TUKARAM KANA JOSHI & ORS. THR. POWER OF ATTORNEY HOLDERversusM.I.D.C. & ORS.

                     [2012] 13 S.C.R. 29


    TUKARAM KANA JOSHI & ORS. THR. POWER OF                     A
               ATIORNEY HOLDER
                              v.
                        M.l.D.C. & ORS.
               (Civil Appeal No. 7780 of 2012)
                                                                B
                    NOVEMBER 2, 2012

               [DR. B.S. CHAUHAN AND
             JAGDISH SINGH KHEHAR, JJ.]

     Constitution of India, 1950:                               c
      Articles 21 and 300-A - Initiation of land acquisition
proceedings notifying the land for acquisition - Acquisition
proceedings lapsed - Still possession of the land taken by
the Authority - No compensation granted to /and-owner- Writ 0
petition - Dismissed by High Court on the ground of delay
and non-availability of certain documents - On appeal, held:
Acquisition of property tantamounts to deprivation and such
deprivation can take place only in accordance with law and
cannot be done by way of executive fiat or order or E
administrative caprice· - Right to property is not only a
constitutional right, or fundamental right or a statutory right,
but also a human right - Depriving the /and-owners of their
immovable properties, was a clear violation of Article 21 -
Land Acquisition Act, 1894.
                                                                 F
     Article 14 - Acquisition of land - Benefit of acquisition
given to some land-owners while refused to some - Held:
Refusal to some land-owners to acquisition benefits is
discriminatory - Land Acquisition.
                                                               G
    Delay!Laches - Acquisition of Land, without granting any
compensation therefor - Writ petition - Dismissed on the
ground of delayllaches by High Court - On appeal, held: High
Court committed an error in dismissing the petition on the
                              29                               H
    30       SUPREME COURT REPORTS              [2012) 13 S.C.R.


A ground of delay - Delay and /aches is one of the facets to
  deny exercise of discretion and not an absolute impediment
  - The court should exercise the discretion, when there is
  continuity of cause of action, or the situation shocks the
  judicial conscience and when no third party interest is involved
B - The present case is not hit by the doctrine of delay and
  /aches as it is not a constitutional limitation, the cause of
  action was continuous and the situation shocks the judicial
  conscience.

       The land of the predeces~or-in-interest of the
C appellants was notified u/s. 4 of Land Acquisition Act in
  the year 1964 by the respondent-Authority, for a project
  for industrial development. The acquisition proceedings
  lapsed as no subsequent proceedings were taken up
  thereafter. However, the possession of the land was
D taken by the State authorities and the land was handed
  over to Industrial Development Corporation. The
  predecessor-in-interest were not granted any
  compensation, while similarly situated persons were
  granted compensation. The appellants had been
E pursuing the authorities for compensation. They were
  unable to get any compensation or any land in lieu of the
  acquired lands as per the beneficial schemes floated by
  the State Authorities. Therefore, the appellants filed writ
  petition. The High Court dismissed the petition on the
F ground of delay, and the non-availability of certain
  documents. Hence the present appeal.

         Allowing the appeal, the Court.
      HELD: 1.1 The appellants were deprived of their
G immovable property in 1964, when Article 31 of the
  Constitution was still intact and the right to property was
  a part of fundamental rights under Article 19 of the
  Constitution. Even after the Right to Property seized to
  be a Fundamental Right, taking possession of or
H acquiring the property of a citizen most certainly
  TUKARAM KANA JOSHI & ORS. THR. POWER OF                 31
        ATIORNEY HOLDER v. M.l.D.C.

tantamounts to deprivation and such deprivation can A
take place only in accordance with the "law", as the said
word has specifically been used in Article 300-A of the
Constitution. Such deprivation can be only by resorting
to a procedure prescribed by a statute. The same cannot
be done by way of executive fiat or order or B
administration caprice. [Para 6) [40-A-C]

    Jilubhai Nanbhai Khachar, etc. etc. v. State of Gujarat
and Anr. AIR 1995 SC 142 : 1994 (1) Suppl. SCR 807 -
relied on.
                                                                c
     1.2 The right to property is now considered to be not
only a constitutional or a statutory right, but also a human
right. Though, it is not a basic feature of the Constitution
or a fundamental right. Human rights are considered to
be in realm of individual rights, such as the right to health, D
the right to livelihood, the right to shelter and employment
etc. Now however, human rights are gaining an even
greater multi faceted dimension. The right to property is
considered, very much to be a part of such new
dimension. [Para 7) [40-F-G]                                   E
    Lachhman Dass v. Jagat Ram and Ors. (2007) 10 SCC
448: 2007(2) SCR 980; Amarjit Singh and Ors. v. State of
Punjab and Ors. (2010) 10 SCC 43: 2010 (12) SCR 163;
Narmada Bachao Ando/an v. State of Madhya Pradesh and
Anr. AIR 2011 SC 1989: 2011 (6) SCR 443; State of Haryana       F
v. Mukesh Kumar and Ors. AIR 2012 SC 559 : 2011 (14)
 SCR 21; and Delhi Airtech Services Pvt. Ltd. v. State of U.P
and Anr. AIR 2012 SC 573: 2012 (12) SCR 191 - relied on.

    1.3 In the present case, the functionaries of the State G
took over possession of the land belonging to the
appellants without any sanction of law. The appellants
had repeatedly asked for grant of the benefit of
compensation. The State must either comply with the
                                                                H
    32     SUPREME COURT REPORTS            (2012] 13 S.C.R.


A procedure laid down for acquisitk>n, or requisition, or any
  other permissible statutory mode. There is a distinction,
  a true and concrete distinction, between the principle of
  "eminent domain" and "police power" of the State. Under
  certain circumstances, the police power of the State may
B be used temporarily, to take possession of property but
  the present case clearly shows that neither of the said
  powers have been exercised. It is evident that the act of
  the State amounts to encroachment, in exercise of
  "absolute power" which in common parlance is also
c called abuse of power or use of muscle power. The
  authorities have treated the land owner as a 'subject' of
  medieval India, but not as a 'citizen' under the
  Constitution. [Para 9] [41-E-H; 42-A-B]

       1.4. Depriving the appellants of their immovable
D properties, was a clear violation of Article 21 of the
  Constitution. In a weltare State, statutory authorities are
  bound, not only to pay adequate compensation, but there
  is also a legal obligation upon them to rehabilitate such
  persons. The non-fulfillment of their obligations would
E tantamount to forcing the said uprooted persons to
  become vagabonds or to indulge in anti-national
  activities as such sentiments would be born in them on
  account of such ill-treatment. Therefore, it is not
  permissible for any welfare State to uproot a person and
F deprive him of his fundamental/constitutional/human
  rights, under the garb of industrial development. [Para 15]
  [44-C-F]
      2.1 The High Court committed an error in holding the
G appellants non-suited on the ground of delay and non-
  availability of records, as the court failed to appreciate
  that the appellants had been pursing their case
  persistently. Accepting their claim, the Statutory
  Authorities had even initiated the acquisition proceedings
H in 1981, which subsequently lapsed for want of further
   TUKARAM KANA JOSHI & ORS. THR. POWER OF                  33
         ATIORNEY HOLDER v. M.l.D.C.

action on the part of those authorities. The claimants are        A
illiterate and inarticulate persons, who have been
deprived of their fundamental rights by the State, without
it resorting to any procedure prescribed by law, without
the court realising that the enrichment of a welfare State,
or of its instrumentalities, at the cost of poor farmers is       B
not permissible, particularly when done at the behest of
the State itself. [Para 14] [43-H; 44-A-B]

     2.2 The State, especially a welfare State which is
governed by the Rule of Law, cannot arrogate itself to a C
status beyond one that is provided by the Constitution.
The Constitution of India is an organic and flexible one.
Delay and laches is adopted as a mode of discretion to
decline exercise of jurisdiction to grant relief. The Court
is required to exercise judicial discretion. The said
discretion is dependent on facts and circumstances of D
the cases. Delay and laches is one of the facets to deny
exercise of discretion. It is not an absolute impediment.
There can be mitigating factors, continuity of cause of
action, etc. That apart, if whole thing shocks the judicial
conscience, then the Court should exercise the E
discretion more so, when no third party interest is
involved. Thus analysed, the petition is not hit by the
doctrine of delay and laches as the same is not a
constitutional limitation, the cause of action is continuous
and further the situation certainly shocks judicial F
conscience. [Para 1O] [42-B-E]

    H.D Vora v. State of Maharashtra and Ors. AIR 1984 SC
866: 1984 (2) SCR 693 - relied on.
     2.3 The question of condonation of delay is one of           G
discretion and has to be decided on the basis of the facts
of the case at hand, as the same vary from case to case.
It will depend upon what the breach of fundamental right
and the remedy claimed are and when and how the delay
arose. It is not that there is any period of limitation for the   H
    34       SUPREME COURT REPORTS             [2012] 13 S.C.R.


A Courts to exercise their powers under Article 226, nor is
  it that there can never be a case where the Courts cannot
  interfere in a matter, after the passage of a certain length
  of time. There may be a case where the demand for justice
  is so compelling, that the High Court would be inclined
B to interfere in spite of delay. Ultimately, it would be a
  matter within the discretion of the Court and such
  discretion, must be exercised fairly and justly so as to
  promote justice and not to defeat it. The validity of the
  party's defence must be tried upon principles
c substantially equitable. [Para 11) [42-E-H; 43-A]
        P. S. Sadasivaswamy v. State of T. N. AIR 1974 SC 2271:
    1975 (2) SCR 356; State of M.P. and Ors. v. Nandlal Jaiswal
    and Ors. AIR 1987 SC 251: 1987 (1) SCR 1; and Tridip
    Kumar Dingal and Ors. v. State of West Bengal and Ors.
D (2009) 1 sec 768: 2008 (15) SCR 194 - relied on.
       2.4 No hard and fast rule can be laid down as to
  when the High Court should refuse to exercise its
  jurisdiction in favour of a party who moves it after
E considerable delay and is otherwise guilty of laches.
  Discretion must be exercised judiciously and reasonably.
  In the event that the claim made by the applicant is
  legally sustainable, delay should be condoned. In other
  words, where circumstances justifying the conduct exist,
F the illegality which is manifest, cannot be sustained on
  the sole ground of laches. When substantial justice and
  technical considerations are pitted against each other, the
  cause of substantial justice deserves to be preferred, for
  the other side cannot claim to have a vested right in the
G injustice being done, because of a non-deliberate delay.
  The court should not harm innocent parties if their rights
  have infact emerged, by delay on the part of the
  Petitioners. [Para 12] [43-B-E]

         Durga Prasad v. Chief Controller of Imports and Exports
H
  TUKARAM KANA JOSHI & ORS. THR. POWER OF               35
        ATIORNEY HOLDER v. M.l.D.C.

and Ors. AIR 1970 SC 769: 1969 (2) SCR 596; Collector,        A
Land Acquisition, Anantnag and Anr. v. Mst. Katiji and
Ors. AIR 1987 SC 1353: 1987 (2) SCR 387; Dehri Rohtas
Light Railway Company Ltd. v. District Board, Bhojpur and
Ors. AIR 1993 SC 802: 1992 (2) SCR 155; Dayal Singh and
Ors. v. Union of India and Ors. AIR 2003 SC 1140: 2003 (1)    B
 SCR 714; and Shankara Co-op Housing Society Ltd. v. M.
Prabhakar and Ors. AIR 2011 SC 2161: 2011 (7) SCR 468
- relied on.

     3. The appellants have been seriously discriminated
against qua other persons, whose land was also C
acquired. Some of them were given the benefits of
acquisition, including compensation in the year 1966.
This kind of discrimination not only breeds corruption,
but also dis-respect for governance, as it leads to
frustration and to a certain extent, forces persons to take D
the law into their own hands. The findings of the High
Court, that requisite records were not available, or that
the appellants approached the authorities at a belated
stage are contrary to the evidence available on record
and thus, cannot be accepted anci excused as it remains E
a slur on the system of governance and justice alike, and
an anathema to the doctrine of equality, which is the soul
of the Constitution. Even under valid acquisition
proceedings, there is a legal obligation on the part of the
authorities to complete such acquisition proceedings at F
the earliest, and to make payment of requisite
compensation. The appeals etc. are required to be
decided expeditiously, for the sole reason that, if a
person is not paid compensation in time, he will be unable
to purchase any land or other immovable property, for the G
amount of compensation that is likely to be paid to him
at a belated stage. [Para 17] [44-H; 45-A-D]
    K. Krishna Reddy and Ors. v. The Special Dy. Collector,

                                                              H
    36      SUPREME COURT REPORTS             [2012] 13 S.C.R.


A Land Acquisition Unit II, LMD Karimnagar, Andhra Pradesh,
    AIR 1988 SC 2123: 1988 (2) Suppl. SCR 853 - relied on.

       4. In order to redress the grievances of the
  appellants, the respondent-authorities would notify the
   land in dispute under Section 4 of the Act within a period
8
  of 4 weeks from the date of this judgment. Section 6
  declaration will be issued within a period of one week
  thereafter. As the appellants have full notice and
  information with respect to the proceedings, publication
  in the ne.wspapers either of the notification or of the
C declaration under the Act are dispensed with. Notice
  under Section 9 of the Act will be served within a period
  of 4 weeks after the publication of Section 6 declaration
  and award will be made within a period of three months
  thereafter. The deemed acquisition proceedings would
D thus, be concluded most expeditiously. The market value
  of the land in dispute be assessed as it prevails on the
  date on which the Section 4 notification is published in
  the Official Gazette. Payment of compensation/award
  amount will be made to the claimants/persons-interested
E immediately thereafter, alongwith all statutory benefits.
  The appellants shall be entitled to pursue the statutory
  remedies available to them for further enhancement of
  compensation, if so desired. [Para 20] [46-B-F]
                       Case Law Reference:
F
         1994 (1) Suppl. SCR 807 Relied on          Para 1
         2007(2) SCR 980          Relied on         Para 2
         2010 (12) SCR 163        Relied on         Para 2
G
         2011 (6) SCR 443         Relied on         Para 2
         2011 (14) SCR 211        Relied on         Para 2
         2012 (12) SCR 191        Relied on         Para 2
H
  TUKARAM KANA JOSHI & ORS. THR. POWER OF                   37
         ATTORNEY HOLDER v. M.l.D.C.

    1984 (2) SCR 693              Relied on          Para 4        A
    1975 "(2) SCR 356             Relied on          Para 5
    1987 (1) SCR 1                Relied on          Para 5

    2008 (15) SCR 194             Relied on          Para 5
                                                                   B
    1969 (2) SCR 596              Relied on          Para 6

    1987 (2) SCR 387              Relied on          Para 6

     1992 (2) SCR 155             Relied on          Para 6
                                                                   c
    2003 (1) SCR 714              Relied on          Para 6

    2011 (7) SCR 468              Relied on          Para 6

    1988 (2) Suppl. SCR 85~       Relied on          Para 9

    CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. D
7780 of 2012.

    From the Judgment & Order dated 14.11.2011 of the High
Court of Judicature at Bombay in Writ Petition No. 9513 of
2009.                                                      E

    V.C. Daga, Dilip Annasaheb Taur, Sujay N. Gowde, Retu
Rastogi, Anil Kumar for the Appellant.

    Guru Prasad Pal, Ramni Taneja, Anil Shrivastav, Pankaj
Bhasme, A.S. Bhasme, B.H. Marlapalle, Shankar Chillargei           F
Asha Gopalan Nair for the Respondents.

    The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

    DR. B.S. CHAUHAN, J. 1. Leave granted.
                                                                   G
    2. This appeal has arisen from the impugned judgment and
order dated 14.11.2011, passed by the High Court of Bombay
in Writ Petition No.9513 of 2009, by way of which the High Court
has rejected the claim of the appellants for any compensation
                                                                   H
    38       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                 [2012) 13 S.C.R.


A   due to them for the land taken by the respondent authorities,
    without resorting to any procedure prescribed by law.

         3. The facts and circumstances giving rise to this appeal
    are as under:
B          A. The land in dispute admeasuring 0-2-3 and 0-7-1 (9500
     sq.mtrs.) in Survey nos. 2 and 3 respectively, situate in the
     revenue estate of village Shirwame Taluka and District Thane,
    was owned by the predecessors-in-interest of the appellants,
     namely, Kana Ganpat Joshi, Maruti Kana Joshi, Dinanath
C    Ganpat Joshi and Gopinath Ganpat Joshi. A very large chunk
     of land including the said land stood notified under Section 4
     of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (hereinafter referred to as
    the 'Act') on 6.6.1964 for the establishment of the Ulhas Khore
     Project i.e. a project for industrial development. However, no
D   subsequent proceedings were taken up thereafter, and the
    acquisition proceedings lapsed. The predecessors-in-interest
    of the appellants were not merely illiterate farmers, but were
    also absolutely unaware of their rights and hence too inarticulate
    to claim them. Thus, they could be persuaded by the officers
E   of the respondent authorities to hand over possession of the
    said land. Actual physical possession of the said land was
    taken by the State authorities and handed over to the
    Maharashtra Industrial Development Corporation (hereinafter
    called as the 'Development Corporation') in the year 1964
    itself.
F
         B. Similarly situated persons who were also deprived of
    their rights in a similar manner were granted compensation
    vide order dated 17.6.1966.

G        C. The respondent-authorities realised in 1981 that grave
    injustice had been done to the appellants. Thus, in respect of
    the land in dispute, a fresh notification under Section 4 of the
    Act dated 14.5.1981 was issued. However, no further
    proceedings under the Act were initiated. The appellants had
H   been pursuing the authorities persuading them to complete the
  TUKARAM KANA JOSHI & ORS. THR. POWER OF                        39
ATTORNEY HOLDER v. M.l.D.C. [DR. 8.S. CHAUHAN, J.]

deemed acquisition proceedings, but despite their efforts, even        A
a declaration under Section 6 of the Act was not issued and
therefore, such proceedings also died a natural death.

      D. On 30.4.1988, the Development Corporation, under the
instructions of the Government of Maharashtra handed over the          B
possession of the said land to the City Industrial Development
Corporation of Maharashtra (hereinafter referred to as
'CIDCO'). The appellants were unable to get any compensation
for the said land or even for that matter, any land in lieu of the
lands _so taken, in spite of their best efforts made in this regard.   C
Various beneficial schemes were floated by the State
authorities in favour of persons who had been deprived of their
livelihood and those, whose land had been acquired for the
same purpose and under such schemes, such uprooted
persons were granted a particular piece of developed land,
proportionate to their area acquired. But, appellants' efforts in      D
this regard also could not be fruitful.

      E. As the appellants were unable to get any relief from any
authority, though they were continuously pursuing their
remedies by approaching the Special Land Acquisition Officer,          E
as well as the Revenue Authorities of the State, without any
success whatsoever, they then, feeling totally distraught/
frustrated, approached the High Court of Bombay as a last
resort, by filing Writ Petition No. 9513 of 2009. The same was
dismissed by the High Court only on the grounds of delay, and          F
the non-availability of certain documents.

     Hence, this appeal.

    4. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties and
perused the record.                                                    G

     5. This Court has dealt with this case on several occasions
in the past and has repeatedly asked the State authorities to
be sensitive, sympathetic and requested them to put forward
suggestions before the court, to enable it to redress the              H
    40       SUPREME COURT REPORTS               [2012) 13 S.C.R.


A   grievances of the appellants. The respondents herein have
    placed various affidavits on record and the facts of the case
    have fairly been admitted.

       6. The appellants were deprived of their immovable
8 property in 1964, when Article 31 of the Constitution was still
  intact and the right to property was a part of fundamental rights
  under Article 19 of the Constitution. It is pertinent to note that
  even after the Right to Property seized to be a Fundamental
  Right, taking possession of or acquiring the property of a citizen
C most certainly tantamounts to deprivation and.such deprivation
  can take place only in accordance with the "law", as the said
  word has specifically been used in Article 300-A of the
  Constitution. Such deprivation can be only by resorting to a
  procedure prescribed by a statute. The same cannot be done
  by way of executive fiat or order or administration caprice. In
D Jilubhai Nanbhai Khachar, etc. etc. v. State of Gujarat & Anr.,
  AIR 1995 SC 142, it has been held as follows:-

         "/n other words, Article 300-A only limits the power of the
         State that no person shall be deprived of his property
E        save by authority of Jaw. There is no deprivation without
         due sanction of law. Deprivation by any other mode is not
         acquisition or taking possession under Article 300-A. In
         other words, if there is no law, there is no deprivation."

        7. The right to property is now considered to be, not only
F a constitutional or a statutory right, but also a human right.
  Though, it is not a basic feature of the Constitution or a
  fundamental right. Human rights are considered to be in realm
  of individual rights, such as the right to health, the right to
  livelihood, the right to shelter and employment etc. Now
G however, human rights are gaining an even greater multi faceted
  dimension. The right to property is considered, very much to
  be a part of such new dimension.

     (Vide: Lachhman Dass v. Jagat Ram & Ors. (2007) 10
H SCC 448; Amarjit Singh & Ors. v. State of Punjab &·Ors.
  TUKARAM KANA JOSHI & ORS. THR. POWER OF          41
ATTORNEY HOLDER v. M.l.D.C. [DR. B.S. CHAUHAN, J.]

(2010) 10 SCC 43; Narmada Bachao Ando/an v. State of A
Madhya Pradesh &Anr. AIR 2011SC1989; State ofHaryana
v. Mukesh Kumar & Ors. AIR 2012 SC 559 and Delhi Airtech
Services Pvt. Ltd. v. State of U.P & Anr. AIR 2012 SC 573)
      8. In the case at hand, there has been no acquisition. The
question that emerges for consideration is whether, in a             B
democratic body polity, which is supposedly governed by the
Rule of Law, the State should be allowed to deprive a citizen
of his property, without adhering to the law. The matter would
have been different had the State pleaded that it has right, title
and interest over the said land. It however, concedes to the         C
right, title and interest of the appellants over such land and
pleads the doctrine of delay and laches as grounds for the
dismissal of the petition/appeal.
      9. There are authorities which state that delay and laches
extinguish the right to put forth a claim. Most of these authorities D
pertain to service jurisprudence, grant of compensation for a
wrong done to them decades ago, recovery of statutory dues,
claim for educational facilities and other categories of similar
cases, etc. Though, it is true that there are a few authorities
that lay down that delay and laches debar a citizen from seeking E
remedy, even if his fundamental right has been violated, under
Article 32 or 226 of the Constitution, the case at hand deals
with a different scenario altogether. Functionaries of the State
took over possession of the land belonging to the appellants
without any sanction of law. The appellants had asked F
repeatedly for grant of the benefit of compensation. The State
must either comply with the procedure laid down for acquisition,
or requisition, or any other permissible statutory mode. There
is a distinction, a ?true and concrete distinction, between the
principle of "eminent domain" and "police power'' of the State. G
Under certain circumstances, the police power of the State may
be used temporarily, to take possession of property but the
present case clearly shows that neither of the said powers have
been exercised. A question then arises with respect to the
authority or power under which the State entered upon the land. H
    42        SUPREME COURT REPORTS                [2012] 13 S.C.R.


A    It is evident that the act of the State amounts to encroachment,
     in exercise of "absolute power" which in common parlance is
     also called abuse of power or use of muscle power. To further
     clarify this position, it must be noted that the authorities have
     treated the land owner as a 'subject' of medieval India, but not
B    as a 'citizen' under our constitution.
        10. The State, especially a welfare State which is
   governed by the Rule of Law, cannot arrogate itself to a status
   beyond one that is provided by the Constitution. Our
   Constitution is an organic and flexible one. Delay and laches
C is adopted as a mode of discretion to decline exercise of
  jurisdiction to grant relief. There is another facet. The Court is
   required to exercise judicial discretion. The said discretion is
   dependent on facts and circumstances of the cases. Delay and
   laches is one of the facets to deny exercise of discretion. It is
D not an absolute impediment. There can be mitigating factors,
   continuity of cause action, etc. That apart, if whole thing shocks
  the judicial conscience, then the Court should exercise the
   discretion more so, when no third party interest is involved. Thus
  analysed, the petition is not hit by the doctrine of delay and
E laches as the same is not a constitutional limitation, the cause
  of action is continuous and further the situation certainly shocks
  judicial conscience.
        11. The question of condonation of delay is one of
  discretion and has to be decided on the basis of the facts of
F the case at hand, as the same vary from case to case. It will
  depend upon what the breach of fundamental right and the
  remedy claimed are and when and how the delay arose. It is
  not that there is any period of limitation for the Courts to
  exercise their powers under Article 226, nor is it that there can
G never be a case where the Courts cannot interfere in a matter,
  after the passage of a certain length of time. There may be a
  case where the demand for justice is so compelling, that the
  High Court would be inclined to interfere in spite of delay.
  Ultimately, it would be a matter within the discretion of the Court
H and such discretion, must be exercised fairly and justly so as
   TUKARAM KANA JOSHI & ORS. THR. POWER OF          43
 ATTORNEY HOLDER v. M.l.D.C. [DR. S.S. CHAUHAN, J.]

. to promote justice and not to defeat it. The validity of the party's A
  defence must be tried upon principles substantially equitable.
  {Vide: P.S. Sadasivaswamy v. State of T.N. AIR 1974 SC
  2271; State of M.P. & Ors. v. Nandlal Jaiswal & Ors., AIR 1987
  SC 251; and Tridip Kumar Dingal & Ors. v. State of West
  Bengal & Ors., {2009) 1 SCC 768;)                                    B
       12. No hard and fast rule can be laid down as to when the
 High Court should refuse to exercise its jurisdiction in favour of
 a party who moves it after considerable delay and is otherwise
 guilty of laches. Discretion must be exercised judiciously and
 reasonably. In the event that the claim ·made by the applicant       C
 is legally sustainable, delay should be condoned. In other words,
 where circumstances justifying the conduct exist, the illegality
 which is manifest, cannot be sustained on the sole ground
 of !aches. When substantial justice and technical considerations
 are pitted against each other, the cause of substantial justice      D
 deserves to be preferred, for the other side cannot claim to have
 a vested right in the injustice being done, because of a non-
 deliberate delay. The court should not harm innocent parties if
 their rights have infact emerged, by delay on the part of the
 Petitioners. {Vide: Durga Prasad v. Chief Controller of Imports      E
 and Exports & Ors., AIR 1970 SC 769; Collector, Land
 Acquisition, Anantnag & Anr. v. Mst. Katiji & Ors., AIR 1987
 SC 1353; Dehri Rohtas Light Railway Company Ltd. v. District
 Board, Bhojpur & Ors., AIR 1993 SC 802; Dayal Singh & Ors.
 v. Union of India & Ors., AIR 2003 SC 1140; and Shankara             F
 Co-op Housing Society Ltd. v. M. Prabhakar & Ors., AIR 2011
 SC 2161)
      13. In the case of H.D Vora v. State of Maharashtra & Ors.,
 AIR 1984 SC 866, this Court condoned a 30 year delay in
 approaching the court where it found violation of substantive G
 legal rights of the applicant. In that case, the requisition of
 premises made by the State was assailed.
      14. The High Court committed an error in holding the
 appellants non-suited on the ground of delay and non-availability H
    44       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                [2012] 13 S.C.R.


A   of records, as the court failed to appreciate that the appellants
    had been pursing their case persistently. Accepting their claim,
    the Statutory authorities had even initiated the acquisition
    proceedings in 1981, which subsequently lapsed for want of
    further action on the part of those authorities. The claimants are
s   illiterate and inarticulate persons, who have been deprived of
    their fundamental rights by the State, without it resorting to any
    procedure prescribed by law, without the court realising that the
    enrichment of a welfare State, or of its instrumentalities, at the
    cost of poor farmers is not permissible, particularly when done
c   at the behest of the State itself. The appellants belonged to a
    class which did not have any other vocation or any business/
    calling to fall back upon, for the purpose of earning their
    livelihood.
        15. Depriving the appellants of their immovable properties,
D was a clear violation of Article 21 of the Constitution. In a
  welfare State, statutory authorities are bound, not only to pay
  adequate compensation, but there is also a legal obligation
   upon them to rehabilitate such persons. The non-fulfillment of
  their obligations would tantamount to forcing the said uprooted
E persons to become vagabonds or to indulge in anti-national
  activities as such sentiments would be born in them on account
  of such ill-treatment. Therefore, it is not permissible for any
  welfare State to uproot a person and deprive him of his
  fundamental/constitutional/human rights, under the garb of
F industrial development.
       16. The appellants have been deprived of their legitimate
  dues for about half a century. In such a fact-situation, we fail to
  understand for which class of citizens, the Constitution provides
  guarantees and rights in this regard and what is the exact
G percentage of the citizens of this country, to whom
  Constitutional/statutory benefits are accorded, in accordance
  with the law.
        17. The appellants have been seriously discriminated
    against qua other persons, whose land was also acquired.
H
  TUKARAM KANA JOSHI & ORS. THR. POWER OF          45
ATTORNEY HOLDER v. M.l.D.C. [DR. B.S. CHAUHAN, J.]

Some of them were given the benefits of acquisition, including        A
compensation in the year 1966. This kind of discrimination not
only breeds corruption, but also dis-respect for governance, as
it leads to frustration and to a certain extent, forces persons to
take the law into their own hands. The findings of the High
Court, that requisite records were not available, or that the         B
appellants approached the authorities at a belated stage are
contrary to the evidence available on record and thus, cannot
be accepted and excused as it remains a slur on the system
of governance and justice alike, and an anathema to the
doctrine of equality, which is the soul of our Constitution .. Even   c
under valid acquisition proceedings, there is a legal obligation
on the part of the authorities to complete such acquisition
proceedings at the earliest, and to make payment of requisite
compensation. The appeals etc. are required to be decided
expeditiously, for the sole reason that, if a person is not paid      D
compensation in time, he will be unable to purchase any land
or other immovable property, for the amount of compensation
that is likely to be paid to him at a belated stage.
     18. While dealing with the similar issue, this Court in K.
Krishna Reddy & Ors. v. The Special Dy. Collector, Land               E
Acquisition Unit II, LMD Karimnagar, Andhra Pradesh, AIR
1988 SC 2123, held as under:
     " ... .After all money is what money buys. What the claimants
     could have bought with the compensation in 1977 cannot
     do in 1988. Perhaps, not even one half of it. It is a common     F
     experience that the purchasing power of rupee is
     dwindling. With rising inflation, the delayed payment may
     lose all charm and utility of the compensation. In some
     cases, the delay may be detrimental to the interests of
     claimants. The Indian agriculturists generally have no           G
     avocation. They totally depend upon land. If uprooted, they
     will find themselves nowhere. They are left high and dry.
     They have no savings to draw. They have nothing to fall
     back upon. They know no other work. They may even face
     starvation unless rehabilitated. In all such cases, it is of     H
     46        SUPREME COURT REPORTS               [2012] 13 S.C.R.


A         utmost importance that the award should be made without
          delay. The enhanced compensation must be determined
          without loss of time .... "
          19. In view of the above, the instant case represents a
B    highly unsatisfactory and disturbing situation prevailing in one
     of the most developed States of our country.
        20. Be that as it may, ultimately, good sense prevailed, and
   learned senior counsel appearing for the State came forward
   with a welcome suggestion stating that in order to redress the
C grievances of the appellants, the respondent-authoriti~s would
   notify the land in dispute under Section 4 of the Act within a
   period of 4 weeks from today. Section 6 declaration will be
   issued within a period of one week thereafter. As the appellants
   have full notice and information with respect to the proceedings,
   publication in the newspapers either of the notification or of the
0 declaration under the Act are dispensed with. Notice under
   Section 9 of the Act will be served within a period of 4 weeks
  after the publication of Section 6 declaration and award will be
  made within a period of three months thereafter. The deemed
  acquisition proceedings would thus, be concluded most
E expeditiously. Needless to say, the market value of the land in
  dispute will be assessed as it prevails on the date on which
  the Section 4 notification is published in the Official Gazette.
  Payment of compensation/award amount will be made to the
  claimants/persons-interested immediately thereafter, alongwith
F all statutory benefits. The appellants shall be entitled to pursue
  the statutory remedies available to them for further
  enhancement of compensation, if so desired.
       21. Before parting with the case, we appreciate the gesture
  shown by the State Government for coming forward with a most
G appropriate suggestion to enable us to resolve the controversy
  involved herein, in a manner so cordial and sympathetic.
          22. With these observations, the appeal stands disposed
    of.
H K.K.T.                                          Appeal allowed.