Holding

A High Court may not frame an additional substantial question of law without giving notice and an opportunity to the parties, and its judgment in such circumstances must be set aside.

Summary

The plaintiff, U.R. Virupakshaiah, filed a partition suit alleging that the disputed lands were joint family property. The High Court, hearing a second appeal under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, framed an additional substantial question of law concerning the existence of a joint Hindu family while dictating its judgment, without giving the parties notice or an opportunity to be heard. The Supreme Court held that, although a High Court may formulate a new substantial question of law at a later stage, it must comply with the proviso to Section 100 by notifying the parties and allowing them to present arguments. The Court also clarified that the presumption of a joint family weakens with each successive generation and the burden of proof lies on the plaintiff to establish the joint family status. Consequently, the High Court's judgment was set aside and the matter remitted for fresh consideration, with the appeal allowed.

Issues considered

Whether a High Court exercising jurisdiction under Section 100 CPC can frame an additional substantial question of law while dictating judgment without referring to the questions framed at the time of admission of the second appeal.
Whether the parties must be given notice and an opportunity to be heard before such a substantial question of law is formulated.
Whether the presumption of existence of a joint Hindu family diminishes with successive generations and who bears the burden of proof.
Whether the High Court can interfere with findings of fact based on inadmissible evidence or unraised presumptions.

Legislation cited

Subjects

Section 100 CPCsubstantial question of lawsecond appealjoint Hindu familypresumption of joint familyburden of proofprocedural fairnessnotice and opportunity to be heard

Judgment

[2008] 17 S.C.R. 877

U.R. VIRUPAKSHAIAH A
v.
SARVAMMA & ANR.
(Civil Appeal No. 7346 of 2008)

DECEMBER 17, 2008
B
[S.B. SINHA AND CYRIAC JOSEPH, JJ.]

CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, 1908:
s. 100 - Second appeal - High Court formulating
additional substantial question of law while dictating judgment
c
in open court - Propriety of - Held: Before such a substantial
question of law could be formulated, parties should have been
put to notice and given an opportunity (o meet the same -
High Court did not at all deal with the substantial questions D
of law formulated at the time of admission of the second
appeal - Judgment of High Court set aside and matter
remitted to it for consideration afresh - Hindu Law - Existence
of joint family - Presumption.

In the instant appeal, filed by the plaintiff against the E
judgment of the High Court passed in a second appeal
arising out of a partition suit, the question for
consideration before the Court was: whether the High
Court, in exercise of its jurisdiction u/s 100 CPC could,
F
while dictating the judgment, frame an additional question
. ""'
- of law and answer the same without even referring to the
questions of law formulated at the time of admission of
. . the second appeal?
Allowing the appeal, the Court G

HELD: 1.1. In view of the Code of Civil Procedure
(Amendment) Act, 1976, it is now essential for the High
Court to formulate a substantial question of law. Although
877 H
878 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 17 S.C.R.

A the High Court has requisite jurisdiction to formulate a
substantial question of law at a subsequent stage which
~
was not formulated at the time of admission of the second "
appeal, but the requirerrients laid down in the proviso
appended to s.100 of the Code were required to be met.
B The High Court formul"t~d the additional substantial
question of law while djctating the judgment in open
court and did not record any reason therefor. Before such
a substantial question of law could be formulated, the
parties shouldhave been put to notice. They should have
c been given an opportunity to meet the same. The prayer
r -
,,_
'---

of the appellant to grant some time to deal with the said
question w~s declined: The High Court failed to take into
consideration the fact that ~Y framing the additional
substantial question of law, a .new case is sought to be
D
made out. (Para 12 and 13] (886-B-C]
2.1. The High Court proceeded on the presumption
that the plaintiff and the defendants belong to the fourth
generation of the common ancestor. In holding so, the
E High Court wrongly included the propositors as the first
generation. The plaintiff and the defendants were the third
generation of the propositors. It is well settled that the ...
presumption in reg~rd to existence of joint family gets
weaker and weaker from descendant to descendant and
F
such weak presumption can be rebutted by adduction of
~~-
slight evidence of separate possession of the properties
in which even the burden would shift to the plaintiff to
prove that the family was a joint family. But it is evident
G
that no such contention was raised. No substantial
question of law in this behalf was framed. [Paras 11 ;15
and 16] (885-C; 886.-F; 888 ..E]
Nune Prasad &, Ors. v. Nune Ramakrishna 2008 (10)
~ ...
SCALE 523; Panchugopal Baiua & Ors. v. Umesh Chandra
H
.. U.R. VIRUPAKSHAIAH v. SARVAMMA & ANR. 879

Goswami & Ors. (1997) 4 SCC 713; Kshitish Chandra Purkait A
·~ v. Santosh Kumar Purkait & Ors. (1997) 5 SCC 438; Bhagwan
...,
Dayal (since deceased) and thereafter his heirs and legal
representatives Bansgopa/ Dubey & Anr. V. Mst. Reoti Devi
(deceased) and after her death, Mst. Dayavati, her daughter
AIR 1962 SC 287 and Bhagwati Prasad v. Shri Chandramaul B
(1966) 2 SCR 286, referred to.

- ~
Hero· Vinoth (Minor) v. Sheshammal (2006) 5 SCC 545,
held inapplicable.
2.2. The High Court's jurisdiction to interfere with a c
finding of fact may not be limited in a case of this nature
where-the finding of fact had been arrived at upon taking
into consideration inadmissible evidence and based on
presumptions which could not have been raised. The
premise on which, therefore, the High Court reversed the D

...
judgment of the courts below was non-existent. [Para 11
and 16] [885-C; 887-H]
Makhan Singh (Dead) By Lrs. V. Ku/want Singh (2007)
10 sec 602, distinguished. E
Mui/a 's Hindu Law (17th Edn) Article 212(2), 213 -
.. referred to .
3. The High Court did not deal with the substantial
questions of law formulated at the time of admission at
F
• • ..>· . ...,. all. The judgment of the High Court is set aside and the
matter is remitted to it for consideration of the matter
afresh. In the event the High Court opines that any
substantial question of law should be framed suo motu
or at the instance of the appellant before it, it shall give G
an opportunity of hearing to the other side. [Para 18] [891-
..> ,....
C-0]

Case Law Reference:
(
2008 (10) SCALE 523 referred to Para ·12 H
'
880 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008) 17 S.C.R.
. ,,

A (1997) 4 sec 113 referred to Para 12
r-...
(1997) 5 sec 438 referred to Para 12 ...
AIR 1962 SC 287 referred to Para 16
(1966) 2 SCR 286 referred to Para 16
B
(2006) 5 sec 545 held inapplicable Para 17
(2007) 1o sec 602 distinguished Para 17 -yr
....
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No.
c 7346 of 2008.
"'
From the final Judgment and Order dated 6.3.2007 of the
High Court of Karnataka at Bang~lore in Regular Second
Appeal No. 1359 of 2006.
D
S.B. Sanyal, Kiran Suri, S.J. Amith and Aparna Bhat for
the Appellant.

G.V. Chandrasekhar, N.K. Verma and Anjana
Chandrashekar for the Respondents.
E
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

S.B. SINHA, J. 1. Leave granted.

2. Whether the High Court, while exercising its jurisdiction
F under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, could, while
dictating the judgment, frame an additional question of law and r-----..- •
allow the same without even referring to the questions of law
formulated at the time of admission thereof, arises for
consideration herein.
G
3. Before, however, adverting to the said question, we
may notice the factual matrix involved in the matter.

H
U.R. VIRUPAKSHAIAH v. SARVAMMA & ANR. 881
[S.B. SINHA, J.]

, A
Nanjappa
(Propositus)
"''

J I I
/
, 'I , '
Channapasappa Mallappa Revanna

' .) .I
' .)
c
I I 'I , I
'I
Revanns Chikkasiddappa Dead and
Siddappa Shetty unmarried
(Dead) (Dead) and issueless
,
I I
'
'I
D
'
Virupakashappa T.C. Nanjappa
Plaintiff/Petitioner (Original Defen-
dant-Dead)
, ....

I I E
~
Sarvamanga Ia ,
, Kathayani
(Widow) (D.1 )(a)/ D.1 (b)/Present
Present Respondent
Respondent No.1 . . No.2
F
One Nanjappa was the owner of the property. The admitted
genealogical table of the family is as under:
4. Virupakashappa filed a suit for partition claiming share
in Survey No.197/2 measuring 11 acres 22 guntas, Survey
No.203/3 measuring 3.2 acres, Survey No.203/6 measuring 2 G
acres 21 guntas and a house property situated at
Chikkathotulkere, Tumkur Taluk, District Tumkur in the year
1996. Defendants-Respondents, inter a/ia, in their written
statements denied and disputed the said genealogical table.
It is profitable to refer thereto : H
882 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 17 S.C.R.

A "It is false to state that land bearing survey No.197/3
measures 11-22 guntas, schedule properties are not
appropriate with the existing one. The plaintiff with a mala ,,_ ,,.
fide intention filed this suit. Plaintiff has not got any kind of
blood relationship with the defendants.
- The defendant's
.
grand father was enjoying the properties since long days
B
back in the year 1946 when the grand father was died the
revenue entries were changed into defendant's father's
name, since 1956 the defendant is enjoying the entire
schedule properties together with other properties as the
absolute owner with title and possession. The defendant -r
.
c has sold piece of land for family maintenance. He has
improved the said lands and he raised coconut trees with
water supply some time he has raised loan,s by
mortgaging the schedule properties.
Plaintiff is utter stranger and he has no relationship with
D this defendant. He has filed this suit to gain by an unlawful .
way."
It was furthermore contended that revenue entries
throughout stood in the name of the father of the defendant and
"
they have been exercising ownership rights over the lands in
E suit since time immemorial.
5. The learned Trial Judge, in view of the abovenoted rival
contentions of the parties, inter alia, framed the following issues:
"1. Whether the plaintiff proves that the suit schedule
properties are the ancestral and joint family
F
properties of the plaintiff and defendants and they
are in joint possession of the same? ,..._.....,
2. Whether the plaintiff further proves that the
defendant has unlawfully got\the revenue entries of
the suit schedule property to his own name, with
G
ulterior motive and refused to allot the half share to
the plaintiff in the su!t schedule property?
3. Whether the plaintiff further proves that he is entitled
"r ..
for half share in the suit schedule property and
mesne profits?"
H
U.R. VIRUPAKSHAIAH v. SARVAMMA & ANR. 883
[S.B. SINHA, J.]

Parties not only adduced oral evidence before the learned A
Trial Judge but placed on record a large number of documents
to prove their respective cases. Before the learned Trial Judge
........,
........
a Deed of Mortgage purported to have been executed by
Chennapasappa and R~venna was brought on record to show
that they had been entering into separate transactions in regard B
to portions of the purported joint family property. The learned
Trial Judge opined that the plaintiff is entitled to a decree for
partition against the defendants except the property mortgaged
by his father to one Krishnappa. It was held that there was no
evidence regarding any further transaction.
~

6. An appeal preferred thereagainst by the respondent
c
was dismissed holding that the plaintiff was not able to prove
that the properties in suit continued to be the joint family
property.
7. A second appeal was preferred thereagainst by the D
respondent. Two substantial questions of law were framed at
'
the time of admission of the appeal :
-"1. Whether the Courts below were justified in holding
that the recital in the mortgage deed Ex.01 which
is one of the year 1922 which came into existence E
at an undisputed point of time, do not establish the
partition between Channabasappa, Mallappa and
Revenna, sons of Nanjappa?
2. Whether the First Appellate Court was justified in
rejecting the application filed under Order 41 Rule F
27 and also a~lication for amendment of written
statement setti g up the plea of prior partition?"
.> -1
However, the High Court, after hearing the counsel for the
parties and at the time of dictating a judgment, sought to frame
a new question of law which reads as under :
G
"Whether the Courts below are justified in holding that
there exists a joint family and the suit schedule properties
are joint family properties in the light of the admitted fact
; -y that the plaintiff and defendant belonged to 4th generation
and the plaintiff has admitted in categorical terms in his H
884 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 17 S.C.R.

A evidence that there was a partition in the family 80 years
back and in the absence of any material placed by the
plaintiff to show either the existence of the joint family or ~
,.,
that the schedule properties are joint family properties.?"
8. So as to enable the appellant herein to make
B submissions on the said additional substantial question of law,
an opportunity was soughtto be granted. Appellant-sought for
eight days' time which, having been found to be unreasonable,
was declined. The learned Judge proceeded with the judgment
and allowed the respondent's appeal. -r
c 9. Mr. S.B. Sanyal, learned senior counsel appearing on
behalf of the appellant, urged :
1. The additional substantial question of law having
been framed during the course of the judgment
without recording reasons, therefore, must be held
D to be impermissible in law and as no reasonable :
opportunity was given to the appellant to show that
no such question of law arose for consideration
before the High Court, the impugned judgment
cannot be sustained.
E 2. A new issue and/or point cannot be allowed to be
urged for the first time before the High Court,
particularly when, by reason thereof, it would be
entering into the forbidden arena of appreciation of ,..
evidence for the purpose of reversal of the
concurrent findings of fact arrived at by two courts.
F
3. The question as to whether_ there had been a
)'----'
previous partition or not being a pure question of
fact, the High Court could not have entered into
evidences adduced by the parties to hold that the
predecessor's, in interest of the parties, had
G
partitioned the properties.
4. The High Court proceeded to determine the issue
as regards jointness of the property on a wrong y ..
a
premise that the parties belong to fourth generation
of the properties.
H
U.R. VIRUPAKSHAIAH v. SARVAMMA & ANR. 885
[S.B. SINHA, J.]

10. Mr. G.V. Chandrasekhar, learned counsel appearing A
on behalf of the respondent, on the other hand, would contend
,
.... that the learned Trial Judge as also the First Appeilate Court
having not taken into consideration the vital admission of the
plaintiff as regards previous partition as also other evidences
brought on record which clearly show that the parties had been B
in separate possession for a long time, the impugned judgment
should not be interfered with.
11. It is well settled that the presumption in regard to
existence of joint family gets weaker and weaker from
descendant to descendant and such weak presumption ·can be c
rebutted by adduction of slight evidence of separate possession
of the properties in which even the burden would shift to the
plaintiff to prove that the family was a joint family.
The High Court's jurisdiction to interfere with a finding of
fact may not be limited in a case of this nature where the finding D
...
of fact had been arrived at upon taking into consideration
inadmissible evidence and based on presumptions which could
not have been raised.
12. The Code of Civil Procedure was amended in the year
1976 by reason of Code of Civil Procedure (Amendment) Act, E
1976. In terms of the said amendment, it is now essential for
the High Court to formulate a substantial question of law. The
.:,, judgments of the Trial Court and the First Appellate Court can
be interfered with only upon formulation of a substantial question
of law, if any, which has arisen for its consideration by the High
Court. It, furthermore, should not ordinarily frame a substantial F
• -'i -'( question of law at a subsequent stage without assigning any
reason therefor and without giving a reasonable opportunity of
hearing to the respondents. {See Nune Prasad & Ors. v. Nune
Ramakrishna [2008 (10) SCALE. 523]; Panchugopal Barua
& Ors. v. Umesh Chandra Goswami & Ors. [(1997) 4 SCC 713 G
paras 8 and 9]; and Kshitish Chandra Purkait v. Santosh
Kumar Purkait & Ors. [(1997) 5 SCC 438 paras 10 and 12]}.
-.. 13. The High Court, in this case, however, formulated a
..; substantial question of law while dictating the judgment in open
H
886 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 17 S.C.R.

A court. Before such a substantial question of law could be
formulated, the parties should have been put to notice. They
should have been given an opportunity to meet the same.
Although the court has the requisite jurisdiction to formulate a
substantial question of law at a subsequent stage which was
not formulated at the time of admission of the second appeal
8
but the requirements laid down in the proviso appended to
Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedures were required to
be met. The High Court did not record any reason for
formulating the additional question. The prayer of the appellant T
to grant some time to deal with the said question was declined.
C The High Court failed to take into consideration the fact that
by framing the additional substantial question Of law, a new
case is sought to be made out.
14. Principal contention raised on behalf of the defendant-
respdnd~nt, in their written statement, ·as noticed hereinbefore,
D was non..;existence of any relationship between the parties. We,
however, do not mean to suggest that defendants cannot raise
inconsistent pleas but the same should have been kept in mind
by the High Court. It might or might not have been possible for
the High Court to consider the question of law raised on the
E basis of the facts found by the courts below, but, indisputably,
the High Court without recording sufficient reasons, could not
allow the appellant to raise absolutely a new contention which
was beyond the pleadings of the parties.
15. The High Court furthermore proceeded on the
F presumption that the plaintiff and the defendants belong toJhe
fourth generation of Nanjappa. In holding s_o, the High Court
wrongly included the propositors as the first generation. The
plaintiff and the defendants were the third generation of the
propositors.
G In Mu/la's Hindu Law (17th Edn) Article 212(2), 213, it is
stated:
"§ 212. Joint Hindu family- (1) ...

H
(2) The joint and undivided family is the normal condition
of Hindu society. An undivided Hindu family is ordinarily
-
U.R. VIRUPAKSHAIAH v. SARVAMMA & ANR. 887
[S.B. SINHA, J.]

joint not only in estate but also in food and worship. The A
existence of joint estate is not an essential requisite to
constitute a joint family and a family, which does not own
any property, may nevertheless be joint. Where there is joint
estates, and the members of the family become separate
in estate, the family ceases to be joint. Mere severance in 8
food and worship does not operate as a separation.
a
Possession of joint family property is not necessary
requisite for the constitution of a joint Hindu family. Hindus
get a joint family status by birth, and the joint family property
is only an adjunct of the joint family." · c
xxx xxx xxx
§ 213. Hindu coparcenary - A Hindu coparcenary is a
much narrower body than the joint family. It includes only
those persons who acquire by birth an interest in the joint
or coparcenary property. These are the sons, grandsons D
and great:grandsons of the holder of the joint property for'
the time being, in other words, the three generations next
to the holder in unbroken male descent. See§ 217. The
above propositions must be read in the light of what. has
been stated in the note at the top of this chapter.
E
To understand the formation of a coparcenary, it is,
important to note the distinction between ancestral
property and separate property. Property inherited by a·
Hindu from his father, father's father or father's fathers'.
father, is ancestral property. Property inherited by him from F
other relations is his separate property. The essential·
feature of ancestral property is that if the person inheriting .
it has sons, grandsons or great-grandsons, they become
joint owner's coparceners with him. They become entitled ·
to it due to their birth~ These propositions also must be
read in the light of what has been stated in the note at the G
top of this· chapter."
16. The premise on which, therefore, the High Court
reversed the judgment of the courts below was non-existent.

- Mr. Chandrasekhar may be right in his submission that the H
888 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 17 S.C.R.

A presumption with regard to the existence of joint family gets
weaker and weaker from descendant to descendant. It has
been so held by this Court in Bhagwan Dayal (since deceased) ~
and thereafter his heirs and legal representatives Bansgopal
Dubey & Anr. V. Mst. Reoti Devi (deceased) and after her
death, Mst. Dayavati, her daughter [AIR 1962 $C 287] in the
B
following terms :
"16. The general principle is that every Hindu family is
presumed to-be joint unless the contrary is proved; but this
presumption can be rebutted by direct evidence or by ...,
course of conduct. It is also settled that there is no
c presumption that when one member separates from
others that the latter remain united; whether the latter
remain united or not must be decided on the facts of each ·~

case. To these it may be added that in the case of old
transactions when no contemporaneous documents are
D maintained and when most of the active participants in the
transactions have passed away, though the burden still
remains on the person who asserts that there was a
t-
partition, it is permissible to fill up gaps more readily by
reasonable inferences than in a case where the evidence
E is not obliterated by passage of time."
[See also Bhagwati Prasad v. Shri Chandramaul [(1966)
2 SCR 286].
But it is evident that no such contention was raised. No -....,
substantial question of law in this behalf was framed.
F
17. Mr. Chandrasekhar would contend.that the jurisdiction
of the High Court to interfere with the findings of fact is not ,__ " ·-
limited. Reliance has been placed on Hero Vinoth (Minor) v.
Sheshammal [(2006) 5 SCC 545], wherein it was held :
"19. It is not within the domain of the High Court to
G
investigate the grounds on which the findings were arrived
at, by the last court of fact, being the first. appellate court.
It is true that the lower appellate court should not ordinarily

H
reject witnesses accepted by the trial court in respect of
credibility but even where it has rejected the witnesses
~

-...
U.R. VIRUPAKSHAIAH v. SARVAMMA & ANR. 889
[S.8. SINHA, J.]

accepted by the trial court, the same is no ground for A
"---j interference in second appeal when it is found that the
appellate court has given satisfactory reasons f.or doing so.
In a case where from a given set of circumstances two
inferences of fact are possible, the one drawn by the lower
appellate court will not be interfered by the High Court in B
second appeal. Adopting any other approach is not
permissible. The High Court will, however, interfere where
/ it is found that the conclusions drawn by the lower
'Y
appellate court were erroneous being contrary to the
mandatory provisions of law applicable or its settled
position on the basis of pronouncements made by the c
Apex Court, or. was based upon inadmissible evidence
or arrived at by ignoring material evidence."
It was furthermore held :
"23. To be "substantial" a question of law must be 0
debatable, not previously settled by law of the land or a
binding precedent, and must have a material bearing on
the decision of the case, if answered either way, insofar
as the rights of the parties before it are concerned. To be
a question of law "involving in the case" there must be first
a foundation for it laid in the pleadings and the question E
should emerge from the sustainable findings of fact arrived
-· at by court of facts and it must be necessary to decide that
question of law for a just and proper decision of the case.
An entirely new point raised for the first time before the
High Court is not a question involved in the case unless it F
'-.
----. goes to the root of the matter. It will, therefore, depend on
the facts and circumstance of each case whether a
question of law is a substantial one and involved in the
case or not, the paramount overall consideration being the
need for striking a judicious balance between the G

--
indispensable obligation to do justice at all stages and
impelling necessity of avoiding prolongation in the life of
f- any lis. (See Santosh Hazari v. Purushottam Tiwari.)
24. The principles relating to Section 100 CPC relevant
for this case may be summarised thus: H

.
890 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 17 S.C.R.

A (i)
(ii) The High Court should be satisfied that the case
.involves a substantial question of law, and not a
mere question of law. A question of law having a
material bearing on the decision of the case (that
8 is, a question, answer to which affects the rights of
parties to the suit) will be a substantial question of
law, if it is not covered by any specific provisions
of law or settled legal principle emerging from
binding precedents, and, involves a debatable legal
issue. A substantial question of law will also arise
c in a contrary situation, where the legal position is
clear, either on account of express provisions of law
or· binding precedents, but the court below has
decided the matter, either ignoring or acting
contrary to such legal principle. In the second type
D of cases, the substantial question of law arises not
because the law is still debatable, but because the
decision rendered on a material question, violates
the settled position of law."
The principles laid down therein do not advance the case
E of the respondents as the High Court did not arrive at any
finding which could involve their application to the facts of the
present case.
In Ma.khan Singh (Dead) By Lrs. V. Ku/want Singh [(2007)
1.0 sec 602] whereupon again reliance has been placed by
F Mr. Chandrasekhar, this Court held :
"9. The High Court has also rightly observed that there· was
no presumption that the property owned by the members
of the joint Hindu family could a fortiori be deemed to be
of the same character and to prove such a status it had to
G be established by the propounder that a nucleus of joint
Hindu family income was available and that the said
property had been purchased from the.said nucleus and
that the burden to prove such a situation lay on the party,
•
who so asserted it. The ratio of K. V. Narayanaswami Iyer
H
U.R. VIRUPAKSHAIAH v. SARVAMMA & ANR. 891
[S.B. SINHA, J.]

case2 is thus clearly applicable to the facts of the case. We A
are therefore in full agreement with tfle High Court on this
aspec~ as well. From the above, ·it would be evident that
the High Court has not made a simpliciter reappraisal of
the evidence to arrive at conclusions different from those
of the courts below, but has corrected an error as to the 8
onus of proof on the existence or otherwise of a joint Hindu
family property."
18. The instant case does not come within the purview of
the aforementioned dicta. The High Court did not deal with the
substantial questions of law formulated at the time of admission C
at all. We, therefore, are of the opinion that the impugned
judgment cannot be sustained. It is set aside accordingly and
the matter 'is remitted to the High Court for consideration of the
matter afresh. In the even-t, the High Court opines that any
substantial question of law should be framed suo motu or at
the instance of the appellant before it, viz., respondent herein, D
it shall give an opportunity of hearing to appellant.
19. Appeal is allowed on the aforementioned terms~ In the
facts and circumstance of the case, however, there shall be no
order as to costs.
E
RP. Appeal allowed.