Holding

Disciplinary proceedings under Regulation 20(3)(iii) cannot be validly initiated after superannuation unless a charge‑sheet was issued before superannuation; hence the proceedings and removal order were illegal.

Summary

The respondent, a Branch Manager of UCO Bank, was superannuated on 1 November 1996 after show‑cause notices were issued for alleged irregularities in sanctioning PMRY loans. A charge‑sheet was issued only on 13 November 1998, well after his retirement, and disciplinary proceedings were launched under Regulation 20(3)(iii) of the UCO Bank Officer Employees Services Regulations, 1979, which creates a legal fiction allowing proceedings to continue as if the officer were still in service. The Supreme Court held that a disciplinary proceeding is deemed to be initiated only when a charge‑sheet is issued; therefore the legal fiction could not be invoked because the charge‑sheet was filed post‑superannuation. Consequently, the charge‑sheet, enquiry report and the removal‑from‑service order were illegal and without jurisdiction. The Court dismissed the appeal of UCO Bank, allowed the respondent’s writ petition, and directed the bank to pay all retiral benefits. The judgment also affirmed that courts should not normally interfere with the quantum of punishment imposed by a disciplinary authority unless the proceeding itself is unlawful.

Issues considered

Whether disciplinary proceedings under Regulation 20(3)(iii) of the UCO Bank Officer Employees Services Regulations, 1979 can be validly initiated after an employee's superannuation when only show‑cause notices were issued before retirement.
Whether the legal fiction created by Regulation 20(3)(iii) applies when the charge‑sheet is issued post‑superannuation.
Whether an order of removal from service is valid when the employee is no longer in service.
Whether the High Court could interfere with the quantum of punishment imposed by the disciplinary authority.

Legislation cited

Banking Companies (Acquisition and Transfer of Undertakings) Act, 1970s. 19(2)
Code of Civil Procedures. Order 41 Rule 33
Constitution of Indias. Article 142

Subjects

disciplinary proceedingssuperannuationlegal fictioncharge‑sheetremoval from servicebanking regulationsUCO Bankretiral benefitsArticle 142CPC Order 41

Judgment

-
-4 UCO BANK AND ANR.
v.
A
RAJINDERLALCAPOOR

MAY 18, 2007

[S.B. SINHA AND MARKANDEY KA TJU, JJ.] B

>.,
Service Law-Disciplinary Proceedings-Initiation of-Under
Discipline and appeal Regulations-After Superannuation of the employee-
Propriety of-Charge-Sheet issued after date of superannuation-Prior to
superannuation only show-cause notices issued-Held : Disciplinary
c
proceedings could not have been initiated under the Regulations after
superannuation of the employee-Legal fiction under the provision of the
·regulations could have been invoked only if the proceedings had been
initiated while the employee was in service-Departmental proceeding is not
initiated merely by issuance of show cause notice-UCO Bank Officer D
.... Employees Services Regulations, 1979-/nterpretation of Statutes-Legal
~ Fiction-Constitution of India, 1950-Article 142.

Interpretation of Statutes-Legal Fiction-Scope and ambit of-He/fi:·
ls confirmed to the object and purport for which the case has been created.
E
Charge-skeet was issued against the respondent-employee, after his
superannuation in respect of irregularities in disbursing loan. Disciplinary
proceedings were initiated against him in terms of Regulation 20(3}(iii} of
UCO Bank Officer Employees Services Regulations, 1979. Before his
superannuation only show cause notices had been issued in respect of the
said irregularities. Disciplinary authority imposed penalty of removal from F
service. Appellate authority confirmed the order. Respondent filed Writ
Petition challenging framing of charges and the orders of the Disciplinary
and appellate authority. Single Judge of High Court though found tJte
respondent guilty of irregularities, but found the punishment disproportionate
to the gravity of charges. Hence converted the penalty of removal from service G
to that of compulsory retirement. Appeal thereagainst was dismissed by
Division Bench of High Court. Hence the present appeal

Dismissing the appea~ the Court

543 H
544. SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2007) 7 S.C.R.

A HELD : l. Ordinarily the High Court should not interfere with the
quantum of punishment im1>9sed by the Disciplinary Authority. It~ also true
._
that the officers of the bank enjoy a part ofconfidence and in the event a
Manager of a Bank is found to have .embezzled or misappropriated any amount,
or exceeded the jurisdiction in the ma,tter of grant of sanction o.f. loan~. the.
B Court takes a strict view of the matter~ (ParaJ6) (552-A-B)

2. However, in v.iew of the facts of the case, initiation of departmental
proceedin~s itself, was wholly illegal ~nd withoutjurfsdiction. ..
(Para 17) [552-C)

·. ·3~· By reason ofRegulation 20(3)(iii) of UCO Bank Officer Empioyees
C ·Service Regulations, 1979 a legal fiction has been create.:;. Obli~iOus of the
legal principle that legal fietion must be given full effect but the scope and
ambit of a legal fiction should be confined to the object and purport for which
the same_has been created. (Para 19) [552-F)

Dilip S. Dahanukar v.. Kotak.Mahindra Co. Ltd and Anr., . SCALE 452,
D . ..
· relied. on.
·1:,·

4. ·Regulation 20(3)(iii) however, could be invoked only when the -+
Disciplinary proceedings had clearly been initfated prior to the respondent's
ceasing to be in service. The terminologies used therein are ofSeminal
. : .. . . ~ . .
E importance. Only when adisciplinary proceeding has been initiated against
an officer of the bankdespite his attaining the age-of superannuation, can
the disciplinary proceeding be allowed on the basis of the legal fiction created
thereunder, i.e. continue "as if he was in service". Thus, only when a valid
departmental proceeding is initiated by reason of the legal fiction raised in
terms of the said provision, the deli~quent officer would be deemed to be in
F service although he has reached his age of superannuation. The departmental
proceeding, it is trite law, is not initiated merely by issuance of a show cause
notice. It is initiated only when a charge sheet is issued.
(Para 21) (553-B-CJ

Union of India etc. etc. v. K. V. Jankiraman,_etc. etc., AIR (1991) SC
G 2010 and Coal India Limited and Ors. v. Saroj Ku",,,a;. Mishra, (2007) 5 SCALE
724, relied oit. ~-t~

Union of India v. Sangram Keshari Nayak, (2007) 6 SCAL¥- 348,
referred to.
H
UCO BANK v. RAJINDER LAL CAPOOR [S.B. SINHA, J.] 545
5. Respondent, therefore, having been allowed to superannuate, only a A
proceeding, inter alia, (or withholding. of his pension under the Pension
Regulations could have been initiated against the respondent Discipline and
appeal Regulations were, thus not attracted. Consequently the charge sheet,
the enquiry report and the orders of punishment passed by the Disciplinary
Authority and the appellate Authority must be held to be illegal and without B
jurisdiction. (Para 2211554-8-C)

6. An order of dismissal or removal from service can be passed only
a
when an employee is in service. If person is not in employment, the question
of termination of his services ordinarily would not arise unless there exists
a specific rule in that behalf. (Para 2311554-DI
J.
c
7. As Regulation 20 is not applicable in the case of the respondent, the
entire proceeding initiated against the respondent became vitiated in law.

- [Para 23] (554-D]

8. The respondent did not question the correctness or otherwise of the
orders of the Single Judge who held him guilty of some irregularities. It is
permissible for him to raise all contentions in support of the order passed by
D
the Single Judge, in terms of the provisions contained in Order 41, Rule 33
CPC and the principles akin thereto. (Para 25] (554-F]

9. This Court in exercise of discretionary jurisdiction under Article
142 of the Constitution oflndia, allows the Writ Petition of the respondent to E
do complete justice to the parties. The appellant is directed to pay all retiral
benefits to the respondent expeditiously.
(Paras 27 and 28) (554-H; 555-A)

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 2739 of2007.
F
From the Final Judgment and Order dated 8.9.2006 of the High Court of
-t Punjab and Haryana at Chandigarh in LPA No. 174 of 2006;

Raju Ramachandran and Sr. Adv., Rajesh Singh for the Appellants.

Deepak Sibal, Ejaz Maqbool, Vikash Singh, Taruna Singh and Abhijeet
Sinha for the Respondent. G
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

S.B. SINHA, J. 1. Leave granted.

2. This appeal is directed against a Judgment and order dated 08.09.2006 H
546 SUPREME COORT REPORTS [2007) 7 S.C.R.

A passed by a Division Bench of the High Court of Punjab and Haryana at
Chandigarh in Letters Patent Appeal No. 174 of 2006, affinning the Judgment --+-
and Order dated l l .07 .2006 passed by a learned Single Judge of the said Court
in CWP No. 1902 of 200 I whereby the Writ Petition filed by the respondent
herein challenging the correctness or otherwise of the orders dated 27 .09. l 999
and 01.12.2000 passed by the Disciplinary Authority and the Appellate
B Authority respectively, was allowed in part by converting the punishment of
removal frllm the service of the respondent into compulsory retirement with
effect from the date of superannuation i.e. 0 l. l l. l 996.

3. The basic fact of the matter is not in dispute.

c Appellant No. I herein is a Nationalised Bank. It framed several "
regulations in exercise of its power conferred upon it under Section 19 (2) of
the Banking Companies (Acquisition and Transfer of Undertakings) Act,

-
1970, inter alia, UCO Bank Officer Employees' Services Regulations, 1979.
The Government oflndia launched a scheme known as 'Prime Minister Rozgar
D Yojana' (PMRY) with an objective to provide sustained employment to IO lacs
educated unemployed Urban Youth, the salient features whereof, inter alia,
_...
are as under :
+
"(a) The scheme would cover whole of the country from 1994-1995
onwards.
E
(b) The educated unemployed entrepreneurs would be given a subsidy
of 15% subject to a ceiling of Rs.7500/- each for starting the micro-
enterprises. ~,

(c) The beneficiary would be required to bring 5% of the project cost
F as margin money.

(d) An eligible entrepreneur under the scheme could take a composite +
loan upto Rs. I lac from a bank without a collateral guarantee project
for formal sponsoring/recommending back to the branches for
sanction."
G 4. The Reserve Bank of India issued guidelines/directions to work out
the modalities in respect of implementation of the said scheme to the Scheduled
Commercial Banks from time to time. Pursuant to one of such directions, the
Board of Directors of the Appellant-Bank in terms of a Circular letter dated ---y-
31.07 .1995 authorized the Branch Managers in Scales I & II to sanction
H composite loans upto Rs. I lac, stating :
UCO BANK v. RAJINDER LAL CAPOOR [S.B. SINHA, J.] 547

-4-
" During the last year, some of the Branch Managers in scale I A
& II did not have the necessary sanctioning powers to sanction and
disburse the PMRY applications sponsored to them. This had resulted
in considerable delay and Divisional Offices were required to process
these applications and advice sanctions to those branches which
could not dispose of applications at their level. To obviate this difficult
situation our Board of Directors have recently vested the Branch B
Managers in Scale I & II with necessary sanctioning powers and the
Branch Managers in scale I & II are now authorized to sanction
compositors loans (both tenn loan and working cap!tal finance) upto
Rs. l lac in each case in respect of PMRY scheme sponsored to them.
This delegation of powers has already been advised vide H.O. Circular c
No. CHD/SISB/18/95-96 Dt. 16.6.95."

· 5. Respondent while working in the capacity of the Branch Manager of
his Branch disbursed loan within the capacity to various persons whose
names had been recommended by the Chairman, Task Force Committee under
PMRY Scheme, 1996. For his alleged acts of omission and commission which D
included the purported irregularities committed by him in sanctioning and
..- disbursing the loans under the PMRY Scheme, a show cause notice was
...,..
issued upon him on 24.10.1996. On the eve of his retirement i.e. on 30.10.1996,
another show cause notice was issued to him purported to be in connection
with the irregularities committed by him in sanctioning and disbursing loans
under the said Scheme, while working as Branch Manager at Kohara Branch
E
of the appellant-Bank in 1996. Admittedly he was allowed to superannuate on
1.11.1996. He was however, not paid his retiral benefits. He made a representation
therefor. Inter alia, on the premise that a sum of Rs. 1 lac could not be
recovered from the two borrowers, the retiral benefits were not disbursed. The
Regional Office of the appellant-bank, however, recommended grant of tenninal F
-._ benefits in favour of the respondent, by a letter dated 14.05.1998 addressed
to the Zonal Office of the appellant- bank stating :

"In respect of the irregularities committed by Sh. Capoor vide our
show cause notice dated 30. l 0.1996 served on Sh. Capoor had since
been replied and in view of his request dt. 8.5.97 to keep G
Rs.50,000/- out of his terminal benefits as security against the loan
advanced to Sh. Satinder Singh (PMRY case) and the letter was sent
to you which was enclosed with our letter No. CDO/P/PER/97-98/1881
~-
DT. 14.5.97. Accordingly, we have kept Rs.50,000/- in the shape of
FDR for a 4 years 6 months with our Kohara branch. The present
H
548 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2007) 7 S.C.R.

A position of the loan account of Sh. Satinder Singh as of 20.3.98 is
balance out.Standing Rs.71,064/- with overdue of Rs. 9414/•. Sh. Satinder
Singh had deposited in the said loan account of Rs.50,000/- as
instalments upto 20.3.1998 and the last instalment is due in June 2001.

Sh. Capoor has since vacated the leased accommodation provided
B to him when he was posted as Manager at branch office Kohara and
he has returned all the furniture provided at his residence less 4
regulators offans and about Rs.2500/- has been claimed by the landlord
as electricity bill pending against the said occupation which will be
recovered from his terminal benefits.

C In view of the above facts, we recommend that Sh. Capoor should
be allowed the terminal benefits after retirement and no RDA be
initiated against him."

6. Curiously, despite the said recommendation, a charge-sheet was issued
on or about 13.11.1998. The articles of charges against him read as under:
D
"I. Sh. R.L.Capoor had failed to discharge his duties with utmost
integrity, honesty, devotion & diligence which is violative of Regulation
3(1) of UCO Bank Officer Employees (Conduct) Regulations, 1976 as
amended.
E 2. Sh. R.L.Capoor in the exercise of powers conferred on him, acted
otherwise, than in his best judgment which is violative of Regulation
3(3) of UCO Bank Officer Employees' (Conduct) Regulations, 1976, as
amended.
3. Sh. R.L; Capoor failed to take all possible steps to ensure the
F integrity and devotion to duty of all persons under his control and
authority which is violative of Regulation 3(4) of UCO Bank Officer .r
Employees' (Conduct) Regulations, 1976, as amended."

7. In the disciplinary proceedings, the Enquiry Officer in his report
dated 13 .09 J 999 opined that the Charges Nos. I and 2 had been proved,
G whereas Charge No. 3 had not been proved. The summary of the findings of
the Enquiry Offi.cer are as under :
AJJegation No. I First Part proved

H
UCO BANK v. RAJINDER LAL CAPOOR (S.B. SINHA, J.] 549

Second Part not proved A
Allegation No. 2 2(a) proved
2(b) proved
2(c) Not proved
2(d) Proved
2(e) Proved
B
2(f) Not proved
2(g) Not proved
2(h) Not proved
Second part Not proved

'
Allegation No. 3 Not proved c
Allegation No. 4 Not proved

Charge No. 1
The CSOE had failed to Proved as per
discharge his duties with discussions under
D
utmost integrity, honesty, allegations I & 2
devotion an diligence
.....
_., which is violation of
Regulation 3(1) of UCO
Bank Officer Employees'
(Conduct) Regulation, E
1976 as amended.
Charge No.2
The CSOE in exercise of powers rroved as per
conferred on him acted otherwise discussions under F
than in his best judgment which is allegations 1 & 2
~
Violative of Regulation 3(3) of
t
UCO Bank Officer Employees'
(Conduct) Regulation, 1976 as
amended.
G
Charge No.3
The CSOE failed to take all Not proved
possible steps to ensure the
integrity and devotion to duty
of aJJ persons under his control H
and authority which is violative
550 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2007] 7 S.C.R.

A of Regulation 3(4) of the
UCO Bank Officer Employees'
(Conduct) Regulation, 1976
as amended.
8. The Disciplinary Authority by an order dated 27.09.1999, however,
B upon purported consideration of the findings of the Enquiry Officer as also
the comments thereupon by the respondent, imposed upon the respondent,
the penalty of removal from service. The appeal preferred thereagainst was
dismissed by the Appellate Authority by an order dated Ol.12.2000.
Respondent filed a Writ Petition in the High Court of Punjab and Haryana,
C praying for quashing of the charge-sheet dated 13. l l.1998 as also the orders
dated 27.09.1999 and Ol.12.2000. The learned Single Judge of the said Court,
as indicated hereinbefore, allowed the Writ Petition in part opining that the
respondent was guilty of commission of procedural irregularities in the matter
of sanctioning and disbursing the amount of loans under the PMRY Scheme.
The learned Judge arrived at a finding that the punishment imposed upon the
D respondent was grossly disproportionate, vis-a-vis, the gravity of charges
framed against him and upon taking into consideration the fact that the
respondent had an unblemished 40 years of service career. It was, thus, held
that imposition c·f the said penalty after he attained the age of superannuation
would not be proper. It was, therefore, opined that the penalty ofremoval from
E service should be converted to that of compulsory retirement.

9. The Letters Patent Appeal preferred against there has been dismissed
by a Division Bench of the said Court.

IO. Appellants are, thus, before us.
F
11. Mr. Raju Ramachandran, learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf
of the appellant, would submit :

(i) The High Court committed a manifest error in passing the
impugned judgment so far as it interfered with the quantum of
G punishment imposed upon the respondent by the ·Disciplinary
Authority and the Appellate Authority.
(u) Interference with the finding of fact arrived at in a departmental
enquiry being impermissible, the High Court committed a manifest
error in passing the impugned judgment.
H (ill) Validity of the charge-sheet having not been interfered with, the
UCO BANK v. RAJINDER LAL CAPOOR [S.B. SINHA, J.] 551
learned Single Judge committed a serious error in interfering with A
the quantum of punishment.

12. Strong reliance, in this behalf, has been placed oh Disciplinary
Authority-cum-Regional Manager & Ors. v. Nikunja Bihari Patnaik~ [1996]
9 SCC 69; Bank ofIndia & Anr. v. Degala Suryanarayana, [1999] 5 SCC 762;
Chairman and Managing Director, United Commercial Bank & Ors. v. P.C. B
Kakkar, [2003] 4 SCC 364, and Damoh Panna Sagar Rural Regional Bank
and Anr. v. Munna Lal Jain, JT (2005) l SC 70 and [2006] 10 SCC 572.

13. Mr. Deepak Sibbal, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the
respondent, on the other hand, contended :
c
(i) The appellant bank having not suffered any financial loss, the
purported irregularities committed by the respondent were trivial in
nature.

(ii) A target having been fixed to be achieved by the Appellant-Bank
in respect of the PMRY Scheme and emphasis was laid upon every D
Branch Manager to achieve the same, it cannot be said that the
respondent exceeded his jurisdiction in the matter of sanctioning and
disbursing the loans.

(iii) Only because the purpose for grant of loan was changed and E
recommendation of the ~ask Force Committee was not strictly adhered
to, cannot by itself be a ground for imposition of such a harsh
punishment, particularly when no ill will or motive on his part was
alleged or established.

14. It is evident from thereport of the Enquiry Officer that the illegalities F
which are said to have been committed are principally two being :

1) The proposal of the Task Force for grant ofloan for Rs.50;000/- for
the purpose of setting up a cream separator was altered to dairy and
a sum of Rs. 95,000/- was sanctioned therefor.

2) Two cheques for a sum of Rs.19,5000/- and Rs. 5,000/- were issued G
in favour of Shri Paramjit Singh, who is the real brother of the borrower
Satinder Singh.

15. The charges of forgery and interpolation also are said to have been
restricted to the said transactions only. H
552 SUPREME COURT REPORTS .· • (2007] 7 S.C.R.

A 16. We agree with the contention of Mr Raju Ramachandran that
ordinarily the High Court should not interfere with the quantum of punishment
imposed by the Disciplinary Authority. It is also true that the officers of the
bank enjoys a part of confidence and in the event a Manager of a Bank is
found to have embezzled or misappropriated any amount, or excee.ded the
B · jurisdiction in the matter of grant of sanction of loans, the Court takes a strict
view of the matter.

17, The High Court, therefore, may not be correct in arriving at its
opinion. However; as would appear from the discussions made hereinafter,
initiation of th~ departmental proceedings itself, in our considered opinion,
C was wholly illegal and without jurisdiction.

IS. The fact that charge-sheet was issued only on l3J l.98 \°vas not in
dispute~ It also stands admitted that the respondent attained the age· of
superannuation on or before 0 l. l l .1996. Disciplinary Proceedings admitt~dly.
were initiated against the respondent in terms of Regulation 20 (3)(iii) of UCO
D Bank Officer Employees Services Regulations, 1979 which reads as under:

"The officer against whom disciplinary proceedings have been initiated
will cease to be in service on the date Of superannuation but the
disciplinary proceedings will continue as ifhe was in service until the
proceedings are concluded and final order is passed in respect thereof.
E The concerned officer will not receive any pay and/or allowance after
the date of superannuation. He will also not be entitled for the payment
of retirement benefits till the proceedings are completed and fmal
order is passed thereon except his.own contributions to CPF."

19. A bare perusal of the said provision would clearly show that by
F reason thereof a legal fiction has been created. We are not oblivious of the
legal principle" that a legal fiction must be given full effect but it is equally --r-
well-settled that the scope and ambit of a legal fiction should be confmed to·
the object and purport for which the same has been created.

G 20. In Dilip S. Dahanukar v. Kotak Mahindra Co. Ltd and Anr., [2007]
5 SCALE 452, it was observed :
"46.Legal fiction, it is well-settled, must be construed having
regard to the purport of the statue. {See Sadashiv Dada Patil v.
Purushottam Onkar Patil (D) By Lrs. [2006] 10 SCALE 21); MP. State
Electricity Board v. Union of India & Ors., [2006] 9 SCALE 194;
H
·< UCO BANK v. RAJINDER LAL CAPOOR [S.B. SINHA, J.) 553

~
Maruti Udyog Ltd. v. Ram /al & Ors., [2005] 2 SCC 638 and Bharat A
Petroleum Corpn. Ltd v. P. Kesavan & Anr., [2004] 9 SCC 772}"

21. The aforementioned Regulation, however, could be invoked only
when the Disciplinary Proceedings had clearly been initiated prior to the
respondent's ceasing to be in service. The terminologies used therein are of
seminal importance. Only when a disciplinary proceeding has been initiated B
against an officer of the bank despite his attaining the age of superannuation,
..., can the disciplinary proceeding be allowed on the basis of the legal fiction
·....- created thereunder, i.e., continue "as if he was in service". Thus, only when
a valid departmental proceeding is initiated by reason of the legal fiction
raised in terms of the said provision, the delinquent officer woul.d be deemed
to be in service although he has reached his age of superannuation. The
c
departmental proceeding, it is trite law, is not initiated merely by issuance of
a show cause notice. It is initiated only when a chargesheet is issued (See
Union of India etc. etc. v. K. V. Jankiraman, etc. etc. reported in AIR ( 1991)
SC 2010). This aspect of the matter has also been considered by this Court
recently in Coal India Limited & Ors. v. Saroj Kumar Mishra, (2007) 5 D
~
SCALE 724 wherein it was held that date of application of mind on the
.;.. allegations levelled against an officer by the Competent Authority as a result
whereof a chargesheet is issued would be the date on which the disciplinary
proceedings said to have been initiated and not prior thereto. Pendency of
·a preliminary enquiry, therefore, by itself cannot be a ground for invoking
Ckuse 20 of the Regulations. Albeit in a different fact situation but involving
E
a similar question of law in Coal India Ltd (supra) this Court held :

"13. It is not the case of the appellants that pursuant to or in furtherance
of the complaint received by the vigilance department, the competent
authority had arrived at a satisfaction as is required in terms of the
F
....,_ said circulars that a chargesheet was likely to be issued on the basis
of a preliminary enquiry held in that behalf or otherwise.
_J

'
14. The circular letters issued by the appella.its put restrictions on a
valuable right of an employee. They, therefore, are required to be
construed strictly. So construed there cannot be any doubt whatsoever
G
that the conditions precedent contained therein must be satisfied
before any action can be taken in that regard."

~ It was further more observed that :

"20. A departmental proceeding is ordinarily said to be initiated only
H
554 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2007) 7 S.C.R.

A when a chargesheet is issued."
+"
(See also Union ofIndia v. Sangram Keshari Nayak, (2007]'6 SCALE
348)

22. Respondent, therefore, having been allowed to superannuate, only
a proceeding, inter a/ia, for withholding of his pension under the Pension
B
Regulations could have been initiated against the respondent. Discipline and
...
,.
Appeal Regulations were, thus not attracted. Consequently the char.gesheet,
the enquiry report and the orders of punishment passed by the Disciplinary •
--,'"

Authority and the Appellate Authority must be heid to be illegal and without
jurisdiction.
c
23. An order of dismissal or removal from service can be passed only
when an employee is in service. If a person is not in employment, the question
of terminating his services ordinarily would not arise unless there exists a
specific rule in that behalf. As Regulation 20 is not applicable in the case of
the respondent, we have no other option but to hold that the entire proceeding r
D initiated against the respondent became vitiated in law.

24. We are not oblivious of the peculiar legal position obtaining in this 'f·
..
case. A gross illegality has been committed by the appellant in initiating a
departmental proceeding against the respondent but he· did not question the
same. The learned Single Judge of the High Court held him guilty of commission
E
of some irregularities. He did not question the correctness or otherwise of the
said order also.
r-
25. However, the legal effect of the order passed by the learned Single
Judge could be that he became entitled to receive all retiral benefits. Thus,
F in our opinion, it is permissible for him to raise all contentions in support of
the order passed by the learned Single Judge, in terms of the provisions
contained in Order 41, Rule 33 of the Code of Civil Procedure and the
-r ....__
~

principles akin thereto. F

26. Furthermore, the respondent has retired as far back as on 01.11.1996.
G At this late stage, we are of the opinion that we should not allow an illegality j
to be perpetuated which is otherwise apparent on the face of his record. '

27. We, therefore, are of the opinion that although the learned Single ./
-r· ~
Judge and also the Division Bench of the High Court may not be correct in
'
passing the impugned judgments, we should in exercise of discretionary
H

t
UCO BANK v. RAJINDER LAL CAPOOR [S.B. SINHA. J.] 555
"'+ jurisdiction under Article 142 of the Constitution of lndia, should allow the A
Writ Petition of the respondent to do complete justice to the parties.

28. We direct the appellant to pay all retiral benefits to the respondent
expeditiously.

29. The Appeal is dismissed with aforementioned directions. However, B
in the facts and circumstances of the case, there shall be no order as to costs.

K.K.T. Appeal dismissed.

.........
+