Supreme Court of India
U.C. RAMANversusP.T.A. RAHIM AND ORS.
- Citation
- 2014 INSC 517
- Decided
- 1 August 2014
- Disposal
- Dismissed
- Bench
- RAJENDRA MAL LODHA
Holding
The Supreme Court held that the chairmanship of the State Haj Committee is not an office of profit because the only remuneration received is compensatory allowance, not pecuniary gain.
Summary
U.C. Raman challenged the election of P.T.A. Rahim, who was Chairperson of the Kerala State Haj Committee, on the ground that the post constituted an "office of profit" under Article 191(1)(a) and thus disqualified him from contesting the Kerala Legislative Assembly election. The High Court held that the position was not an office of profit because Rahim received only travel allowance (TA) and daily allowances, which were merely compensatory and not pecuniary gain. The Supreme Court examined the definition of "office of profit" and affirmed that profit means pecuniary gain, not status or influence, and that allowances of a compensatory nature do not render the office an office of profit. It also considered the amendment to the Parliament (Prevention of Disqualification) Act, 2006, but held it inapplicable as the respondent was a state committee chair, not a member of the central Haj Committee. Consequently, the Court dismissed the appeal, upholding the High Court's decision and the respondent's election.
Issues considered
- Whether the post of Chairperson of the Kerala State Haj Committee is an office of profit under Article 191(1)(a) of the Constitution.
- Whether the travel allowance and daily allowance received by the respondent constitute pecuniary gain rendering the office an office of profit.
- Whether the amendment to the Parliament (Prevention of Disqualification) Act, 2006, which includes the Haj Committee of India, shields the respondent from disqualification.
Legislation cited
Subjects
office of profitdisqualificationlegislative assembly electiontravel allowancecompensatory allowanceHaj CommitteeRepresentation of People ActParliament (Prevention of Disqualification) ActArticle 191constitutional law
Judgment
• [2014] 11 S.C.R. 909
U.C. RAMAN A
v.
P.T.A. RAHIM AND ORS.
(Civil Appeal No. 5509 of 2012)
AUGUST 01, 2014
B
[R.M. LODHA, CJI AND SHIVA KIRT! SINGH, J.]
Constitution of India, 1950 - Article 19(1)(a) -
Disqualification -to contest Legislative Assembly election - By ·
the reason of holding 'office of profit' (i.e. post of Chairperson C
of State Haj Committee) - Held: 'Office of profit' means an
· office capable of yielding pecuniary gain - 'Profit' would not
include status and influence - The candidate not liable to be
disqualified, because he was in receipt of only TA and daily
allowances which are only compensatory in nature - D
Parliament (Prevention of Disqualification) Act, 2006 - Haj
Committee Act, 2002 - s.3.
Dismissing the appeal, the Court
HELD: 1. An 'office of profit' is an office which is E
capable of yielding a profit or pecuniary gain. The word
'profit' would not include status and influence etc.,
besides the pecuniary profits. [para 20] [919-F]
2. As per the evidence on record the first respondent F
was neither in receipt of any pay, salary, emoluments,
remuneration or commission, nor anything of such nature
was payable to him. He was in receipt of only TA and daily
allowance which are compensatory allowance and these
alone were 'receivable' also. [para 12] [917-C-D] G
3. The inclusion of Haj Committee of India constituted
u/s 3 of Haj Committee Act, 2002 within the purview of s.3
of the Parliament (Prevention of Disqualification) Act,
909 H
910 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2014] 11 $.C.R.
•
A 1959 would not be of any consequence because the first
respondent happened to be Chairperson of the State Haj
Committee of Kerala and the allowances admissible to
the Haj Committee of India have not been shown to be
same as that for the State Haj Committee. [para 14] [917·
B H; 918-A-B]
Jaya Bachchan v. Union of India & Ors. (2006) 5 SCC
266 = 2006 (2) Suppl. SCR110; Ravanna Sabanna vs. ·G.S.
Kaggeerappa, AIR 1954 SC 653; Shivamurthy Swami
C lnamdar etc. vs. Agadi Sanganna Andanappa etc.1971 (3)
SCC 870; Gajanan Samadhan Lande v. Sanjay Shyamrao
Dhotre (2012) 2 SCC 64= 2011 (13) SCR 395 - relied on.
Gunigobinda Basu vs. Sankari Prasad Ghosal and Ors.
1964 (4) SCR 311; Bihari/al Dobray vs. Roshan Lal Dobray,
' D 1984 (1) SCC 551= 1984 (1) SCR 877; Pradyut Bordoloi vs.
Swapan Roy 2001 (2) SCC 19= 2000 (5) Suppl. SCR 525
- referred to.
Case Law Reference:
E 1964 (4) SCR 311 referred to Par1:t 11
1984·(1) SCR 877 referred to Para 11
2000 (5) Suppl. SCR 525 referred to Para 11
2006 (2) Suppl. SCR 110 relied on Para 11
F i
2011 (13) s ~ 395 relied on Para 15
1911 (3) sec 870 relied on Para 15
AIR 1954 SC 653 relied on Para 15
G
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No.
5509 of 2012.
From the Judgment & Order dated 12.04.2012 in Election
H
• U.C. RAMAN v. P.T.A. RAHIM 911
Petition No. 4 of 2011 of the High Court of Kerala at Ernakulam. A
T.R. Andhyarujiriam, Zulfiker Ali, Faisal M. Aboobaker,
Soumik Ghoshal, P. George Giri for the Appellant.
V.A. Mohta, Hari Kumar G., (for A. Venayagam Balan) for
the Respondents. · B
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
SHIVA KIRTI SINGH, J. 1. The only issue falling for
consideration in this Appeal filed under Section 116A read with C
Section 116B of the Representation of People Act, 1951 is
whether for the purpose of Article 191 (1 )(a) of the Constitution
of India, the first respondent held an office of profit under the
Government of India and for that reason his nomination ought
to have been rejected by the returning officer and the High Court
should have set aside his election as a member of Kerala
0
Legislative Assembly for which he was declared elected on
13.5.2011.
2. At the stage of scrutiny of nomination papers, the
appellant as well as one another candidate raised objections E
against acceptance of nomination of the first respondent by
pointing out to the returning officer that the first respondent was
disqualified to contest the election to the Kera la· Legislative
Assembly by reason of his holding an 'office of profit' under the
State Government namely the post of Chairperson of State Haj F
Committee. The returning officer rejected the objections. In the
election, first respondent secured highest number of votes
·followed by the appellant and was declared elected.
Undisputedly, the first respondent had been nominated by the
State Government as one of the members of the Haj Committee G
under the provisions of Haj Committee Act, 2002 (Central Act
35 of 2002) (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') on 18.6.2009.
3. Under the provisions of the Act, the first respondent got
elected as the Chairperson and he was notified as such by the
H
912 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2014] 11 S.C.R.
•
A State Government in the Official Gazette with effect from
30.6.2009. The appellant obtained information regarding
/
allowances received by the first respondent as Chairperson of
State Haj Committee and filed Election Petition No.4 of 2011
on 27 .6.2011. As noticed earlier the case of the appellant is
B that election of first respondent was vitiated by improper
acceptance of his nomination papers and that he was wholly
disqualified to contest in the election on account of his holding
an 'office of profit' under the State Government.
4. The first respondent filed written statement in the.
C election petition wherein he admitted that at the relevant time
he held the office of Chairperson of the Kerala State1 Haj
Committee. However, he raised several objections to the
maintainability of the election petition and also disputed -that .
Chairperson of Kerala State Haj Committee holds an 'office of
D profit' under the State Government so as to be covered by the
provisions of Article 191 of the Constitution of India. He also
disputed that he was appointed by the State Government.
5. After noticing the relevant provisions of the Constitution,
E the Representation of People Act and the Act the learned Single
Judge under the main issue, found two questions falling for
consideration:-
(1) Whether the first respondent occupies the office under
the State Government? and
F
(2) If it is an office, is he the holder of an office of profit?
6. The High Court further observed that if the aforesaid two
questions are answered against the first respondent, then the
G next question would be whether he is exempted under the
provisions of Kerala Legislative Assembly(Removal of
Disqualification) Act, 1951 (Act 15 of 1951).
7. In the light of facts of the case and the various decisions
of this Court, the High Court answered the first question in
H
• U.C. RAMAN v. P.T.A. RAHIM
[SHIVA KIRT! SINGH, J.]
913
favour of the appellant and held that the office of Chairperson A
of the Haj Committee is an office under the State Government.
However, on the basis of large number of precedents of this
Court, the High Court decided the second question against the
appellant by holding that the appellant had miserably failed to
prove that the first respondent was holding an 'office of profit' B
as contemplated under Article 191 of the Constitution and
therefore acceptance of his nomination did not suffer from any
impropriety or illegality. Accordingly, the election petition
preferred by the appellant, was dismissed by the judgment
under appeal. c
8. On behalf of the appellant, Mr. T.R. Andhyarujina,
learned senior advocate made serious effort to persuade us
to hold that on the basis of evidence adduced by the appellant,
the High Court should have decided the second question also
in favour of the appellant and ought to have held that the office D
held by the first respondent was an 'office of profit' covered by
Article 191 of the Constitution of India and consequently the
election of first respondent should have been set aside. On the
other hand, Mr. V.A. Mohta, learned senior advocate,
appearing for the first respondent defended the judgment of the E
High Court by referring to the evidence on record that had been
considered by the High Court as well as by placing reliance
upon several judgments of this Court and Section 2(1 )of Act 15
of 1951.
F
9. On behalf of the appellant it was further contended that
Section 37 of the Haj Committee Act, 2002 though provides
that office of a member of the Committee or State Committee
shall not be deemed to be an 'office of profit', it cannot be of
any help to the first respondent because he held the post of G
Chairperson of the State Haj Committee and also because the
Haj Committee Act, 2002 is a Central Act and not a law enacted
by the legislature of the State as contemplated under Article
191(1)(a). On the other hand Mr. Mohta has relied upon Section
2 of Act 15 of 1951 to supplement his submissions that a H
914 SUPREME COURT REPORTS
I
[2014] 11 S.C.R.
•
A ' aforesaid State Act, for
person shall not be disqualified; as per
being chosen as and for being a nieniber of the legislative
assembly of the State of Kerala by reason only that he is in
receipt of travelling and daily allowances while serving as a
member of any Committee or Board constituted by the
B Government of India or the Government of any State.
;
10. The issue of exemptio"n from disqualification by virtue
of Section 37 of the Haj Committee Act, 2002· or Section 2 of
Act No. 15of1951, will be relevant and worth deciding only.if
the appellant succeeds in assailing the finding of the High Court
C on the basis of judgments of this Court and the evidence on
record that office in question is not an 'office of profit'. On this
issue, the conclusions derived by High Court as findings of fact
on the basis of evidence on record have not been assail,ed as
perverse or even erroneous. The relevant findings are that the
D evidence led by the appellant coupled with pleadings of the rival
parties disclose that the appellant has succeeded only in
proving that the first respondent has obtained pecuniary
benefits by way of travelling allowance covered by exhibits P-
4, P-5, and P-6 and beyond that the first respondent has not
E received any pecuniary· benefits by way of any other allowances,
salary or commission. There is no pleading, evidence· or even
a suggestion given to the first respondent that he received ·
anything beyond TA which is admissible to the Chairperson,
Vice-chairperson and members, as per Rule 11 of the Haj
F Committee Rules, 2002 made by the Central Government in
exercise of powers conferred under Section 44 of Haj
Committee Act, 2002. The rules do not entitle the Chairperson
and the members anything besides TA and daily allowance for
attending meetings. It is also an admitted fact that although
G State Government has been vested with power to prescribe
allowances to the members of the Haj Committee under
Section 20 of the Act but such power has not been exercised
by th~ State Government so far. Keeping in view the nature of
TA and daily allowance in mind, the High Court has come to
H the conclLJsion that not only the pecuniary benefits received by
• U.C. RAMAN v. P.T.A. RAHIM
[SHIVA KIRTI SINGH, J.]
915
the first respondent are only compensatory in nature but as a A
matter of fact the post did not carry any other benefits which
may be categorized as pecuniary benefits 'receivable' by the
first respondent, so as to classify the office in question as an
'office of profit'.
B
11. In the backdrop of factual matrix noted above, learned
senior advocate for the appellant has advanced a submission
that profit should not be confined to pecuniary benefits but also
to other factors such as status, power and influence emanating
from the post. He has placed reliance upon the judgments of C
this Court in the cases of : ·
(1) Gurugobinda Basu vs. Sankari Prasad Ghosal
and Ors. 1964 (4) SCR 311,
(2) Biharilal Dobray vs. Roshan Lal Dobray, 1984 0
(1) sec 551
(3) Pradyut Bordoloi vs. Swapan Roy, 2001 (2)
sec 19 and
(4) Jaya Bachchan v. Union of India & Ors., (2006) E
5 sec 266.
The first three judgments deal with various tests which should
be applied to find out whether the office in question is an office
under the Government or not. Since in the present case this
F.
issue has been decided by the High Court in favour of the
appellant and there is no serious challenge to that finding, those
judgments are not of much relevance. So tar as the case of
Jaya Bachchan is concerned, this Court was called upon to
answer what the term 'office of profit' could mean although the
context was Article 102 of the Constitution of India which is G
concerned with disqualification of member of either House of
Parliament. Nonetheless, the interpretation given by this Court
to the term 'office of profit' is equally applicable in interpreting
the same phraseology in the context of Article 191 of the
H
·.
916 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2014] 11 S.C.R.
•
A Constitution. It will be useful to extract a part of paragraph 6 of
the judgment which runs as follows:
"6 ....... An office of profit is an office which is capable of
yielding a profit or pecuniary gain. Holding an office under
the Central or State Government, to which some pay,
B
salary, emolument, remuneration or non-compensatory
allowance is ·attached, is "holding an office of profit". The
question whether a person holds an office of profit is
required to be interpreted in a realistic manner. Nature of
the payment must be considered as a matter of substance
c rather than of form. Nomenclature is not important. In fact,
mere use of the .word "honorarium" cannot take the
payment out of the purview of profit, if there is pecuniary
gain for the recipient. Payment of honorarium, in addition
to daily allowances in the nature of compensatory
D allowances, rent free accommodation and chauffeur driven
car at State expense, are clearly in the nature of
remuneration and a source of pecuniary gain and hence
constitute profit. For deciding the question as to whether .
one is holding an office of profit or not, what is relevant is
E whether the office is· capable of yielding a profit or
pecuniary gain and not whether the person actually
obtained a monetary gain, If the "pecuniary gain" is
"receivable" in connectiaa with the office then it becomes
an office of profit, irrespective of whether such pecuniary
F gain is actually received or not. If the office carries with it,
or entitles the holder to, any pecuniary gain other than
reimbursement of out of pockeVactual expenses, then the
office will be an office of profit for the purpose of Article
102(1 )(a). This position of law stands settled for over half
G a century commencing from the decisions of Ravanna
Subanna v. G.S. Kaggeerappa AIR 1954 SC 653,
Shivamurthy Swami lnamdar v. Agadi Sanganna
Andanappa (1971) 3 sec 870, Satruchar/a
Chandrasekhar Raju v. Vyricherla Pradeep Kumar Dev
H
• U.C. RAMAN v. P.T.A. RAHIM
[SHIVA KIRTI SINGH, J.)
917
(1992) 4 sec 404 and Shibu Soren v. Dayanand Sahay A
(2001) 7 sec 425."
12. The law as indicated above was not only noticed by
the High Court but also appreciated in proper perspective. In
that light. the High Court examined the evidence on record and 8
carne to the conclusion that the pecuniary gain not only
received but also 'receivable' in connection with the office was
only compensatory in nature by way of TA and daily allowances.
Therefore, the High Court in tune with the aforesaid judgment
of this Court held that office in question was not an 'office of
profit'. The answer given by the High Court is fully in accord with C
the law laid down by this Court because as per the evidence
on record the first respondent was neither in receipt of any pay,
salary, emoluments, remuneration or commission, nor anything
of such nature was payable to him. l'le was in receipt of only
TA and daily allowance which are compensatory allowance and D
these alone were 'receivable' also.
13. On behalf of the appellant an attempt was made to take
advantage of amendment made in the year 2006 through
Parliament (Prevention of Disqualification) Act 2006, whereby E
Section 3 was enlarged and· the table annexed to the
Parliament (Prevention of Disqualification) Act, 1959 was
amended by adding several Committees, Councils, Trusts etc.
including the Haj Committee of India constituted under Section
3 of the Haj Committee Act, 2002. According to the learned F
senior counsel for the appellant, the very amendment amounts
to an acceptance, though by the Central Government. that the
Vice Chairman or member of the Haj Committee of India
suffered from disqualification and therefore, they were included
under Section 3 of the Parliament (Prevention of G
Disqualification) Act, 1959 with a view to save them from
disqualification as holder of an 'office of profit'
14. In our considered view the inclusion of Haj Committee
of India constituted under Section 3 of Haj Committee Act, 2002
within the purview of Section 3 of the Parliament (Prevention H
. 918 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2014] 11 S.C.R. •
A of Disqualification) Act, 1959 cannot help the case of the
appellant because the first respondent happened to be
Chairperson of the State Haj Committee of Kerala and the
allowances admissible to the Haj Committee of India have not
been showri to be same as that for the State Haj Committee,
B Kerala. Further the reply on behalf of the first respondent that
such amendment may have been· introduced by way of abundant
caution is also plausible and cannot. be brushed aside.
15. Learned counsel for the first respondent has placed
C reliance 1.1pon the following judgments of this Court to further
illustrate as to what are the essential requirements for
·determining whether the office in question is an 'office of profit'
or not.
1. Gajanan Samadhan Lande v. Sanjay
D Shyamrao Dhotre, (2012) 2 SCC 64
2. Shivamurthy Swami lnamdar etc. vs. Agadi
Sanganna Andanappa etc., 1971 (3) SCC 870
3. Ravanna Sabanna vs. G.S. Kaggeerappa, AIR
E 1954 SC 6°53
16. Paragraph 12 of judgment in the case of Ravanna
Subanna discloses that a small amount of Rs.6/- for each
sitting of Committee for the Chairman deserved to be treated
F as consolidated fee for the out-of-pocket expenses which he
has to incur for attending the meetings of the Committee and
is not meant to be a payment by way of remuneration or profit.
17. In the case of Shivamurthi Swami also a similar view
G was taken in paragraph 17 by treating Rs.16/- per day payable
to the member of the concerned Board as a payment for the
purpose of reimbursing the expenses incurred by the members
and hence it was held to be a compensatory allowance and
not a profit.
H
• U.C. RAMAN v. P.T.A. RAHIM
[SHIVA KIRT! SINGH, J.]
919
18. In the case of Gajanan Samadhan Lande to which A
one of us (Justice R.M. Lodha)(as His Lordship then was) was
a member, it was succinctly explained that :
" ...... one of the essential necessities in determining
the question whether the office is an "office of profit" or not 8
is whether such office carries remuneration in the form of
pay or commission. As an elected Director, the amount
paid to the returned candidate by way of allowances, by
no stretch of imagination, can be said to be "remuneration"
in the form of pay or commission. It is only a sort of
reimbursement of the expenses incurred by the returned C
candidate. The essential condition that the office carries
remuneration in the form of pay or commission is also not
satisfied." ·
19. The aforesaid judgments relied upon by the learned D
advocate for the first respondent clearly support the view taken
by ihe High Court and fortify the judgment under appeal.
20. The plea raised by Mr. Andhyarujina, learned senior
advocate for the appellant that the word 'profit' should include · E
even status and influence etc., besides the pecuniary profits,
is not found acceptable in view of long line of judgments at-l:his
Court, some of which have been cited by both the parties and
have been noticed above. This Court has given categorical
clarification on more than one occasion that an 'office of profit' F
is an office which is capable of yielding a profit or pecuniary
gain. The word 'profit' has always been treated equivalent to
or a substitute for the term 'pecuniary gain'. The very context,
in which the word 'profit' has been used after the words 'office
of, shows that not all offices are disqualified but only those
which yield pecuniary gains as profit other than mere G
compensatory allowances, to the holder of the office. There is
no requirement to make a departure from the long line of
established precedents ,on this issu-e. If the submissions of
learned counsel for the appellant were to be accepted, it would
H
920 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2014] 11 S.C.R. •
A add a great amount of uncertainty in deciding whether an office
is an 'office of profit' or not.
In the aforesaid factual and legal premises, we find no
option but to dismiss the appeal. We order accordingly.
However, parties shall bear their own costs, so far as this
8
appeal is concerned.
Kalpana K. Tripathy Appeal dimissed.
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