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Supreme Court of India

U.P. STATE ROAD TRANSPORT CORPORATION AND ORS.versusMAHESH KUMAR MISHRA AND ORS.

Citation
2000 INSC 143
Decided
15 March 2000
Disposal
Dismissed

Holding

A High Court may interfere with the quantum of punishment if it shocks the conscience of the Court, and in this case the dismissal was disproportionate, so the appeal is dismissed.

Summary

A bus conductor was dismissed after a departmental inquiry found him guilty of issuing short‑distance tickets to eleven passengers. The dismissal was challenged before the U.P. State Public Services Tribunal, which upheld it, and subsequently before the Allahabad High Court, which reinstated the conductor with only 25% back wages, holding the penalty disproportionate. The corporation appealed to the Supreme Court, contending that the High Court should not have interfered with the quantum of punishment once the inquiry was deemed proper. The Supreme Court held that both the Supreme Court and High Courts may intervene if the imposed penalty shocks their conscience, and that dismissal in the present facts was grossly disproportionate. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed, upholding the High Court's order.

Issues considered

  • Whether a High Court can interfere with the quantum of punishment imposed in a disciplinary proceeding under Article 226 of the Constitution.
  • Whether the dismissal of the bus conductor was proportionate to the alleged misconduct of issuing short‑distance tickets.
  • Whether the departmental inquiry was conducted in accordance with the U.P. State Road Transport Corporation Employees (Other Than Officers) Services Regulation, 1981.

Subjects

service lawdisciplinary actionquantum of punishmenthigh court interferenceArticle 226proportionalitydismissalback wagesdepartmental inquiry

Judgment

      U.P. STATE ROAD TRANSPORT CORPORATION AND ORS.                            A
                             v.
               MAHESH KUMAR MISHRA AND ORS.

                             MARCH 15, 2000

             [S. SAGHIR AHMAD AND D.P. W ADHWA, JJ.]                            B

      Service Law :

      U.P. State Road Transport Corporation Employees (Other Than Offic-
ers) Services Regulation, 1981 :
                                                                                c
       Termination of service-Bus conductor-City bus-Some passengers
found to have issued short distance tickets-Departmental inquiry-No passen-
ger examined nor statement of any one of them recorded by Traffic Inspector
who checked the bus-Report by Traffic Inspector signed by delinquent-Order
of dismissal passed-Order of High Court directing reinstatement of employee     D
with 25 per cent back wages upheld.

      Constitution of India, 1950 :

      Article 226-High Court's power to interfere with quantum of punish-
ment imposed on delinquent after disciplinary proceedings-Held, if penalty      E
imposed shocks conscience of Court, High Court can interfere with the punish-
ment inflicted upon delinquent.

      Respondent No. 1, a bus conductor, was found to have issued short
distance tickets to 11 passengers in a city bus. A regular departmental
inquiry was conducted under the U.P. State Road Transport Corporation           F
Employees (Other Than Officers) Services Regulation, 1981, and ulti-
mately the services. of the respondent were terminated. The respondent
after unsuccessfully challenging the order in the departmental appeal and
before the U.P. State Public Services Tribunal, filed a writ petition before
the High Court, which partly allowed the writ petition and directed rein-
statement of the respondent with 25 per cent back wages. Aggrieved, the
                                                                                G
Corporation filed the present appeal.

      It ~as contended for the appellant-Corporation that once the inquiry
held against the respondent was found to be proper by Tribunal as also by
the High Court, the quantum of punishment should not have been inter-           H
                                      439
A
    440                     SUPREME COURT REPORTS
    fered with by the High Court.
                                                                 [2000] 2 S.C.R.
                                                                                    ..
                                                                                    .
          Dismissing the appeal, this Court

          HELD : 1.1. Not only the Supreme Court but also the High Court can
    interfere with the punishment inflicted upon the delinquent employee after
B   disciplinary proceedings, if that penalty shocks the conscience of the Court.
    It cannot be said that the High Court can, in no circumstance, interfere
    with the quantum of punishment. [443-G, 444-F]

         B.C. Chaturvedi v. Union of India & Ors., [1995] 6 SCC 749 and
    Colour-Chem Ltd. v. A.L. Alaspurkar and Others, [1998) 3 SCC 192, relied
c   on.

           1.2. In the instant case, the charge against the respondent was "not
    that the passengers were allowed to travel without ticket so that the
    amount of fare charged from the passengers could be pocketed by him. He
    had issued tickets to all the passengers. The dispute was only with regard
D
    to the spot or place at which they had boarded the bus, and that instead of
    charging a fare of Rs. 1.80 he had charged Rs. 1.50 from the passengers.
    This fact could have been established beyond doubt, if any of the· passen-
    gers concerned was examined at the domestic inquiry, or their statements
    could have been recorded by the Transport Inspector, who checked the
E   bus. This was not done, and reliance was placed only upon the report of
    the Transport Inspector which was signed by the respondent. It was a bus
    plied ·in the city itself and the passengers, being local, their statements
    could have been easily obtained. The U.P. State Public Services Tribunal
    overlooked this aspect. [442-C, 444-D]
F         1.3. The order of the High Court, though extremely brief, must have
    been based on overall consideration of the facts of the case and it must
    have exercised its jurisdiction only when it was shocked to notice that
    though all the passengers had been issued tickets, the only dispute was
    with regard to the point at which they had boarded the bus for which the
G   punishment of dismissal from service was highly disproportionate. [444-C]

          CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 2125 of 2000.

          From the Judgment and Order dated 12.2.1998 of the Allaha~ad High
    Court in C.M.W.P. No. 11506 of 1994.
H
                 U.P.S.R.T.C. v. M.K. MISHRA [S.S. AHMAD, J.]              441
       Pradeep Misra for, the Appellants.                                          A
       .Girdhar G. Upadhyay and R.D. Upadhyay for the Respondents.

       The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

       S. SAGIR AI™AD, J. Leave granted.
                                                                                   B
       Respondent No. 1 (hereinafter referred to as 'respondent') was ap-
 pointed on 28.5.1965 in the U.P. State Road Transport Corporation as
 Conductor on which post he was confirmed on 1.4.1972.

        On 11.2.1981, while the respondent was on duty on Bus No. UTY 1918,        C
 it was checked by the Transport Inspector and 11 passengers were found to
 have been issued short distance tickets. On 12.2.1981, the Transport Inspector
 submitted his report which was followed by a preliminary enquiry. A
 chargesheet was issued to the respondent on 6th of June, 1981 on the basis
 of which a regular departmental enquiry was held under U.P. State Road
 Transport Corporation Employees (Other Than Officers) Services Regulation,        D
  1981. After enquiry, the services of the respondent were terminated by order
 dated 29.3.1982. This order was challenged in a departmental appeal, filed by
 the respondent, which was rejected on 4th of April. 1983. The respondent,
 thereafter, approached the U.P. State Public Services Tribunal (for short, 'the
 Tribunal') for quashing of the termination order on a number of grounds           E
 including that the enquiry was not properly held, but the Tribunal, by its
 judgment dated 24.1.1994, dismissed the claim petition .. This order was
 challenged by the respondent in a Writ Petition in the Allahabad High Court
 which, by its judgment dated 12th of February, 1998, partly allowed the Writ
 Petition and directed that the respondent shall be reinstated in service but he
 would be paid 25 per cent of the back wages only. It is against this judgment.    F
 that the present appeal has been filed.

          The principal contention raised by the learned counsel for the appel-
  lants is that it having been found by the U.P. State Public Services Tribunal
  as also by the High Court that the enquiry held by the appellants was proper,
                                                                                   G
· there was no occasion for the High Court to interfere on the quantum of
  punishment. This proposition is seriously contested by the counsel for the
  respondent who submitted that the whole matter had to be examined in the
  background of the entire facts and since the High Court considered the
  totality of the circumstances and came to "the conclusion that the punishment,
  inflicted upon the respondent, was disproportionate to the nature of charge      H
         442                     SUPREME COURT REPORTS                  [2000] 2 S.C.R.
     A   against him, it was justified in ordering reinstatement and though the
         respondent, in the circumstances of the case, should have been allowed at
         least 75 per cent of back wages, he was allowed back wages only to the
         extent of 25 per cent.

                The Bus which was checked by the Transport Inspector was meant to
     B   ply within the District of Allahabad and was not a long distance Bus. The
         allegation against the respondent was that though the passengers had boarded
         the Bus at the "High Court" for "Manauri" for which they should have been         -:
         charged Rs. 1.80, they were issued tickets from "Zero Road" to "Manauri"
         and they were charged only Rs. 1.50. The only evidence on the basis of
     c   which the respondent was punished was the way bill and the tickets which
         had not been punched. The passengers were not examined at the trial nor was       ...,
         the statement of any passenger recorded at the time when the Bus was
         checked so that it could be ascertained whether they had boarded the Bus
         at the "High Court" or at "Zero Road". Reliance was placed by the
                                                                                                  '
         Disciplinary Authority and the Tribunal on the report of the Transport                   '
     D   Inspector which also bears the signature of the respondent. This document
         was relied upon by the Disciplinary Authority as also by the Tribunal on the
         ground that if the contents of the report were not correct, the respondent
         ought not to have signed the report and he should have protested then and
         there. Since this was not done, the inference drawn by the Disciplinary
     E   Authority as also by the Tribunal was that whatever was written in the report
         was correct and it was on that basis that the respondent was held to be guilty.

                It was in the background of these circumstances that the High Court                    '
         exercised its discretion under Article 226 of the Constitution and interfered
         with the quantum of punishment inflicted by the Disciplinary Authority. It
     F   may be that the order of dismissal was held to be valid and proper by the U.P.
         State Public Services Tribunal but the Tribunal also overlooked the fact that        ~


         though sufficient evidence could have been collected at the spot to indicate
         that the passengers to whom tickets were issued by the respondent had boarded
..       the Bus at the "High Court" and not at "Zero Road" but this was not done .
I.
     G   It was a Bus plied in the City itself and, therefore, the passengers, who were
         available in the Bus, being local passengers, could have been approached at
         the spot for stating whether they had boarded the Bus at the "High Court" or
         at "Zero Road". Learned counsel for the appellants has placed reliance upon ·
         an unreported decision of this Court in Civil Appeal No. 9754of1995, arising                 ........
         out of SLP(C) No. 1960 of 1994 (U.P. State Road Transport Corporation &
     H   Anr. v. Om Prakash Pandey), in which the order of the High Court, by which
                U.P.S.R.T.C. v. M.K. MISHRA [S.S. AHMAD, J.]               443
interference was made with the punishment inflicted upon the delinquent            A
employee of the Corporation, was set aside. This case is clearly distinguish-
able on the ground that a number of passengers were allowed to travel without
tickets and, therefore, the misconduct imputed to the employee was serious.
This is not the case here as the respondent had issued tickets to all the
passengers, who were found travelling in the Bus, but the dispute was only
                                                                                   B
 with regard to the spot or place at which they had boarded the Bus. To put
it differently, the dispute was whether they had boarded the Bus at "Zero
Road" or at the "High Court". In these circumstances, the High Court was
justified in interfering with the quantum of punishment.

     A Three-Judge Bench of this Court in B.C. Chaturvedi v. Union o.flndia        C
& Ors., [1995] 6 SCC 749, laid down as under :-

              "A review of the above legal position would establish that the
         disciplinary authority, and on appeal the appellate authority, being
         fact-finding authorities have exclusive power to consider the evidence
         with a view to maintain discipline. They are invested with the            D
         discretion to impose appropriate punishment keeping in view the
         magnitude or gravity of the misconduct. The High Court!fribunal,
         while exercising the power of judicial review, cannot normally
         substitute its own conclusion on penalty and impose some other
         penalty. If the punishment imposed by the disciplinary authority or
                                                                                   E
         the appellate authority shocks the conscience of the High Court/
         Tribunal, it would appropriately mould the relief, either directing the
         disciplinary/appellate authority to reconsider the penalty imposed,
         or to shorten the litigation, it may itself, in exceptional and rare
         cases, impose appropriate punishment with cogent reasons in sup-
         port thereof."                                                            F

       This will show that not only this Court but also the High Court can
interfere with the punishment inflicted upon the delinquent employee if, that
penalty, shocks the conscience of the Court. The law, therefore, is not, as
contended by the learned counsel for the appellants that the High Court can,
in no circumstance, interfere with the quantum of punishment imposed upon
                                                                                   G
a delinquent employee after disciplinary proceedings.

     Another Three-Judge Bench of this Court in Colour-Chem Ltd. v.
Alaspurkar and Others, [1998] 3 SCC 192, has also laid down the same
proposition and held that if the punishment imposed is shockingly dispropor-       H
    444                      SUPREME COURT REPORTS                  [2000) 2 S.C.R.
A   tionate to the charges held proved against the employee, it will be open to the
    Court to interfere.

           As pointed out earlier, the order of the High Court though extremely
    brief, must have been based on overall consideration of the facts of the case
    and it must have exercised its jurisdiction only when it was shocked to notice
B

                                                                                       --
    that though all the passengers had been issued tickets, the only dispute was
    with regard to the point at which they had boarded the Bus for which the
    punishment of dismissal from service was highly disproportionate.

            We have already noticed above that instead of charging a fare of Rs.
    1. 80, the respondent had charged a fare of Rs. 1.50 from the passengers. While
c   the appellants maintained that the passengers had boarded the Bus at the "High
    Court" and were to alight at "Manauri", the respondent contended that the
    passengers had boarded the Bus at "Zero Road" and were to get down at
    "Manauri" and, therefore, he had rightly charged Rs. 1.50 from those passen-
    gers. This fact could ha"'.e been established beyond doubt if any of those
D   passengers was examined at the domestic enquiry, or the Transport Inspector,
    who checked the Bus, could have recorded their statement at the spot. This
    was not done and the reliance was placed only upon the report of the Transport
    Inspector which was signed by the respondent also. It was not a case where
    the passe~gers were allowed to travel without tickets so that the amount of fare
    charged from the passengers could be pocketed by him.
E
         . Under these circumstances, we do not agree with the contention of the
    counsel for the appellants, that the High Court should not have interfered with
    the quantum of punishment inflicted upon the respondent. The appeal is,
    therefore, dismissed but without any order as to costs.
F
    R.P.                                                        Appeal dismissed.


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