Holding

Section 23(1‑A) benefits are available to claimants where the reference court’s award was made after 24 September 1984, even if the Collector’s award preceded the amendment, and the State’s appeal is dismissed.

Summary

The case concerned lands acquired under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, where the Collector had made his award on 31 March 1981 and the landowners filed reference applications under Section 18. The High Court had granted benefits under Section 23(1‑A) of the Act, which provides an additional solatium, and the State appealed. The Supreme Court examined whether the benefit of Section 23(1‑A), introduced by the Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1984 and made applicable by Section 30(1)(a), could be claimed when the Collector’s award pre‑dated the amendment but the reference court’s award was rendered after 24 September 1984. The Court held that the language of Section 23(1‑A) imposes a duty on the court to award the additional amount and, read with Section 30(1)(a), the benefit applies to proceedings pending on 30 April 1982 where no Collector’s award had been made, even if the court’s award came later. Consequently, the claimants were entitled to the additional solatium, and the State’s appeal was dismissed with costs.

Issues considered

The applicability of Section 23(1‑A) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, as amended by the 1984 Amendment Act, to cases where the Collector’s award was made before the amendment but the court’s award was made after the amendment.
Whether Section 30(1)(a) of the Amendment Act gives retrospective effect to Section 23(1‑A) for pending acquisition proceedings.
The distinction between an "award" and a "decree" and its relevance to the entitlement of additional solatium.

Legislation cited

Land Acquisition Act, 1894s. 11, s. 18, s. 19, s. 23(1-A), s. 23(2), s. 30(1)(a), s. 30(2), s. 4, s. 54, s. 6
Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1984s. 15, s. 30(1)(a), s. 30(2)

Subjects

Land acquisitionSection 23(1‑A)Additional solatiumTransitional provisionsAward vs decreeRetrospective applicationSupreme Court interpretation

Judgment

A UNION OF INDIA AND ANOTHER: ETC. ETC.

v.
ZORA SINGH ETC. ETC.

B
NOVEMBER 22, -1991

[RANGANATH MISRA, CJ., M.H.KANIA AND

KULDIP SINGH, JJ.]
C Land Acquisition Act, 1894-Section 23(1-A)-Benefit
under-Entitlement of Land Acquisition Act, 1894-Section 23(1-A)
"Award"-Construction-"Award" whether 'decree', "Court" whether
"Collector".
Land Acquisition Act, 1894-Section 23(1-A) read with Section
D 30(l)(a) of the Land Acquisition Amendment Act, 1984-Applicability
of,
The lands of the respondent and other land owners were ac-
quired under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894.

Notifications under sections 4 and 6 of the Act were published.
E on 10.5.1979 and 27.3.1981 respectively. ·
f

The respondent and other land owners filed Reference Appli-
cations u/s 18 of the Act against the award before the District Judge.

The District Judge classifying the acquired land into various
F grades awarded compensation and also granted benefits u/s 23(1-A)
of the Act to the respondent and other land Owners. Hence, the
State appealed to the High Court.

Those land-owners, who were not satisfied with the compensa-
tion awarded and those to whom benefit u/s 23(1-A) were not granted,
G also appealed to the High Court.
The Single Judge of the. High Court confirmed the grant of
benefits u/s 23(1-A) of the Act and also granted such benefits to
t~ose cases, whe~e such b~nefits were not given by the Dis.trict Judge.

The State preferred th_e Letters Patent Appeals before the- Di-
vision ~erich of the High Court, contending that the respondent and

478
U.0.1. v. ZORA SINGH 479

other land o-WOers were not entitled to the benefit of section 23(1-A) A
of thf Act; that the section 23(1-A) was introduced by the Land
Acquisition(Amendment) Act, 1984; that as the Collector had made
his award on 31.3.1981 the provisions of section 23(1-A) of the Act
was not applicable to the cases of the respondent and other land
owners.
B
The--Division Bench of the High Court dismissed the Letters
Patent Appeals of the State. Hence the present appeals by special
leave were filed by the State before this Court.

The parties before this Court made the same submissions which C
were made before the High Court. ·

Dismissing the appeal, (CA No.4568 of 1991) this Court,

HELD: 1. A perusal of the provisions of sub-section(l-A) of
section. 23 makes it clear that the said sub-section deals with sub- D
stantive rights and it confers a substantive right to claim the addi-
tional amount calculated as set out in the said sub-section in the
circumstances set out therein. Similarly, sub-section(2) of Section
23 also confers a substantive right on the claimant to a higher solatium .
[486 E-F] •
E
2. The provisions of the Act, being substantive in nature, can
have only prospective application unless the language in which the
provisions are couched, read in the context, shows that the intention
of the legislature was to give retrospective effect to them. The lan-
guage of sub-section(l-A) of section 23 shows that a duty is cast on
the court to award an amount calculated as stated therein in addi- F
tion to the market value of the land acquired for the period com-
mencing from the date of the publication of section 4 of the Notifi-
cation to the date of the award of the Collector or the date of taking
possession, whichever is earlier. (486 F-G]

3. The expression "award" used in section 23(1-A) suggests G
that the intention of the legislature was to make the provisions of
the said sub-section applicable to cases where the Collector had yet
to make his award or the Trial Court hearing the Reference under
Section 18 of the Land acquisition Act has still to make its award
after the coming into force of the said sub-section oil September 30,
1984. [486 ff.,.487 A)_ . .. H
480 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1991) SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A 4. The expression "award" is to be distinguished from the
expression "decree" and hence, it appears that in the absence of any
contrary or inconsistent provision in the Act the provisions of sub-,
section(l-A) of section 23 would not come into play where the awards
had been made by the Collector earlier as well as by the Reference
Court but on the date of coming into effect of the said sub-section,
B an appeal from the said award might have been pending in a court.
In that case, the court would not be "awarding" any amount but
would be making a "decree" for an amount. [487 B-C]
S. By reason of the provision of section 30(1)(a) of the Amendment
Act of 1984 the provisions of section 23(1-A) of the Act were, by a
C deeming provision, made also applicable to every proceeding for the
acquisition of land under the Act where the Collector bad not made
his award by .April, 30,1982. On a correc~ interpretation of the
provisions of section 23(1-A) read with section 30(1)(a) of the Amendment
Act of 1984, an additional amount calculated in the manner indi-
cated in section 23(1-A) is also payable in those cases ·where the
D Collector had not made his award on or before April 30,1982, but
the Court might have made its award before September 24,1984.
[487 D-EJ
• 6. The construction that is being given to th·e provisions of
section 23(1-A) and section 30(l)(a) will, in a sense, limit the ben-
E efits strictly conferred by section 30(1)(a) to only thos_e cases, where
the Collector as well as the Court have made their respectiv~·awards
between April 30,1982 and September 24, 1984. ·That cannot be
helped, as that is the result of the plain grammatical construction of
the clear language used in the relevant provisions. [487 E-F]

F 7. The Court would not be j~stified in giving an unduly re-
stricted meaning to the provisions of section 23(1-A) unwarranted
by the plain language of the sub-sectio·n. [487 F] .
__!. -sedion 23(1-A) refers clearly to the duties of the court.
The court is defined by section 3(d) as the principal court of origi-
nal jurisdiction, except in the circumstances set out in the said sub-
G section, which would be the court having jurisdiction to decide the
reference under section 18 of the Act. There, is therefore, no_ war-
rant to read in the place of the word "Court" in Section 23(1-A) the
wo.rd "Collector". Moreover, the decision of such a court determin-
ing compensation is ~egarded as an award under the Act. In the
light of the provisions, there is no warrant to give an unduly re-
H stricted meaning to section 23(1-A) Qf the Act. [487 G-488 A)
U.O.I. v. ZORA SINGH 481

9. On the plain language of section 23(1-A) itself, the duty A
was cast on the court to award an additional amount calculated as
prescribed therein which would mean that such amount is dirl!cted
to be awarded by the court, namely, the Reference court, in all
,. cases which are pending before that court on September 1, 1984.
•,
Sub-section (l)(a) of Section 30 lays down that the provisions of
section 23(1-A) of the Act are also made applicable to all proceed- B
ings for the acquisition of any land under the said Act pending on
April 30,1982, where no award had been made by the Collector
before that date. At first glance this would appear to suggest that
the additional amount referred to in section 23(1-A) could not be
awarded where the Collector had made his award before April 30,1982.
But this provision cannot be allowed to cut down the benefits avail- C
able to the claimants on a plain reading of section 23(1-A). This is
clear from the use of the word "also" in the opening part of section
30(1). [489 E-H]

10. In the present case as the Reference court bas made its
award after September 24,1984 the benefit of the provisions of Sec- D
tion 23(1-A) was clearly available to the claimant. [491 DJ

..... Jaiwant Laxman P. Sardesai etc. v. Government of Goa, Daman
and Diu and Another etc., AIR 1987 Bombay 214(F.B.) and Union of
India & Others v. Filip Tiago De Gama of Vedem Vasco De Gama,
[1990) 1 sec 277, overruled.' E
State of Punjab v. Krishan Lal, AIR 1987 Punjab and Haryana
222(F.B.); and Maya Devi and Others v. The Union Territory of Chandigarh,
1988 Punjab Law Journal 189, approved.
..... Union of India and Another etc. v. Raghuvir Singh (dead) by Lrs. F
etc., [1989) 2 SCC 754; K.Kamala Jammanniavaru v. Special Land
Acquisition Officer, [1985) I SCC 582 and Bhag Singh v. Union Terri-
tory of Chandigarh, [1985) 3 SCC 737; referred to.

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : ·Civil Appeal No. 4568 of
199L G

.... From the Judgment and Order dated30.l.89 of the Punjab & Hary~a
High Court in LPA No.1251of1987. - r

WITH

CA Nos 4569 - 4686/91 H
482 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1991] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A M. Chandra Sekhar, Additional Solicitor General, G.L. Sanghi, Harbans
Lal, Har Dev Singh, S.P. Goyal, Harinder Pal Singh, Ms. Naresh Bakshi,
S.M. Sarin, P.N. Puri, M.K. Dua, Ms. Madhu Moolchandani, Manoj Swamp,
Dr.(Ms.) Meera Agarwal, R.C. Mishra, M.N. Krishnamani, K.P. Sunder
Rao, Attar Singh, S.N. Terdal, Hemant Sharma, T.C. Sharma, N.D. Garg,
Ms. Kusum Chowdhary and S.P. Sarin for the appearing parties.
B
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

KANIA, J. Leave granted.

Counsel heard. As the controversy before us is a limited one and
C relates only to the question of granting of benefit of the provisions of
Section 23(1-A) introduced into the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (hereinaf-
ter referred to as "the said Act") by the Land Acquisition (Amendment)
Act, 1984, (referred to hereinafter as "the Amendment Act of 1984") only
a few facts are necessary for the appreciation of the submissions inade
before us.
D
This appeal, arising out of S.L.P. (Civil) No.14297 of 1990 by Spe-
cial Leave, is directed against the judgment of a Division Bench of the
Punjab and Haryana High Court in Letters Patent Appeal No.1251 of
1987. The other appeals before us are connected appeals filed by the
Union of India or the claimants. The respondent was the owner ofa piece
E ofland in one of the villages in District Bhatinda in Punjab. Land admeasuring
74375 acres situated in various villages in Bhatinda District including the
land of the respondent was acquired by the appellants under the sai<i Act.

. The Notifications under Sections 4 and 6 of the said Act were pub-
lished on May 10,1979 and March 27, 1981, respectively. The Special
F Land Collector made and declared his award of compensation in respect
of the acquisition of the said land and several other plots of land on March
31, 1981. Being aggrieved by the said award, the respondent and other
landowners filed Reference applications under Section 18 of the said Act
which were decided by the iearned District Judge concerned in 1985 and
1986. The land acquired was classified into various grades and compensa-
'G tion awarded accordingly. In the case before us and several other similar
cases the benefits under Section 23(1-A) of the said Act were granted to
the land-owners. The State appealed to the High Court. In several other
cases where the land owners were not satisfied with the compensation
awarded, including the cases where the benefits conferred by Section
23(1-A) were not awarded the land owners filed appeals before the High
H Court.
U.O.I. v. ZORA SINGH [KANIA, J.] 483

What is relevant for our purpose is that a learned Single Judge of the A
High Court confirmed the grant of benefits under Section 23(1-A) of the
said Act where such benefits had been granted by the learned District
Judge and awarded the same where that had not been done by the learned
District Judge. Letters Patent Appeals were filed by the State being dissat-
isfied with the judgment of the learned Single Judge.
B
It was submitted on behalf of the Onion of India before the Di vision
Bench deciding the Letters Patent Appeals that the claimants/land owners
w~re uot entitled to the benefit of Section 23(1-A) of the said Act intro-
duced by the said Amendment Act, 1984 as aforestated. It was submitted
on behalf of the appellants that the right to get additional amount at the
rate of 12% per annum on the enhanced amount of compensation from the c
date of Notification under Section 4 of the said Act and till the date of the
award of the Collector or the date of talcing possession whichever is
e1µ'lier conferred under the provisions of Section 23(1-A) of the said Act
was available only in cases where the Collector made his award after 30th
day of April, 1982, being the date of the introduction of the Land Acquisi-
tion (Amendment) Bill, 1982 in the House of the People, whereas in the D
present case, the Collector had made his award on March 31, 1981. Reli-
ance was placed on the Judgment of a Full Bench of the Punjab and
Haryana High Court in State of Punjab v. Krishan Lal, AIR (1987) Punjab
and Haryana, 222. The Division Bench repelled this contention and pointed
out that the learned Chief Justice H.N. Seth, who spoke for the Full
Bench in Krishan Lal's case (supra) had explained that judgment in the E
subsequent decision rendered in Maya Devi and Others v. The Union
Territory of Chandigarh, Punjab Law Journal (198$) 189. and pointed out
that the land owner was entitled to the additional amount in terms of
Section 23(1-A) of the Amendment Act of 1984 if the proceedings for
determination of compensation were- decided after September 24, 1984,
and since the Regular First Appeal in respect of the proceedings for deter- F
mination of the compensation was decided after September 24, 1984, the
Court while adjudicating upon the amount of compensation payable to the
claimant was bound to grant the additional amount in terms of Section
25{1-A). of the said Act. The Division :Bench in its impugned judgment
gave to the_.claimant the benefit of the added amount referred to in Section
23(1-A) of the said Act. The same submissions have been made on behalf G
. -- of the respective parties before us. ·

Before discussing the submi~sioils of the respective parties, it would
not be out of place to set out the relevant provisions of the said Act.

The said Act, namely, the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, provides for H
compulsory acquisition of land. ~e term 'Award' has not been d,efined in
484 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1991) SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A the said Act. Sub-clause (d) of Section 3, the definition section, defines
the expression 'Court' as follows :
"(d)the expression 'Court' means a principal Civil Court of
original jurisdiction, unless the appropriate Government has
appointed, as it is hereby empowered to do, a special judicial
B officer within any specified local limits to perform the func-
tion of the Court under this Act.'
Part II of the said Act deals with the question of acquisition of land.
Section I I of the said Act deals with the enquiry and award of compensa-
tion by the· Collector. Section I I-A which was introduced into the said
Act by the Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1984 (Act No.68of1984)
c provides for the period within _which the award shall be made. Generally·
speaking, it prescribes that the period for making the award is limited to
two years, and the sebtion provides that, if the award is not made within
that period, the entire proceedings for acquisition of land shall lapse.
There i~ a proviso to the said section and an Explanation, but it is not
necessary to consider the same for the purpose of this case. Sub-section
D (I) of Sectfon 18 which is inciuded in Part III of the said Act runs as
follows: ·
"18. Reference to Court- ·
(I) Any person interested who has not accepted the awar:d
E may, by.written application to the Collector, require that
the matter be referred by the Collector for the determina-
tion of the Court, whether his objection be to the meas-
urement· of· the land, the amount of compensation, the
person to whom it is payable, or the apportionment of the
compensation among the persons interested.;'
F Section 23 deals with the matters to be considered by the Court for
determining the compensation to be awarded for the land acquired under
the said Act. We may mention here that under the general scheme of the
said Act, the landowner whose land has been acquired is entitled to be
paid the market-value of the land acquired as prevailing at the timr:f the
publication of the notification under Section 4 issued together ith the
G
solatium at the prescribed rate in consideration of the compulsor nature
of the acquisition .. Prior to the coming into effect of the AmencWent Act
of 1984 solatium was fixed at the rate of 15 per centum. Sub-sectibn (I-A)
which was introduced into Section 23 of the said Act by the Am~ndment
Act of 1984 runs as follows:
H "In addition to the market value of the land, as above .pro-
vided, the Court shall in every case award an amount calcu-
U.0.1. v. ZORA SINGH [KANIA, J.) 485

lated at the rate of twelve per centum per annum on such A
market-value for the period commencing on and from the date
of the publication of the notification under Section 4, sub-
section (1), in respect of such land to the date of the award of
the Collector or the date of taking possession of the land,
whichever is earlier."
, By the said Amendment Act of 1984 th~ expression "thirty per
B
centum" was substituted in place of the expression "fifteen per centum" in
sub-section (2) of Section 23 of the said Act. Sub-section (2) of Section 23
now runs as follows :

"(2) In addition to the market-value of the land, as above p~ c._
vided, the Court shall in every case award a sum of thirty per---+
centum on such market-value, in consideration of the compul- '
sory nature of the acquisition."
These amendments were effected in the Land Acquisition Act (the
said Act) by the Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1984, ("the Amend-
ment Act of 1984") as set out earlier. Sub-sections (1) and (2) of Section D
30 of the Amendment Act ')f 1984 run as follows:

"30 Transitional Provisions:
(I) The provisions of sub-section (1-A) of Section 23 of the
principal Act, as inserted by Clause (a) of Section 15 of this E
Act, shall apply, and shall be deemed to have applied, also to,
and in relation to,
(a) every proceedings for the acquisition of any land under
the principal Act pending on the 30th day of April, 1982
the date of introduction of the Land Acquisition (Amend-
ment) Bill, 1982, in the House of the People, in which no F
award has been made by the Collector before that date;
(b) every proceeding for the acquisition of any land under the
principal Act commenced after that date, whether or not
an award has been made by the Collector before the com-
mencement of this Act. G
(2) The provisions of sub-section (2) of Section 23 and Sec-
tion 28 of the principal Act, as amended by Clause (b) of
Section 15 and Section 18 of this Act respectively shall apply,
and shall be deemed to have applied, also to, and in relation
to, any award made by the Collector or Court or to any order
passed by the High Court or Supreme Court in appeal against H
486 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1991] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A any such award under the provisions of the principal Act later
the 30th day of April, 1982, the date of introduction of the
Land Acquisition (Amendment) Bill, 1982, in the House of the ___
,.,.

People and before the commencement of this Act."

(emphasis supplied by us)
B On behalf of the appellants reliance was placed by learned Counsel
on the decision of this Court in Union of India and Others v. Filip Tiago
De Gama of Vedem Vasco De Gama. [1990) l SCC 277. The respondent,
on the other hand, placed strong reliance on the decision of a Full Bench
of the Bombay High Court in Jaiwant La:xman P. Sardesai and etc. v.
Government of Goa, Daman Diu and Another etc, AIR 1987 Bombay 214.
c On the basis of the aforesaid judgment of the Bombay High Court it was
submitted by the respondent/claimant that a wide and liberal interpreta-
tion should be given to the provisions of sub-section (I-A) of section 23
and the amount calculated as set out in the said sub-section awarded in all
cases where any proceeding wa:s pending in any court including the High
Court or this Court in connection with the determination of compensation
D
for the land acquired. We may mention that both the parties referred us to
the decision of a Constitution Bench of this Court, in Union of India and
Another etc. v. Raghuvir Singh (dead) by Lrs etc, [1989) 2 SCC 754. We
propose t'-' discuss these decisions a little later but before doing so, we
propose to analyse the relevant provisions of the said Act and the effect
E thereof.
A perusal of the provisions of sub-section (l-A) of Section 23 makes
it clear that the said sub-section deals with substantive rights and it con-
fers a substantive right to claim the additional amount calculated as set
out in the said sub-section in the circumstances set out therein. Similarly,
sub-section (2) of Section 23 also confers a substantive right on the claim-
F ant to a higher solatium. Under the well-settled rules of interpretatiop, the
said provisions of the said Act, being substantive in nature, can hav~ only
prospective application unless the language in which the provisions are
couched, read in the context, shows that the intention of the legislature
was to give retrospective effect to them. The language of sub-section (I-
A) of Section 23 shows that a duty is cast on the court to award an
G amount calculated as stated therein in addition to the market value of the
land acquired for the period commencing from the date of the publication
of the Section 4 Notification to the date of the award of the Collector or
the date of taking possession, whichever Is earlier.
(Emphasis supplied)
H The expression "award" used in section 23 (I-A) suggests that the

\\
U.0.1. v. ZORA SINGH [KANIA, J~] 487

intention of the legislature was to make the provisions of the said sub- A
section applicable to cases where the Collector had yet to make his award
or the Trial Court hearing the Reference under Section 18 of the Land
Acquisition Act had still to make its award after the· coming into force of
the said sub-section on September 30, 1984. The expression "award" is to .
be distinguished from the expression "decree" and hence, it appears that
in the absence of any contrary or inconsistent provision in the said Act the B
provisions of sub-section would not come into play where the award had
been made by the Collector earlier as well as by the Reference Court but
on the date of coming into effect of the said sub-section, an appeal from
the said award might have been pending in a court. In that case, the Court
would not be "awarding" any amount but would be making a"decree" for
an amount. c
By reason of the provision of section 30(l)(a) .of the Amendment
Act of 1984 the provisions of section 23(1-A) ofthe.said;,Act were, by a
deeming provision, made also applicable to every proceeding for the ac-
quisition of land under the said Act where the Collector had not made his
award by April 30,1982. On a correct il,lterpretation of the provisions of O
section 23 (1-A) read with section 30(l)(a) of the Amendment Act of
1984, an additional amount calculated in the manner indicated in section
23(1-A) is also payable in those cases where the Collector had not made
his award on or before April 30, 1982, even in cases where the court
might have made its award before September 24, 1984.
E
It is true that the aforesaid construction we are giving to the provi-
sions of Section 23(1-A) and Section 30(l)(a) will, in a sense, limit the
benefits strictly conferred by Section 30(l)(a) to only those cases where
the Collector as well as the Court have made their respective awards
between April 30, 1982 and September 24, 1984 but, in our view, that
cannot be helped as that is the result of the plain grammatical construction F
of the clear language used in the relevant provisions. We are of the opin-
ion that we would not be justified in giving an unduly restricted meaning
to the provisions of Section 23(1-A) unwarranted by the plain language of
that sub-section as appears to have been done in the case of Union of
India and Others v. Filip Tiago De Gama of Vedem Vasco De Gama
discussed more particularly hereinafter, in order to give a wider meaning G
of the provisions of Section 30(l)(a). Section 23(1-A) refers clearly to the.
duties of the Court. As we have already pointed out, the court is defined
by Section 3(d) as the principal court of original jurisdiction, except in the
circumstances set out in the said sub-section, which would be the court
having jurisdiction to decide the reference under Section 18 of the said
Act. There, is therefore, no warrant to read in the place of the word H
48S SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1991) SUPP, 2 S.C.R.

A "Court" in Section 23(1-A) the word "Collector''. Moreover, the decision
of such a court determining compensation is regarded as an award under
the said Act. In the light of these provisions, there is no warrant to give an
unduly restricted meaning to Section 23(1-A) of the 8ald Act, as pointed
out above.

B Coming now to the decisions cited before us we find that in the case
before the Full Bench of the Bench of the Bombay High Court in Jaiwant
Laxman P. Sardesai and etc. v. Government of Goa; Daman and Diu and
Another etc. (AIR 1987 Bombay 214) the facts were that the Notification
under Section 4 of the said Act was published on October 3, 1969, in the
Government Gazette of the Government of Goa. The Notification under
C Section 6 was published on June IO, 1971 The Land Acquisition Officer
declared his award on August 2, 1972. All these events undoubtedly oc-
curred prior to April 30, 1982. However, on a Reference made under
Section 18 of the said Act on December 24, 1973, the Civil Court investi-
gated the claim and gave its award on June 24, 1985. The award was,
therefore, made by the Court not before April 30, 1982, but after Septem-
D ber 30, 1984, when the provisions of the Land Acquisition (Amendment)
Act, 1984, .had already come into effect. It was, therefore, strictly speak-
ing, not necessary for .the court to make any observation regarding the
legal position in a case where both the Collector as well as the Court in a
Reference under Section 18 had made their respective awards before April
30, 1982. Moreover, we find that the judgment appears to proceed on a
E somewhat unwarranted assumption. This is clear from ihe following ob-
servations which appear at paragraph 5 of the aforesaid Report (p 217):

"It is not in dispute that where on the date of the commence-
ment of the amending Act any proceedings for determination
of compensation were pending before the Collector under Sec-
F tion 11 of the Act or before the Court under reference under
Section 18 of the Act or before the High Court in appeal under
Section 54 of the Act, then the amended section 23 (I-A)
would be applicable to. such proceedings, in absence of sub-
section (I) of Section 30."

G In our view; it was erroneously taken as undisputed that had the
provisions of sub-section (I) of Section 30 not been in existence, the
provisions of the amended section 23(1-A) would have applied to a case
where the Collector as well as the Court had already made their award
before April 30, 1982, but an appeal was pending in the High Court on
April 30, 1982, or on the commencement of the Land Acquisition (Amend-
H ment) Act. As we have already pointed out, the correctness of this as-
U.0.1. v. ZORA SINGH [KANIA, 1:1 489

sumption is very much in dispute before us. In these circumstances, we A
find ourselves unable to accept as correct the view taken by the Full
Bench of the Bombay High Court to the extent that it extends the opera-
tidn of the provisions of section 23(1-A) even to cases where the Collector
as well as the Reference Court had made their awards before April 30,
-1982, in the case before the Full Bench of the Bombay High Court in
Jaiwant Laxman P. Sardesai and etc. v. Government of Goa, Daman and B
Diu and Another etc., AIR 1987 Bombay 214.

As far as the decision of a Division Bench comprising two learned

-- (
Judges of this Court in Union of India and Others v. Filip Tiago De Gama
of Vedem Vasco De Gama [1990] I S.C.C. 277 strongly relied upon ~y
the appellants is concerned, we find that in that case the Land Acquisitidn C
Officer made his award determining the compensation on Maleh 5, 1969.
On a reference under Section 18 the Civil Court made its award on May
28, 1985, that is, even after September 24,1984, when the Ainendinent
Act of 1984 came into effect. The view taken by· the Di vision Bench is
that, as the Collector had made his award before April 30, 1982, then the

..
f
additional. amount referred to in section 23 (1-A) could not be awarded. · D
This view has been taken on the basis that sub-section {l)(b) of Section 30
of the said Act provides that the provisions of section 23(1-A) shall Qe
applicable to every acquisition proceeding commenced after April 30,1982,
irrespective of the fact whether the Collector has made the award on or
before September 24, 1984, and that sub-section (l) of Section 30 does not
refer to court award and the court award is used only in sub-section (2) of E
Section 30. (See para 21 of the said report). We find that on the plain
language of section 23(1-A) itself, which we have set out earlier, the duty
was cast on the Court to award an additional amount calculated as pre-
scribed therein which would mean that it is directed to. be awarded by the
court, namely, the-Reference Court, in all cases which are pending before
that court on September 1,1984. Sub-section (l)(a) of Section 30 undoubt- F
edly lays down that the provisions of section 23(1-A) of the Act·are also
made applicable to all proceedings for the acquisition of any land under
the said Act pending on April 30, 1982, where no award had been made
by the Collector before that date. At first glance this would appear to
suggest that the additional amount referred to in section 23 (l-A) could
not be awarded where the Collector had made his award before April 30, G
1982.. But this provision cannot be allowed to cut down the benefits avail-
able to the claimants on a plain reading of section 23(1-A). This is clear
from the use of the word "also" in the opening part of section 30(1). In
our opinion, the view taken by the Bench comprising two learned Judges
of this Court in that case cannot be accepted as correct as it is too narrow
and unduly cuts down the operation of the benefit conferred under the H
490 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1991] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A plain language of section 23 (I-A) of the said Act. As far as the provisions
of section 30(2) are concerned, we do not feel that we are called upon to
interpret the same in this decision. In our view, therefore, the said deci-
sion cannot be accepted as good law in so far as it lays down that in order
to bring the provisions of section 23(1-A) of the said Act into play the
Collector must have made his award after April 30, 1982.
B
Coming to the decision in Union of India and Another v. Raghuvir
Singh (dead) by Lrs. (Supra) referred to earlier, we find that it mainly
concerned itself with the provisions of section 30(2) of the said Amend-
ment Act with which we are not directly concerned here and in that
connection, the Constitution Bench of this Court has made the following
C observations (p. 779):

"In constming section 30(2), it is just as well to be clear that
the award made by the Collector referred to here is the award
made by the Collector under Section 11 of the parent Act, and
the award made by the Court is the award made by Principal
D Civil Court of Original Jurisdiction under Section 23 of the
parent Act on a re~erence made to it by the Collector under
Section 19 of the parent Act. There can be no doubt that the
benefit of the enhanced solatium is intended by section 30(2)
in respect of an award made by the collector between April 30,
..
t

1982, and September 24, 1984, Likewise the benefit of the
E enhanced solatium is extended by section 30(2) to the case of
an award made by the Court between April 30, 1982, and
September 24, 1984, even though it be upon reference from an
award made before April 30, 1982."
The Court went on to point out that (p. 780) :
F
"Section 30(2) of the Amendment Act extends the benefit <' •
the enhanced solatium to cases where the award by the Collec-
tor or by the Court is made between April 30, 1982, and Sep-
tember 24, 1984, or to appeals against such awards decided by
the High Court and the Supreme Court whether the decisions
G of the High Court or the Supreme Court are rendered before
September 24, 1984, or after that date. All that is material is
that the award (emphasis supplied) by the Collector or· by the
Court should have been made between April 30, 1982, and
September 24, 1984. We find ourselves in agreement with the
conclusion reached by this Court in K Kamalajammanniavarn
H v. Special Land Acquisition Officer, (1985) I SCC 582 and
U.0.I. v. ZORA SINGH [KANIA, J.) 491

find ourselves unable to agree with the view taken in Bhag A
Singh v. Union Territory of Chandigarh (1985] 3 SCC 737. ,
The expanded meaning given to section 30 (2) in the latter
case does not, in our opinion, flow reasonably from the l -
guage of that sub-section. It seems to us that the learne dges
in that case missed the significance of the word~ ch' in the,
collocation 'any such award' in section 30(2). Due signifi- B
cance must be attached to that word, and to our mind it must •
necessarily intended that the appeal to the High Court or the
Supreme Court, in which the benefit of the enhanced solatium '
is to be given, must be confined to an appeal against an award
of the Collector or of the Court rendered between April 30,
1982, and September 24, 1984." C
We find that this decision which was rendered by a Constitution
Bench of this Court comprising 5-learned Judges runs in no way counter
to the view which we have taken and, in fact, it leads some support to the
view which we are taking. In the case before us, as the Reference Court
has made its award after September 24, 1984 the benefit of the provisions . D
of section 23(1-A) was clearly available to the claimant as held in the ·
impugned judgment.

In the result, the appeal arising out of Special Leave Petition (Civil)
No.14297 of 1990 in Union of India v. Zora Singh must be dismissed
with costs.
E
As far as the other appeals filed by the Union of India which have
been heard together with the 'Zora Singh 's case are concerned, learned
Counsel for the Union of India has not drawn our attention to any material
difference in the relevant facts therein from the facts in 'Zora Singh 's case.
In fact, the arguments proceeded on the footing that all the relevant facts
F
were the same as in the case of 'Zora Singh.· In a result, all these appeals
must also be dismissed, however, with no order as to costs.

·.As far as the appeals before us which have been filed by the claim-
ants are concerned, the same will have to be placed before appropriate
Benches of this Court for disposal in the light of this decision.

- V.P.R. Appeals dismissed.