UCO BANK & ORS.versusSK SHRIVASTAVA

                   [2026] 5 S.C.R. 37 : 2026 INSC 328

                              UCO Bank & Ors.
                                     v.
                               SK Shrivastava
                        (Civil Appeal No. 375 of 2020)
                                  07 April 2026
             [J.K. Maheshwari* and Vijay Bishnoi, JJ.]


                            Issue for Consideration
       Under Regulation 29 of UCO Bank (Employees’) Pension
       Regulations, 1995 (Pension Regulation), a notice of voluntary
       retirement if not refused within the prescribed period of three
       months or before the date as specified in the notice, whether such
       notice would be deemed to be accepted on expiry of such period;
       whether issuance of show cause notice dated 11.11.2010 by the
       Appellant may fall within the purview of institution of the disciplinary
       proceedings and such proceedings be treated as pending in terms
       of Regulation 20(3)(i) & (ii) of the Service Regulation; whether
       further action taken by the Appellant in issuing chargesheet to
       conduct an inquiry and pass consequential order of dismissal
       from service would withstand the scrutiny of law; in the facts and
       looking to the legal position, whether the judgments of the High
       Court warrant interference.

                                    Headnotes†
       UCO Bank (Employees’) Pension Regulations, 1995 –
       Regulation 29 – UCO Bank (Officers’) Service Regulations,
       1979 – Regulation 20(3)(ii) – Respondent-Branch Manager sent
       a notice of voluntary retirement on 04.10.2010 giving three
       months’ notice as required, effective till 04.01.2011 – In the
       meantime, a show-cause notice dtd.11.11.2010 was issued to the
       Respondent seeking explanation regarding some suspicious
       transactions however, initiation of disciplinary proceedings
       was not indicated therein – Vide letter dtd.14.05.2011,
       Respondent stopped working with the bank w.e.f. 16.05.2011 –
       On 29.06.2011, Respondent was informed that his request for
       voluntary retirement was not accepted – Respondent was
       subsequent charge-sheeted – Non-acceptance of voluntary


* Author
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      retirement and consequent initiation of inquiry and dismissal,
      challenged by the Respondent – Writ petitions allowed by
      Single Judge directing grant of terminal benefits to the
      Respondent, order confirmed in writ appeal by the High Court:
      Held: Impugned order upheld – Regulation 29 of Pension Regulation
      governs the voluntary retirement and its acceptance until refused
      by the appointing authority within notice period, otherwise it
      would become effective on lapse of the time specified in the
      notice – A positive act of passing an order of refusal is required
      to be undertaken by the appointing authority – Thus, the request
      of voluntary retirement if not refused within the period specified
      in the notice or withheld, the deemed approval of voluntary
      retirement would be effective on expiry of notice period – Officer
      submitted his notice of voluntary retirement on 04.10.2010, giving
      three months’ notice as required, which would be effective till
      04.01.2011 – Show cause notice issued in the meantime by the
      Appellant on 11.11.2010 did not indicate the intention to institute
      disciplinary proceedings in terms of Regulation 20(3)(ii) of the
      Service Regulation – Nonetheless, the existence of such a show
      cause notice itself is not sufficient without refusal by competent
      authority to stop the automatic operation of the notice of voluntary
      retirement – In absence, the notice of voluntary retirement would
      take its course – In the present case, no such order of refusal
      or order of withholding was passed by the competent authority
      within the stipulated period – The notice of voluntary retirement,
      therefore, became effective automatically by efflux of time upon
      the expiry of the three-month period on 04.01.2011 – The non-
      approval communicated on 29.06.2011, after expiry of the notice
      period and cessation of work vide notice dtd.14.05.2011 with effect
      from 16.05.2011, is of no avail to the bank – When an employee
      decides to severe master servant relationship and serves a notice
      indicating such intention specifying the period, by operation of law
      it will become effective in absence of any order of refusal – The
      subsequent act of issuing chargesheet and consequential order
      of dismissal is also not justified in law – No infirmity in the view
      taken by the High Court. [Paras 26, 28, 30, 33, 43, 45]

      Interpretation of Statutes – Harmonious construction – UCO
      Bank (Employees’) Pension Regulations, 1995 – Regulation
      29(1) and (2) – UCO Bank (Officers’) Service Regulations,
      1979 – Regulation 20(3)(i)-(iii):
[2026] 5 S.C.R.                                                                  39

                    UCO Bank & Ors. v. SK Shrivastava


     Held: Provision of Regulation 20(3)(i), (ii), (iii) of Service Regulations
     and Regulation 29(1) and (2) of the Pension Regulation, ought
     to be read in tandem harmoniously – Regulation 20(3)(i) & (ii) of
     the Service Regulation deals with cessation of service and when
     it would not affect the pendency of disciplinary proceedings –
     It puts an embargo only in two specific contingencies, first,
     where the officer is placed under suspension, second, where a
     show-cause notice has been issued for institution of disciplinary
     proceedings – In either of the situation, an officer would require
     prior approval of the competent authority – Indeed it is true that
     voluntary retirement is also a mode to ‘leave or discontinue’
     service, therefore to such extent, Regulation 20(3)(i) & (ii) may
     have relevance – Nonetheless, voluntary retirement is not a
     mere act of leaving or discontinuing, rather, a distinct right of an
     employee that is available on completion of the requisite number
     of years of service, etc. – As per intent of Regulation 20(3)(i) &
     (ii), the employee cannot leave without approval of the competent
     authority pending the disciplinary proceedings irrespective of the
     fact that he has tendered notice to that effect – However, on literal
     reading of proviso to Regulation 29(2) of Pension Regulation, the
     intent thereof seems to be otherwise i.e., unless refused by the
     competent authority within the period prescribed in the notice, the
     voluntary retirement shall become automatically effective – It is in
     this context provisions of both regulations ought to be harmoniously
     constructed – While Regulation 20(3) (i) & (ii) of Service Regulation
     permits the authority to not grant ‘approval’ where disciplinary
     proceedings are pending; Regulation 29 of Pension Regulation also
     achieves the same effectively, through its proviso, by permitting
     the authority to ‘refuse’ voluntary retirement, but within the notice
     period – Therefore, essence and intent are the same subject to
     some restrictions. [Para 34]

     UCO Bank (Officers’) Service Regulations, 1979 – Regulation
     20(3)(iii) – When not applicable:
     Held: If disciplinary proceedings against an officer are pending and
     he wishes to leave/discontinue or resign, he may be permitted to
     do so by prior approval of the competent authority in writing – Such
     notice, if any, given by the officer before or during the disciplinary
     proceedings, shall not be given effect unless accepted by the
     competent authority – The pendency of the disciplinary proceedings
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      would include suspension or issuance of a show-cause notice for
      institution of the disciplinary proceedings – Regulation 20(3)(iii) of
      the Service Regulation applies where the disciplinary proceedings
      were initiated prior to attaining the age of superannuation, and
      prescribes the recourse to the bank after attaining the age of
      superannuation, which is not of much relevance in the facts of
      this case. [Para 32]

                               Case Law Cited
      UCO Bank v. Rajinder Lal Capoor [2007] 7 SCR 543 : (2007) 6
      SCC 694; UCO Bank v. Rajinder Lal Capoor [2008] 5 SCR 775 :
      (2008) 5 SCC 257; State Bank of India & Ors. v. Navin Kumar
      Sinha [2024] 11 SCR 799 : 2024 SCC OnLine SC 3369; UCO
      Bank & Ors. v. M.B. Motwani (Dead) thr. L.Rs and Ors. [2023] 16
      SCR 525 : (2024) 13 SCC 109; Canara Bank v. D.R.P. Sundharam
      (2016) 12 SCC 724 – held not applicable.
      State of Haryana & Ors. v. S.K. Singhal [1999] 2 SCR 714 : (1999)
      4 SCC 293; Tek Chand v. Dile Ram [2001] 1 SCR 527 : (2001)
      3 SCC 290; Dinesh Chandra Sangma v. State of Assam & Ors.
      [1978] 1 SCR 607 : (1977) 4 SCC 441; B.J. Shelat v. State of
      Gujarat and Ors. [1978] 3 SCR 553 : (1978) 2 SCC 202; Union of
      India and Ors. v. Sayed Muzaffar Mir [1994] Supp. 3 SCR 729 :
      (1995) Supp. 1 SCC 76 – referred to.

                                  List of Acts
      UCO Bank (Employees’) Pension Regulations, 1995; UCO Bank
      (Officers’) Service Regulations, 1979.

                               List of Keywords
      Regulation 29 of UCO Bank (Employees’) Pension Regulations,
      1995; Regulation 20(3) of UCO Bank (Officers’) Service
      Regulations, 1979; Notice of voluntary retirement; Notice of
      voluntary retirement not refused within prescribed period would
      be deemed to be accepted; Deemed approval of voluntary
      retirement effective on expiry of notice period; Notice of voluntary
      retirement effective automatically by efflux of time; Retired prior
      to institution of the disciplinary proceedings; No intention to
      institute disciplinary proceedings; Absence of order of refusal
      of voluntary retirement.
[2026] 5 S.C.R.                                                          41

                    UCO Bank & Ors. v. SK Shrivastava


                           Case Arising From
     CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 375 of 2020
     From the Judgment and Order dated 7.01.2019 of the High Court
     of Chhattisgarh at Bilaspur in WA No. 824 of 2018
     With
     Civil Appeal No. 376 of 2020

                        Appearances for Parties
     Gaurav Agarwal, Sr. Adv./ Amicus Curiae
     Advs. for the Appellant(s):
     Brijesh Kumar Tamber, Vinay Singh Bisht, Prateek Kushwaha,
     Ms. Arani Mukherjee, Yashu Rustagi, Sahas Bhasin, Vaibhav
     Dayma.
     Respondent-in-person

                Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court

                                Judgment

     J.K. Maheshwari, J.

1.   The Civil Appeal No. 375 of 2020 is arising out of the judgment dated
     07.01.2019 in Writ Appeal No. 824 of 2018 by the High Court of
     Chhattisgarh, Bilaspur (hereinafter ‘High Court’) preferred against
     the judgment dated 28.09.2018 in WP (S) No. 1620 of 2012, wherein
     the direction for grant of terminal benefits to Respondent No. 1 was
     issued. Learned Single Judge was of the view that after completion
     of the notice period of three months as specified in the notice for
     voluntary retirement or from the date of stopping to attend the
     service, the Respondent be treated retired voluntarily. Since he stood
     retired prior to institution of the disciplinary proceedings, therefore,
     he is entitled to all consequential benefits as per Rules governing
     the field. The Division Bench reaffirmed the finding of the learned
     Single Judge inter alia observing that since option of refusal of notice
     for voluntary retirement was not exercised by the Appellant-Bank
     before the expiry of notice period i.e. 04.01.2011 or even prior to
     16.05.2011 i.e. the date since when the employee decided to severe
     the master servant relationship, therefore, communication made
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      subsequently to refuse the request of voluntary retirement cannot
      be given retrospective effect to undo an act which was deemed to
      have been done.
2.    In Civil Appeal No. 376 of 2020, the judgment dated 12.07.2019
      in Writ Appeal No. 321 of 2019 is under challenge, whereby, the
      judgment dated 24.04.2019 passed in WP (S) No. 5109 of 2012
      was assailed. Learned Single Judge while allowing the writ petition
      opined that the employee stood retired with effect from the date of
      severance of master servant relationship i.e. 16.05.2011, therefore,
      the chargesheet issued on 05.03.2012 after retirement is liable to
      be quashed. In view of the judgment dated 28.09.2018 delivered
      in WP (S) No. 1620 of 2012 which was affirmed by the Division
      Bench, the learned Single Judge quashed the chargesheet and the
      consequential order of dismissal along with costs of Rs. 25,000/-.
3.    In the present two appeals filed by the Appellant-bank, the Respondent
      herein was the petitioner before High Court. The former writ petition
      relates to grant of terminal benefits to him and the latter relates to
      challenge to chargesheet and his dismissal from service. Consequent
      upon the decision in the previous writ petition, the latter writ petition
      was allowed. Since both the appeals have been filed in relation to
      the same employee, therefore, both the Civil Appeals are heard
      analogously and being decided by this common judgment.
4.    The issue pertaining to the voluntary retirement is governed by the
      UCO Bank (Employees’) Pension Regulations, 1995 (hereinafter
      referred to as ‘Pension Regulation’) as stood on the date on which
      notice for voluntary retirement was submitted by the Respondent.
      The service conditions of the employee are governed by the UCO
      Bank (Officers’) Service Regulations, 1979 (hereinafter referred to as
      ‘Service Regulation’) applicable for termination or discontinuation
      from employment of the Bank. The said Regulation was later amended
      on 30.04.2011.

      FACTUAL MATRIX
5.    The facts unveiling the controversy are that the Respondent was
      appointed as Clerk-cum-Godown Keeper in UCO Bank on 10.09.1983
      and promoted as an Assistant Manager with effect from 01.01.2000.
      He was further promoted as Manager w.e.f. 26.04.2007. In July 2010,
      while working as Branch Manager at Raipur Branch, some suspicious
[2026] 5 S.C.R.                                                          43

                    UCO Bank & Ors. v. SK Shrivastava


     transactions in the account of M/s. Bhanu Road Carriers and M/s.
     Progressive Exim Ltd. came to the knowledge of the Appellant.
     Internal correspondence was made from Head Office to Zonal Office
     regarding the same. In the meantime, Respondent sent a notice
     of voluntary retirement on 04.10.2010 to the General Manager,
     Kolkata. In response, Zonal Office asked for fresh application under
     the Pension Regulation. The Head Office also sought information
     regarding vigilance, non-vigilance or court case and an undertaking
     to the effect that he would not accept any commercial employment
     for two years from the date of acceptance of his voluntary retirement.
6.   In the interregnum, the Zonal Office issued a show-cause notice dated
     11.11.2010 and asked explanation regarding alleged transactions
     and suspicious entries in the accounts as referred above. An internal
     communication between the Head Office and the Zonal Office dated
     11.12.2010 indicates that voluntary retirement of Respondent was
     not considered because of proposed changes in Pension Regulation,
     therefore, the Respondent was advised to continue in service, and a
     communication from Zonal Office to the Chief Manager, UCO Bank,
     Bilaspur was made on 20.12.2010 to that effect. The Head Office
     wrote another letter to Zonal Office on 06.04.2011 stating that since
     show cause notice has been issued on 11.11.2010 to the Respondent,
     therefore his request for voluntary retirement cannot be considered,
     and the same was communicated to the branch office.
7.   On 09.05.2011, reply to the show cause notice was submitted, and in
     the meantime, an undertaking was furnished by the Respondent on
     11.04.2011 that he shall not take any commercial employment. Since
     the period specified in the notice for voluntary retirement had elapsed,
     hence, after writing a letter dated 14.05.2011, Respondent stopped
     working with the bank w.e.f. 16.05.2011. Later, vide communication
     dated 29.06.2011 it was informed to the Respondent by post sent
     from Bilaspur Branch that his request for voluntary retirement is not
     being accepted. As per information supplied by the Postal Department,
     the said letter was never delivered to the Respondent and the High
     Court has also taken note of the said fact.
8.   After about eight months from the date when he severed his
     employment with the Appellant, the Respondent was charge-sheeted
     on 05.03.2012 alleging the suspicious transactions as mentioned
     hereinabove. Challenging the non-acceptance of voluntary retirement
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       and consequent initiation of inquiry and dismissal, the Respondent
       filed the respective writ petitions, which were allowed by the learned
       Single Judge and confirmed in writ appeal by the High Court vide
       impugned order. Hence, the present two appeals.
9.     In the course of hearing, both the parties have placed reliance on
       the judgments of this Court in UCO Bank v. Rajinder Lal Capoor1
       (hereinafter ‘R.L. Capoor - I’), UCO Bank v. Rajinder Lal Capoor2
       (hereinafter ‘R.L. Capoor - II’) and the judgment of Three-Judge
       Bench in Canara Bank v. D.R.P. Sundharam3. All the said judgments
       deal with Regulation 20(3)(iii) of the Service Regulation, consequential
       effect of show cause notice and meaning of deemed pendency.
       Considering the peculiar facts of the case and that the Respondent
       himself was appearing in person as well as looking to the questions
       of law as involved, Mr. Gaurav Agrawal, learned senior counsel, was
       appointed as amicus curiae to assist the Court, who agreed to assist
       us in examining the legal issues involved in these two appeals.

       ARGUMENTS ADVANCED BY THE PARTIES
10. Learned counsel for the Appellant, the Respondent-in-person and
    learned amicus curiae have advanced their arguments and were
    heard at length. Learned counsel for the Appellant assailed the
    judgment of the High Court placing reliance on Regulation 20(3)(ii) of
    the Service Regulation and contended that in case a notice to show
    cause for institution of disciplinary action has been issued, it would
    amount to pendency of the disciplinary proceedings, and during such
    pendency, the request for voluntary retirement cannot be accepted. It
    is further argued that the deeming fiction as contained in Regulation
    29(1) and (2) of the Pension Regulation may not be applicable on
    elapse of three months’ notice period as specified therein, in case
    the disciplinary proceeding is pending as per Regulation 20(3)(ii) of
    the Service Regulation. In support of his contentions, reliance has
    been placed upon the aforementioned judgments.
11. Per contra, the Respondent-in-person, submitted that while allowing
    the writ petition, the High Court recorded the reasons in detail


1     (2007) 6 SCC 694
2     (2008) 5 SCC 257
3     (2016) 12 SCC 724
[2026] 5 S.C.R.                                                           45

                    UCO Bank & Ors. v. SK Shrivastava


     indicating that the voluntary retirement was deemed to have been
     accepted w.e.f. the date of expiry of three months’ notice period or
     from the date of cessation of employment i.e., 16.05.2011. It was
     contended that the show cause notice dated 11.11.2010 does not
     indicate about initiation of disciplinary proceedings, as required under
     Regulation 20(3)(ii) of the Service Regulation. It is also contended, in
     case the disciplinary proceedings is not initiated prior to retirement,
     dismissal from service consequent to such proceedings is arbitrary
     and without any sanction under the law, and as such, the findings
     of the High Court do not warrant interference. In view of the above
     submissions, it was prayed that the Appeals preferred by the Bank
     may be dismissed with direction to pay the post retiral and pensionary
     benefits within time frame along with interest.
12. Mr. Gaurav Agrawal, learned senior counsel and amicus, has placed
    all the facts in detail in his brief note of submissions and argued that
    Regulation 29 of the Pension Regulation would apply for voluntary
    retirement on completion of 20 years of service in case the notice
    to that effect proposing a date of not less than three months has
    been given in writing to the appointing authority. As per the proviso
    to Regulation 29(2), such notice shall become effective if not refused
    during the notice period. He submits that Clauses (i), (ii) and (iii)
    of Regulation 20(3) of the Service Regulation operate in different
    spheres and the judgments referred hereinabove only deal with the
    contingency of Regulation 20(3)(iii), therefore, Regulation 20(3)(ii)
    of the Service Regulation, particularly in facts of the present case,
    requires independent consideration. As per his contention, show
    cause notice dated 11.11.2010 does not indicate the institution of
    disciplinary proceedings and satisfy the requirement contemplated in
    Regulation 20(3)(ii) of the Service Regulation. It was also stated that
    nothing has been placed on record to indicate that the competent
    authority fulfilling the requirement of clause 20(3)(ii) of Service
    Regulation and Clause 29(2) of Pension Regulation has passed any
    order refusing voluntary retirement within the notice period. Lastly, it
    was submitted that the judgment of the High Court is just, equitable
    and in accordance with law, therefore, warrants no interference.
13. It is pointed out, the documents dated 28.07.2010 (communication of
    Vigilance Department advising to lodge FIR) and 12.08.2010 (a draft
    show cause notice) placed before this Court along with additional
    affidavit were not filed with counter affidavit before the High Court. The
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       communication of these two documents and internal correspondences
       of the Head Office to the Zonal Office dated 11.12.2010, 20.12.2010
       and 06.04.2011 to the Respondent was also not averred in counter
       affidavit.
14. Learned amicus has drawn a distinction between “notice to retire” and
    “request seeking permission to retire” placing reliance on the judgment
    of this Court in State of Haryana & Ors. v. S.K. Singhal4. It is his
    contention that any refusal to accept notice within the period specified
    in the notice has not been placed before the Court. Therefore, in
    terms of proviso of Regulation 29(2) of the Pension Regulations, the
    voluntary retirement is deemed to come into force immediately after
    expiry of the date as specified in the notice. In support, reliance was
    also placed on Tek Chand v. Dile Ram5.
15. In the facts of both these Appeals, the following four questions
    falls for our consideration - (a) Under Regulation 29 of Pension
    Regulation, a notice of voluntary retirement if not refused within the
    prescribed period of three months or before the date as specified in
    the notice, whether such notice would be deemed to be accepted on
    expiry of such period? (b) Whether issuance of show cause notice
    dated 11.11.2010 by the Appellant may fall within the purview of
    institution of the disciplinary proceedings and such proceedings be
    treated as pending in terms of Regulation 20(3)(i) & (ii) of the Service
    Regulation? (c) Whether further action taken by the Appellant in
    issuing chargesheet to conduct an inquiry and pass consequential
    order of dismissal from service would withstand the scrutiny of law?
    (d) In the facts and looking to the legal position discussed, whether
    the judgments of the High Court warrant interference?

       ANAYSIS
16. On appraisal of the rival contentions and to deal with the questions
    posed above, for ready reference, it is necessary to first refer the
    relevant provisions of the Pension Regulation applicable as on the
    date, governing the issue of voluntary retirement. Regulation 29 of
    Chapter V of the Pension Regulation is relevant therefore reproduced
    as under:


4     (1999) 4 SCC 293
5     (2001) 3 SCC 290
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                    UCO Bank & Ors. v. SK Shrivastava


           “29. Pension on Voluntary Retirement. – (1) On or
           after the 1st day of November, 1993 at any time after an
           employee has completed twenty years of qualifying service
           he may, by giving notice of not less than three months
           in writing to the appointing authority retire from service;
           Provided that this sub-regulation shall not apply to an
           employee who is on deputation or on study leave abroad
           unless after having been transferred or having returned
           to India he has resumed charge of the post in India and
           has served for a period of not less than one year;
           Provided further that this sub-regulation shall not apply
           to an employee who seeks retirement from service for
           being absorbed permanently in an autonomous body or a
           public sector undertaking or company or institution or body,
           whether incorporated or not to which he is on deputation
           at the time of seeking voluntary retirement;
           Provided that this sub-regulation shall not apply to an
           employee who is deemed to have retired in accordance
           with clause (I) of regulation 2.
           (2) The notice of voluntary retirement given under sub-
           regulation (1) shall require acceptance by the appointing
           authority;
           Provided that where the appointing authority does not
           refuse to grant the permission for retirement before
           the expiry of the period specified in the said notice, the
           retirement shall become effective from the date of expiry
           of the said period.”
                                               (emphasis supplied)

17. Upon reading, it is quite clear, if an employee on or after 1st day of
    November 1993 completes twenty years of qualifying service, and
    furnishes a notice of not less than three months to the appointing
    authority, he may retire voluntarily. Provisos of Regulation 29(1) of
    the Pension Regulation deal with the contingencies which are not
    relevant for the present case. Regulation 29(2) makes it further clear
    that notice for voluntary retirement is required to be given as per
    Regulation 29(1), which is required to be accepted by the appointing
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      authority. Regulation 29(2) of Pension Regulation applies subject to
      proviso to the said sub-regulation, whereby in case the appointing
      authority does not refuses the permission of voluntary retirement
      before the period specified in the notice, the voluntary retirement
      would be effective ipso facto from the date specified in the notice.
      Therefore, in Regulation 29(2), voluntary retirement is qualified by
      an act of the appointing authority to refuse within the notice period.
      Otherwise, the notice of voluntary retirement shall be deemed to be
      accepted from the date or period as indicated in the notice.
18. In view of the discussions made regarding provisions contained
    in Pension Regulation and to understand the import of the said
    provision, we may take guidance from judgments delivered by this
    Court dealing with pari materia provisions and interpretation thereto.
19. In the case of Dinesh Chandra Sangma Vs. State of Assam &
    Ors.6 a Three-Judge bench of this Court was having an occasion
    to deal with a similar issue of voluntary retirement in the context of
    Fundamental Rule 56 (c), wherein this Court observed as follows -
           7. Before we proceed further we may read F. Rule 56 as
           amended:
                  “F. Rule 56. (a) The date of compulsory retirement of
                  a Government servant is the date on which he attains
                  the age of 55 years. He may be retained in service
                  after this age with sanction of the State Government
                  on public grounds which must be recorded in writing,
                  and proposals for the retention of a Government
                  servant in service after this age should not be made
                  except in very special circumstances.
                  (b) Notwithstanding anything contained in these
                  rules the appropriate authority may, if he is of the
                  opinion that it is in the public interest to do so, retire
                  government servant by giving him notice of not less
                  than three months in writing or three months’ pay
                  and allowances in lieu of such notice, after he has
                  attained fifty years of age or has completed 25 years
                  of service, whichever is earlier.


6        (1977) 4 SCC 441
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                       UCO Bank & Ors. v. SK Shrivastava


                   (c) Any government servant may, by giving notice
                   of not less than three months in writing to the
                   appropriate authority, retire from service after he
                   has attained the age of fifty years or has completed
                   25 years of service, whichever is earlier.”
                              ***       ***       ***
            8. ……While the Government reserves its right to
            compulsorily retire a government servant, even against his
            wish, there is a corresponding right of the government
            servant under F. Rule 56(c) to voluntarily retire from
            service by giving the Government three months’ notice
            in writing. There is no question of acceptance of the
            request for voluntary retirement by the Government
            when the government servant exercises his right
            under F. Rule 56 (c). Mr Niren De is therefore right in
            conceding this position.
                                ***        ***       ***
            17. The High Court committed an error of law holding that
            consent of the Government was necessary to give legal
            effect to the voluntary retirement of the Appellant under
            F. Rule 56(c). Since the conditions of F. Rule 56(c) are
            fulfilled in the instant case, the Appellant must be held to
            have lawfully retired as notified by him with effect from
            August 2, 1976.
20. By the said judgment it was made clear that, as per relevant rules, to
    give effect to the voluntary retirement, the consent of the Government
    was not necessary since the notice given by employee reflects the
    intention to retire voluntarily from the date so specified in the notice.
    Nonetheless, it appears that the said provision did not contain
    any option on the part of the government to refuse the request for
    voluntary retirement.
21. In another judgment of three-Judge Bench in B.J. Shelat Vs. State
    of Gujarat and Ors.7, wherein this Court dealt with the question
    of jurisdiction of the authority to take a disciplinary action and was
    observed as thus: -


7   (1978) 2 SCC 202
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      “6. We will proceed to consider the question of the
      jurisdiction of the authority to take disciplinary action against
      the Appellant after his retirement. It may be recalled that
      the Appellant gave a notice intimating his intention to
      retire on July 17, 1973 stating that he intended to retire on
      reaching the age of 55 years on December 3, 1973. He
      attained the age of 55 years on December 3, 1973 and
      it is common ground that the notice of suspension was
      issued by the High Court only on December 11, 1973. But
      before December 3, 1973 it is admitted that a show-cause
      notice was issued on November 23, 1973 by the Chief City
      Magistrate on the directions of the High Court calling upon
      the petitioner to submit his explanation and the Appellant
      submitted his explanation on November 26, 1973.
      7. Rule 161 of the Bombay Civil Services Rules provides
      for the retirement of Government servants before attaining
      the age of superannuation. Rule 161(1)(aa) provides—
           “Notwithstanding anything contained in clause (a):
           (1) An appointing authority shall, if he is of the opinion
           that it is in the public interest so to do, have the
           absolute right to retire any Government servant to
           whom clause (a) applies by giving him notice of not
           less than three months in writing or three months’
           pay and allowances in lieu of such notice:
               ***                  ***                   ***

      Sub-rule (2)(ii) is as follows:
           “Any Government servant to whom clause (a) applies
           may, by giving notice of not less than three months in
           writing to the Appointing Authority, retire from service...
           and in any other case, after he has attained the age
           of 55 years.”
      There is no dispute that the Rule applicable is Rule
      161(2)(ii) and the Appellant is entitled to retire by giving a
      notice of not less than 3 months after he has attained the
      age of 55 years. Under Rule 161(1)(aa)(1) the appointing
      authority has an absolute right to retire any Government
[2026] 5 S.C.R.                                                          51

                    UCO Bank & Ors. v. SK Shrivastava


           servant to whom clause (a) applies in public interest by
           giving him notice of not less than three months in writing
           or three months’ pay and allowances in lieu of such notice.
           But the Government servant has no such absolute right. A
           right is conferred on the Government servant under Rule
           161(2)(ii) to retire by giving not less than three months’
           notice on his attaining the prescribed age. Such a right
           is subject to the proviso which is incorporated to the sub-
           section which reads as follows:
                “Provided that it shall be open to the appointing
                authority to withhold permission to retire to a
                Government servant who is under suspension,
                or against whom departmental proceedings are
                pending or contemplated, and who seeks to retire
                under this sub-clause.”
           But for the proviso a Government servant would be at
           liberty to retire by giving not less than three months’
           notice in writing to the appointing authority on attaining
           the prescribed age.”
22. In the above case, the judgment of Dinesh Chandra Sangma
    (Supra) was relied upon and applying the law as prevalent, the
    Court observed as thus:
           “8. ……. In the case before us it is incumbent on the
           appointing authority to withhold permission to retire on one
           of the conditions mentioned in the proviso. We are of the
           view that the proviso contemplates a positive action by
           the appointing authority. The words “It shall be open to
           the appointing authority to withhold permission” would
           indicate that the appointing authority has got an option
           to withhold permission and that could be exercised by
           communicating its intention to withhold permission
           to the Government servant. The appointing authority
           may have considered the question and might not have
           taken a decision either way or after considering the
           facts of the case might have come to the conclusion
           that it is better to allow the Government servant to
           retire than take any action against him. For the proviso
           to become operative it is necessary that the Government
52                                                        [2026] 5 S.C.R.

                        Supreme Court Reports


          should not only take a decision but communicate it to the
          Government servant.”
23. The Court also interpreted the meaning of the word ‘withhold’ in case
    the disciplinary proceedings are pending and a person applied for
    voluntary retirement, wherein following was observed :-
          “9. Mr Patel next referred us to the meaning of the
          word “withhold” in Webster’s Third New International
          Dictionary which is given as “hold back” and submitted that
          the permission should be deemed to have been withheld
          if it is not communicated. We are not able to read the
          meaning of the word “withhold” as indicating that in the
          absence of a communication it must be understood as the
          permission having been withheld.
          10. It will be useful to refer to the analogous provision
          in the Fundamental Rules issued by the Government of
          India applicable to the Central Government servants.
          Fundamental Rule 56(a) provides that except as otherwise
          provided in this Rule, every Government servant shall
          retire from service on the afternoon of the last day of the
          month in which he attains the age of fifty-eight years.
          Fundamental Rule 56(j) is similar to Rule 161(aa)(1) of
          the Bombay Civil Services Rules conferring an absolute
          right on the appropriate authority to retire a Government
          servant by giving not less than three months’ notice.
          Under Fundamental Rule 56(k) the Government servant
          is entitled to retire from service after he has attained the
          age of fifty-five years by giving notice of not less than
          three months in writing to the appropriate authority on
          attaining the age specified. But proviso (b) to sub-rule
          56(k) states that it is open to the appropriate authority
          to withhold permission to a Government servant under
          suspension who seeks to retire under this clause.
          Thus under the Fundamental Rules issued by the
          Government of India also the right to the Government
          servant to retire is not an absolute right but is subject to
          the proviso whereunder the appropriate authority may
          withhold permission to a Government servant under
          suspension. On a consideration to Rule 161(2)(ii) and
[2026] 5 S.C.R.                                                          53

                       UCO Bank & Ors. v. SK Shrivastava


            the proviso, we are satisfied that it is incumbent on
            the Government to communicate to the Government
            servant its decision to withhold permission to retire
            on one to the grounds specified in the proviso.
            11. In the view we have taken that the appointing
            authority has no jurisdiction to take disciplinary
            proceedings against a Government servant who had
            effectively retired, the question as to whether the
            High Court was right in holding that the disciplinary
            authority had sufficient grounds for dismissing the
            Appellant does not arise.
            …..As already stated, as we have come to the conclusion
            that the disciplinary action cannot be taken after the date
            of his retirement, we refrain from expressing any opinion
            on the correctness of the decision taken by the appointing
            authority.”
     In the said context, it is evident that until the appointing authority
     withholds the permission to let an employee voluntarily retire,
     pendency of disciplinary proceedings against such Government
     servant has no adverse consequence. Therefore, withholding
     permission in terms of the rules was found to be a prerequisite.
24. Both the above referred judgments have been further cited with
    approval in the case of Union of India and Ors. v. Sayed Muzaffar
    Mir 8 and the Court held as thus: -
            “3. The learned Additional Solicitor General, Shri Ahmed
            appearing for the Appellants, has contended that the
            right of premature retirement conferred by the aforesaid
            provision could be denied to a railway servant in case
            he be under suspension, as was the Respondent at the
            relevant time. This is what finds place in the proviso to
            the aforesaid provision. The Additional Solicitor General
            also seeks to place reliance on what has been stated in
            Rule 1801(d) which starts with non-obstante clause and
            states that the competent authority may require a railway



8   (1995) Supp. 1 SCC 76
54                                                    [2026] 5 S.C.R.

                    Supreme Court Reports


      servant under suspension to continue his service beyond
      the date of his retirement in which case he shall not be
      permitted by that authority to retire from service and
      shall be retained in service till such time as required by
      that authority. Relying on these provisions the contention
      advanced is that though the Respondent had sought
      premature retirement by his letter dated 22-7-1985 and
      though the three months’ period had expired on 21-10-
      1985, the Railways were within the rights not to permit the
      premature retirement because of the suspension of the
      Respondent at the relevant time, which had come to be
      ordered in the course of a disciplinary proceeding which
      was then pending against the Respondent.
      4. There are two answers to this submission. The first
      is that both the provisions relied upon by the learned
      counsel would require, according to us, passing of
      appropriate order, when the government servant is
      under suspension (as was the Respondent), either
      of withholding permission to retire or retaining of the
      incumbent in service. It is an admitted fact that no such
      order had been passed in the present case. So, despite
      the right given to the appropriate/competent authority
      in this regard, the same is of no avail in the present
      case as the right had not come to be exercised. We
      do not know the reason(s) thereof. May be, for some
      reason the authority concerned thought that it would
      be better to see off the Respondent by allowing him
      to retire.
      5. The second aspect of the matter is that it has been
      held by a three-Judge Bench of this Court in Dinesh
      Chandra Sangma v. State of Assam [(1977) 4 SCC 441 :
      1978 SCC (L&S) 7] , which has dealt with a pari materia
      provision finding place in Rule 56(c) of the Fundamental
      Rules, that where the government servant seeks premature
      retirement the same does not require any acceptance and
      comes into effect on the completion of the notice period.
      This decision was followed by another three-Judge Bench
      in B.J. Shelat v. State of Gujarat [(1978) 2 SCC 202 : 1978
[2026] 5 S.C.R.                                                              55

                    UCO Bank & Ors. v. SK Shrivastava


           SCC (L&S) 208].
           6. The period of notice in the present case having expired
           on 21-10-1985, and the first order of removal having been
           passed on 4-11-1985, we hold that the Tribunal had rightly
           come to the conclusion that the order of removal was non
           est in the eye of law.”
25. In another case of S.K. Singhal (Supra), this Court was having an
    occasion to consider the pari materia provision of Punjab Civil Services
    Rules wherein the rule contemplates about “notice to retire” and “not a
    request seeking permission to retire”. In the said case, this Court has
    relied upon the above referred three judgments and held as thus: -
           “13. Thus, from the aforesaid three decisions it is clear
           that if the right to voluntarily retire is conferred in absolute
           terms as in Dinesh Chandra Sangma case [(1977) 4 SCC
           441 : 1978 SCC (L&S) 7] by the relevant rules and there is
           no provision in the rules to withhold permission in certain
           contingencies the voluntary retirement comes into effect
           automatically on the expiry of the period specified in the
           notice. If, however, as in B.J. Shelat case [(1978) 2 SCC
           202 : 1978 SCC (L&S) 208] and as in Sayed Muzaffar
           Mir case [1995 Supp (1) SCC 76 : 1995 SCC (L&S) 256]
           the authority concerned is empowered to withhold
           permission to retire if certain conditions exist, viz., in
           case the employee is under suspension or in case a
           departmental enquiry is pending or is contemplated,
           the mere pendency of the suspension or departmental
           enquiry or its contemplation does not result in the
           notice for voluntary retirement not coming into effect
           on the expiry of the period specified. What is further
           needed is that the authority concerned must pass a
           positive order withholding permission to retire and
           must also communicate the same to the employee
           as stated in B.J. Shelat case [(1978) 2 SCC 202 : 1978
           SCC (L&S) 208] and in Sayed Muzaffar Mir case [1995
           Supp (1) SCC 76 : 1995 SCC (L&S) 256] before the
           expiry of the notice period. Consequently, there is no
           requirement of an order of acceptance of the notice to
           be communicated to the employee nor can it be said that
56                                                     [2026] 5 S.C.R.

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      non-communication of acceptance should be treated as
      amounting to withholding of permission.”
      14. Before referring to the second category of cases where
      the rules require a positive acceptance of the notice of
      voluntary retirement and communication thereof, it is
      necessary to refer to the decision of this Court in Baljit
      Singh (Dr) v. State of Haryana [(1997) 1 SCC 754 : 1997
      SCC (L&S) 313] strongly relied upon by the learned counsel
      for the Appellants and to Power Finance Corpn. Ltd. v.
      Pramod Kumar Bhatia [(1997) 4 SCC 280 : 1997 SCC
      (L&S) 941] . The former case arose under Rule 5.32(B) of
      the Punjab Civil Services Rules. That rule extracted earlier
      contains an express provision in the proviso to sub-rule
      (2) that the retirement takes effect automatically if refusal
      is not communicated within 3 months. In that case, when
      the employee gave notice for voluntary retirement on 20-
      9-1993, criminal cases were pending against him. After
      expiry of 3 months, on 25-2-1994, the competent authority
      declined to accept the notice. A two-Judge Bench of this
      Court, however, held that the voluntary retirement did not
      come about automatically on the expiry of the notice period
      but that it could take effect only upon acceptance of the
      notice by the Government and that the acceptance must
      also be communicated and till then the jural relationship
      of master and servant continues. This Court referred only
      to the decision of the two-Judge Bench in Sayed Muzaffar
      Mir case [1995 Supp (1) SCC 76 : 1995 SCC (L&S) 256]
      and stated that that case was to be confined to its own
      facts. The two-Judge Bench of this Court in Baljit
      Singh case [(1997) 1 SCC 754 : 1997 SCC (L&S) 313]
      did not notice that there were two three-Judge Bench
      cases in Dinesh Chandra Sangma [(1977) 4 SCC 441
      : 1978 SCC (L&S) 7] and Shelat [(1978) 2 SCC 202 :
      1978 SCC (L&S) 208] taking the view under similar
      rules that a positive order was to be passed within the
      notice period withholding permission to retire and that
      the said order was also to be communicated to the
      employee during the said period. By stating that an order
      of acceptance of the notice was necessary and that the
[2026] 5 S.C.R.                                                         57

                    UCO Bank & Ors. v. SK Shrivastava


           said acceptance must be communicated to the employee
           and till that was done the jural relationship continued and
           there was no automatic snapping thereof on the expiry of
           3 months’ period, the two-Judge Bench, in our view, has
           gone contrary to the two three-Judge Bench cases which
           were not brought to its notice. In the above circumstances,
           we follow the two three-Judge Bench cases for deciding
           the case before us.”
26. After taking clue from the above judgments, if we look into the
    language of Regulation 29(2) of the Pension Regulation which
    deals with the voluntary retirement, acceptance of the notice by the
    appointing authority is subject to compliance of proviso, whereby
    refusal to let the employee retire voluntarily ought to be ordered
    before expiry of the notice period, and communicate, otherwise, in
    terms of proviso to Regulation 29(2), voluntary retirement shall be
    deemed to be effective on lapse of the notice period. Therefore, a
    positive act of passing an order of refusal is required to be undertaken
    by the appointing authority.
27. In the judgment of Tek Chand (Supra) decided by another Three-
    Judge Bench, this Court has considered all the above referred
    judgments and in the context of the language used in the proviso
    to sub-rule (2) of Rule 48-A of the Central Services Pension Rules,
    1972 dealing with the voluntary retirement, the Court in paragraphs
    33 and 35, held as thus: -
           “33. It is clear from sub-rule (2) of the Rule that the
           appointing authority is required to accept the notice of
           voluntary retirement given under sub-rule (1). It is open
           to the appointing authority to refuse also, on whatever
           grounds available to it, but such refusal has to be before
           the expiry of the period specified in the notice. The
           proviso to sub-rule (2) is clear and certain in its terms.
           If the appointing authority does not refuse to grant the
           permission for retirement before the expiry of the period
           specified in the said notice, the retirement sought for
           becomes effective from the date of expiry of the said
           period. In this case, admittedly, the appointing authority
           did not refuse to grant the permission for retirement to
           Nikka Ram before the expiry of the period specified in
58                                                    [2026] 5 S.C.R.

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      the notice dated 5-12-1994. The learned Senior Counsel
      for the Respondent argued that the acceptance of
      voluntary retirement by appointing authority in all cases
      is mandatory. In the absence of such express acceptance
      the government servant continues to be in service. In
      support of this submission, he drew our attention to Rule
      56(k) of the Fundamental Rules. He also submitted that
      acceptance may be on a later date, that is, even after
      the expiry of the period specified in the notice and the
      retirement could be effective from the date specified in the
      notice. Since the proviso to sub-rule (2) of Rule 48-A is
      clear in itself and the said Rule 48-A is self-contained, in
      our opinion, it is unnecessary to look to other provisions,
      more so in the light of law laid down by this Court. An
      argument that acceptance can be even long after
      the date of the expiry of the period specified in the
      notice and that the voluntary retirement may become
      effective from the date specified in the notice, will lead
      to anomalous situation. Take a case, if an application
      for voluntary retirement is accepted few years later from
      the date specified in the notice and voluntary retirement
      becomes operative from the date of expiry of the notice
      period itself, what would be the position or status of such
      a government servant during the period from the date of
      expiry of the notice period up to the date of acceptance
      of the voluntary retirement by the appointing authority?
      One either continues in service or does not continue in
      service. It cannot be both that the voluntary retirement
      could be effective from the date of expiry of the period
      mentioned in the notice and still a government servant
      could continue in service till the voluntary retirement is
      accepted. The proviso to sub-rule (2) of Rule 48-A of the
      Rules does not admit such situation.
      35. In our view, this judgment fully supports the contention
      urged on behalf of the Appellant in this regard. In this
      judgment, it is observed that there are three categories
      of rules relating to seeking of voluntary retirement
      after notice. In the first category, voluntary retirement
      automatically comes into force on expiry of notice
[2026] 5 S.C.R.                                                        59

                    UCO Bank & Ors. v. SK Shrivastava


           period. In the second category also, retirement comes
           into force unless an order is passed during notice
           period withholding permission to retire and in the
           third category voluntary retirement does not come
           into force unless permission to this effect is granted
           by the competent authority. In such a case, refusal
           of permission can be communicated even after the
           expiry of the notice period. It all depends upon the
           relevant rules. In the case decided, the relevant Rule
           required acceptance of notice by appointing authority
           and the proviso to the Rule further laid down that
           retirement shall come into force automatically if the
           appointing authority did not refuse permission during
           the notice period. Refusal was not communicated
           to the Respondent during the notice period and the
           Court held that voluntary retirement came into force
           on expiry of the notice period and subsequent order
           conveyed to him that he could not be deemed to have
           voluntary retired had no effect. The present case is
           almost identical to the one decided by this Court in the
           aforesaid decision.”
28. In the above mentioned precedents, the pari materia provisions
    dealing with the contingency of voluntary retirement have been dealt
    with and it was made clear that subject to applicable law, the request
    if not refused within the period specified in the notice or withheld,
    the deemed approval of voluntary retirement would be effective on
    expiry of notice period.
29. There may be three contingencies for the employees with respect of
    retirement. First is on attaining the age of superannuation; second
    would be a situation of compulsory retirement in public interest and
    third is where an employee sought retirement voluntarily indicating
    his intention to cease the master-servant relationship. In the third
    contingency, subject to applicable regulations or rules, where an
    employee voluntarily ceases the employment and indicates his
    intention in the notice of voluntary retirement, until it is refused or
    withheld by an order within the notice period, the intention of the
    employee would become effective from the date as specified by him.
    Meaning thereby, if an employee voluntarily wishes to severe his
    relationship with employer, and by virtue of rule, the prescription is
60                                                              [2026] 5 S.C.R.

                           Supreme Court Reports


      not followed, i.e., requiring the authorities to indicate their intention to
      refuse the request, as per deemed approval clause, in our opinion,
      the request becomes effective ipso facto.
30. In the case at hand, the notice of three months indicating intention
    to retire voluntarily was given on 04.10.2010 and the period was
    supposed to expire on 04.01.2011, to which refusal was not ordered
    within the notice period. The non-approval communicated on
    29.06.2011, after expiry of the notice period and cessation of work
    vide notice dated 14.05.2011 with effect from 16.05.2011, is of no
    avail to the bank.
31. Reverting to the arguments as advanced by the Appellant, relying upon
    Regulation 20(3)(ii) of Service Regulation, it sets forth an embargo
    upon an officer against leaving or discontinuing or resigning from
    service of bank without giving a notice in writing. The said provision
    is relevant, therefore, reproduced for ready reference as under: -
           “20. Termination of Service. –
           (1) **** **** ****
           (2) **** **** ****
           (3) (i) An officer against whom disciplinary proceedings
           are pending shall not leave/discontinue or resign from his
           service in the bank without the prior approval in writing
           of competent authority and any notice or resignation
           given by such an officer before or during the disciplinary
           proceedings shall not take effect unless it is accepted by
           the Competent Authority.
           (ii) Disciplinary proceedings shall deemed to be pending
           against any employee for the purpose of this regulation
           if he has been placed under suspension or any notice
           has been issued to him to show cause why disciplinary
           proceedings shall not be instituted against him and will
           be deemed to be pending until final orders are passed by
           the Competent Authority.
           (iii) The officer against whom disciplinary proceedings
           have been initiated will cease to be in service on the date
           of superannuation but the disciplinary proceedings will
[2026] 5 S.C.R.                                                         61

                    UCO Bank & Ors. v. SK Shrivastava


           continue as if he was in service until the proceedings are
           concluded and final order is passed in respect thereof.
           The concerned officer will not receive any pay and/or
           allowance after the date of superannuation. He will also
           not be entitled for the payment of retirement benefits till
           the proceedings are completed and final order is passed
           thereon except his own contributions to CPF.”
32. Upon reading, it is discernable that if disciplinary proceedings against
    an officer are pending and he wishes to leave/discontinue or resign,
    he may be permitted to do so by prior approval of the competent
    authority in writing. Such notice, if any, given by the officer before
    or during the disciplinary proceedings, shall not be given effect
    unless accepted by the competent authority. The pendency of the
    disciplinary proceedings would include suspension or issuance of
    a show-cause notice for institution of the disciplinary proceedings.
    Regulation 20(3)(iii) of the Service Regulation applies where the
    disciplinary proceedings were initiated prior to attaining the age
    of superannuation, and prescribes the recourse to the bank after
    attaining the age of superannuation, which is not of much relevance
    in the facts of this case.
33. The argument as advanced to apply Regulation 20(3)(i) and 20(3)(ii)
    of the Service Regulation may have some relevance as it imposes
    embargo upon an officer against ‘leaving or discontinuing or resigning’
    from service without the prior approval of the authority if disciplinary
    proceedings are pending. It also provides what would mean by
    pendency of disciplinary proceedings. As discussed, Regulation
    29 of Pension Regulation governs the voluntary retirement and its
    acceptance until refused by the appointing authority within notice
    period, otherwise it would become effective on lapse of the time
    specified in the notice.
34. Looking at the provision of Regulation 20(3)(i), (ii), (iii) of Service
    Regulations and Regulation 29(1) and (2) of the Pension Regulation,
    it ought to be read in tandem harmoniously. Regulation 20(3)(i) &
    (ii) of the Service Regulation deals with cessation of service and
    when it would not affect the pendency of disciplinary proceedings.
    It puts an embargo only in two specific contingencies, first, where
    the officer is placed under suspension, second, where a show-cause
    notice has been issued for institution of disciplinary proceedings. In
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                          Supreme Court Reports


      either of the situation, an officer would require prior approval of the
      competent authority. Indeed it is true that voluntary retirement is also
      a mode to ‘leave or discontinue’ service, therefore to such extent,
      Regulation 20(3)(i) & (ii) may have relevance. Nonetheless, voluntary
      retirement is not a mere act of leaving or discontinuing, rather, a
      distinct right of an employee that is available on completion of the
      requisite number of years of service, etc. For exercising the option
      of voluntary retirement, Regulation 29 of the Pension Regulation
      is the main provision. Given the situation, without considering both
      provisions harmoniously, otherwise, this leads to an anomalous
      situation. We say so because as per intent of Regulation 20(3)(i) &
      (ii), the employee cannot leave without approval of the competent
      authority pending the disciplinary proceedings irrespective of the fact
      that he has tendered notice to that effect. However, on literal reading
      of proviso to Regulation 29(2) of Pension Regulation, the intent
      thereof seems to be otherwise i.e., unless refused by the competent
      authority within the period prescribed in the notice, the voluntary
      retirement shall become automatically effective. It is in this context
      provisions of both regulations ought to be harmoniously constructed.
35. Under Regulation 20(3)(i) & (ii) of Service Regulation, competent
    authority can retain the employee against whom disciplinary
    proceedings are pending, unless permitted. At the same time,
    Regulation 29(2) of the Pension Regulation requires acceptance
    of the notice of voluntary retirement by authority. Nonetheless,
    its proviso contemplates that the notice for voluntary retirement
    becomes effective unless positively refused by the competent
    authority. On said reading, the intent can be gathered that while
    drafting Regulation 29 of Pension Regulation, the intent of Regulation
    20(3)(i) and (ii) of Service Regulation has been duly taken care
    of, albeit in a different language. While Regulation 20(3)(i) & (ii)
    of Service Regulation permits the authority to not grant ‘approval’
    where disciplinary proceedings are pending; Regulation 29 of
    Pension Regulation also achieves the same effectively, through its
    proviso, by permitting the authority to ‘refuse’ voluntary retirement,
    but within the notice period. Therefore, essence and intent are the
    same subject to some restrictions. In this manner, said provisions
    are to be applied harmoniously.
36. Now reverting to the argument of issuance of the show cause notice
    dated 11.11.2010 is concerned, such notice must indicate the intention
[2026] 5 S.C.R.                                                          63

                    UCO Bank & Ors. v. SK Shrivastava


     of institution of disciplinary proceedings, to trigger the embargo under
     Regulation 20(3)(ii) of the Service Regulation. For understanding the
     nature and context of the show-cause notice dated 11.11.2010, its
     relevant operative part is reproduced hereunder: -
           “Due to above action M/s. Progressive Exim Ltd. is
           aggrieved on the Bank and the Bank’s image has suffered.
           Since money was withdrawn from Current account of M/s.
           Bhanu Road Carriers, which was not belonging to them,
           the Bank was out of fund for a period from 08/10/2008
           to 02/06/2010.
           You are advised to submit your explanation within seven
           days from the receipt of this letter. If no reply received
           from you it will be construed that you have nothing
           to say in the matter and further course of action will
           be taken against you.”
37. After reading the operative portion as above, it is clear, an explanation
    vis-à-vis allegations was sought from the officer and in absence of
    which, bank was to take further recourse. In our view, the aforesaid
    content of show cause notice, is not suggestive of the intention to
    institute disciplinary action. Mere mention of ‘further course of action’
    cannot be construed as intention to institute disciplinary proceedings.
    Therefore, even said contention of the Appellant falls flat.
38. Insofar as reliance is placed on the judgments of R.L. Capoor – I
    (Supra) and its review in R.L. Capoor – II (Supra), it is necessary
    to understand its factual matrix. In the said case, the employee
    was working as a Branch Manager in UCO Bank and was allowed
    to superannuate on 1-11-1996. Prior to his retirement, only show-
    cause notices were issued to him on 24-10-1996 and 30-10-1996
    in connection with alleged irregularities committed while sanctioning
    and disbursing loans under the PMRY Scheme. A charge-sheet was
    issued only on 13-11-1998, nearly two years after his superannuation,
    and upon conclusion of enquiry, the penalty of removal from service
    was imposed, which was also affirmed in appeal. The Respondent’s
    writ petition was allowed in part by the High Court, which converted
    the penalty into compulsory retirement, and the LPA preferred by
    the Bank was dismissed, taking the matter to this Court.
39. In the judgment of R.L. Capoor – I (Supra), this Court dismissed the
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                                Supreme Court Reports


       Bank’s appeal and held the entire disciplinary proceeding is illegal
       and without jurisdiction on the ground that Regulation 20(3)(iii) of
       the Service Regulation could be invoked only when disciplinary
       proceedings had been initiated prior to superannuation, and since
       initiation of a proceeding is only upon issuance of a charge-sheet and
       not merely upon a show-cause notice, the legal fiction thereunder
       could not be attracted.
40. The Bank thereafter filed a Review Petition, giving rise to the judgment
    of R.L. Capoor – II (Supra), seeking to rely upon Regulation 20(3)(ii)
    of the Service Regulation. The review petition was dismissed and this
    Court held that the legal fiction of deemed pendency under Regulation
    20(3)(ii) of the Service Regulation is of limited scope, operating only
    to prevent an officer from resigning during such proceedings, and
    cannot be extended to constitute initiation of disciplinary proceedings
    for purposes of Regulation 20(3)(iii).
41. In both of these cases, therefore, this Court primarily examined the
    scope and import of Regulations 20(3)(i), 20(3)(ii) and 20(3)(iii) of
    the Service Regulation, and elaborated upon the meaning of the
    legal fiction as created by the expression ‘deemed to be pending’.
    Therefore, both these judgements only dealt with a very specific issue
    i.e., applicability of legal fiction contained in Regulation 20(3)(ii) for
    the purpose of Regulation 20(3)(iii). As such, we find ourselves in
    agreement with the submission made by the learned amicus that
    R.L. Capoor - I (Supra) and R.L. Capoor – II (Supra) only deals
    with the contingency of Regulation 20(3)(iii) and do not apply on the
    facts of the present case.
42. The view taken in RL Capoor – I (Supra) and R.L. Capoor - II (Supra)
    has also been reiterated in the judgment of D.R.P. Sundharam
    (Supra) by a Three-Judge Bench of this Court. It is to observe here
    that in neither of these judgements the effect of the Regulation 29 of
    Pension Regulation has been considered. More so, all the judgments
    relate to the Regulation 20(3)(iii) of the Service Regulation without
    dealing with the purport of Regulation 20(3)(i) & (ii) of Service
    Regulation which is applicable to the facts of the case at hand.
    Judgements of this Court in State Bank of India & Ors. v. Navin
    Kumar Sinha9 and UCO Bank & Ors. v. M.B.Motwani (Dead) thr.



9     2024 SCC OnLine SC 3369
[2026] 5 S.C.R.                                                         65

                         UCO Bank & Ors. v. SK Shrivastava


      L.Rs and Ors10, dealt with the cases involving retirement on attaining
      the age of superannuation and the dispute was adjudicated in light
      of R.L.Capoor – I (Supra), R.L.Capoor – II (Supra) and D.R.P.
      Sudharam (Supra). As such, these judgements will not have any
      implication on the fact of the present appeals.
43. In light of the discussions made above and by applying the rule of
    harmonious construction with respect to the interplay of the said
    provisions of the Pension Regulation and the Service Regulation,
    the situation as emerges is that the officer submitted his notice of
    voluntary retirement on 04.10.2010, giving three months’ notice as
    required, which would be effective till 04.01.2011. In the meantime, a
    show cause notice was issued by the Appellant on 11.11.2010 and as
    discussed, it would not indicate the intention to institute disciplinary
    proceedings in terms of Regulation 20(3)(ii) of the Service Regulation.
    Nonetheless, the existence of such a show cause notice itself is not
    sufficient without refusal by competent authority to stop the automatic
    operation of the notice of voluntary retirement. In absence, the
    notice of voluntary retirement would take its course. In the present
    case, no such order of refusal or order of withholding was passed
    by the competent authority within the stipulated period. The notice
    of voluntary retirement, therefore, became effective automatically by
    efflux of time upon the expiry of the three-month period on 04.01.2011.
    This Court, accordingly, finds no infirmity in the view taken by the
    High Court, which is liable to be upheld.
44. Before parting with this judgment, we deem it necessary to place
    on record our appreciation for the invaluable assistance rendered
    by learned Amicus Curiae Mr. Gaurav Agrawal, Senior Advocate by
    way of filing erudite submissions, therefore, we acknowledge his
    assistance and place the same on record.

      CONCLUSION
45. In the light of discussion made hereinabove, in our view, while
    passing the impugned judgment, the High Court has not committed
    any infirmity. The judgment rendered by the High Court is after a
    thorough examination of facts and applicable regulations, therefore,
    the conclusion drawn as such is in right perspective. In our view, it


10   (2024) 13 SCC 109
66                                                            [2026] 5 S.C.R.

                             Supreme Court Reports


      is correct to hold that when an employee decides to severe master
      servant relationship and serves a notice indicating such intention
      specifying the period, by operation of law it will become effective
      in absence of any order of refusal. The subsequent act of issuing
      chargesheet and consequential order of dismissal is also not justified
      in law. As directed by the High Court, the Respondent shall be entitled
      to all consequential post-retiral benefits in terms of this order as well.
      The Bank is directed to settle all the dues within a period of three
      months along with applicable interest rate. Accordingly, the appeals
      filed by the Appellant-Bank fail and are, hereby, dismissed.
46. Pending application(s), if any, shall stand disposed of.

      Result of the case: Appeals dismissed.




      †
          Headnotes prepared by: Divya Pandey