Holding

The Sessions Judge erred; a magistrate need not pass a speaking order under s.204, and directors and managers are liable under s.47 of the Pollution Act, so the appeal is allowed.

Summary

The Uttar Pradesh Pollution Control Board filed a complaint under the Water and Air (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Act, 1974 alleging that Mohan Meakins Ltd. and its directors and manager discharged noxious effluents into the River Gomti, violating sections 24 and 43 of the Act. The Chief Judicial Magistrate issued process against the accused, but the Sessions Judge quashed it on the ground that the magistrate had not passed a "speaking order" under CrPC s.204. After a detailed order was later issued, the Sessions Judge again quashed it, and the High Court dismissed the Board’s revision after fifteen years. The Supreme Court held that a magistrate is not required to give reasons while issuing summons, and that directors and managers can be held liable under s.47 of the Pollution Act when the company commits an offence. The Court also rejected the argument that the long delay barred prosecution and set aside the lower courts' orders, directing the trial court to proceed expeditiously.

Issues considered

Whether a magistrate must pass a speaking or detailed order while issuing summons under CrPC s.204.
Whether directors, managers and other officers of a company can be held liable under s.47 of the Water and Air (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Act, 1974 for offences committed by the company.
Whether the lapse of a long period (seventeen years) bars the prosecution of the accused.
Whether the Sessions Judge erred in quashing the process issued by the magistrate.

Legislation cited

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973s. 204

Subjects

environmental lawwater pollutioncorporate liabilitydirector liabilityWater and Air ActCriminal Procedure Codespeaking orderstatutory liabilitydelay in prosecution

Judgment

A U.P. POLLUTION CONTROL BOARD
v.
MIS. MOHAN MEAKINS LTD. AND ORS.

MARCH 27, 2000

B [K.T. THOMAS AND M.B. SHAH, JJ.]

Water arul Air (Prevention arul Control of Pollution) Act, 1974 :

Ss. 24, 43, 47-Water pollution-Distillery unit of industrial company-
Discharging noxious trade effluents into river Gomti-Complaint by U.P.
c Pollution Control Board against the company and its Directors and Man~
ager-Magistrate's order to issue process against accused quashed by Sessions
Judge Oil the ground that it was a non-speaking order-Magistrate passing a
detailed order-Sessions Judge quashing it again on the ground that no '
specific role was assigned to accused in the complaint-Revision petition .filed
D by Board dismissed by High Court after 15 years-Held, Sessions Judge erred
in quashing orders passed by Magistrate-For issuing summons, Magistrate
need not pass a detailed order-When offence has been committed by com-
pany, every person incharge of and responsible to company for conduct of its
business is also made guilty of offence-Court should not deal with prosecu-
tion under the Act in a-casual manner-Magistrate would expeditiously pro-
E
ceed with the trial.

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 :

S. 204-Jssue ofprocess-Ordered by Magistrate-Sessions Judge quash-
ing the order on the ground that Magistrate did not pass a speaking order-
F Held, there is no legal requirement imposed on a Magistrate for passing
detailed order while issuing summons-Sessions Judge erred in quashing the
order.

The appellant-Board filed a complaint before the Chief Judicial
Magistrate arraying respondent No. 1 as first accused, and its directors as
G accused Nos. 2 to 10 and the Manager as accused No. 11. It was alleged
that the distillery unit of respondent No. 1 was discharging noxious trade
effluents in river Gomti making the water in the river more polluted to
impermissible levels. It was alleged that the company violated s.24 of the
Water and Air (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Act, 1974; and
H thereby committed the offence under s.43. The trial court ordered to issue

-
566
U.P. POLLUTION CONTROL BOARD v. MOHAN MEAKINS LTD. 567

of process against the accused but the Sessions Judge, in revision petition, A
moved by the accused, quashed the order on the ground that the Magistrate
did not pass "a speaking order" for issuing summons. Thereafter the
magistrate passed a detailed order and issued process to the accused. The
accused again challenged the order holding that in the complaint no spe-
cific role was assigned to accused 2 to 11 in the flowing of the polluted B
emuents into the river. The revision petition filed by the Board was also
dismissed by the High Court after fifteen years. Aggrieved, the Board filed
the present appeal.
Allowing the appeal, this Court

HELD : 1. The Sessions Judge was in error in quashing the process at c
the first round merely on the ground that the Chief Judicial Magistrate had
not passed a speaking order. There is no legal requirement imposed on a
Magistrate for passing detailed order while issuing summons under s.204
Cr.P.C. what is to be looked at during the stage of issuing process is whether
there are allegations in the complaint by which the Managers or Directors D
of the company can also be proceeded against, when the company is alleged
to be guilty of the offence. It was unfortunate that the Sessions Judge
himself did not look into the complaint at that stage to form his own opinion
whether process could have been issued by the Chief Judicial Magistrate on
the basis of the averments contained in the complaint. Instead the Session E
Judge relegated the work to the trial magistrate for doing the exercise over
again. [558-E; 573-B-C; 570-F]

Kdnti Bhadra Shah v. State of West Bengal, [2000] 1SCC722, relied on.

2. In view of s.47 of the Water and Air (Prevention and Control of
Pollution) Act, 1974, where an offence under the Act has been committed F
by a company, every person who was in charge of and was responsible to
the company for the conduct of its business is also made guilty of the
offence by the statutory creation. Any Director, Manager or other officer of
the company, who has consented to or connived in the commission of the
said offence, is made liable for the punishment of the offence. [572-D-E] G
Municipal Corporation ofDelhi v. Ram Kishan Rohtagi, [1983] 1 SCC 1,
distinguished.

l Municipal Corporation of Delhi v. Purshotam Dass Jhunjunwala, AIR
(1983) 1 sec 9, referred to. H
568 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2000] 2 S.C.R.
A 3. The courts should not deal with the prosecution for offences under
the Act in a casual or routine manner. Parliamentary concern in the matter
is adeguately reflected in strengthening the measures prescribed by the
statute. The court has no jurisdiction for ignoring the seriousness of the
subject. [574-B-C]
B 4. The plea to absolve the Directors of the company from the trial on
the ground of lapse of a long time since the institution of the complaint
cannot be accepted. Lapse of seventeen years is no doubt considerable, but
the Board is not the least to be blamed for it. The trial court would
expeditiously proceed with the trial. If any of the accused applies for
c dispensing with his personal presence in the court, after making the first
appearance, the trial court can consider his request in the light of this
judgment. [573-G; 574-C-D]

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal no. 302
of 2000.
D
From the Judgment and Order dated 27.7.99 of the Allahabad High
Court in Crl.R. No. 681 of 1984.

K.N. Rawal, Additional Solicitor General and Pradeep Misra, for the
Appellant.
E
Rakesh Dwivedi, P. Chidambaram, K.K. Mohan and Ms. Geetanjali
Mohan for the Respondents.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

F THOMAS, J. River "Gomti" is a tributary of Ganga. It is a bane that
almost all rivers in India are now saturated with pollutants and the holy river
is not spared from that malady. What causes greater concern to those for whom
rivers flowed sanctified waters, and to those, for whom rivers supplied potable
water, is the frightening gallop of pollution level in recent decades. The
measures evolved by the Parliament to control the escalating poisoning of our
G streams have not yielded the desired results due to a variety of causes. The
present is a case in which the trade effluents discharged by an industrial unit
of a premier liquor processing company made the water in Gomti more
polluted to impermissible levels. So the State Pollution Control Board ('the
..~ ' Board' for short) initiated proceedings for prosecuting Mis Mohan Meakins
H Limited and its Directors way back in 1983. Alas, the canoe remains at the
U.P. POLLUTION CONTROL BOARD v. MOHAN MEAKINS LTD. [THOMAS, J.] 569

starting point itself in spite of lapse of long seventeen years till now. A

Though the trial court issued process against the accused at the first ·
instance, they desired the trial court to discharge them without even making
their first appearance in the court. When the attempt made for that purpose.
failed they moved for exemption from appearance in the court. In the
meanwhile the Sessions_Judge, Lucknow (Shri Prahlad Narain) entertained B
a revision moved by the accused against the order issuing process to them
and, quashed it on the erroneous ground that the magistrate did not pass "a
speaking order" for issuing such summons.

The Chief Judicial Magistrate, (before whom the complaint was filed) C
thereafter passed a detailed order on 25.4.1984 and again issued process to
the accused. That order was again challenged by the accused in revision
before the Sessions Court and the same Sessions Judge (Shri Prahlad Narain)
again quashed it by order dated 25.8.1984.

The Board moved the High Court in a revision against the said order. D
Though the motion was made in 1984 itself it took fifteen years for the High
Court to dismiss that revision petition as per the order passed by a learned
Single Judge on 27.7.1999. The special leave petition to appeal is filed in
challenge of the said order. Special leave granted.

- We may point out at the very outset that the Sessions judge was in
error for quashing the process at the first round merely on the ground that
the -Chief Judicial Magistrate had not passed a speaking order. In f~ct it was
contended before the Sessions Judge, on behalf of the Board, that there is
no legal requirement in Section 204 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (For
E

.... short the 'Code') to record reasons for issuing process. But the said
contention was spumed down in the following words:
F

"My attention has been drawn to Section 204 of the Code of
Criminal Procedure and it has been argued that no reasons for
summoning an accused persons need be given. I feel that under G
Section 204 aforesaid, a Magistrate has to form an opinion that there
was sufficient ground for proceeding and, if an opinion had to be
formed judicially, the only mode of doing so is to find out express
reasons for coming to the conclusions. In the impugned order, the
learned Magistrate has neither specified any reasons nor has he even
H
570. SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2000] 2 S.C.R.
A formed an opinion much less about there being sufficient ground for
not proceeding with the case."

In a recent decision of the Supreme Court it has been pointed out that 1

the legislature has stressed the need to record reasons in certain situations
such as disffiissal of a complaint without issuing process. There is no such
B legal requirement imposed on a magistrate for passing detailed order while
issuing summons vide Kanti Bhadra Shah v. State of West Bengal, [2000(1)
SCC 722]. The following passage will be apposite in this context:

"If there is no legal requirement that the trial court should write an
order showing the reasons for framing a charge, why should the
c already burdened trial courts be further burdened with such an extra
work. The time has reached to adopt all possible measures to
expedite the court procedures and to chalk out measures to avert off
roadblocks causing avoidable delays. If a Magistrate is to write
detailed orders at different stages, the snail-paced progress of
D proceedings in trial courts would further be slowed down. We are
corning across interlocutory orders of Magistrates and Sessions
Judges running into several pages. We can appreciate if such· a
detailed order has been passed for culminating the proceedings
before them. But it is quite unnecessary to write detailed orders at
other stages, such as. issuing process, remanding the accused to
E custody, framing of charges, passing over to next stages in the trial."

(Emphasis supplied)

· It was unfortunate that the Sessions Judge hiffi!ielf did not look into the
complaint at that stage to form his own opinion whether process could have
F been issued by the Chief Judicial Magistrate on the basis of the averments
contained in the complaint. Instead the sessions judge relegated the work to
the trial magistrate for doing the exercise over again. After the Chief. Judicial
Magistrate passed the second order issuing process, the Sessions Judge
quashed the said order on the second occasion also and stated thus:

G "Having scrutinized the array of accused persons in this complaint,
I have felt that since no specific role in the flowing of the polluted
effluents into the river Gomti has been assigned to any of the present
applicant Nos., 2 to 11, the law laid down in the Delhi Municipal
Corporation case referred to above requires that the impugned order
H summoning the present applicant Nos. 2 to 11 must be quashed."
U.P. POLLUTION CONTROL BOARD v. MOHAN MEAKINS LTD. [THOMAS, J.) 571

Learned s~ssions Judge relied on the decision of this court in A
Municipal Corporation of Delhi v. Ram Kishan Rohtagi, [1983] 1
SCC 1. Though an attempt was made before the Sessions Judge to
offset the impact of the said decision by citing a later decision of
this Court in Municipal Corporation of Delhi v. Purshotam Dass
Jhunjunwala, AIR (1983) 1 SCC 9 it did not deter the Sessions Judge
B
from quashing the order passed by the magistrate issuing summons

- on the second occasion. Learned single judge of the High Court who
heard the revision confirmed the said order as per the impugned
judgment in which it is stated, inter alia, thus:

"In the present case the revisionist has not been able to. show that c
the directors (opp. parties Nos. 5 to 13) were in charge of or
responsible to the company for the conduct of the business of the
company. No effort was made at the hearing before this Court to show
that such allegations were contained in the complaint filed by the
revisionist."
D
In Municipal Co1poration of Delhi v. Ram Kishan Rohtagi & Ors.,
[1983) 1 SCC 1 cited by the Sessions Judge, and sought to be relied on here
also by the learned counsel for the respondents, a two Judge Bench of this
Court considered the validity of prosecution proceedings taken under the
Prevention of Food Adulteration Act. The Delhi High Court had quashed the E
complaint filed by the Municipal Corporation of Delhi against a company and
its manager as well as the directors, against whom the offence under Section
7 read with Section 16 of the FPA Act was alleged. On the factual position
this Court noticed that "so far as the Directors are concerned, there is not even
a whisper nor a shred of evidence nor anything to show, apart from the
presumption drawn by the complainant, that there is any act committed by the F
Directors from which reasonable inference can be drawn that they could also
be vicariously liable." It was only on the said fact situation that the complaint
as against the Directors was quashed. In Municipal Coiporation of Delhi v.
Purshottam Dass (supra) the same Bench of two Judges pointed out the
different factual position therein that "a clear averment has been made G
regarding the active role played by the respondents (the Directors of the
company) of the extent of their liability," and hence the court declined to
quash the complaint.

Neither of the above decisions has laid down a legal position which can
be o~ any use to the respondents in this case for contending that the Directors H
•
572 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2000] 2 S.C.R.
A cannot be prosecuted for the offence alleged. In the complaint filed by the
appellant before the Chief Judicial Magistrate, the company (M/s. Mohan
Meakins Ltd.) has been arrayed as first accused and the other persons who
were arrayed as accused 2 to 10 were described as the Directors of the said
company. The 11th person arrayed in the complaint as accused is described
as the Manager of the Company. The averments in the complaint show that
B
the Distillery unit of the company at Daltonganj, Lucknow, has been discharg-
ing nexious trade effluents into the river Gomti and causing continuous
pollution of the rivet. It was further averred in the complaint that on 19-9-
1982, samples of trade effluents were collected by the officers empowered in
this behalf, from the drain "just outside the plant inside the factory", and from
c the irrigation plant out of"whiCh the effluents ~ere pumped into the river.
When the samples were analysed in the Industrial Toxicology Research
Centre, Lucknow, it was revealed that the quality of effluents was beyond the
standard laid down for the purpose. Therefore, it is alleged that the company
has violated Section 24 of the Act and thereby the company is guilty of the
D offence under Section 43 of the Act.

Where an offence under the Act has been committed by a company
every person who was in charge of and was responsible to the company for
the conduct of the business of the company is also made guilty of the offence
by the statutory creation. Any Director, Mariager or other officer of the
E company, who has consented to or connived in the commission of the said
offence, is made liable for the punishment of ·the offence. This is clearly
discernible from Section 47 of the Act.

"47. Offences _by companies.- Where an offence under this Act has
been committed by a company every·; person who at the· time the
F offence was committed was in charge of, and was responsible to the
company for the conduct of the business of the company, as well as
the company, shall be deemed to be guilty of the offence and shall
be Ii-able to be proceeded against and punished accordingly:

Provided that nothing contained in this sub- section shall render any
G such person liable to any punishment provided in this Act if he proves
that the offence was committed without his knowledge or that he
exercised ali due diligence to prevent the commission of such offence.

(2) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section {l), where .an
H offence under this Act has been committed by a company and it is
U.P. POLLUTION CONTROL BOARD v. MOHAN MEAKINS LTD. [THOMAS, J.] 573

proved that the offence has been committed with the consent or A
connivance of or, is attributable to any neglect on the part of, any
director, manager, secretary or other officer of the company, such
director, manager, secretary or other officer shall also be deemed to
be guilty of that offence and shall be liable to be proceeded against 1

and punished accordingly." · B

In the above context what is to be looked at during the stage of issuing
process is whether there are allegations in the complaint by which the
Managers or Directors of the company can also be proceeded against, when
the company is alleged to be guilty of the offence. Paragraph 12 of the
complaint reads thus: c
"That the accused persons from 2 to 11 are directors/managers/
partners of Mis. Mohan Meakins Distillery, Daliganj, Lucknow, as
mentioned in this complaint are responsible for constructing the
proper works and plant for the treatment of their highly polluting
trade effluent so as to conform the standard laid down by the Board. D
Aforesaid accused persons are deliberately avoiding to abide the
provisions of sections 24 and 26 of the aforesaid Act which are
punishable respectively under Sections 43 and 44 of the aforesaid Act,
for which not only the company but its directors, managers, secretary
and all other responsible officers of the accused company, ;esponsible
E
for the conduct of its business are also liable in accordance with the
provision of the Section 47 of the Act."

The appellant has further stated in paragraph 23 of the complaint that "the
Chairman, Managing Directors and Directors of the company are the persons
responsible for the act and therefore, they are liable to be proceeded against . F
according to the law."

Shri P. Chidambaram, learned senior counsel who argued for respond-
ents made a fervent plea to rescue the Directors of the company on the
ground of lapse of a long time now since the institution of the complaint.
Lapse of seventeen years is no doubt considerable, but the Board is not the G
least to be blamed for it. Since it is not a pleasant task to probe into the
causes which contributed for such a long delay we choose to refrain from
doing that exercise. Nonetheless, lapse of such long period cannot be a
reason to absolve the respondents from the trial. It must reach its logical
culmination. Courts cannot afford to lightly deal with cases involving H
574 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2000] 2 S.C.R.-
A pollution of air and water. The message must go to all concerned.· The courts
will share the parliamentary concern on the escalating pollution level of our
environment. Those who discharge noxious polluting effluents to streams
may be unconcerned about the enormity of the injury which it inflicts on the
public health at large, the irreparable impairment it causes on the aquatic
organisms, the deleteriousness it imposes on the life and health of animals.
B
So the courts should not deal with the prosecution for offences under the Act
in a casual or routine manner. Parliamentary concern in the matter is
adequately reflected in strengthening the measures prescribed by the statute.
The court has no justification for ignoring the seriousness of the subject.

C We are, therefore, not inclined to accede to the plea made by. Shri
Chidambaram on the ground of lapse of loJJg period now. Of course this lapse
of long period is a good reason for expediting the trial. Now the deck is clear
and hence the trial court can proceed with faster pace and accelerated velocity.

If any of the accused applies for dispensing with his personal presence
D in the court, after making the first appearance, the trial court can exempt him
from continuing to appear in the court by imposing any condition which the
court deems fit. Such conditions can include, inter alia, that a counsel on his
behalf would be present when the case is called, that he would not dispute his
identity as the particular accused in the case, and that he would be present in
E court when such presence is imperatively needed.

Subject to the above observations, we set aside the impugned judgment
of the High Court as well as the order of the Sessions Court. We direct the
trial court to proceed with the case in accordance with law and dispose it ol
as expeditiously as possible.

R.P. Appeal allowed.