further stated in the affidavit that since 1962,
'* notifications were issued by the Central Government fixing the
values of chlorine and other products in gaseous form. Repre-
D
sentations were also made by certain manufacturers and by the
Western U.P. Chambers of Commerce and Industries for fixa-
tion of tariff values. The various Collectorates were asked to
furnish particulars regarding the assessable value of the various
gases manufactured in their Collectorates, and after the data E
-"-r was collected from them, tariff values were fixed for various
gases including chlorine. It was pointed out that even in the
case of chlorine, there has been a considerable fluctuation in
,;....- its price. This contention was sought to be demonstrated by
reference to the information regarding the manufacturing cost F
and manufacturing profit of chlorine gas manufactured by the
~
petitioners for the period from JaJ:J,uary 1972 to April 1972. In
the month of January 1972, there was a fluctuation in price
from Rs50 to Rs.900. In the month of February, the price
fluctuation was between Rs.250 to Rs.800; in the month of
March 1972, it was between Rs.250 to Rs.1,000, and in the G
month of April 1972, the price fluctuation was between Rs.250
.to Rs.800. It was contended that there is a considerable flue-
~~
tuation in prices and a uniform rate of t~ value might at
times also be to the benefit of the petitioner-company when the
H
298 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1992) 3 S.C.R.

A manufacturing cost and the manufacturing profit· would be
higher than the tariff value, although it may be put to a loss
r-
when such value is actually less than the tariff value. The
respondents deny the petitioners' contention that the impugned
notifications issued under sub- section (2) of section 3 of the
Act were arbitrary or unreasonable or that the provisions of
B sub-section (2) of section 3 and sub-section (3) of section 3
were ultra vires or violative of any provisions of the Constitution
of India. It is not necessary for us to elaborately mention the
other points made out in the affidavits is reply having regard
to the arguments advanced by the counsel on both sides.•
c
In our opinion, the tdl'iff value bas been notified under s.3(2) for valid
reasons and on germane grounds having a nexus to the 'value' of the goods
and the High Court erred in accepting the assessee's plea that "the notifica-
tions are arbitrary, perverse and display a non-application of mind on the
D part of the authorities as the tariff values fixed are unrelated to the value
or price or the manufacturing cost and manufacturing profit of the
products". That the weighted average so fixed exceeds the manufacturing
cost and profit of a particular manufacturer, can be no reason for doubting
its validitf. Equally, there is no acceptable logic in the High Court's
suggestion that it should be fixed at the lowest of the prices at which the
E manufacturer is able to sell his goods in the wholesale market. To apply
f:uch a measure will restrict the fixation of the value at figures even less
than those that can be arrived at under s.4. The whole purpose of s3(2)-'is
to enable the Revenue to free itself from the shackles of s.4, inter alia, in
cases where, as here, the Government feels that the application of that
F section would lead to difficulties and harassments. The criticism that the
tariff value has been manipulated to enhance the rate of duty has also no
force. The Central Government has the undoubted power to enhance the
rates and the validity of a notification having such an effect is not open to
challenge even if it is done under the "guise" of fixing a tariff value. But, as
already pointed out by us, there is no such guise or facade in this case and
G the tariff value has b~en fixed on the basis of relevant criteria having a
nexus to the value of the goods.

We have so far avoided any reference to s3(3), inserted in 1978, and
s.4(3), inserted with effect from 1.10.1975, as these am~ndments came into
H effect later than the period with which WC are con~med and WC wished
U.0.1. v. CENTURY MFG. CO. [RANGANATIIAN, J.] 299

to look at the provisions of the statute as they stood before these amend- A
ments. In the light of our interpretation outlined above, it will be seen that
these amendments are clarificatory in nature. The generality of s.3(2) is
unrestricted and s.3(3) only explains a few possible ways in which that
power can be, and could always have been, exercised. Likewise, the scheme
of ss.3 and 4 leave no doubt that s.4 is without prejudice to the provisions B1
of s.3 and the newly inserted s.4(3) only makes this abundantly clear.

We have principally dealt with the reasoning of the judgment under
appeal and it is unnecessary to deal specifically with the earlier decision of
the M.P. High Court viz. Gwalior Rayon Silk Mfg. (Wvg.) Co. v. Union of
India, (1981) 5 E.L.T. 52 M.P. and the Madras decision Subbarayan v. C

- Union, (1975) 4 E.L.T. (J) 473 which have adopted a similar approach. The
decision in Union of India v. Vazir Sultan Tobacco Co. Ltd., (1978) Tax LR
1824 is not directly in point. The second Gwalior Rayon decision (1988) 34
E.L.T. 562 (M.P.) and the Kerala decision Veeran v. Union, (1981) 8 E.L.T.
515 set out the correct position though they restrict themselves to a
consideration of s.4 of the Act after its amendment in 1973/1975. D
For the reasons discussed above, we are of opinion that the tariff
values of sulphuric acid and chlorine were validly fixed under the impugned
notifications. S.3(2) of the Act as well as the notifications are declared valid
and constitutional. The Judgment of the High Court under appeal is set E
--)'- aside. The appeals are allowed but we direct that the parties should bear
their own costs.

G.N. Appeals allowed.

•