TRISHALA JAIN AND ANR.versusSTATE OF UTTARANCHAL AND ANR.

                       [2011) 8 S.C.R. 520


A                   TRISHALA JAIN AND Al\IR.
                                 v.
              STATE OF UTIARANCHAL AND ANR.
            (Civil Appeal Nos.7496-7497 of 2005 etc.)
                          MAY 05, 2011
8
               . [ASOK KUMAR GANGULY AND
                   SWATANTER KUMAR, JJ.]

        Land Acquisition Act, 1894 - ss.23 and 24:
c
       Fair market value of the acquired land - Determination
  of - Land Acquisition Officer applied the belting system and
  categorizing the land into three different categories awarded
  the compensation accordingly - However, Reference Court
D held that the land as a whole was similarly placed and was to
  be used for one purpose, thus there was no question of
  applying the belting system and accordingly awarded uniform
  compensation to all the claimants - This finding of Reference
  Court upheld by the High Court - Correctness of this
E concurrent view not questioned by any of the parties before
  the Supreme Court - Held: The concurrent· finding recorded
  by the Courts below having remained unchallenged before the
  Supreme Court need not be interfered with.

       Fair market value of the acquired land - Determination
F of - Sale instances (exemplars) - Claimants placed reliance
  upon two sale instances and sought compensation on that
  basis - Reference Court declined to consider the two sale
  instances produced by the claimants - Justification of- Held:
  Justified - Both the seller and the purchaser in the sale
G instances relied upon by the claimants were either claimants
  in different claim petitions or belonged to the same family -
  The claimants had full knowledge of acquisition of/and as well
  as the purpose for which the said land was sought to be
  acquired - Circumstances and evidence clearly indicate that
~                               520
       TRISHALA JAIN AND ANR. v. STATE OF                  521
            UTIARANCHAL AND ANR.
there was clear attempt on the part of the claimants to execute   A
sale deeds for the purpose of hiking up land price just before
acquisition to get more compensation - The said two sale
instances were sham, collusive, lacked bona fides and were
executed with the intention to raise the price of the land in
question with the pretence of it being actual market value -      B
Decision of Reference Court rightly upheld by the High Court.

        Determination of market value of acquired land -
Principle of deduction inland value covered by a comparable
sale instance - Applicability of -Deduction on account of C
expenses of development of the site - Held: Normally
deduction is to be applied on account of carrying out
development activities like providing roads or civic amenities
such as electricity, water etc. when the land has been acquired
for construction of residential, commercial or institutional
 projects - It shall also be applied where the sale instances D
 (exemplars) relate· to smaller pieces of land and in
 comparison the acquisition relates to a large tract of land -
 In addition thereto, deduction can also be applied on account
 of wastage of/and - The cases where the acquired land itself
 is fully developed and has all essential amenities, before E
 acquisition, for the purpose .for which it is acquired requiring
  no additional expenditure for its development, falls under the
 purview of cases of 'no deduction' - Furthermore, where the
  evidence led by the parties is of such instances where the
  compensation paid is comparable, i.e. exemplar lands have F
  all the features comparable to the proposed acquired land,
  including that of size, is another category of cases where
.principle of 'no deduction' may be applied - In the instant
~case, there is evidence on record to show that plotting was
1done only on part of the acquired land and the land is G
·Surrounded by colonies like ITBP etc. but, there is no
evidence to show that the acquired land itself is developed
.:;ind is having all the required facilities and amenities - It may
 'Je a case where less deduction may be applied but certainly
  't is not a case of 'no deduction' - It also cannot be believed, H
    522      SUPREME COURT REPORTS                 [2011] 8 S.C.R.


A in the absence of specific documentary evidence, that no
  further development is required on the acquired land - Under
  the circumstances, no infirmity in the approach of tf]e High
  Court in applying the principle of deduction - In the faCts and
  circumstances of the present case, deduction of 10% from the
B market value on account of development charges an_d other
  possible expenditures was justifiable and ca/led for... ·

         Determination of Compensation - Application of principle
    of guesstimate for determining the amount of compensation
    - Held: More often than not, it is not possible to fix the
C   compensation with exactitude or arithmetic accuracy -
    Depending on the facts and circumstances of the case, the
    Court may have to take recourse to some guesswork while
    determining the fair market value of the land and the
    consequential amount of compensation that is required to be
D   paid to the persons interested in the acquired land - 'Guess'
    as understood in its common parlance is an estimate without
    any specific information while 'calculations' are always made
    with reference to specific data - 'Guesstimate' is an estimate
    based on a mixture of guesswork and calculations and it is a
E   process in itself - 'Guesstimate' is with higher certainty than
    mere 'guess' or a 'conjecture' per se - However, principle of
    some guesswork would have hardly any application in a case
    of no evidence - Discretion of the court in applying guesswork
    to the facts of a given case is not unfettered but has to be
F   reasonable and should have a connection to the data on
    record produced by the parties by way of evidence - Further,
    this entire exercise has to be within the limitations specified
    under ss. 23 and 24 of the Act and cannot be made in
    detninent thereto - On facts, it is a case of acquisition of land
G   which is situated on a reasonably good location surrounded
    by developed areas having civic amenities and facilities and
    further development activity was going on in nearby areas -
    The land acquired had the potential of being developed for
    residential or institutional purposes and the same was
H   acquired for construction of a Government Polytechnic
       TRISHALA JAIN AND ANR. v. STATE OF                     523
            UTTARANCHAL AND ANR
Institute',;.. Therefore, it is a case where the Court should apply • A
minimal deduction·which will meet the ends ofjustice and
would help in determining just and fair compensation for the
land in question - 10% deduction from the market vafue of
the acquired land would meefthe erids of justice.
                                                                     B
     The instant appeals came up before this Court as a
result of a common Notification issued under Section 4(1)
of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. The following common
questions arose for consideration:
      I.      Whether or not the belting system ought to             C
              hav.e :been applied. for determination of fair
              market value of the acquired Ian<;!?
      II.     What should be the just and fair market,value
              of the acquired land on the date ofissuance            D
              of notification under Section 4 of the Act?
      Ill.     Whether there oughLto have been any
             . deduction after determining the fair market
               value of the land?             '·
                                                                     E
      IV.     What compensation and benefits are the·
              claimants entitled to?
     Disposing of the appeals, the Court

     HELD:                                                           F

Question No. 1.

     1. The Special Land Acquisition Officer (SLAO); while
.giving its award had applied the belting system and                G
.categorizing the land into three different categories had
.awarded the compensation accordingly. Howev~.r. the
!Reference Court had held that the land as a V(hole'was
isimilarly placed and was surrounded by develoRed ai:.eas
and it was to be used for one purpose, i.e. construction
                                                                     H
    524      SUPREME COURT REPORTS             (2011] 8 S.C.R.

A of Government Polytechnic Institute, thus there was no
  question of applying the belting system. Keeping in view
  the documentary and oral evidence. on record, the
  Reference Court set aside the belting system and
  awarded uniform compensation to all the claimants. This
a finding of the Reference Court was upheld by the High
  Court in the impugned judgments. The correctness of
  this concurrent view has also not been questioned by
  any of the parties in the present appeals. Therefore,
  concurrent finding recorded by the Courts below which
c remained unchallenged before this Court need not be
  disturbed by this Court. [Para 10] [543-F-H;. 544-A-B]
    Question No. II

         2.1. The principal evidence relied upon by the
D   claimants in all these cases are the two sale instances
    shown at serial Nos. 109 and 110. According to the
    claimants, they were entitled to compensation on the
    basis of these two sale instances. From the fac;tual matrix
    the question that requires consideration of this Court is
E   whether the Reference Court was justified in law with
    reference to the facts on record in declining to consider
    the two sale instances produced by the claimants at
    serial Nos. 109 and 110 or in other words, was it justified
    on part of the Reference Court to keep them outside the
F   zone of consideration while determining the market value
    of the acquired land. It cannot be disputed that both the
    seller and the purchaser in sale instances at s.erial Nos.
    109 and 110 are either claimants in different claim
    petitions or belong to the same family. The claimants had
G   full knowledge of acquisition of land and as well as the
    purpose for which the said land was sought to be
    acquired. [Paras 11, 12 and 13] [544 -C-D; 546-E-G; 547-
    B]

          2.2. A fraudulent move or design is not capable of
H
       TRISHALA JAIN AND ANR v. STATE OF                 525
            UTTARANCHAL AND ANR.
direct proof in most cases; it can only be inferred. Under      A
such circumstances, the Court has to take a general view
keeping in mind the facts and circumstances of the case
with particular reference to the intent of parties, their
action in furtherance thereto and the object sought to be
achieved by them. In the instant case, it is not in dispute     8
that these sale deeds have been executed in favour of
the family members or persons known to the claimants.
These are circumstances and evidence which clearly
indicate that the sale instances relied upon by the
claimants are result of collusion between these parties.        c
There was clear attempt on the part of the claimants to
execute sale deeds for the purpose of hiking up land
price just before acquisition to get more compensation.
These two sale instances which have been executed just
about two months prior to the issuance of the notification      D
under Section 4(1) stand out as transactions which are
sham, collusive, lack bona fide and have been executed
with the intention to raise the price of the land in question
with the pretence of it being actual market value. There
is no infirmity in this view of the Reference Court which       E
was rightly upheld by the High Court. [Paras 13 and 14]
[547-C-G]

    Yeshwant Deorao Deshmukh v. Walchand Ramchand
Kothari (1950) 1 SCR 852 - relied on.
                                                           F
    A.P. State Road Transport Corporation, Hyderabad.v. P.
Venkaiah (1997) 10 SCC 128: 1997 (3) SCR 1054; Cement
Corporation of India v. Purya (2004) 8 SCC 270; Chimanlal
Hargovinddas v. Special Land Acquisition Officer, Poona
(1988) 3 sec 751: 1988 (1) Suppl. SCR 531 and State of G
Haryana v. Ram Singh (2001) 6 SCC 254: 2001 (3) SCR
1178 - referred to.

Question No. Ill

    3.1. The law with regard to applying the principle of       H
      '
    526    SUPREME COURT REPORTS              [2011) 8 S.C.R.
            \
A ,deductipn to the determined market value of the acquired
   land 4" quite consistent, though, of course, the extent of
   dedu~tion has varied very widely depending on the facts
   and circumstances of a given case. It is not possible to
   state precisely the exact deduction which could be made
B uniformly applicable to all the cases. Normally the rule is
   that deduction is to be applied en account of carrying out
   development activities like providing roads or civic
   amenities such as electricity, water etc. when the land
   has been acquired for construction of residential,
c commercial or institutional projects. It shall also be
   applied where the sale instances (exemplars) relate to
   smaller pieces of land and in comparison the acquisition
   relates to a large tract of land. In addition thereto,
   deduction can also be applied on account of wastage of
D land. [Pa~~ 18) [549-H; 550-A-C]
         3.2. It is also neither possible nor appropriate to
    stricto,sensu define a class of cases where the Court
    would not apply any deduction. This again would be
    dependant upon the facts and circumstances of a given
E   case. The cases where the acquired land itself is fully
    developed and has all essential amenities, be.fore
    acquisition, for the purpose for which it is acquired
    requiring no additional expenditure for its development,
    falls under the purview of cases of 'no deduction'.
F   Furthermore, where the evidence led by the parties is of
    such instances where the compensation paid is
    comparable, i.e. exemplar lands have all the features
    comparable to the proposed acquired land, including that
    of size, is another category of cases where principle of
G   'no deduction' may be applied. These may be the cases
    where least or no deduction could be made. Such cases
    are exceptional and/or rare as normally the lands which
    are proposed to be acquired for development purposes
    would be agricultural lands and/or semi or haphazardly
H   developed lands at the time of issuance of notification
         TRISHALA JAIN AND ANR. v. STATE OF             527
     '        · UTTARANCHAI.. AND ANR.
            .                     .

·. under Section4(1) of ·the Act~ which is the relevant time    A
  ~o be taken into consideration for all purposes and
   j.htents for determining the market value of the land in
   question. [Para 19) [550-E-H; 551-A-B]
       3.3. It is evident that the acquired land h'as to be more 8
  or le~s developed land as its developed surrounding
  areas', with all amenities and facilities and is fifto be used
  for the purpose for which it is acquired without any
  further expend-iture, before such land could be
  considered for no deduction. Similarly the sale instances C
  even of smaller plots could be considered for
  determining the market value of a larger chun.k of land
  with some deduction unless, there was compa·rability in
  potential, utilisation, amenities and. infrastructure with
  hardly any distinction. On such principles each case
  would have to be considered on its own merits. This D
  Court, d'epending. on the facts and circum~tances of each
  given case, has taken the view that deduction on account
  of expenses of development of the ·sites could_ vary from
  10% to'..86.33% depending on the nature of the land, Its
: situation, the purpose. and stage of development [Paras E
. 20, 21) [552-H; 553~A-D]
   · : 3.4. In the present case,. there is evidence on record
 to show that plotting has been done only on part of the
 acquired land and the land is surrounded by colonies like      F
 ITBP etc. but, there is no evidence to show that the
 acquired land itself is developed and is having all the
 required facilities and amenities. It may be a c.ase where
 less deduction may be applied but certainly it is not a case
 of 'no deduction'. It also cannot be believed, in the          G
 absence of specific documentary evidence, that no
 further development is required on the acquired land. The
 claimants, on whom the onus lies to prove inadequacy
 of compensation have not even stated that whether
 under the relevant laws they are ·expected to leave any        H
    528    SUPREME COURT REPORTS               [2011) 8 S.C.R.


A i:>art of their land open when they are permitted to raise
  construction on the land in question. Under these
  circumstances, there is no infirmity in the approach of the
  High Court in applying the principle of deduction. A
  deduction of 10% from the market value on account of
s development charges and other possible expenditures
  would be justifiable and called for in the facts and
  circumstances of the present case. [Para 25] [556-C-F]

       Land Acquisition Officer, Kammarapally Village v.
  Nookala Rajamallu (2003) 12 SCC 334: 2003 (6) Suppl.
C SCR 67; Bhagwathula Samanna & Ors v. Special Tahsildar
  & Land Acquisition Officer (1991) 4 SCC 506: 1991(1) Suppl.
  SCR 172; K.S. Shivadevamma v. Assistant Commissioner·
  and Land Acqusition Officer (1996) 2 SCC 62: 1995(6) Suppl.
  SCR 364; Ram Piari v. Land Acquisition Collector, Solan
D (1996) 8 SCC 338: 1996 (3) SCR 307; Hasanali Walimchand
  (Dead) by L v. State of Maharashtra (1998) 2 SCC 388: 1998
  (1) SCR 1; Chim an/a! Hargovinddas v. Special Land
  Acquisition Officer, Poona (1988) 3 SCC 751: 1988 (1) Suppl.
  SCR 531; V. Hanumantha Reddy (Deceased) by L v. Land
E Acquisition Officer & Manda/ R. Officer (2003) 12 SCC 642;
  Atma Singh v. State of Haryana (2008) 2 SCC 568: 2007 (12)
  SCR 1120 and Charan Dass v. Himacha/ Pradesh Housing
  & Urban Development Authority (2010) 13 SCC 398: 2009
  (14) SCR 163 - referred to.
F
    Question No. IV:

      Determination of Compensation - Application of
  principle ·of guesstimate for determining the amount of
  compensation to be awarded for the land acquired under
G the Act
      4.1. Acquisition of land is an act falling in the purview
  of eminent domain of the State. It essentially relates to the
  concept of compulsory acquisition as opposed to
H voluntary sale. It is trite that no person can be deprived
      TRISHALA JAIN AND ANR. v. STATE OF                  529
           UTTARANCHAL AND ANR.
of his· property save by authority of law in terms of Article    A
300A of the Constitution of India. The provisions of the
Act provide a complete mechanism for 'deprivation of
property in accordance with the. law' as stated under the
Act. Justifiability and fairness of such compensation is
subject to judicial review within the confines of the four       B
corners of the Act. Once the lands are acquired under the-
Act, the persons interested therein are entitled to
compensation as per the provisions of the Act. Thus, in
the present case the land in question has been acquired
under the provisions of a law which specifically provide         c
that acquisition can only be for a public purpose and
upon payment of compensation to the claimants in
accordance with law. The compensation payable to the
claimants has to be computed in terms of Sections -23
and 24 of the Act. The market value of the land has to be        0
determined at the date of the publication of the
notification- under Section 4(1) of the Act, after taking into
consideration what is stated under Sections 23(1), 23(1A),
23(2) and excluding the considerations stated under
Section 24 of the Act. More often than not, it is not
possibl_e to fix the compensation with exactitude or             E
arithmetic accuracy. Depending on the facts and
circumstances of the case, the Court may have to take
recourse to some guesswork while determining the fair
market value of the land and the consequential amount
of compensation that is required to be paid to the               F
persons interested in the acquired land. [Para 26] [557-
A-F]

     4.2. 'Guess' as understood in its common parlance
ls an estimate without any specific information while            G
'calculations' are always made with reference to specific
data. 'Guesstimate' is an estimate based on a mixture of
guesswork and calculations and it is a process in itself.
At the same time 'guess' cannot be treated synonymous
to 'conjecture''. 'Guess' by itself may be a statement or        H
   530     SUPREME COURT REPORTS              [2011] 8 S.C.R.


A result based on unknown factors while 'conjecture' is
  made with a very slight amount of knowledge, which is
  just sufficient to incline the scale of probability.
  'Guesstimate' is with higher certainty than mere 'guess'
  or a 'conjecture' per se. The concept of 'guesswork' is
B r:iot unknown to various fields of law. It has been applied
  in cases relating to insurance, taxation, compensation
  under the Motor Vehicles Act as well as under the Labour
  Laws. All that is required from a Court is that such
  guesswork has to be used with greater element of
c caution and within the determinants of law declared by
  the Legislature or by the Courts from time to time. [Paras
  27, 28) [557-G-H; 558-A-C]

     · 4.3. Under the Act, as settled by various judgments
  of this Court, there are different methods of computation
D of compensation payable to the claimants, for example it
  can be based upon comparable sale instances, awards
  and judgments relating to the similar or comparable
  lands, method of averages, yearly yields with reference
  to the revenue earned by the land etc. Whatever method
E of determining the compensation is applied by the court,
  its result should always be reasonable, just and fair as
  that is the purpose sought to be achieved under the·
  scheme of the Act. For attaining that purpose, application
  of some guesswork may be necessary but this principle
F would have hardly any application in a case of no
  evidence. In other words, where the parties have not
  brought on record any evidence, then the court will not
  be in a position to award compensation merely on the
  basis of imagination, conjecture etc. [Para 32] [561-C-F]
G
       4.4. The Court may apply some guesswork before it
  could arrive at a final determination, which is in
  consonance with the statutory law as well as the
  principles stated in the judicial pronouncements. The
  guesswork has to be used for determination of
H
      TRISHALA JAIN AND ANR. v. STATE OF                531
           UTTARANCHAL AND ANR.
compensation with greater element of caution and the           /:
principle of guesstimation will have no application to the
case of 'no evidence'. This principle is only intended to
bridge the gap between the calculated compensation and
the actual compensation that the claimants may be
entitled to receive as per the facts of a given case to meet   B
the ends of justice. It will be appropriate to state certain
principles controlling the application of 'guesstimate: (a)
Wherever the evidence produced by the parties is not
sufficient to determine the compensation with exactitude,
this principle can be resorted to and b) Discretion of the     c
court in applying guesswork to the facts of a given case
is not unfettered but has to be reasonable and should
have a connection to the data on record produced by the
parties by way of evidence. Further, this entire exercise
has to be within the limitations specified under Sections
                                                               0
23 and 24 of the Act and cannot be made in detriment
thereto. Applying these principles to the facts of the
present case, this· Court has to take recourse to the
'principle of guesstimation' inasmuch as it is essential for
fixation of fair market value of the land which shall be the
basis for determining the compensation payable to the          E
claimants. [Paras 33, 34) [561-F-H; 562-A-E]
    4.5. All the claimants in the present appeals have
primarily relied upon the sale instances shown at serial
Nos. 109 and 110. These sale instances have rightly been       F
ignored by the Courts below. Besides the fact that these
sale deeds are executed between the members of the
family, the claimants had full knowledge of the
Government's intention to acquire these lands, for the
purpose specified, even prior to issuan~e of notification      G
under Section 4(1) of the Act These are reasons enough
to doubt the consideration paid in these sale deeds. The
SLAO, in his Award, has taken note of 140 sale instances
:mmediately preceding the issuance of Notification under
3ection 4(1) of the Act. The Reference Court specifically
                                                               H
   532     SUPREME COURT REPORTS               [2011) 8 S.C.R


A recorded that the highest value reflected in these 140 sale
  instances is Rs. 12,55,550.50 per acre, except in sale
  instances at serial Nos. 109 and 110 produced by the
  claimants. The claimants did not produce any other
  evidence except these two sale instances which had
B been executed between the memt:Jers of the family and
  contained unreasonably high price of the land. There is
  tremendous gap between the prices of the land fetched
  in all other sale deeds on one hand, the highest being Rs.
  12,55,550.50 per acre and that in sale deeds executed by
c the claimants between themselves on the other hand
  which is Rs. 34,87,648 per acre, for sales effected within
  a span of 2-3 days for similarly situated lands in the same
  village. It certainly arouses suspicion in the mind of the
  Court as to the intention behind execution of these sale
  deeds. Ex facie they appear to have been executed to
0
  hike up the price of the land just before the issuance of
  Notification under Section 4(1) of the Act. If considered
  from the point of view of a reasonable man, all these
  circumstances clearly fall beyond the ambit of
  coincidence and appear to have been 'managed' to
E achieve the end of receiving higher compensation. The
  sale instances at serial Nos. 109 and 11 O produced by the
  claimants are liable to be ignored for the purposes of
  fixation of market value of the acquired land as these
  transactions are sham and lack bona fide. The two
F exhibits produced by the claimants offend the very
  essence of the parameters stated under Section 23 of the
  Act. Thus, the view taken by the Reference Court and the
  High Court, rejecting these instances as collusive and
  sham is liable to be sustained. The sale instance shown
G at serial No. 10Q is certainly an exemplar which can be
  taken into consideration. This is a sale deed executed on
  29th November, 1991 where a land admeasuring 0.90
  acres has been sold at a rate of Rs.12,55,550.50 per acre.
  As far as the location and potential of this land is
H concerned, it is situated at a distance of 1Yz furlong of the
      TRISHALA JAIN AND ANR. v. STATE OF                533
           UTIARANCHAL AND ANR.

acquired land in the same village. It is the case of the A
claimants in all these appeals that the acquired land is
surrounded by developed areas like ITBP Colony on the
North and there was a 20 feet wide passage ending on
the acquired land. Facilities of post office, electricity,
hospital, schools etc. were available in those colonies B
which ar~ very close to the acquired land. The Reference
Courts, in their respective awards, also noticed that
heavy construction activity was going on nearby Shimla
Road and the value of this land is continuously rising.
Another relevant piece of evidence with reference to c
potential and location of the land is the statement of PW-
4, an Architect by profession. He claims to have visited
the site and made plans to divide the land in question into
plots after making provision for civic amenities, children
park etc. In these circumstances, it is difficult to doubt that D
the land i,n question has substantial potential and is
located, adjacent to developed areas. According to this
witness, there has been a decreasing trend in the value
of the land in that area. The declaration under Section 6
was issued in April, 1992 itself at a time when the prices E
had started falling. The cumulative effect of the
documentary and oral evidence on record is that it is a
case of acquisitfon of land which is situated on a
reasonably good location surrounded by developed
areas having civic amenities and facilities and further
development activity was going on in nearby areas. It was F
a\so submitted by the claimants that plotting has already
been done on the acquired land and some plots of land
have been sold immediately prior to the issuance of the
Notification under Se~tion 4(1) of the Act. It is evident that
the land acquired had the potential of being developed G
for residential or institutional purposes and the same was
acquired for construction of a Government Polytechnic
Institute. Therefore, it is a case where the Court should
apply minimal deduction which will meet the ends of
justice and would help in determining just and fair H.
    534     SUPREME COURT REPORTS                [2011] 8 S.C.R


A   compensation for the land in question. This Court is of
    the considered view that 10% deduction from the market
    value of the acquired land would meet the ends of justice.
    The sale instance at serial No. 108 falls in the Revenue
    Estate of the same Village and is situated at a distance
B   of 1% furlong from the acquired land. The acquired land
     belonging to the claimants forms part of Khasra No.39/2
    while, in the same Reveue Estate, the sale ins'tance at
    serial No. 108 is part of Khasra No. 410. Thus a sale deed
    related to a land in such proximity of time and distance
c   cannot be said to be incomparable sale instance, i.e. it has
    to be taken as a comparable sale instance. Though it
    relates to the sale of a smaller plot of land but is certainly
    bigger than the land sold by the claimants between
    themselves. Its location and potential, if not identical in
0   absolute terms, is certainly comparable for the purposes
    of determining market value of the land in. question. It is
    a well established principle that the value of sale of small
    pieces of land can be taken into consideration for
    determining even the value of a large tract of land but with
E   a rider that the Court while taking such instances into
    consideration has to make some deduction keeping in
    view other attendant circumstances and facts of that
    particular case. Keeping in view the surrounding
    developed areas and location and potential of the land it
    will meet the ends of justice if 10% deduction is made
F   from the estimated market value of the acquired land. The
    comparable sale instance under serial No. 108 depicted
    the fair value of land in that area at the time of issuance
    of Notification under Section 4(1) of the Act which is
    Rs.12,55,550.50 per acre. The time gap between this sale
G   instance and issuance of said Notification is merely two
    months· which would hardly call for any increase in the
    said value but to balance the equities between the parties
    we would round off the figure to Rs. 13,00,000 per acre.
    By applying the principle of guesstimate, thus, the market
H   value of the acquired land is determined at Rs. 13,00,000
      TRISHALA JAIN AND ANR. v. STATE OF                  535
           UTTARANCHAL AND ANR.
per acre as on the date of the issuance of the Notification     A
under Section 4(1) of the Act. Deducting 10% therefrom,
it would come to Rs.11,70,000 per acre which will be the
compensation payable to the claimants with statutory
benefits and interests thereupon in accordance with law.
[Paras 35 to 44) [562-F; 563-A-H; 564-A, F-G; 565-C-H;          B
566-A-H; 567-A-H]
     Charan Dass v. Himachal Pradesh Housing & Urban
Development Authority (2010) 13 SCC 398: 2009 (14) SCR
163; Thakur Kamta Prasad Singh (Dead) through LRs v.
State of Bihar (1976) 3 SCC 772: 1976 (3) SCR 585; Special      C
Land Acquisition Officer v. Karigowda (2010) 5 SCC 708:
2010 (5) SCR 164 and Commissioner of Central Excise,
Jaipur v. Rajasthan Spinning and Weaving Mills Ltd. 2007
(12) SCR 703 - referred to.
                                                                D
                     Case Law Reference:
    (1950) 1 SCR 852              relied on     Para 13
    1997 (3) SCR 1054             referred to   Para 16
    (2004) 8 sec 210              referred to   Para 16         E
    2001 (3) SCR 1178             referred to   Para 17, 38
    2003 (6) Suppl. SCR 67        referred to   Para 18, 21
    1991 (1) Suppl. SCR 172       referred to   Para 20, 23
                                                                F
 ___ _1_9,95 (6) Suppl. SCR 364   referred to   Para 21
    1996 (3) SCR 307              referred to   Para 21
    1988 (1) Suppl. SCR 531       referred to   Para 21
    1998 (1) SCR 1                referred to   Para 21         G

    (2003) 12 sec 642             referred to   Para 22
    2007 (12) SCR 1120            referred to   Para 24
    2009 (14) SCR 163             referred to   Para 24, 28
                                                                H
    536      SUPREME COURT REPORTS                [2011] 8 S.C.R.


A         1976 (3) SCR 585             referred to   Para 29
          201 O (5) SCR 164            referred to   Para 30
          2007 (12) SCR 703            referred to   Para 31

B       CIVIL APPELLATE JURtSDICTION : Civil Appeal No.
    7496-7497 of 2005 etc.

         From the Judgment & Order dated 20.07.2005 of the High
    Court of Uttaranchal at Nainital in First Appeal No. 920 & 921
    of 2001.
c                                 WITH
    C.A. Nos. 7498-7499 of 2005, 1122 of 2011 & 3613 of 2008.

        R.S. Hegde, Girish Ananthamurthy, P.P. Singh, Braj
    Kishore Mishra, Aparna Jha, Abhishek Yadav, Vikram
0
    Patralekh, Satyajit A. Desai, Som Nath Padhan for the
    Appellants.

          Rachna Srivastava, Jitendra Mohan Sharma, Vijay K. Jain
    for the Respondents.
E
          The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

         SWATANTER KUMAR, J. 1. By this common judgment,
    we propose to dispose of the afore-noticed six Civil Appeals
    as they arise from different judgments of the High Court of
F   Uttaranchal but are result of a common Notification issued
    under Section 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (in short-
    the 'Act') and thus are based upon similar facts and
    documentary and oral evidence.

G FACTS:

    C. A. Nos.7496-7497 of 2005 and 7498-7499 of 2005

        2. On 30th January, 1992, the Government of Uttar
    Pradesh (now the State of Uttaranchal) issued a Notification
H
     TRISHALA JAIN AND ANR. v. STATE OF    537
UTTARANCHAL AND ANR. [SWATANTER KUMAR, J.]
under Section 4(1) of the Act for acquiring some land for a A
public purpose, namely the construction of Government
Polytechnic Institute in the District of Dehradun. This
Notification came to be published in the Official Gazette on
22nd February, 1992. On 18th April 1992, declaration under
Section 6(1) of the Act was issued which was published in B
the Official Gazette on 12th May, 1992 identifying the land
admeasuring 12.85 acres for acquisition for the said purpose
in village Sewala Kalan, Pargana Kendriya Doon, District
Dehradun, out of which lands admeasuring 4.58 acres and
3.031 acres belonged to the first and the second claimant c
respectively. In furtherance to this Notification, possession of
the acquired land was taken on 7th July, 1992. The Special
Land Acquisition Officer (in short the 'SLAO') pronounced his
award on 8th June, 1993.. While determining compensation,
the SLAO applied belting system to the acquired land and
                                                                 0
assessed the market value of the first belt admeasuring 0.56 .
acres at the rate of Rs. 9, 78,223.40 per acre, second belt
admeasuring 1.38 acres at the rate of Rs. 6,52,482.27 per
acre and for the third belt admeasuring 10.91 acres at the rate
of Rs. 4,39,362.70 per acre. However, the claimants, being
dissatisfied with the award of the SLAO, filed applications E
under Section 18 of the Act which in turn came to be referred
to the Court of competent jurisdiction (hereinafter referred to
 as the 'Reference Court').

      3. The Reference Court, in LA Case No. 386 of 1993,       F
 considered the list of 140 sale instances attached with the
 award of the SLAO. It noticed that the SLAO had relied on
 sale instance at serial no. 43 related to land admeasuring
 0.094 acre for a total consideration of Rs. 92,000 and
assessed the market value of acquired land at the rate of Rs.   G
9,78,723 per acre before applying the belting system. This
sale deed was executed on 10th June, 1991 and the land was
 from the revenue estate of the same village but at some
1distance from the acquired land. The Reference Court also
•noticed the evidence of OW 1, Ram Singh, who had stated        H
     538    SUPREME COURT REPORTS                [2011] 8 S.C.R.


A that ITBP quarters are located to the north of the acquired
  land; and to the east of ITBP Colony, is a 20 feet wide
  passage which ends on the acquired land. A high tension line
  of 1100 K.V. also runs near the acquired land. This witness
  admitted that the land in question was full of residential
B potentialities. Reliance was also placed upon the statements
  of PW7 and PW8 in regard to the urbanization of the
  surrounding areas and the potential of the land in question for
  building construction and residential purposes.

C      4. Out of those 140 sale instances, sale instance at serial
  Nos. 109 and 110 are stated to be the sale deeds executed
  on 26th November, 1991 and 27th November, 1991, which
  were heavily relied upon by the Reference Court. The
  Reference Court vide its judgment-cum-award dated 12th May,
  1995 held application of belting system improper as entire
D land was acquired for one purpose, i.e. construction of
  Government Polytechnic Institute. It determined the market
  value of the land at the rate of Rs. 6,40,000 per bigha and
  after applying 20% deduction, enhanced compensation to flat
  rate of Rs. 5, 12,000 per bigha along with other statutory
E benefits.

        5. The State, aggrieved by the enhancement of
  compensation awarded to the claimants by the Reference
  Court, preferred appeals being First Appeal Nos. 920-921 of
F 2001, before the concerned High Court. The High Court vide
  its judgment dated 20th July, 2005, primarily accepted the
  findings recorded by the Reference Court on merits and
  merely raised the deduction from 20% to 33.33% thus
  awarding the compensation at the rate of • 4,26,667 per
G bigha. The High Court recorded a definite finding that the
  Reference Court was fully justified in setting aside the order
  of the SLAO applying belting system for determination of
  compensation in relation to the acquired land. It also did not
  consider it appropriate to rely upon the sale instances placed
  on record by the State and practically affirmed the findings of
'H
     TRISHALA JAIN AND ANR. v. STATE OF    539
UTTARANCHAL AND ANR. [SWATANTER KUMAR, J.]
the Reference Court including finding based upon sale            A
instances at serial Nos. 109 and 110 for determining the
market value of the acquired land. The High Court modified
the order of the Reference Court only by raising the deduction
on account of development charges and fixing of the final
amount of compensation as afore-indicated.                       B

     6. Against the above judgment of the High Court, Civil
 Appeal Nos.7498-7499 of 2005 have been preferred by the
 State of Uttaranchal while Civil Appeal Nos. 7496-7497 of
 2005 have been preferred by the claimants.
                                                                 c
 C.A. No. 1122 OF 2011

       7. Civil Appeal No. 1122 of 2011 has been preferred by
  the State of Uttaranchal against the judgment of the
  Uttaranchal High Court dated 9th March, 2006 passed in First D
  Appeal Nos. 918 and 919 of 2001. Vide that order the Court
  had primarily relied upon another judgment of the Division
  Bench of that Court passed in First Appeal Nos. 920-921 of
  2001 (in the case of State of U.P. through Collector,
  Dehradun v. Smt. Trish/a Jain) and awarded compensation E
  at the rate of Rs. 4,26,667 per bigha reducing the
· compensation of Rs. 5, 12,000 per bigha as awarded by the
i Reference Court. The High Court in this case had echoed in
  entirety the reasoning and compensation awarded by the
  other Bench in the case of Trisha/a Jain (supra). This judgment F
  of the High Court, impugned in Civil Appeal No. 1122 of
  2011, therefore has to be treated at parity for all intents and
  purposes with the impugned judgment in Civil Appeal Nos.
  7496-7497 of 2005 and Civil Appeal Nos. 7498-7499 of
 2005.
                                                                 G
 C.A. No. 3613 of 2008

     8. Civil Appeal No. 3613 of 2008 is directed against the
 judgment of the Uttaranchal High Court dated 11th May, 2006
 passed in First Appeal Nos. 60-63 of 2001. It is necessary      H
    540      SUPREME COURT REPORTS                  [2011] 8 S.C.R.


A for us to notice the facts giving rise to this appeal separately
  because there are certain distinguishing features with regard
  to factual matrix as well as evidence of this case. The land in
  question in this case also forms part of the 1and admeasuring
  12.85 acres sought to be acquired by the Notification dated
B 30th January, 1992 issued under Section 4(1) of the Act and
  is covered by the common award passed by the SLAO on
  8th June, 1993 awarding the compensation at the same rate
  as in other cases. The claimants herein made a separate
  reference under Section 18 of the Act and the Reference
c Court, in LA Case No. 121 of 1994, awarded compensation
  at the rate of Rs. 12,50,000 per acre (i.e. Rs. 2,38,095.24 per
  bigha approximately) in addition to granting other statutory
  benefits and interests. It needs to be noticed that the two sale
  instances at serial Nos. 109 and 110, which were the
  foundation of the judgment pronounced by the Reference
0
  Court in other cases, i.e. sale deeds dated 26th November,
  1991, and 27th November, 1991, had been rejected on the
  ground that they were not admissible in evidence as neither
  the vendor nor the vendee had been produced to prove the
  sale instances in Court. The Reference Court also noticed the
E contention raised on behalf of the State, i.e. these sale
  instances were collusive. It will be useful to refer to the relevant
  part of the judgment of the Reference Court which reads as
  under:

F               "The respondent No.2 have (sic) taken a special
          stand in his written statement that the sale deed executed
          by Sri Viresh Jain was forged and fictitious and collusive .
          and no reliance can be placed on such a sale deed. He
          has further argued that the judgment passed in L.A. Case
G         No. 386 of 1993 Smt. Trish/a Jain vs. Collector and
          another in such circumstances cannot be made the basis
          for awarding compensation in the present case. The rtno.
          2 has filed voluminous documents in support of their case
          that the sale deed executed by Sri Viresh Jain were
H         collusive and were made only to create evidence of hither
     TRISHALA JAIN AND ANR. v. STATE OF    541
UTTARANCHAL AND ANR. [SWATANTER KUMAR, J.}
      compensation. He has further filed various. documents, /J
     which supports the contention of the respondent no. 2 that
      Sri Dinesh Jain and Sri Viresh Jain themselves offered
    ·their 100 bigha of land in village phoolsani for the purpose
      of Government polytechnic. He has also filed documents
      and the copy of the Selection Committee in which Sri B
      Manoj Kumar Jain, Upkhand Adhikari, U.S.E.B. was a
      member, Sri Manoj Kumar Jain was examined as a
      witness. He was admitted that he is the brother in law of
      Sri Dinesh Jain and Sri Viresh Jain. He has also admitted
      that he was member of the selection committee which        c
      was to select the land for Government polytechnic.
      Various other documents were also filed by the
      respondent no. 2 vide which the signatures of Jinendra
     .Kumar Jain and Smt. Veena Kumar Jain were identified
 . .. by Sri Dinesh Jain. His sole concentration was that the
                                                                  0
      sale deed executed by Sri Viresh Jain was collusive and
      since Sri Manoj Kumar Jain was one of the member of
      the selection committee appointed for the acquisition of
      land for Government Polytechnic, the information was
      leaked to Sri Viresh Jain and, therefore, they manipulated E
      these two sale deeds by transferring the land to their near
      relations say the sister and the son of his BUA without ·
      passing valid consideration. The learned counsel for the
       respondent no. 2 has placed reliance on the law laid
      down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in AIR 1951 page
      (sic) 16 Yashvant Dearo vs. Jai Chand Ram Chand. It F
      is correct that the fraudulent motive or design is not
      capable of direct proof in most of the cases. Such
      intention could only be inferred. It is worthy to point out
      that the two sale deeds relied upon by the claimants
      executed by Sri Viresh Jain in favour of Sri Jinendra G
      Kumar Jain and Smt. Veena Kumar Jain have not be.en
      proved in accordance with law as laid down by the
      Hon'ble Supreme Court in as much as vendee or vendor
      of these sale deeds or any attesting 'witnesses have not
      been produced in evidence. Therefore, they cannot be H
     542       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                 [2011] 8 S.C.R.


A          made the basis of awarding of compensation in the
           present case. The judgment in L.A. Case No. 386 of
           1993 Smt. Trisha/a Jain v. Collector and another is under
           appeal and the entire matter with regard to the alleged
           collusive sale deed is yet to be thrashed out. Therefore,
B          it is not fair and justified for this court to comment upon
           these sale deeds. For the purpose of decision of this
           case it is only sufficient, if these two sale deeds are
           discard~d and if they are not considered and not made
           the basis for awarding compensation in these cases.
c          Therefore, it is held that these two sale deeds cannot be
           made basis for awarding any compensation, in the
           present case and the argument of the claimants fails in
           this respect."

       Having held thus, the Reference Court relied upon the
D sale instance at serial No. 108, out of 140 sale instances, of
  the list produced and proved by the SLAO. As per the sale
  instance at serial No. 108, a land admeasuring 0.90 acre was
  sold at the rate of Rs. 12,55,550.50 per acre on 29th
  November, 1991. Examining this document with other
E evidence on record, particularly statement of DW2, the
  Reference Court finally awarded ~ompensation at the rate of
  Rs. 12,50,000 per acre without applying any deduction.

       The claimants, aggrieved by the above judgment of the
F Reference Court dated 6th February, 2001, preferred an
  appeal before the Uttaranchal High Court. The High Court,
  vide its judgment dated 11th May, 2006, while referring to the
  different judgments of this Court as well as of different High
  Courts, opined that the Reference Court had fallen in error of
G law in not applying, to a certain extent, deduction from the
  market value determined by that court in accordance with law.
  The High Court did not interfere with the determination of the
  market value of the acquired land but applied a deduction of
  33.33% on such value and finally awarded compensation to
  the claimants at the rate of Rs. 8,33,334 per acre with other
fl
     TRISHALA JAIN AND ANR. v. STATE OF    543
UTTARANCHAL AND ANR. [SWATANTER KUMAR, J.]
statutory benefits and interests thereupon. Dissatisfied with      A
this judgment of the High Court reducing the compensation
awarded by the Reference Court, the claimants-Krishna Devi
and others have filed the present appeal before this Court.

Questions of Fact and Law that fall for Determination:             B
   9. On examination of the present appeals, the following
common questions arise for consideration of this Court:

      I.     Whether or not the belting system ought to have
             been applied for determination of fair market value   C
             of the acquired land?

      II.    What should be the just and fair market value of
             the acquired land on the date. of issuance of
             notification under Section 4 of the Act?
                                                                   D
      Ill.   Whether in the facts and circumstances of the
             present case there ought to be any deduction after
             determining the fair market value of the land?

      IV.    What compensation and benefits are the claimants      E
             entitled to?

Question No. 1.

       10. As already noticed, the SLAO, in all cases, while
.giving its award had applied the belting system and               F
•Categorizing the land into three different categories had
 awarded the compensation accordingly. However, the
!Reference Court had held that the land as a whole was
similarly placed and was surrounded by developed areas and
it was to be used for one purpose, i.e. construction of            G
 3overnment Polytechnic Institute, thus there was no question
 :>f applying the belting system. Keeping in view the
 -.:focumentary and oral evidence on record, the Reference
  ~ourt set aside the belting system and awarded uniform
  ~ompensation to all the claimants. This finding of the           H
    544     SUPREME COURT REPORTS               [2011) 8 S.C.R.

A   Reference Court was upheld by the High Court in the
    impugned judgments. The correctness of this concurrent view
    has also not been questioned by any of the parties in the
    present appeals before us. Therefore, concurrent finding
    recorded by the Courts below which remained unchallenged
B   before this Court need not be disturbed by this Court.

    Question No. II

          11. Now, we have to examine the most important question
    arising in the present appeal as to how this ·Court should
C determine the fair market value of the acquired land in the
    given facts and circumstances. First of all, we need to refer
    to the evidence that was produced by the parties in support
    of their respective claims. The principal evidence relied upon
    by the claimants.in all these cases are the two sale instances
D shown at serial Nos. 109 and 110. These were executed by
    Shri Viresh Jain, in favour of Jitendra Kumar and Smt. Veena
    Kum.ari, on 26th November, 1991 and 27th November, 1991
    respectively. These lands are situated in Khasra No. 39/2, a
    part of which was acquired under the same Notification. Under
E these sale deeds areas of 440.8 sq. yards and 283.3. sq.
    yards were sold at the rate of Rs. 32,72,603.49 and Rs.
    34,87,648.30 per acre respectively. The claimants in different
    cases examined themselves to prove these sale instances as
    a whole, as they are the main witnesses and the sale
F instances were also executed between themselves. It needs
    to be noticed that one of the purchasers and the seller are
    the claimants in the present appeals and the other purchaser
    is their close relative. According to the claimants, they were
    entitled to compensation on the basis of these two sale
G · instances. The claimants have also brought on record
    documents, viz., Exh.11. and Exh.12, which are the agreements
    signed between Trishala Jain.and one Vikram Singh Bangari,
    executed on 23rd April, 1991 for the purpose of leveling of'
    the land in question. Shri Bangari was examined as PW 6 who·
    submitted that he had completed the leveling work on or
H
     TRISHALA JAIN AND ANR. v. STATE OF    545
UTIARANCHAL AND ANR. [SWATANTER KUMAR, J.]
before 3rd February, 1992. Further, the testimony of PW7, A ,
according to the claimants, clearly shows that there was
urbanization all over the periphery of municipal limits and
building activities were increased even beyond the municipal
limits. Claimants have also relied upon other evidence
including the cross examination of DW 1, Ram Singh, who B
admitted that these sale deeds were unlikely to have been
executed at higher rate for enhancing the rate of compensation
of the acquired land. As we have already noticed, this witness
also gave the statement that towards the North of the acquired
land, there were several quarters of ITBP and there was 20 c
feet wide passage which ended on the acquired land. He
further stated that some shops are located in the South of the
acquired land across the road and facilities of schools and
post office are also available near the acquired land. On the
backdrop of this entire evidence, the claimants contended that D
the deduction applied by the High Court is not justified and .
their claim for compensation in line with the two sale instances
proved by them on record is to be upheld. According to them,
the sale instances produced by the SLAO were far away from
the acquired land and were not relevant or comparable E
instances.

     12. On the other hand, the SLAO, in his award, had
considered details of 140 sale instances executed over a
period from the Revenue Estate of the same Village. Most of
these sale instances were found to be not relevant by the       F
Reference Court. The SLAO had relied upon the sale deed
at Serial No.43 in which the land admeasuring 0.094 acres
had been sold by a registered sale deed on 10th June, 1991
for a sum of '92,000 giving the value of the land at the rate
of Rs. 9,78,732.40 per acre, and determined the market value    G
of the land acquired at that rate. When the matter came up
before the Reference Court for consideration; in all other
references except Reference No. 121 of 1994 titled as
Chamel Singh v. Collector, Dehradun, the Reference Court
had relied upon the two sale instances produced by the          H
   546      SUPREME COURT REPORTS                [2011) 8 S.C.R.


A claimants and awarded compensation at. the rate of Rs.
  5, 12,000 per bigha whiG:h was later reduced by the High Court
  to Rs. 4,26,667 per bigha. In the case of Chame/rSingh
  (supra), the Reference Court rejected these two sale instances
  at serial Nos. 109 and 110 as vendor or vendee had not been
B examined. It also noticed the allegation of the State that those
  sale deeds were not bona fide and have been executed only
  with the intention to enhance the value of the acquired land
  and as such declined to rely on them in its judgment. The
  Reference Court in that case also rejected the reliance placed
c by SLAO upon sale deed at serial No. 43 for determining the
  market value of acquired land and instead relied upon the sale
  instance at serial No. 108 where the land admeasuring about
  0.90 acres was sold on 29th November, 1991 at the rate of
  Rs. 12,55,550.50 per acre. After discussing the evidence at
  some detail, the Reference Court awarded the compensation
D to the claimants at the rate of Rs.12,50,000 per acre without
  making any deduction from such market v;:1lue. In appeal the 1
  High Court, however, applied a deduction of 33.33% andll
  awarded compensation to the claimants at the rate of Rs.
  8,33,334 per acre. From the above factual matrix the first
E question that requires consideration of this Court is whether
  the Reference Court was justified in law with reference to the
  facts on record in declining to consider the two sale instances
  produced by the claimants at serial Nos. 109 and 110. In other
  words, was it justified on part of the Reference Court to keep
F them outside the zone of consideration while determining the
  market value of the acquired land?

       13. Firstly, it cannot be disputed that both the seller and
  the purchaser in sale instances at serial Nos. 109 and 110
G are either claimants in different claim petitions or belong to
  the same family. The sale deed is stated to be.executed by
  Sh. Viresh Jain in favour of Jitender Kumar Jain and Smt.
  Veena Kumari Jain (sister of Sh. Viresh Jain). Veena Kumari
  Jain has described herself as wife of M. Kumar who appears
H to be Sh. Manoj Kumar Jain, who was examined as a witness
      TRISHALA JAIN AND ANR. v. STATE OF    547
 UTTARANCHAL AND ANR. [SWATANTER KUMAR, J.]
  as he was a Member of the Selection Committee dealing with           A
. the acquisition of the land for the purpose of construction of
  Government Polytechnic Institute. In his examination he
  admitted that he was brother-in-law of Sh. Viresh Jain. As a
  member of that Committee he had a definite role to play in
  selection of the land for that purpose. In other words, the          B
  claimants had full knowledge of acquisition of land and as well      '

  as the purpose for which the said land was sought to be
  acquired. With respect we reiterate the view expressed by this
  Court in the case of Yeshwant Deorao Deshmukh v.
  Walchand Ramchand Kothari [(1950) 1 SCR 852] that a                  c
  fraudulent move or design is not capable of direct proof in
  most cases; it can only be inferred. Under such circumstances,
  the Court has to take a general view keeping in mind the facts
  and circumstances of the case with particular reference to the
  intent of parties, their action in furtherance thereto and the       D
  object sought to be achieved by them.

      14. It ,is not in dispute that these sale deeds have been
 executed in favour of the family members or persons known
 to the claimants. These are circumstances and evidence
 which clearly indicate that the sale instances relied upon by         E
 the claimants are result of collusion between these parties.
 There was clear attempt on the part of the claimants to
 execute sale deeds for the purpose of hiking up land price
 just before acquisition to get more compensation. These two
 sale instances which have been executed just about two                F
 months prior to the issuance of the notification under Section
 4(1) stand out as transactions which are sham, collusive, lack
 bona fide and have been executed with the intention to raise
 the price of the land in question with the pretence of it being
 actual market value. We are unable to find any infirmity in this      G
 view of the Reference Court in LA Case No. 121 of 1994
 which has rightly been upheld by the High Court.

     15. It will be appropriate at this stage to notice that in C.A.
 Nos. 7498-99 of 2005 a specific ground has been taken by              H
   548      SUPREME COURT REPORTS                 [2011] 8 S.C.R.

A the State that the High Court erred in not considering the
  application of State filed under Order XLI Rule 27 of the Code
  of Civil Procedure, 1908 during pendency of First Appeal Nos.
  920 and 921 of 2000 to lead additional evidence to show that
  the sale deeds relied upon by the Reference Court in LA Case
B No. 386 of 1993 and accepted by the High Court were
  collusive and the claimants had prior knowledge of the
  impending acquisition proceedings. This additional evidence
  is basically related to the facts which have already been
  mentioned by us while discussing the facts of C.A No. 3613
c of 2008. In that application, it was specifically stated that Smt.
  Veena Kumari is sister of one of the claimants, i.e. Viresh
  Jain and she is wife of Manoj Kumar Jain, who was member
  of the Selection Committee aforereferred and these facts had
  duly been verified from the local police station vide letter dated
0 11th September, 1996. However, this application appears to
  have been rejected by the High Court without recording any
  appropriate reasons in support thereof. In view of the peculiar
  fact that the Reference Court, in its award in L.A. Case No.
  121 of 1994 which is subject matter before us in C.A. No.
  3613 of 2008, has noticed this entire evidence in great detail,
E it can hardly be contended that the application has rightly been
  rejected by the High Court. In our opinion, the High Court
  should have allowed this application particularly when the
  entire evidence sought to be produced by way of additional
  evidence challenged the very basis of the judgment of the High
F Court. In view of these peculiar facts we need not discuss this
  issue at any greater length and according to us the facts
  stated in that application can be examined by this Court as
  they are already part of the judicial record in C.A. No. 3613
  of 2008, which has been listed for hearing along with other
G appeals and all these appeals have been heard together.

       16. Corollary to the discussion under this head is the
  question that whether the Reference Court, in LA Case No.
  121 of 1994, was right in law in rejecting the two sale
H instances for the reason that vendor or vendee had not been
      -~HALA JAIN AND ANR. v. STATE OF                    549
UTTA~HAL AND ANR. [SWATANTER KUMAR, J.]                           .
examined to prove them in Court and thus these sale A
instances were inadmissible in evidence. While recording
such a finding the Reference Court had relied upon the·
judgment of this Court in the case of A.P. State Road
Transport Corporation, Hyderabad v. P. Venkaiah, ((1997) 10
sec 128}. This issue need not detain us any further as it is B
no longer res integra that the judgment of this Court in the
above case has been overruled. by a Constitution Bench of
this Court in the case of Cement Corporation of India v.
Purya, ((2004) 8 SCC 270). Thus, in our view, these two sale
instances cannot be rejected on that ground after the dictum          c
of the Constitution Bench in the above case. Though, this
observation is subject to the other findi11_gs recorded by us in
this judgment.                                        ,

      17. A Bench of this Court in the case of Chimanlal
Hargovinddas (supra) stated that the Court while tackling the         D
problem of valuation of the land under acquisition should
necessarily make some general observations. Explaining the
factors, which must be etched on the mental screen while
performing such exercise, this Court specifically held, "o-nly
genuine instances have to be taken into consideration                 E
(sometimes instances are rigged up in anticipation of
acquisition of land)". Further, this Court in the case of State
of Haryana v. Ram Singh ((2001) 6 SCC 254], has reiterated
this principle and held, "It is open to the Court to accept the
certified copy as the reliable evidence and without examining         F
parties to the documents. This does not however, preclude the
Court from rejecting the transaction itself as being malafide
or sham provided such a challenge is already before the
Court".
                                                                      G
Question No. Ill

     18. The law with regard to applying the principle of
deduction to the determined market value of the acquired land
is quite consistent, though, of course, the extent of deduction
                                                                      H
     550      SUPREME COURT REPORTS                 [2011] 8 S.C.R.


  A has varied very widely depending on the              fal
    circumstances of a given case. In other words, it is not
                                                                and

    possible to state precisely the exact deduction which could be
    made uniformly applicable to all the cases. Normally the rule
    stated by this Court consistently, in its different judgments, is
· B that deduction is to be applied on account of carrying out
    development activities like providing roads or civic amenities
    such as electricity, water etc. when the land has been acquired
    for construction of residential, commercial or institutional
    projects. It shall also be applied where the sale instances
  c (exemplars) relate to smaller pieces of land and in comparison
    the acquisition relates to a large tract of land. In addition
    thereto, deduction can also be applied on account of wastage
    of land. This Court in the case of Land Acquisition Officer,
    Kammarapally Village v. Nookala Rajamal/u [(2003) 12
  D SCC 334], had also observed that it is advisable to apply
    some deduction on account of exemplars of plots of smaller
    size relied upon by way of evidence by the parties. This is
    the normal rule stated by the Court but is not free of
    exceptions.

E       19. Similarly, it is neither possible nor appropriate to
  stricto sensu define a class of cases where the Court would
  not apply any deduction. This again would be dependant upon
  the facts and circumstances of a given case. The cases where
  the acquired land itself is fully developed and has all essential
F amenities, before acquisition, for the purpose for which it is
  acquired requiring no additional expenditure for its
  development, falls under the purview of cases of 'no
  deduction'. Furthermore, where the evidence led by the parties
  is of such instances where the compensation paid is
G comparable, i.e. exemplar lands have all the features
  comparable to the proposed acquired land, including that of
  size, is another category of cases where principle of 'no 1
  deduction' may be applied. These may be the cases where
  least or no deduction could be made. Such cases are
H exceptional and/or rare as normally the lands which are
     TRISHALA JAIN AND ANR. v. STATE OF    551
UTTARANCHAL AND ANR. [SWATANTER KUMAR, J.]

proposed to be acquired for development purposes would be               A .
agricultural lands and/or semi or haphazardly developed lands
at the time of issuance of notification under Section 4(1) of
the Act, which is the relevant time to be taken into
consideration for all purposes and intents for determining the
market value of the land in question.                                   B

     20. This Court in the case of Bhagwathula Samanna &
Ors v. Special Tahsildar & Land Acquisition Officer, ((1991)
4 sec 506], stated that it is permissible to take into account
of exemplars of even small developed plots for determining
value of a large tract of land acquired, if the latter is al.so fully   C
developed with all facilities requiring little or no further
development. In the facts and circumstances of that case the
Court felt that it was not appropriate to resort to deduction of
1/3rd value of the comparable sale instances as development
charges. The Court reiterated the general rule that if market           D
value of a large property is to be fixed· on the basis of a sale
transaction for smaller property, a deduction is to be made
taking into consideration the expenses required for
development of that larger tract and make smaller plots within
that area and held as under :                                           E

     "8. In awarding compensation in acquisition proceedings,
     the Court has necessarily to determine the market value
      of the land as on the date of the relevant Notification. It
      is useful to consider the value paid for similar land at the
                                                                        F
      material time under genuine transactions. The market
      value envisages the price which a willing purchaser may
      pay under bona.fide transfer to a willing seller. The land
      value can differ depending upon the extent and nature of
      the land sold. A fully developed small plot in an important       G
      locality may fetch a higher value than a larger· area in an
      undeveloped condition and situated in a remote locality.
    . By comparing the price shown in the transactions all
      variables have to be taken into consideration. The
      transaction in regard to smaller property cannot, therefore,
                                                                        H
    552       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                 [2011] 8 S.C.R.


A         be taken as a real basis for fixing the compensation for
          larger tracts of property. In fixing the ma.rket value of a
          large property on the basis of a sale transaction for
          smaller property, generally a deduction is given taking
          into consideration the expenses required for development
B         of the larger tract to make smaller plots within that area
          in order to compare with the small plots dealt with under
          the sale transaction. This principle has been stated by this
          Court in Tribeni Devi's case (supra).

          11. The principle of deduction in the land value covered
c         by the comparable sale is thus adopted in order to arrive
          at the market value of the acquired land. In applying the
          principle it is necessary to consider all relevant facts. It
          is not the extent of the area covered under the
          acquisition, the only relevant factor. Even in the vast area
D         there may be land which is fully developed having all
          amenities and situated in an advantageous position. If
          smaller area within the large tract is already developed
          and suitable for building purposes and have in its vicinity
          roads, drainage, electricity, communications etc. t~n the
E         principle of deduction simply for the reason that it is part
          of the large tract acquired, may not be justified.

          13. The proposition that large area of land cannot possibly
          fetch a price at the same rate at which small plots are
          sold is not absolute proposition and in given
F
          circumstances it would be permissible to take into
          account the price fetched by the small plots of land. If the
          larger tract of land because of advantageous position is
          capable of being used for the purpose for which the
          smaller plots are used and is also situated in a developed
G         area with little or no requirement of further development,
          the principle of deduction of the value for purpose of
          comparison is not warranted."

       It is thus evident from the above enunciated principle that
H the acquired land has to be more or less developed land as
     J"RISHALA JAIN AND ANR. v. STATE OF   553
UTIARANCHAL AND ANR. [SWATANTER KUMAR, J.)
its developed surrounding areas, with all amenities and             A
facilities and is fit to be used for the purpose for which it is
acquired without any further expenditure, before such land could
be considered for no deduction. Similarly the sale instances
even of smaller plots could be considered for determining the
market value of a larger chunk of land with some deduction          8
unless, there was comparability in potential, utilisation,
amenities and infrastructure with hardly any distinction. On such
principles each case would have to be considered on its own
merits.

     21. This Court, depending on the facts and circumstances C
of each given case, has taken the view that deduction on
account of expenses of development of the sites could vary
from 10% to 86.33% depending on the nature of the land, its
situation, the purpose and stage of development. Reference
can be made to the cases of K. S. Shivadevamma v. D
Assistant Commissioner and Land A.cqusition Officer ((1996)
2 SCC 62), Ram Piari v. Land Acquisition Collector, Solan
((1996) 8 SCC 338), Chimanlal Hargovinddas v. Special
Land Acquisition Officer, Poona [(1988) 3 sec 751 ],
Hasanali Walimchand (Dead) by L · v. State of Maharashtra E
[(1998) 2 sec 388J.

    In K.S. Shivadevamma (supra), this Court held as under:

    "10. It is then contended that 53% is not automatic but
    depends upon the nature of the development and the F
    stage of development. We are inclined to agree with the
    learned counsel that the extent of deduction depends
    upon development need in each case. Under the Building
    Rules 53% of land is required to be left out. This Court
    has laid as a general rule that for laying the roads and G
    other amenities 33-1/3% is required to be deducted.
    Where the development has already taken place,
    appropriate deduction needs to be made. In this case, we
    do not find any development had taken :Place as on that
                                              ~
                                                                    H
    554       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                  [2011] 8 S.C.R.


A         date. When we are determining compensation under
          Section 23(1 ), as on the date of notification under
          Section 4(1), we have to consider the situation of the land
          development, if already made, and other relevant facts as
          on that date. No doubt, the land possessed potential
B         value, but no development had taken place as on the
          date, In view of the obligation on the part of the owner to
          hand over the land to the City Improvement Trust for roads
          and for other amenities and his requirement to expend
          money for laying the roads, water supply mains, electricity
          etc., the deduction of 53% and further deduction towards
c
          development charges @ 33-1/3%, ordered by the High
          Court, was not illegal."

       Thus, a deduction of 53% was given on account of
  Building Rules and a further deduction of 33.33% on account
D of development charges on the fact of that case, amounting
  to a total of 86.33% deduction. The above view was reiterated
  in the case of Nookala Rajamallu (supra).

         22. On similar lines, this Court in the case of V.
E   Hanumantha Reddy (Deceased) by LRS v. Land Acquisition
    Officer & Manda/ R. Officer [(2003) 12 SCC 642], while
    considering that the acquired land was adjacent to developed
    land, held that neither its high potentiality nor its proximity to
    a developed land can be a ground for not deducting the
F   development charges and that normally 1/3rd deduction could
    be allowed.

       23. Though in the case of Bhagwathu/a Samanna (supra)
  referring to the peculiar facts of the case, this Court observed
  that it was not necessary to make any deduction, the
G consistent view taken by this Court is that normally deduction
  has to be made. In the cases above mentioned this Court has
  directed to make deduction ranging from 20% to 86.33%.

      24. The learned Counsel for the claimants relied upon the
H judgment of this Court in the case of Atma Singh v. State of
     TRISHALA JAIN AND ANR. v. STATE OF    555
UTTARANCHAL AND ANR. [SWATANTER KUMAR, J.]
Haryana [(2008) 2 SCC 568), to contend that even if             A
exemplars of small plots are tendered in evidence,. the
deduction cannot be more than 10%. He contended that the
Reference Court as well as the High Court both have fallen
in error of law in applying the deduction of 20% and 33.33%
respectively. In this judgment, this Court clearly observed that B
the price fetched for sm.all plots cannot form safe basis for
valuation of large tracts of land as substantial area is used
for development of sites by providing various facilities for
which expenses are also incurred; such amount, which normally
would vary from 20% onwards depending upon the facts of         c
each case, should be deducted. However, in that case the
land had been acquired for setting up a sugar factory which,
for its efficient running, may also require part of the land to
be used for construction of residential colonies for the staff
working in the factory. The sugar factory that was sought to D
be constructed on the acquired land was to carry on its
business. to make profits. The Court noticed that earlier the
by-products of a sugar factory like molasses were treated as
waste and its disposal itself was a problem. However, with
the passage of time and scientific developments, such by- E
products are being used for production of Alcohol and Ethanol
which added to the profits. It was in these circumstances that
Court was of the view that it was not a case for higher
deduction and discounted only 10% from the determined
market value of the acquired land. Thus the claimants cannot
derive any advantage to contend that there should not be any F
deduction in this case. Reliance by them was also placed
upon the judgment of this Court in the case of Charan Dass
v. Himachal Pradesh Housing & Urban Development Authority
[(2010) 13 sec      398). In that case the Court was concerned
with the question that whether deduction of 40% from the G
market value determined by the High Court towards
development charges was justified or not. This Court held that
where the acquired land falls in the amidst of an already
developed land with amenities of roads, electricity etc.,
deduction on this account may not be warranted. At the same H
    556     SUPREME COURT REPORTS                 [2011] 8 S.C.R.


A time it also held that where all civic and other amenities are
  yet to be provided to make the land suitable for building
  purposes or when under the local building regulations setting
  apart some portion of the lands for sanctioning common
  facilities is mandatory, an appropriate deduction may be
B justified. Referring to the facts of that case, this Court
  permitted deduction of 30% as development charges from the
  market value of the land.

       25. In the present case, there is evidence on record to
C show that plotting has been done only on part of the acquired
  land and the land is surrounded by colonies like ITBP etc. but,
  there is no evidence to show that the acquired land itself is
  developed and is having all the required facilities and
  amenities. It may be a case where less deduction may be
  applied but certainly it is not a case of 'no deduction'. It also
D cannot be believed, in the absence of specific documentary
  evidence, that no further development is required on the
  acquired land. The claimants, on whom the onus lies to prove
  inadequacy of compensation have not even stated that
  whether under the relevant laws they are expected to leave
E any part of their land open when they are permitted to raise
  construction on the land in question. Under these
  circumstances, we are unable to find any infirmity in the
  approach of the High Court in applying the principle of
  deduction. In our opinion a deduction of 10% from the market
F value on account of development charges and other possible
  expenditures would be justifiable and called for in the facts and
  circumstances of the present case.

    Question No. IV:
G Determination of Compensation
    Application of principle of guesstimate for determining
    the amount of compensation to be awarded for the land
    acquired under the Act
H
     TRISHALA JAIN AND ANR. v. STATE OF    557
UTIARANCHAL AND ANR. [SWATANTER KUMAR, J.]
     26. Acquisition of land is an act falling in the purview of     A
eminent domain of the State. It essentially relates to the
concept of compulsory acquisition:as opposed to voluntary
sale. It is trite that no person can be deprived of his property
save by authority of law in terms of Article 300A of the
Constitution of India. The provisions of the Act provide a           8
complete mechanism for 'deprivation of property in
accordance with the law' as stated under the Act. Justifiability
and fairness of such compensation is subject to judicial review
within the confines of the four corners of the Act. Once the
lands are acquired under the Act, the persons interested
therein are entitled to compensation as per the provisions of        C
the Act. Thus, in the present case the land in question has
been acquired under the provisions of a law which specifically
provide that acquisition can only be for a public purpose and
upon payment of compensation to the claimants in accordance
with law. The compensation payable to the claimants has to           D
be computed in terms of Sections 23 and 24 of the Act. The
market value of the land has to be determined at the date of
the publication of the notification under Section 4(1) of the Act,
after taking into consideration what is stated under Sections
23(1), 23(1A), 23(2) and excluding the considerations stated         E
under Section 24 of the Act. More often than not, it is not
possible to fix the compensation with exactitude or arithmetic
accuracy. Depending on the facts and circumstances of the
case, the Court may have to take recourse to some
guesswork while determining the fair market value of the land        F
and the consequential amount of compensation that is
required to be paid to the persons interested in the acquired
land.

      27. 'Guess' as understood in its common parlance is an         G
·estimate without any specific information while 'calculations'
 are always made with reference to specific data. 'Guesstimate'
•is an estimate based on a mixture of guesswork and
•calculations and it is a process in itself. At the same time
 'guess' cannot be treated synonymous to 'conjecture'. 'Guess'
                                                                     H
    558       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                   [2011) 8 S.C.R.


A by itself may be a statement or result based on unknown
  factors while 'conjecture' is made with a very slight amount
  of knowledge, which is just sufficient to incline the scale of
  probability. 'Guesstimate' is with higher certainty than mere
  'guess' or a 'conjecture' per se.
B
       28. The concept of 'guesswork' is not unknown to various
  fields of law. It has been applied in cases relating to
  insurance, taxation, compensation under the Motor Vehicles
  Act as well as under the Labour Laws. All that is required from
  a Court is that such guesswork has to be used with greater
C element of caution and within the determinants of law declared
  by the Legislature or by the Courts from time to time. In the
  case of Charan Dass (supra) this Court on the use of
  guesswork for determining compensation, has held as under:-

D         "10. Section 15 of the Act mandates that in determining
          the amount of compensation, the Collector shall be
          guided by the provisions contained ,in Sections 23 and
          24 of the Act. Section 23 provides that in determining the
          amount of compensation to be awarded for the land
E         acquired under the Act, the Court shall, inter alia, take into
          consideration the market value of the land at the date of
          the publication of the Notification under Section 4 of the
          Act. The Section contains the list of positive factors and
          Section 24 has a list of negatives, vis-a-vis the land under
          acquisition, to be taken into consideration while
F
          determining the amount of compensation. As already
          noted, the first step being the determination of the market
          value of the land on the date of publication of Notification
          under Sub-section (1) of Section 4 of the Act. One of the
          principles for determination of the market value of the
G         acquired land would be the price that a willing purchaser
          would be willing to pay if it is sold in the open market at
          the time of issue of Notification under Section 4 of the
          Act. But finding direct evidence in this behalf is not an
          easy task and, therefore, the Court has to take recourse
H
     TRISHALA JAIN AND ANR. v. STATE OF    559
UTIARANCHAL AND ANR. [SWATANTER KUMAR, J.]

    to other known methods for arriving at the market value      A
    of the land acquired. One of the preferred and well
    accepted methods adopted for ascertaining the market
    value of the land in acquisition cases is the sale
    transactions on or about the date of issue of Notification
    under Section 4 of the Act. But here again finding a         B
    transaction of sale on or a few days before the said
    Notification is not an easy exercise. In the absence of
    such evidence contemporaneous transactions in respect
    of the lands, which have similar advantages and
    disadvantages is considered as a good piece of               c
    evidence for determining the market value of the acquired
    land. It needs little emphasis that the contemporaneous
    transactions ·or the comparable sales have to be in
    respect of lands which are contiguous to the acquired
    land and are similar in nature and potentiality. Again, in   D
    the absence of sale deeds, the judgments and awards
    passed in respect. of acquisition of lands, made in the
    same village and/or neighbouring villages can be
    accepted as valid piece of evidence and provide a sound
    basis to work out the market value of the land after
    suitable adjustments with regard to positive and negative    E
    factors enumerated in $ections 23 and 24 of the Act.
    Undoubtedly, an element of some guess work is
    involved in the entire exercise, yet the authority charged
    with the duty to award compensation is bound to make
    an estimate judged by an objective standard.                 F

                                         (emphasis supplied)

     29. Even in the case of Thakur Kamta Prasad Singh
(Dead) through LRs v. State of Bihar [(1976) .3 SCC 772),        G
this Court had held that there is an element of guesswork
inherent in most cases involving determination of the market
value of the acquired land and observed as under:

    "6. Section 23 of the Act provides that in determining the
                                                                 H
    560      SUPREME COURT REPORTS                  (2011) 8 S.C.R.


A         amount of compensation to be awarded for land
          acquisition under the Act the court shall inter alia take
          into consideration the market value of the land at the date
          of the publication of the notification under Section 4 of
          the Act. Market value means the price that a willing
B         purchaser would pay to a willing seller for the property
          having due regard to its existing condition with all its
          existing advantages and its potential possibilitie.s when
          laid out in the most advantageous manner excluding any
          advantages due to the carrying out of the scheme for
c         which the property is compulsorily acquired. In
          considering market value the disinclination of the vendor
          to part with his land and the urgent necessity of the
          purchaser to buy should be disregarded. There is an
          element of guesswork inherent in most cases involving
D         determination of the market value of the acquired land,
          but this in the very nature of things cannot be helped. The
          essential thing is to keep in view the relevant factors
          prescribed by the Act. If the judgment of the High Court
          reveals that it has taken into consideration the relevant
          factors, its assessment ot the fair market value of the
E         acquired land should not be disturbed. No such infirmity
          has been brought to our notice as might induce us to
          disturb the finding of the High Court. The appeal
          consequently fails and is dismissed but in the
          circumstances without costs."
F
        30. Similar view was taken by another Bench of this Court
  in the case of Special Land Acquisition Officer v. Karigowda
  [(2010) 5 SCC 708) where this Court held, "the Court is
  entitled to apply some amount of reasonable guesswork to
G balance the equities and fix a just and fair market value in
  terms of the parameters specified under Section 23 of the
  Act."

      31. The observations made by this Court in a case under
H the Central Excise Valuation Rules, 1975 titled as
     TRISHALA JAIN ANO ANR. v. STATE OF    561
UTTARANCHAL AND ANR. [SWATANTER KUMAR, J.]
Commissioner of Central Excise, Jaipur v. Rajasthan                 A
Spinning and Weaving Mills Ltd. [2007 (12) SCR 703), can
be aptly referred to at this stage wherein this Court had held
that valuation is not an exact science and some amount of
guesswork exists in valuation. Different methods for valuation
are prescribed by Valuation Rules which may be applied by           B ·
the Department but it has to be ultimately ascertained by
applying the rule of convergence, the estimated ad valorem
value of which would constitute the base of the assessable
value.                             ·

      32. Under the Act, as settled· by various judgments of this   C
 Court, there are different methods of computation of
compensation payable to the claimants, for example it can be
based upon comparable sale instances, awards and
judgments relating to the similar or comparable lands, method
of averages, yearly yields with reference to the revenue earned     D
by the land etc. Whatever method of determining the
compensation is applied by the court, its result should always
be reasonable, just and fair as that is the purpose sought to
be achieved under the scheme of the Act. For attaining that
purpose, application of some guesswork may be necessary             E
 but this principle would have hardly any application in a case
of no evidence. In other words, where the parties have not
 brought on record any evidence, then the court will not be in
 a position to award compensation merely on the baSi$ of
 imagination, .conjecture etc.                                      F

     33. These precedents clearly demonstrate that the Court
may apply some. guesswork before it could arrive at a final
determination, which is in consonance with the statutory law
as well as the principles stated in the judicial pronouncements.    G
As already noticed, the guesswork has to be used. for
determination of compensation with greater element of caution
and the principle of guesstimation will have no application to
the case of 'no evidence'. This principle is only intended to
bridge the gap between the calculated compensation and the          H
    562       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                   [2011) 8 S.C.R.


A   actual compensation that the claimants may be entitled to
    receive as per the facts of a given case to meet the ends of
    justice. It will be appropriate for us to state certain principles
    controlling the application of 'guesstimate:

          (a) Wherever the evidence produced by the parties is not
B
          sufficient to determine the compensation with exactitude,
          this principle can be resorted to.

          (b) Discretion of the court in applying guesswork to the
          facts of a given case is not unfettered but has to be
c         reasonable and should have a connection to the data on
          record produced by the parties by way of evidence.
          Further, this entire exercise has to be within the limitations
          specified under Sections 23 and 24 of the Act and
          cannot be made in detriment thereto.
D
        34. Applying these principles to the facts of the present
    case, we have to take recourse to the 'principle of
    guesstimation' inasmuch as it is essential for fixation of fair
    market value of the land which shall be the basis for
E   determining the compensation payable to the claimants. Now,
    we will discuss the evidence led by the parties in that behalf.

       35. All the claimants in the present appeals have primarily
  relied upon the sale instances shown at serial Nos. 109 and
  110. These sale instances were not relied upon by the SLAO
F while making the award and were also rejected by the
  Reference Court in LA Case No.121 of 1994. This view of
  the Reference Court was upheld by the High Court vide its
  judgment in First Appeal Nos. 60-63 of 2001 which is subject
  matter of the appeal before this Court in C.A. No. 3613 of
G 2008. We have 'already noticed that as per these sale
  instances the value of the land comes to a rate of Rs.
  32,72,603 and Rs. 34,87,648 per acre respectively. While
  accepting the concurrent view of the Reference Court and the
  High Court subject matter of CA No. 3613 of 2008, we have
H already held that.these sale instances are liable to be ignored
     TRISHALA JAIN AND ANR. v. STATE OF    563
UTIARANCHAL AND ANR. [SWATANTER KUMAR, J.]
and have rightly been ignored by the Courts. below. Besides       A
the fact that these sale deeds are executed. between the
members of the family, the claimants had. full knowledge of the
Government's intention to acquire these lands, for the purpose
specified, even prior to issuance of notificatioh under Section
4(1) of the Act through Mr. M.K. Jain. These are reasons          8
enough to doubt the consideration paid in these sale deeds.

         36. The SLAO, in his Award, has taken note of 140 sale
  instances immediately preceding the issuance of Notification
  under Section 4(1) of the Act. The Reference Court, in LA C
  Case No. 121 of 1994, specifically recorded that the highest
 value reflected in these 140 sale instances is Rs. 12,55,550.50
.per acre, except in sale instances at serial Nos. 109 and 110
,produced by the claimants. It is interesting to note that the
•claimants did not produce any other evidence except these
·two sale instances which had been executed between the D
•members of the family and contained unreasonably high price
rof the land. There is tremendous gap between the prices of
•the land fetched in all other sale deeds on one hand, the
!highest being Rs. 12,55,550.50 per acre and that in sale
rdeeds executed by the claimants between themselves on the E
iother hand which is Rs. 34,87,648 per acre, for sales effected
.within a span of 2-3 days for similarly situated lands in the
 isame village. It certainly arouses suspicion in the mind of the
 Court as to the intention behind execution of these sale deeds.
 Ex facie they appear to have been executed to hike up the F
 iprice of the land just before the issuance of Notification under.
 !Section 4(1) of the Act. If considered from the point of view
 -:>f a reasonable man, all these circumstances clearly fall
 -Jeyond the ambit of coincidence and appear to have been .
    managed' to achieve the end of receiving higher G
  -:::ompensation. In light of these facts and the reasons already
   ·ecorded, we have no hesitation in holding that the sale
    nstances at serial Nos. 109 and 11 O produced by the
   :::laimants are liable to be ignored for the purposes of fixation
   Jf market value of the acquired land as these transactions are H
    564     SUPREME COURT REPORTS               [2011] 8 S.C.R.
                          '

A sham and lack bona fide.

        37. The SLAO, in his award had relied upon sale
   instance shown at serial No. 43 and had therefore determined
  the market value of the land at the rate of · 9, 78, 723.40 per
8 acre (i.e. Rs. 1,86,423.50 per bigha approximately). The
  compensation awarded on the basis of the above market
  value and by applying belting system was not accepted by the
   Reference Court. The Reference Court in LA Case No. 121
  of 1994, instead relied upon sale deed,at serial No. 108 where
C the land was sold at the rate of Rs. :12,55,550.50 per acre
  on 29th November, 1991, i.e. even subsequent to the sale
  instances relied upon by the claimants. The Reference Court
  had therefore awarded compensation at the rate of Rs.
   12,50,000 per acre which was reduced by the High Court to
  Rs. 8 ,33,334 after applying a deduction of 33.33%.
D
        38. The Reference Court, in LA Case Nos. 386 of 1993,
  had determined the market value of the land at a rate of-Rs:-
  6,40,000 per bigha (i.e. Rs. 33,60,000 per acre approximately)
  and after applying a deduction of 20% awarded compensation
E at the rate of Rs. 5,12,000 per bigha. This was reduced further
  by the High Court by increasing the deduction from 20% to
  33.33% and therefore awarding a sum of Rs. 4,26,667 per
  bigha (i.e. · 22,40,001.80 per acre) as compensation. The two
  exhibits produced by the claimants were the sole basis for
F awarding compensation to the claimants in this line of cases.
  These exhibits offend the very essence of the parameters
  stated under Section 23 of the Act as defined by this Court
  in the case of Ram Singh (supra). Thus, the view taken by the
  Reference Court and the High Court, which is subject matter
G of C.A. No. 3613 of 2008, rejecting these instances as
  collusive and sham is liable to be sustained.

        39. The judgment of the Reference Court and that of the
  High Court in these cases, accepting the sale instances under
  serial Nos. 109 and 110, cannot be sustained in law and is
H liable to be set aside. However, as it appears from the record
     TRISHALA JAIN AND ANR. v. STATE OF    565
UTTARANCHAL AND ANR. [SWATANTER KUMAR, J.]
the earlier judgments of the Division Benches of the High A
Court in First Appeal Nos. 920-921 of 2001, dated 20th July,
2005, and in First Appeal Nos. 918-919 of 2001, dated 09th
March, 2006 were not brought to the notice of the Division '·
Bench of the High Court which pronounced the judgments in
First Appeal Nos. 60-63 of 2001, dated 11th May, 2006.       B

      40. Now, after we have rejected the sale instances at           "
                                                                      . '

serial Nos. 109 and 110, we have to consider what
compensation the claimants are entitled to receive in
accordance with other evidence on record. The sale instance
shown at serial No. 108 is certainly an exemplar which can C
be taken into consideration. This is a sale deed executed on
29th November, 1991 where a land admeasuring 0.90 acFes
has been sold at a rate of Rs. 12,55,550.50 per acre. As far
as the location and potential of this land is concerned, we
may refer straightaway to the award of the Reference Court, D
in LA Case No. 121 of 1994, where it referred to the
statement of PW1, Sh. Gyan Swarup, stating that the land
which was subject matter of this sale deed is situated at a
distance of 1Y2 furlong of the acquired land in the same village. ~
It is the case of the claimants in all these appeals that the E
acquired land is surrounded by developed areas like ITBP
Colony on the North and there was a 20 feet wide passage
ending on the acquired land. Facilities of post office,
electricity, hospital, schools etc. were available in those
colonies which are very close to the acquired land. The F
Reference Courts, in their respective awards, have also
noticed that heavy construction activity was going on nearby
Shimla Road and the value of this land is continuously rising.

     41. Another relevant piece of evidence with reference to
potential and location of the land is the statement of PW-4 G
Girdhari Lal Arora, noticed in the judgment of the Reference
Court in L.A. Case No. 386 if 1993, who is an Architect by
profession. He claims to have visited the site and made plans
to divide the land in question into plots after making provision
                                                                 H
    566      SUPREME COURT REPORTS                    [2011) 8 S.C.R.


A for civic amenities, children park etc. In these circumstances,
  it is difficult to doubt that the land in question has substantial
  potential and is located adjacent to developed areas. He
  further stated, "In the year 1992 the value of the land around,
  the acquired land was · six to 6.50 lacs per bigha and
B thereafter there had been a slump in the prices of the land".
  Statement of this witness has to be given its due value as
  nothing controversial appears to have come in evidence in his
  cross-examination. According to this witness, there has been
  a decreasing trend in the value of the land in that area. The
C declaration under Section 6 was issued in April, 1992 itself
  at a time when the prices had started falling ..

       42. The cumulative effect of the documentary and oral
  evidence on record is that it is a case of acquisition -of land
  which is situated on a reasonably good location surrounded
D by developed areas having civic amenities and facilities and
  further development activity was going on in nearby areas. It
  was also submitted by the claimants that plotting has already
  been done on the acquired land and some plots of land have
  been sold immediately prior to the issuance of the Notification
E under Section 4(1) of the Act. It is evident that the land
  acquired had the potential of being developed for residential
  or institutional purposes and as already noticed, the same was
  acquired for construction of a Government Polytechnic Institute.
  Therefore, it is a case where the Court should apply minimal
F deduction which will meet the ends of justice and would help
  in determining just and fair compensation for the land in
  question. We are of the considered view that 10% deduction
  from the market value of the acquired land would meet the
  ends of justice.
G        43. It is not in dispute before us that sale instance at serial
     No. 108 falls in the Revenue Estate of the same Village and
    ~as recorded by the Reference Court, in LA Case No. 121 of
     1994, it is situated at a distance of 1Y:i furlong from the
    acquired land. The acquired land belonging to the claimants
H
     TRISHALA JAIN AND ANR. v. STATE OF    567
UTTARANCHAL AND ANR. [SWATANTER KUMAR, J.]
forms part of Khasra No.39/2 while, in the same Reveue              A
Estate, the sale instance at serial No. 108 is part of Khasra
No. 410. Thus a sale deed related to a land in such proximity
of time and distance cannot be said to be incomparable sale
instance, i.e. it has to be taken as a comparable sale
instance. Though it relates to the sale of a smaller plot of land   B
but is certainly bigger than the land sold by the claimants
between themselves. Its location and potential, if not identical
in absolute terms, is certainly comparable for the purposes of
determining market value of the land in question. It is a well
established principle that the value of sale of small pieces of     c
land can be taken into consideration for determining even the
value of a large tract of land but with a rider that the Court
while taking such instances into consideration has to make
some deduction keeping in view other attendant
circumstances and facts of that particular case. We have            D
already held that keeping in view the surrounding developed
areas and location and potential of the land it will meet the
ends of justice if 10% deduction is made from the estimated
market value of the acquired land.

      44. The comparable sale instance under serial No. 108         E
depicted the fair value of land in that area at the time of
issuance of Notification under Section 4(1) of the Act which
is Rs. 12,55,550.50 per acre. The time gap between this sale
instance and issuance of said Notification is merely two
months which would hardly call for any increase in the said         F
value but to balance the equities between the parties we would
round off the figure to Rs. 13,00,000 per acre. By applying
the principle of guesstimate, thus, we determine the market
value of the acquired land at Rs. 13,00,000 per acre as on
the date of the issuance of the Notification under Section 4(1)     G
of the Act. Deducting 10% therefrom, it would come to Rs.
 11, 70,000 per acre which will be the compensation payable
to the claimants with statutory benefits and interests thereupon
 in accordance with law;
                                                                    H
    568       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                   (2011] 8 S.C.R.


A        45. Ergo, for the reasons aforerecorded, we pass the
    following orders in the appeals, subject matter of the present
    judgment:

          (i) The Civil Appeal No. 3613 of 2008, the appeal
8         preferred by the claimants Krishna Devi and Others, is
          partially accepted and the judgment of the High Court
          impugned in this appeal is modified to the extent that the
          claimants would be entitled to receive compensation at
          the rate of Rs .. 11, 70,000 per acre with interests and other
          statutory benefits permissible under the law.
c
          (ii) Civil Appeal Nos. 7498-7499 of 2005 preferred by the
          State of Uttaranchal are partially accepted and the
          compensation payable to the claimants is reduced from
          Rs. 22,40,001.80 per acre to Rs. 11,70,000 per acre.
D         The claimants would be entitled to interest and all
          statutory benefits permissible under the law.

          (iii) Civil Appeal No. 1122 of 2011 preferred by the State
          of Uttaranchal is partially accepted and the compensation
          payable to the claimants is reduced from Rs.
E
          22,40,001.80 per acre to Rs. 1~,70,000 per acre. The
          claimants would be entitled to interest and all statutory
          benefits permissible under the law.

          (iv) Civil appeal Nos. 7496-7497 of 2005 preferred by the
F         other claimants are dismissed without any order as to
          costs.

    8.8.B.                                     Appeals disposed of.