Supreme Court of India

UMA DEVI NAMBIAR AND ORS.versusT.C. SIDHAN (DEAD)

Citation: 2003 INSC 705
Decided: 11 December 2003
Disposal: Appeal(s) allowed
Bench: DORAISWAMY RAJU

Holding

Proceedings under Sections 192‑195 of the Indian Succession Act are summary in nature and the court cannot render a detailed, conclusive determination of a will’s genuineness therein; the High Court’s reliance on discretionary jurisdiction was erroneous.

Summary

The petitioners, daughters of the deceased, filed an application under Sections 192‑195 of the Indian Succession Act seeking possession of their ancestral house, alleging illegal occupation by the respondent who claimed title under a purported joint will. The District Judge, in a summary proceeding, examined the will in detail and ordered possession to the respondent; the High Court upheld this order on the basis of discretionary jurisdiction under Section 115 of the CPC. The Supreme Court held that proceedings under Sections 192‑195 are interlocutory and summary, and the court cannot conduct a conclusive examination of a will’s genuineness in such proceedings; the High Court erred in treating the jurisdiction as discretionary. Consequently, the appeal was allowed, possession was directed to the petitioners, and the respondent was ordered to prove the will’s validity in a regular suit.

Issues considered

The nature of proceedings under Sections 192‑195 of the Indian Succession Act – whether they are summary/interlocutory.
Whether a district court may examine the genuineness of a will in a summary proceeding under the Act.
Whether the High Court correctly exercised discretionary jurisdiction under Section 115 CPC in dismissing the revision.
The proper remedy for a party aggrieved by a summary order – suit versus revision.
The scope and limits of judicial discretion in such matters.

Legislation cited

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908s. 115
Hindu Succession Act, 1956s. 15(2)(a)
Indian Evidence Act, 1872s. 68
Indian Succession Act, 1925s. 192, s. 193, s. 194, s. 195, s. 208, s. 209, s. 63, s. 68

Subjects

Indian Succession Actsummary proceedingswill genuinenessjudicial discretionSection 115 CPCpossession of ancestral propertyrevision vs suitinterlocutory order

Judgment

UMA DEVI NAMBIAR AND ORS. A
v.
T.C. SIDHAN (DEAD)

DECEMBER 11, 2003
B
[DORAISWAMY RAJU AND ARIJIT PASAYAT, JJ.]

Indian Succession Act, 1925-Sections 192, 193, 194 and 195-
Proceedings under-Nature of-Held, summary proceedings-Order in-
terlocut01y in nature-Person aggrieved by order can file suit to .claim
possession on the bas's of title- 'R' opposing application of 'A ' for C
possession on basis ofa will-Court examining the genuineness of the will
in a detailed and conclusive manner-Held, such examination beyond the
scope of summary proceedings.

Code of Civil Procedure-Section 115-Revision-Discretionary D
jurisdiction-Exercise of-He?d, discretion should be exercised according
to rules oflaw and not as per whim or caprice ofthe Judge-District Judge
examining the genuineness of a will in summary proceedings in a detailed
and conclusive manner"-Revision against the order dismissed by High
Court citing discretion-Held, discretion not properly exercised-Words E
and Phrases-Discretion.

Words and Phrases-'Will', 'discretion' Meaning of

'S' had two daughters, the appellant and the wife of the respond- F
ent. After the death of 'S\ the ancestral house devolved upon his two
d~ughters. Wife of the respondent died without any issue. The appel-
lant initiated proceedings under Sections 192 to 195 (Part VII) of the
Indian Succession Act, 1925, for possession of the ancestral house
claiming that the r~spondent had taken illegal possession thereof
though, after the death of her sister,-she had become exclusive owner G
thereof. The respondent claimed that his wife had executed a Will,
whereby the ancestral house was bequeathed to him, and he had
become entitled to half share therein.

The District Judge examined the genuineness and the validity of H
637
638 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2003] SUPP. 6 S.C.R.

A the Will in detail and held that the Will had been proved by the
respondent. The District Judge ordered that the possession of the house
should be handed over to the respondent. The appellant filed revision
petition before the High Court, which was dismissed by the High
Court. The High Court while dismissing the revision petition relied
B upon its discretionary Jurisdiction under Section 115 of the Code of
Civil Procedure.
I
The appellant filed appeal by way of special leave petition before I
the Court. The appellant argued, inter alia, that the proceedings under I
Section 192 of the Indian Succession Act, 1925 are summary in nature
C and that the genuineness of the Will could not have been gone into by
the District Judge under such proceedings. The responde.nt argued,
inter alia, that for adjudicating claim under Section 192 of the Indian
Succession Act, 1925, the prima facie view on the question of title has
to be rendered and therefore, scrutiny of the Will by the District Judge
D was not illegal. The respondent also argued that the High Court has
passed the impugned order in exercise of its discretionary jurisdiction
and therefore, it should not ·be interfered with.

Allowing the appeal, the Court

E HELD : 1.1. Sections 192, 193, 194 and 195 of the Indian
Succession Act, 1925 deal with the modalities to be adopted for
protection of properties of the deceased. These proceedings are essen-
tially interlocutory in character and necessarily summary depending
upon the filing of an application for relief seeking the Court to
F determine who has a right to possession pending the final determina-
tion of the rights of the parties in a regular suit. (654-E-F)

Biso Ram v. Emperor, 66 Ind. Cases 76, referred to. j
;

Clarence Pais and Ors. v. Union of India, (2001) 4 SCC 325, cited.
G
1.2. The Court before taking any steps in the matter under Section
194 of the Indian Succession Act, 1925 is required to be satisfied of the
existence of the ground that the person in possession has no lawful title
and that the person applying is likely to be materially prejudiced it left
H to the ordinary remedy of a regular suit. An order under Section 194
U.D. NAMBIAR v. T.C. SIDHAN 639

1s m nature of summary decision and can only be passed in the A
conditions embodied in Section 193 of the Indian Succession Act, 1925
are fulfilled. (654-H; 655-A-B)

1.3. The effect of a summary decision even in an extreme case is not
a bar to a regular suit. A person aggrieved by an order passed in a B
summary proceeding under Part VII of the Indian Succession Act, 1925
is required to seek remedy by a suit and not by an application for revision.
The suit should be a suit for possession byestablishmentoftitle. Therefore,
it should necessarily be by the person who needs to establish his title to
claim such possession on the basis of title. Where an adverse order has
been passed against the plaintiff under Section 194 of the Indian C
Succession Act, 1925 the onus lies heavily on the plaintiff to show that he
has a right which has been demised by the decision under Section 194 of
the Indian Succession Act, 1925. [655-B-C, D-E; 654-B-C]

Gauri Shankar v. Debi Prasad, AIR (1929) Nag. 317; Bhoba Tarani D
v. Profu/la, 140 Ind. Cas. 379; Dhirendra v. Indra Chandra, AIR (1939)
Calcutta 571; Mahammad Ali v. Bismilla Begum, AIR (1930) P.C. 255;
Sahadi v. Usman Ali, 184 Ind. Cas 113; Ahmad v. Partap, AIR (1939)
Lahore 438; Md. Ismailv. Hanuman, AIR (1939) P.C. 290 and Bayamma
v. Papanna, AIR (1936) Madras 971, referred to.
E
1.4. Where, instead of a summary disposal, there is in-depth
analysis of the evidence and conclusive conclusions/d1.:cisions arrived
at, it cannot be said that there has been a proper exercise of the power
conferred b) the dealing with an application under Section 192 of the
Indian Succession Act, 1925. (655-E-F) F
1.5. The genuineness of the Will has to be established in a regular
suit. While dealing with an application under Section 192 of the India
Succession Act, 1925, obviously there has to be some consideration of
the genuineness of the Will. But it cannot be in the conclusive and
detailed manner as has been done in the present case. [655-G-H] G
1.6. As half of the share in the property indisputably belonged to
the appellant, the District Judge while dealing with an application
under Seetion 192 of the Indian Succession Act, 1925 could not have
delivered possession of the vhole property to the respondent in H
640 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2003] SUPP. 6 S.C.R.

A preference to the person whose title and claims are beyond controversy '
at least in respect of a half share. (655-G-H; 656-A)

2.1. The High Court in dismissing the revision petition holding
that the jurisdiction was discretionary committed a serious error and
B misdirected itself. It virtually placed a premium. on grave illegality
committed resulting in miscarriage ofjustice. The principles relating
to exercise of discretion by judiciary do not appear to have beei;i kept
in view by the High Court. (656-B-C; 657-E]

. 2.2. Discretion, in general, is the discernment of what is right and
C proper. If a certain latitude or liberty accorded by statute or rules to
a Judge as distinguished from a ministerial or administrative official,
in adjudicating on matters brought before him, it is judicial discretion.
It limits and regulates the exercise of the discretion, and prevents it
from being wholly absolute, capricious, or exempt from review. Such
D discretion is usually given on matters of procedure for punishment, or
costs of administration rather than with reference to vested substantive
rights. When a statute gives a Judge a discretion what is meant is a
judicial discretion regulated according to known rules of law, and not
the mere whim or caprice of the person to whom it is given on the
E assumption that he is discreet. (656-C; 657-B-D)

Sharp v. Wakefield, (1891) Appeal Cases 173; S.G. Jaisinghani v.
Union of India and Ors., AIR (1967) SC 1427; Hindson and Kersey,
(1680) 8 How. St. Tr. 57; Lee v. Budge Railway Co., (1871) LR 6.CP
576 and Morgan .v. Morgan, (1869) LR IP & M 644, referred to.
F
3.1. In construing a document whether in English or in vernacular
the fundamental rule is to ascertain the intention from the words used;
the surroundings circumstantes are to be considered; but that is only
for the purpose of finding out the intended meaning of the words which
G have actually been employed. [649-A)

3.2. A Will is the. aggregate of man's testamentary intentions s~
far as they are manifested in writing, duly executed. according to
Stat~te. The cardinal maxim to be observed by Courts in construing
a Will is to endeavour to ascertain the intention of the testator. This
H intention bas to be gathered primarily from the language of the
U.D. NAMBIAR v. T.C. SIDHAN 641
document which is to be read as a whole without indulging in any A
conjecture or speculation as to what the testator would have done if
he had been better informed or better advised. (648-F-G; 651-D-E]

Leimage v. Goodbhan, L.R. 1 P. & D. 57; Green v. Tribe, (1878)
· 9 Ch. D. 231; ND. Bani's Law of Succession, 6th Edn. ~nd Gnambal B
Ammal v. Raju Ayyar, AIR (1951) SC 103, referred to.

Wlliam 's Wills and Intestate Succession p5, referred to.

3.3. In construing the language of the Will the Court is entitled
to put itself into the testator's armchair and is bound to bear in mind C
also other matters than merely the words used. It must consider the
surrounding circumstances, the position of the testator, his family
relationship, the probability that he would use words in a particular
sense. But all this is solely an aid to arrive at a right construction of
the Will and to ascertain the meaning of its language when used by that D
particular testator in that document. (649-B-C]

Veerattalingam v. Rameth, AIR (1990) SC 2201, referred to.

3.4. The true intention of the testator has to be gathered not by
attaching importance to isolated expressions -but by reading the Will E
as a whole with all its provisions and ignoring none of them as
redundant or contradictory. The Court must accept, if possible such
construction as would give to every expression some effect rather than
that which would render any of the expressions inoperative. The Court
will look at the circumstances under which the testator makes his Will, F
such as the state of his property, property of his family and the ~ike.
Where apparently conflicting dispositions can be reconciled by giving
full effect to every word used in a document, such a construction should
be accepted instead of a construction which would have the effect of
cutting down the clear meaning of the words used by the testator.
Further where one of the two reasonable constructions would lead to G
intestacy, that should be discarded in favour of a construction which
does not create any such hiatus. (649-D-F]

3.5. To the extent that it is legally possible; effect should be given
to every disposition contained in the Will unless the law prevents effect H
642 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2003] SUPP. 6 S.C.R.

A being given to it. If there are two repugnant provisions conferring
s11ccessive interests, if the first interest created is valid the subsequent
interest cannot take effect but a Court of construction will proceed to
the farthest extent to avoid repugnancy so that effect could be given as
far as possible to every testamentary intention contained in the Will.
B . (649:.F-~)

Ram Gopal v. Nand Lal, AIR (1951~ SC 139; Gnambal Ammal v.
Raju Ayyar, AIR (1951) SC 103; Raj Bajrang Bahadur Singh V'. Thakurain
Bakhtraj Kher, AIR (1957) SC 7; Pearey Lal v. Rameshwar Das, AIR
(1963) SC 1703; Ramchandra v. Hilda Brite, AIR (1964) SC 1323 and
C Navneet Lal v. Gokul, AIR (1976) SC 794, referred to.

3.6. A Will may contain several clauses and the latter clause may
be inconsistent with the earlier clause. In such a situation, the last
intention of the testator is given effect to and it is on this basis that the
D latter clause is held to prevail over the earlier clause. This is regulated
by the well-known maxim "cum duo inter se pugantia reperiuntur in
testamenta ultimum ratum est". This rule of interpretation can be invoked
if different clauses cannot be reconciled. It is to be noted that rules of
interpretation ofWill are different from rules which govern interpretation
of other documents like sale deed, or a gift deed, or a mortgage deed, or
E for that matter, any other instrument by which interest in immovable
property is created. While in these documents, ifthere is any inconsistency
between the earlier and the subsequent part, or specific clauses inter se
contained therein, the earlier part will prevail over the latter as against
the rule ofinterpretation applicable to a Will under which the subsequent
F part, clause or portion prevails over the earlier part on the principle that
in the matter of Will the testator can always change his mind and create
another interest in piace of the bequest already made in the earlier part
or on an earlier occasion. [650-A-B, E-HJ

Jarman on Wills, 1st Edn. P. 11; Schouler's Law of Wills; kalvelikkal
G Ambunhi v. H Ganesh Bhandary, AIR (1995) SC 2491; Hammond v.
Treharne, (1938) 3 All E.R. 308 and Rameshwar v. Ba/raj, AIR (1935)
PC 187, referred to.

3.7. It is seldom profitable to compare with the words of one Will
H with those of another or to attempt to find out to which of the Wills,
U.D. NAMBIAR v. T.C. SIDHAN [PASAYAT, J.] 643
upon which decisions have been given in reported cases, the Will before A
the Court approximates closely. Cases are helpful only in so far as they
purport to lay down certain general principles of construction.
(651-C-D)

3.8. A Will is executed to alter the ordinary mode of succession B
and by the very nature of things it is bound to result in either reducing
or depriving the share of natural heir. If a person intends his property
to pass to his natural heirs, there is no necessity at all of executing a
Will. It is true that a propounder of the Will has to remove all
suspicious circumstances. Suspicion means doubt, conjecture or mis-
. trust. But the fact that natural heirs have either been excluded or a C
lesser share has been given to them, by itself without anything more,
cannot be held to be a suspicious circumstance specially in a case where
the bequest has been made in favour of an offspring. [653-B-C)

H Venkatachala Iyengar v. B.N Thimmajamma and Ors., AIR D
(1959) SC 443; Rani Purnima Debi and Anr. v. Kumar Khagendra
Narayan Deb and Anr., AIR (1962) SC 567; Shashi Kumar Banerjee and
Ors., v. Subodh Kumar Banerjee and Ors., AIR (1964) SC 529; P.P.K
Gopalan Nambiar v. P.P.K. Balakrishnan Nambiar and Ors., AIR (1995)
SC 1882; Puspavati and Ors. v. Chandraja Kadamba and Ors., AIR E
(1972) SC 2492 and Rabindra Nath Mukherjee and Anr. v. Panchanan
Banerjee (dead) by LRs and Ors., [19951 4 SCC 459, referred to.

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 9726 of
2003.

. From the Judgment and Order dated 3.4.2002 of the Kerala High
F
Court in C.R.P. No. 917of2001.

K.K. Venugopal, A. Raghunath, Guru Krishna Kumar and C.V.
Govindan for the Appellants.
G
Subramonium Prasad, Abbay Kumar, Gopal Krishna and S.N. Jha for
the Respondent.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

ARIJIT PASAYAT, J.: Leave granted. H
644 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2003] SUPP. 6 S.C.R.
A When crave for materialistic possessions outweighs personal love and
affection, the inevitable result is passing long tim~s in the corridors of
Courts and the case at hand is no exception. In a proceeding initiated under
Sections 192 to 195 of the Indian Succession Act 1925 (for short the 'Act')
validity and genuineness of a Will was decided by the District Court,
B Kozhikode and the Kerala High Court refused to interfere under Section
115 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 (for short the 'Code'), negativing
appellants' plea that such adjudication was not permissible in the said
proceeding.

The background in which the litigation has reached this Court is
C essentially as follows:
The petitioner No. I had initiated proceedings under Sections 192 to
195 of the Act, aggrieved 'by the action of the respondent in allegedly
taking illegai possession of the petitioner's palatial ancestral home situate
D in the heart of the city of Calicut on U.K. Sankunni Road (a road named
after the petitioner's father Late Shri U.K. Sankunni). The said proceedings
being under Part VII of the Act were summary in nature, confined only
to the issue of possession of the ancestral family home and the two garages.
It has been judicially recognized that in such proceedings where the issue
is one of possession, the question of title cannot be gone into in detail.
E According to her, the respondent (Dr. T.C. Sidhan) propounded a forged
Will in the said proceedings and sought adjudication of the same, to which
the petitioner no. l, objected to. In fact, petitioner no. l had filed a separ.ite
application (I.A. No. 2976 of 2000) objecting to the adjudication of the
alleged Will since the District Court exercising summary powers h~d no
F jurisdiction to do so. The petitioner no. l reiterated her objections even at
the time when the witnesses were produced by the respondent (Dr. T.C.
Sidhan). Notwithstanding all these, the District Court proceeded to adju-
dicate on the genuineness of the Will and solely on that ground gave
possession of the property to the respondent. The District Court justified
this assumption of jurisdiction by citing consent of parties. This was,
G according to petitioners clearly incorrect and on the contrary the petitioner
no. 1 had objected to the said course of action. Original respondent Dr.
T.C. Sidhan has died in the meantime, his legal representatives have been
imp leaded.

H The petitioner no. I, therefore, filed a revision before the High Court
U.D. NAMBIAR v. T.C. SIDHAN [PASAYAT, J.] 645
raising again the fundamental issue of lack of jurisdiction on the part of A
the District Judge, adverting to the specific objections raised in respect of
the lack of jurisdiction of the District C.ourt to consider title. The High
Court, agreed with the contention that the claim of the respondent had to
be decided in appropriate proceedings before the appropriate forum. The
High Court adverting to the submissions on the question of jurisdiction, B
held as follows:

"In this case, the revision petitioner has no contention that
the lower .court had no jurisdiction to pass the impugned order.
The only contention is that the order passed by the lower court
is illegal as it had exercised jurisdiction which is no vested in the C
court, in so far as considering the genuineness, legality and
validity of the Will propounded by the 1st Respondent in the
above summary proceedings, wherein the jurisdiction of the lower
court was invoked only for the settlement of the dispute regarding
actual possession." D
The schedule property is the residential house and compound which
belonged to deceased Sankunni. Sankunni had two daughters, the petitioner
no. I and her elder sister Rani Sidhan, wife of the original respondent Dr.
T.C. Sidhan. After the death ofSankunni, the property devolved upon the
petitioner no. I and the wife of respondent Dr. T.C. Sidhan on equal rights. E
Petitioner no. l was married to Dr. Rajan, the younger brother of
respondent Dr. T.C. Sidhan and they were living together in England. Mrs.
Rani Sidhan, the sister of the petitioner no. l died issue less. Therefore, the
petitioner no. l contended that she is the legal heir of her sister Mrs. Rani
Sidhan under Section 15(2)(a) of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 (in short F
the 'Succession Act'). She alleged that the respondent Dr. T.C. Sidhan,
who has absolutely no right in the schedule property, taking advantage of
the position that he was the husband of Mrs. Rani Sidhan, illegally
occupied the property, and that he was likely to commit waste and cause
damage to the property. As per the ex parte order in IA No. 363/1996 filed G
by the petitioner no. l seeking appointment of a Curator, the lower court
appointed a Curator on 20.2. 1996 and directed him to take immediate
possession of the property. Accordingly, he took possession of the
property from the respondent Dr. T.C. Sidhan. Though the order appointing
the Curator by the lower court was challenged before the High Court in H
646 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2003] SUPP. 6 S.C.R.

A C.M.A. No. 111/96, the said Court did not interfere with the order as the
Curator had already taken possession of the property and directed the lower
court to conduct an enquiry under Section 194 of the Act.·

The case of the respondent Dr. T.C. Sidhan was that as per the joint
B Will executed by him and his wife Mrs. Rani Sidhan, he is the sole heir
of all her assets and her share in the schedule prope1ty devolved upon him
and accordingly he is entitled to be in possession of the schedule property
as the person who is entitled to half share in the properties.

The District Court, Kozhikode in Succession O.P. No. 38 of 96 by
C judgment dated 30.3.2001 came to hold that the alleged Will was proved,
directing fmther the discharge of the Curator and to audit all accounts and
property and directed to handover possession to respondent Dr. T.C.
Sidhan. As the High Court did not interfere with said order, this appeal
has been filed.
D
According to Mr. K.K. Venugopal, learned Senior Counsel the
judgments of the District Court, Kozhikode and the High Court suffer from
irreparable infirmities. In the proceeding under Section 192 of the Act,
there was no scope for adjudicating the genuineness of the Will, on the face
E of several orders passed by various courts including High Court of Kerala
and this Court. The proceedings are summary in nature. It is to be noted
that the so-called attesting witnesses did not in anyway prove execution
of the Will. Earlier an application was filed for examining one of the
attesting witnesses on commission and the same was rejected by the
F District Judge. The genuineness of the Will has to be established by filing .
of suit and a proceeding under Section 192 of the Act is no substitute.
Though these aspects were highlighted before the High Court, which
proceeded on erroneous impression that as the party had consented for
adjudication of the issue, there was no error. The conclusion was clearly
erroneous in view of the stand taken by the appellants at various stages
G and acceptance thereof by various courts including this Court that the issue
whether the Will was genuine has to be adjudicated in an appropriate
proceeding. The learned District Judge, himself has held so only a few
months.before. Even in the grounds before the High Court, it is specificaJly
stated so. But the High Court overlooked all these salient features and
H rejected the revision application by holding that the jurisdiction was
U.D. NAMBIAR v. T.C. SIDHAN [PASAYAT, J.] 647

discretionary. There is no reason indicated to justify the conclusion as to A
why in a case of this nature, where substantial questions of law were
involved interference was not warranted. After having observed that
consent cannot confer jurisdiction, the High Court completely overlooked
the various orders passed which had clearly directed that the genuineness
of the Will was to be established in an appropriate proceeding. It was B
submitted that the fallacy in the conclusions of the District Judge as well
as the High Court are apparent because the whole house was directed to
be handed over to respondent Dr. T.C. Sidhan when admittedly even
according to the respondent half share therein belongs to the appellant
no. 1. It was submitted that till an appropriate adjudication is made, the. C
property can be handed over to the appellant no. l on condition that she
will deposit mesne profits in Court; otherwise there is likelihood of the
property. being passed on to strangers and the same being an ancestral
house, it would be not only be improper, but inequitable, to keep out direct
descendant in preference to distant relative or total third party outsiders.
D
In response, learned counsel for the respondents submitted that while
making adjudication under Section 192 of the Act which appears in part
VII of the Act relating to protection of property of deceased, there has to
be finding recorded as regards the rival claims and a prima facie view on
the question of lawful title has to be rendered and that is what has been E
done; the appellant having consented in an adjudication by the District
Court cannot turn around and say that there was no consent. When the
Court has recorded such a finding it is not open to be questioned before
the higher court. The decision is riot one on title but on the question of
possession. Section 209 deals with the fate of such decision. Strong
reliance was placed on Clarence Pais and Ors. v. Union of India, [2001] F
4 SCC 325; more particularly, para 6 where it has been observed that Will
can be looked into for some purposes. As there was a direction for disposal
of the matter by the District Court with~n a particular time, it was but
necessary to record the decision on the question of prima facie title and
the judgments of the Trial Court and the High Court need no interference. G

Will is a translation of the Latin word "voluntas", which was a term
used in the text of Roman Law to express the intention of a testator. It is of
significance that the abstract term has come to mean that document in
which the intention is contained. The same has been the case with several H
648 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2003) SUPP. 6 S.C.R.

A other English law terms, the concrete has superseded the abstract-obliga-
tion, bond, contract, are examples (Williams' Wills and Intestate Succes-
sion, page 5). The word 'testament' is derived from "testatio menties', it
testifies the determination of the mind. A Will is thus defined by Ulpians's
"Testamentum est mentis nostraejusta contestatio in id sollemniter facta to
B post martem nostrum valeat." Modastinus defines it by means of volantas.
It is "voluntatis nostrae just sententia de co quod quis post mortem suam
fietei vult (or,velit)"; the word "justa" implying in each, that, in order to be
valid, the testament must be made in compliance with the forms of law. It
means, "the legal declaration of a man's intentions, which will be per-
C formed after his death". A last Will and testament is defined to be "the just
sentence of our Will, touching what we would have done after our death".
Every testament is consummated by death, and until he dies, the Will of a
testator is ambulatory~ Nam omne testamentum morte consummatum est; et
voluntae testamentoric est embulatoria usque od mortem. (For, where a
testament is, there must also of necessity be death of testator. For, a -
D testament is of force after men are dead; otherwise it is of no strength at all .....
while the testator Hveth). A "Will", says Jarman, "is an instrument by which
a person makes a disposition of his property to take effect after his decease,
and which is in its own nature ambulatory and revocable during his life".
(Jarman, on Wills, 1st Edn., p. i 1). This ambulatory character of a Will has
E been often pointed out as its prominent characteristic, distinguishing it, in
fact, from ordinary disposition by a living person's deed, which might,
indeed postpone the"'beneficial possession or even a vesting until the death
of the disposer and yet would produce such postponement only by its
express terms under an irrevocable instrument and a statement that a Will
F is final does n.ot import an agreement n.ot to change it. (Schouler's Law of
Wills, S. 326). A Will is the aggregate of man's testamentary intentions so
far as they are manifested in writing, duly executed according to the Statute.
(Per Lord Penzance in Leimage v. Goodbhan, L.R. l P. & D. 57, cited by
Fry. J ., in Green v. Tribe, (1878) 9 Ch D 231 ). In N. D. Bani 's Law of
Succession (Sixth Edition) also about position has been delineated. From
G various decisions of the this Court e.g. Ram Gopal v. Nand Lal, AIR (1951)
SC 139; Gnambal Ammal v. Raju Ayyar, AIR ( 1951) SC l 03; Raj Bajrang
Bhadaur Singh v. Thakurain Bakhtraj Kher, (19~3) SC 7; Pearey Lal v.
Rameshwar Das, AIR (1963) SC 1703; Ramchandra v. Hilda Brite, AIR
(1964) SC 1323 and Navneet Lal v. Gokul. AIR (1976) SC 794, the
H following principles are well established:
U.D. NAMBIAR v. T.C. SIDHAN [PASAYAT, J.] 649

(I) In construing a document whether in English or in vernacular the A
fundamental rule is to ascertain the intention from the words used; the
surrounding circumstances are to be considered; but that is only for the
purpose of finding out the intended meaning of the words which have
actually been employed.

(2) In construing the language of the Will the Comt is entitled to put itself B
into the testator's armchair and is bound to bear in mind also other matters
than merely the words used. It must consider the surrounding circum-
stances, the position of the testator, his family relationship the probability
that he would use words in a particular sense. But all this is solely as an
aid to arriving at a right construction of the Will and to ascertain the C
meaning of its language when used by that pa1ticular testator in that
document.

(3) The true intention of the testator has to be gathered not by attaching
importance in isolated expressions but by reading the Will as a whole with D
all its provisions and ignoring none of them as redundant or contradictory.

(4) The Court must accept, if possible such construction as would give to
every expression some effect rather than that which would render any of
the expressions inoperative. The Court will look at the circumstances E
under which the testator makes his Will, such as the state of his property
of his family and the like. Where apparently conflicting dispositions can
be reconciled by giving full effect to every word used in a document, such
a construction should be accepted instead of a construction which would
have the effect of cutting down the clear meaning of the words used by
the testator. Further where one of the two reasonab'.e constructions would F
lead to intestacy, that should be discarded in favour of a construction which
does not create any such hiatus.

(5) To the extent that it is legally possible, effect should be given to every
disposition contained in the Will unless the law prevents effect being given G
to it. Of course, if there are two repugnant provisions conferring successive
interests, if the first interest created is valid the subsequent interest cannot
take effect but a Court of construction will proceed to the farthest extent
to avoid repugnancy so that effect could be given as far as possible to every
testamentary intention contained in the Will. H
...
650 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2003] SUPP. 6 S.C.R.
A In Kalvelikkal Ambunhi v. H. Ganesh Bhanda1y, AIR ( 1995) SC
2491, it was observed that a Will may contain several clauses and the latter
clause may be inconsistent with the earlier clause. In such a situation, the
last intention of the testator is given effect to and it is on this basis that
the latter clause is held to prevail over the earlier clause. As observed in
B Hammond v. Treharne, [1938] 3 All ER 308, if in a Will there are two
i~consistent provisions, latter shall prevail over the earlier clause. This is
regulated by the well-known maxim "cum duo inter se pugantia reperiuntur
in testamenta ultimum ratum est". This principle is also contained in
Section 88 of the Act which together with its illustrations, provides as
under:
c
"88. The last of two inconsistent clauses prevails. - Where two
clauses of gifts in a Will are irreconcilable, so that they cannot
possibly stand together, the last shall prevail.

D lllustrations

(i) the testator by the first clause of his Will leaves his estate of Ramnagar
to "A'', and by the last clause of his Will leaves it to "B" and not to A".
B will have it.

E (ii) if a man, at the commencement of his Will gives his house to A and
at the close of it directs that his house shall be sold and the proceeds
invested for the benefit of B, the latter disposition will prevail."

This rule ofinte.rpretation can be invoked if different clauses cannot
F be reconciled. [See Rameshwar v. Ba/raj, AIR (1935) PC 187]. It is to be
noted that rules ofinterpretation of Will are different from rules which govern
interpretation ofother documents like sale deed, or a gift deed, or a mortgage
deed or, for that matter, any other instrument by which interest in immov-
able property is created. While in these documents, if there is any inconsist-
ency between the earlier or the subsequent part or specific clauses, inter se
G contained ther~in, the earlier part will prevail over the latter as against the
rule of interpretation applicable to a Will under which the subsequent p!c!,rt,
clause or portion prevails over the earlier part-on the principle that in the
matter of Will the testator can always change his mind and create ano,ther
interest in place of the bequest already made in the earlier .Part or on an
H earlier occasion. Undoubtedly, it is the last Will which prevails.
U.D. NAMBIAR v. T.C. SIDHAN [PASAYAT, J.) 651

What is the intention of the testator has to be found out on a reading A
of the Will and there cannot be any hard and fast rule of uniform
application to find out as to whether the grant was absolute or it was subject
to any condition or stipulation. The true intention of the testator has to
be gathered not only by attaching importance to isolated expressions but
by reading the Will as a whole with all the provisions and ignoring none B
of them as redundant or contradictory. As observed in Navneet Lat's case
(Supra), although there is no binding rule that the Court should avoid
intestacy at any cost, yet the Cou1t would be justified in preferring that
construction of the Will which avoids intestacy. Where the words are
ambiguous attempt should be made to avoid that construction which leads C
to intestacy.

It is seldom profitable to compare the words of one Will with those
of another or to attempt to find out to which of the Wills, upon which
decisions have been given in reported cases,· the Will before the Court
approximates closely. Cases are helpful only in so far as the purport to D
lay down certain general principles of construction and at the present these
principles seem tC\ be fairy well settled. The cardinal maxim to be observed
by Courts in construing a Will is to endeavour to ascertain the intention
of the testator. This intention has to be gathered primarily from the
language of the document which is to be read as whole without indulging E
in any conjecture or speculation as to what the testator would have done
if he had been better informed or better advised [See Gnanmbal's case
(supra)). In construing the Will the Court must consider the surrounding
circumstances. The testator's position, his family relationship, the probabil-
ity that he would use his words in a particular sense and many other things F
summed up in the picturesque phrase. The Court should put itself in the
testator's armchair [See Veerattalingam v. Rameth, AIR (1990) SC 2201).

Section 63 of the Act deals with execution of unprivileged Wills. It
lays down that the testator shall sign or shall affix his mark to the Will G
or it shall be signed by some other person in his presence and by his
direction. It further lays down that the Will shall be attested by two or
more witnesses, each of whom has seen the testator signing or affixing his
mark to the Will or has seen some other person sign the Will, in the
presence and by the direction of the testator and each of the witnesses shall
H
652 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2003] SUPP. 6 S.C.R.

A sign the Will in the presence of the testator. Section 68 of the Indian
Evidence Act, 1872 (in short the 'Evidence Act') mandates examination
of one attesting witness in proof of a Will, whether registered or not. The
law relating to the manner and onus of proof and also the duty cast upon
the Court while dealing with a case based upon a Will has been examined
B in considerable detail in several decisions of this Court [See H Venkatachala
Iyengar v. B.N. Thimmajamma and Ors., AIR (1959) SC 443, Rani
Purnima Debi and Anr. v. Kumar Khagendra Narayan Deb and Anr., AIR
(1962) SC 567 and Shashi Kumar Banerjee and Ors. v. Subodh Kumar
Banerjee and Ors., AIR (1964) SC 529]. A Constitution Bench of this
C Court in Shashi Kumar Banerjee 's case (supra) succinctly indicated the
focal position in law as follows:

"The mode of proving a Will does not ordinarily differ from that
of proving any other document except as to the special require-
ment of attestation prescribed in the case of a Will by Section 63,
D Succession Act. The onus of proving the Will is on the
propounder and in the absence of suspicious circumstances
surrounding the execution of the Will, proof of testamentary
capacity and the signature of the testator as required by law is
sufficient to discharge the onus. Where however there are
E suspicious circumstances, the onus is on the propounder to explain
them to the satisfaction of the court before the court accepts the
Will as genuine. Where the caveator alleges undue influence,
fraud and coercion, the onus is on him to prove the same. Even
where there are no such pleas but the circumstances give rise to
F doubts, it is for the propounder to satisfy the conscience of the
court. The suspicious circumstances may be as to the genuineness
of the signature of the testator, the condition of the testator's mind,
the dispositions made in the Will being unnatural, improbable or
unfair in the light of relevant circumstances or there might be
G other indications in the Will to show that the testator's mind was
not free. In such a case the court would naturally expect that all
legitimate suspicion should be completely removed before the
document is accepted as the last Will of the testator. If the
propounder himself takes part in the execution of the Will which
confers a substantial benefit on him that is also a circumstance to
.H
U.D. NAMBIAR v. T.C. SIDHAN [PASAYAT, J.] 653

be taken into account, and the propounder is required to remove A
the doubts by clear and satisfactory evidence. If the propounder
succeeds in removing the suspicious circumstances the court
would grant probate, even if the Will might be unnatural and
might cut off wholly or in part near relations."
B
A Will is executed to alter the ordinary mode of succession and by
the very nature of things it is bound to result in either reducing or depriving
the share of natural heir. If a person intends his property to pass to his
natural heirs, there is no necessity at all of executing a Will. It is true that
a propounder of the Will has to remove all suspicious circumstances. C
Suspicion means doubt, conjecture or mistrust. But the fact that natural
heirs have either been excluded or a lesser share has been given to them,
by itself without anything more, cannot be held to be a suspicious
circumstance especially in a case where the bequest has been made in
favour of an offspring. As held in PPK Gopalan Nambiar v. PPK
Balakrishnan Nambiar and Ors., AIR ( 1995) SC 1852 it is the duty of the D
propounder of the Will to remove all the suspected features, but there must
be real, germane and valid suspicious features and not fantasy of the
doubting mind. It has been held that if the propounder succeeds in
removing the suspicious circumstance, the Court has to give effect to the
Will, even if the Will might be unnatural in the sense that it has cut off E
wholly or in part near relations [See Puspavati and Ors. v. Chandraja
Kadamba and Ors., AIR (1972) SC 2492]. In Rabindra Nath Mukherjee
and Anr. v. Panchanan Bane1jee (dead) by LRs. and Ors., [1995] 4 SCC
459, it was observed that the circumstance of deprivation of natural heirs
should not raise any suspicion because the whole idea behind execution F
of the Will is to interfere with the normal line of succession and so, natural
heirs would be debarred in every case of Will. Of cou~se, it may be that
in some cases they are fully debarred and in some cases partly.

Now, we shall deal with the scope of Section 208. The object of G
Part VII of the Act is to protect the property appertaining to large estates
in case of a dispute as to succession. This Part in some respect stands in
a similar position to Section 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973
(in short the 'Code') with respect to certain specified properties, where its
scope is large in as much as it embraces all properties movable and H
654 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2003) SUPP. 6 S.C.R.

A immovable and once for all it settles the right to hold possession of the
property summarily directing the order disputants to seek their remedy in
proper Court. (See Biso Ram v. Emperor, 66 Ind. Cases 76). A person
aggrieved- by an order passed in a summary proceeding under Part VII,
should seek remedy by a suit and not by an application for revision. This
B remedy is preserved by this Section. [See Gouri Shankar v. Debi Prasad,
AIR (1929) Nag. 317]. The suit should be a suit for possession by
establishment of title (See Bhoba Tarani v. Profulla, 140 Ind. Cas. 379].
Therefore, it should necessarily be by the person who need to establish his
title to claim any such possession on the basis of title.
c By analogy to Order XXI, Rule 63, it can be said that where an
adverse order has been passed against the plaintiff, under Sectio11 194 of
the Act, the onus lies heavily on the plaintiff to show that he has a right
which has been demised by the decision under Section 194 [See Dhirendra
D v. Indra Chandra, AIR (1939) Calcutta 571; Mahammad Ali v. Bismilla
Begam, AIR (1930)-P.C. 255; Sahadi v. Usman Ali, 184 Ind. Cas. 113;
Ahmad v. Partap, AIR (1939) Lahore 438; Md. Ismail v. Hanuman, AIR
(1939) P.C. 290 and Bavamma v. Papanna, AIR (1936) Madras 971.

Coming to the scope and ambit of Sections 192, 193, 194 and 195
E it is to be noted that they form a part of Chapter XIII dealing with the
modalities to be adopted for protection of properties of the deceased being
covered by Part VII. These proceedings are essentially interlocutory in
character and necessarily summary depending upon the filing of an
application for relief seeking the Cou1t to determine who has a right to
F possession pending the final determination of the rights of the parties in
a regular suit.

Section 192, inter alia, provides that a person who claims right by
suceession can make an application in respect of a property, movable or
G immovabie, left behind a person who has died. Section 193 provides for
an enquiry by the District Judge to whom such an application is made and
Section 194 deals with the procedure to be adopted when an application
is made under Section 192.

H The Coutt before taking any steps in the matter under Section 194
U.D. NAMBIAR v. T.C. SIDHAN [PASAYAT, J.] 655

is required to be satisfied of the existence of such strong ground of belief A
on both points i.e. the person in possession has no lawful title and that the
person applying is likely to be materially prejudiced if left to the ordinary
remedy of a regular suit. An order under Section 194 is in nature of
summary decision and can only be passed if the conditions embodied in
Section 193 are fulfilled. The expression "subject to a suit" means subject B
to a suit contemplated under Section 208 i.e. a regular suit to establish title
and obtain possession.

The effect of a summary decision even in an extreme case is not
a' bar to a regular suit. The underlying object of Section 208 and Part VII C
is particularly to protect the property appertaining to large estates in case
of a dispute as to succession. As noted above, it has a great similarity to
a proceeding under Section 145 of the Code with respect to certain
specified properties where its scope is large in as much as it embraces all
properties movable and immovable and once for all it settles the right to
hold possession of the property summarily directing the other disputants D
to seek their remedy in proper Court by appropriate proceedings. A person
aggrieved by an order passed by a summary proceeding under Part VII is
required to seek remedy by a suit and not by an application for revision.
This remedy is preserved by Section 208. Section 209 makes the position
further clear. It provides that the decision of a District Judge in a summary E
proceeding under Part VII shall have no other effect than that of settling
the actual possession, but for this purpose it shall be final and shall not
be subject to any appeal or review. But where instead of a summary
disposal, there is in depth analysis of the evidence and conclusive
conclusions/decisions arrived at it cannot be said that there has been a F
proper exercise of the power conferred while dealing with an application
under Section 192 of the Act.

In the case at hand by several orders/judgments on earlier occasions/
stages it has been specifically held that the genuineness of the Will has to G
be established in a regular suit. While dealing with an application under
Section 192 of the Act, obviously there has to be some consideration of
the genuineness of the Will. But it cam.ot be in a conclusive and detailed
manner as has bP.en done in this case. Further, when admittedly half of the
share in the property indisputably belonged to appeltant No. 1, the District H
656 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2003] SUPP. 6 S.CR.

A Judge while dealing with an application under Section 192 could not have
either ventured to undertake even a summary decision of a disputed title
of the respondent or even delivered possession of the whole property to
original respondent no. l in preference to the person whose title and claims
are beyond controversy at least in respect of her half share. This itself
B shows that the consideration was not proper and the entire exercise wholly
impermissible. The High Court dismissing the revision petition holding that
the jurisdiction was discretionary, is to put it even in mild terms, a serious
error and misdirection virtually placing a premium on grave illegality
committed resulting in miscarriage of justice.
c Discretion, in general, is the discernment of what is right and proper.
It denotes knowledge and prudence, that discernment which enables a
person to judge critically of what is correct and proper united with caution;
nice discernment, and judgment directed by circumspection; deliberate
D judgment; soundness of judgment; a science or understanding to discern
between falsity and truth, between wrong and right, between shadow and
substance, between equity and colorable glosses and pretences, and not to
do according to the will and private affections of persons. When it is said
that something is to be done within the discretion of the authorities, that
something is to be dorie according to the rules of'reason and justice, not
E according to private opinion; according to law and not humour. It is to be
"not arbitrary, vague, and fanciful, but legal and regular. And it must be
exercised within the limit, to which an honest man, competent to the
discharge of his office ought to confine himself (Per Lord Halsbury, L.C.,
in Sharp v. Wakefield, (I 891) Appeal Cases 173. Also (See S. G.
F Jaisinghani v. Union of India and Ors., AIR (1967) SC 1427).
The word "discretion" standing single and unsupported by circum-
stances signifies exercise of judgment, skifl or wisdom as distinguished
from folly, unthinking or haste; evidently therefore a discretion cannot be
G arbitrary but must be a result of judicial thinking. The wotd in itself implies
vigilant circumspection and care; therefore where the legislature concedes
discretion it also imposes a heavy responsibility.

"The discretion of a Judge is the law oftyrants; it is always unknown.
fl It is differe!1t in different men. It is casual, and depends upon constitution,
U.D. NAMBIAR v. T.C. SIDHAN [PASAYAT, J.] 657

temper, passion. In the best it is often times caprice; in the worst it is every A
vice, folly, and passion to which human nature is liable," said [Lord
Camden, L.C.J., in Hindson and Kersey (1680) 8 How, St. Tr. 57.]

If a certain latitude or liberty accorded by statute or rules to a judge
as distinguished from a ministerial or administrative official, in adjudicat- B
ing on matters brought before him, it is judicial discretion. It limits and
regulates the exercise of the discretion, and prevents it from being wholly
absolute, capricious, or exempt from review.

Such discretion is usually given on matters of procedure or punish-
ment, or costs of administration rather than with reference to vested C
substantive rights. The matters which should regulate the exercise of
discretion have been stated by eminent judges in somewhat different forms
of words but with substantial identity. When a statute gives a judge a
discretion, what is meant is a judicial discretion, regulated according to the
known rules of law, and not the mere whim or caprice of the person to D
whom it is given on the assumption that he is discreet [Per Willes J. in Lee
v Budge Railway Co., (1871) LR 6 CP 576, and in Morgan v. Morgan,
(1869), LR I P & M 644].

The principles relating to exercise of discretion judicially do not E
appear to have been kept in view by the High Court ir this case. The
inevitable result, therefore, is that the order of the High Court refusing to
interfere with the order of the District Judge needs to be vacated. The
Curator should have been directed to deliver possession only to the
appellants whose rights to half share is indisputable and beyond contro-
versy, rather than keep out of possession such sharer. While setting aside F
the orders of the Courts below, we direct the possession to be delivered
forthwith to the appellants. We also find substance in the plea of the
appellants that this being an ancestral property with lot of sentiments
attached to it, if the possession is given to the appellants with clear
conditions stipulated, that the mesne profits the claim relating to which is G
yet to be decided shall be deposited in Court awaiting final adjudication
in the matter. It shall be for the respondents to establish the genuineness
of the Will in the manner recognized by law in the appropriate proceeding,
and thereafter seek for possession :ncluding the claim for any mesne profits
in such proceedings. It shall not be construed that our interference in the H
658 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2003] SUPP. 6 S.C.R.

A matter is on the basis of any expression of opinion about merits of the
original dispute i.e. relating to genuineness of the Will but made only for
the limited purpose of setting aside the illegal orders of the Courts below
as to right to possession. As and when, an appropriate suit is filed the
competent Court shall be at Iiberty to determine the question of title to the
B disputed half share of the respondents on its own merits, on the basis of
materials and evidence that may be let in during trial, uninfluenced by the
observations made on such claims in the orders set aside, as well as those
made in this order. The appeal is allowed in the aforesaid terms. Parties
to bear their respective costs.

B.K.M. Appeal allowed.

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